<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git, branch v4.19.150</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.150</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.150'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-10-07T06:00:09+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 4.19.150</title>
<updated>2020-10-07T06:00:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-07T06:00:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a1b977b49b66c75e6c51a515f6700371ae720217'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a1b977b49b66c75e6c51a515f6700371ae720217</id>
<content type='text'>
Tested-by: Jon Hunter &lt;jonathanh@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing &lt;lkft@linaro.org&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201005142108.650363140@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ctnetlink: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum</title>
<updated>2020-10-07T06:00:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will McVicker</name>
<email>willmcvicker@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-24T19:38:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=289fe546ea16c2dcb57c5198c5a7b7387604530e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:289fe546ea16c2dcb57c5198c5a7b7387604530e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1cc5ef91d2ff94d2bf2de3b3585423e8a1051cb6 upstream.

The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So
check the tuple's family, e.g. l3num, when creating the conntrack in
order to prevent an OOB memory access during setup.  Here is an example
kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than
NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.

Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:...
Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121)
CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S      W  O    4.14.180-g051355490483
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM
task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121
pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
...
Call trace:
__cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468
nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258
ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228
ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4
netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184
nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180
netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770
netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4
___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c
SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108
el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38

This crash is not happening since 5.4+, however, ctnetlink still
allows for creating entries with unsupported layer 3 protocol number.

Fixes: c1d10adb4a521 ("[NETFILTER]: Add ctnetlink port for nf_conntrack")
Signed-off-by: Will McVicker &lt;willmcvicker@google.com&gt;
[pablo@netfilter.org: rebased original patch on top of nf.git]
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ep_create_wakeup_source(): dentry name can change under you...</title>
<updated>2020-10-07T06:00:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-24T23:41:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ced8ce5d2157142c469eccc5eef5ea8ad579fa5e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ced8ce5d2157142c469eccc5eef5ea8ad579fa5e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3701cb59d892b88d569427586f01491552f377b1 upstream.

or get freed, for that matter, if it's a long (separately stored)
name.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>epoll: EPOLL_CTL_ADD: close the race in decision to take fast path</title>
<updated>2020-10-07T06:00:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-10T12:33:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=90ef231ba534d43033884b8560df26e608ca0a21'/>
<id>urn:sha1:90ef231ba534d43033884b8560df26e608ca0a21</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fe0a916c1eae8e17e86c3753d13919177d63ed7e upstream.

Checking for the lack of epitems refering to the epoll we want to insert into
is not enough; we might have an insertion of that epoll into another one that
has already collected the set of files to recheck for excessive reverse paths,
but hasn't gotten to creating/inserting the epitem for it.

However, any such insertion in progress can be detected - it will update the
generation count in our epoll when it's done looking through it for files
to check.  That gets done under -&gt;mtx of our epoll and that allows us to
detect that safely.

We are *not* holding epmutex here, so the generation count is not stable.
However, since both the update of ep-&gt;gen by loop check and (later)
insertion into -&gt;f_ep_link are done with ep-&gt;mtx held, we are fine -
the sequence is
	grab epmutex
	bump loop_check_gen
	...
	grab tep-&gt;mtx		// 1
	tep-&gt;gen = loop_check_gen
	...
	drop tep-&gt;mtx		// 2
	...
	grab tep-&gt;mtx		// 3
	...
	insert into -&gt;f_ep_link
	...
	drop tep-&gt;mtx		// 4
	bump loop_check_gen
	drop epmutex
and if the fastpath check in another thread happens for that
eventpoll, it can come
	* before (1) - in that case fastpath is just fine
	* after (4) - we'll see non-empty -&gt;f_ep_link, slow path
taken
	* between (2) and (3) - loop_check_gen is stable,
with -&gt;mtx providing barriers and we end up taking slow path.

Note that -&gt;f_ep_link emptiness check is slightly racy - we are protected
against insertions into that list, but removals can happen right under us.
Not a problem - in the worst case we'll end up taking a slow path for
no good reason.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>epoll: replace -&gt;visited/visited_list with generation count</title>
<updated>2020-10-07T06:00:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-10T12:30:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ff329915a5b1f6778344a6fc7b060c991376b095'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ff329915a5b1f6778344a6fc7b060c991376b095</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 18306c404abe18a0972587a6266830583c60c928 upstream.

removes the need to clear it, along with the races.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>epoll: do not insert into poll queues until all sanity checks are done</title>
<updated>2020-10-07T06:00:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-10T02:25:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3e3bbc4d23eeb90bf282e98c7dfeca7702df3169'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3e3bbc4d23eeb90bf282e98c7dfeca7702df3169</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f8d4f44df056c5b504b0d49683fb7279218fd207 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/packet: fix overflow in tpacket_rcv</title>
<updated>2020-10-07T06:00:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Or Cohen</name>
<email>orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-04T04:05:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1c3886dc302329f199cc04f8a56ba44d17a0df16'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1c3886dc302329f199cc04f8a56ba44d17a0df16</id>
<content type='text'>
commit acf69c946233259ab4d64f8869d4037a198c7f06 upstream.

Using tp_reserve to calculate netoff can overflow as
tp_reserve is unsigned int and netoff is unsigned short.

This may lead to macoff receving a smaller value then
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr), and if po-&gt;has_vnet_hdr
is set, an out-of-bounds write will occur when
calling virtio_net_hdr_from_skb.

The bug is fixed by converting netoff to unsigned int
and checking if it exceeds USHRT_MAX.

This addresses CVE-2020-14386

Fixes: 8913336a7e8d ("packet: add PACKET_RESERVE sockopt")
Signed-off-by: Or Cohen &lt;orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ snu: backported to pre-5.3, changed tp_drops counting/locking ]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Nuernberger &lt;snu@amazon.com&gt;
CC: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
CC: Amit Shah &lt;aams@amazon.com&gt;
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: don't rely on system state to detect hot-plug operations</title>
<updated>2020-10-07T06:00:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Laurent Dufour</name>
<email>ldufour@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-26T04:19:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b6f69f72c15d7f973f5709c5351f378f235b3654'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b6f69f72c15d7f973f5709c5351f378f235b3654</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f85086f95fa36194eb0db5cd5c12e56801b98523 upstream.

In register_mem_sect_under_node() the system_state's value is checked to
detect whether the call is made during boot time or during an hot-plug
operation.  Unfortunately, that check against SYSTEM_BOOTING is wrong
because regular memory is registered at SYSTEM_SCHEDULING state.  In
addition, memory hot-plug operation can be triggered at this system
state by the ACPI [1].  So checking against the system state is not
enough.

The consequence is that on system with interleaved node's ranges like this:

 Early memory node ranges
   node   1: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000011fffffff]
   node   2: [mem 0x0000000120000000-0x000000014fffffff]
   node   1: [mem 0x0000000150000000-0x00000001ffffffff]
   node   0: [mem 0x0000000200000000-0x000000048fffffff]
   node   2: [mem 0x0000000490000000-0x00000007ffffffff]

This can be seen on PowerPC LPAR after multiple memory hot-plug and
hot-unplug operations are done.  At the next reboot the node's memory
ranges can be interleaved and since the call to link_mem_sections() is
made in topology_init() while the system is in the SYSTEM_SCHEDULING
state, the node's id is not checked, and the sections registered to
multiple nodes:

  $ ls -l /sys/devices/system/memory/memory21/node*
  total 0
  lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root     0 Aug 24 05:27 node1 -&gt; ../../node/node1
  lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root     0 Aug 24 05:27 node2 -&gt; ../../node/node2

In that case, the system is able to boot but if later one of theses
memory blocks is hot-unplugged and then hot-plugged, the sysfs
inconsistency is detected and this is triggering a BUG_ON():

  kernel BUG at /Users/laurent/src/linux-ppc/mm/memory_hotplug.c:1084!
  Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp pseries_rng rng_core vmx_crypto gf128mul binfmt_misc ip_tables x_tables xfs libcrc32c crc32c_vpmsum autofs4
  CPU: 8 PID: 10256 Comm: drmgr Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #25
  Call Trace:
    add_memory_resource+0x23c/0x340 (unreliable)
    __add_memory+0x5c/0xf0
    dlpar_add_lmb+0x1b4/0x500
    dlpar_memory+0x1f8/0xb80
    handle_dlpar_errorlog+0xc0/0x190
    dlpar_store+0x198/0x4a0
    kobj_attr_store+0x30/0x50
    sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0x90
    kernfs_fop_write+0x1b0/0x290
    vfs_write+0xe8/0x290
    ksys_write+0xdc/0x130
    system_call_exception+0x160/0x270
    system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c

This patch addresses the root cause by not relying on the system_state
value to detect whether the call is due to a hot-plug operation.  An
extra parameter is added to link_mem_sections() detailing whether the
operation is due to a hot-plug operation.

[1] According to Oscar Salvador, using this qemu command line, ACPI
memory hotplug operations are raised at SYSTEM_SCHEDULING state:

  $QEMU -enable-kvm -machine pc -smp 4,sockets=4,cores=1,threads=1 -cpu host -monitor pty \
        -m size=$MEM,slots=255,maxmem=4294967296k  \
        -numa node,nodeid=0,cpus=0-3,mem=512 -numa node,nodeid=1,mem=512 \
        -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm0,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=0,memdev=memdimm0,id=dimm0,slot=0 \
        -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm1,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=0,memdev=memdimm1,id=dimm1,slot=1 \
        -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm2,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=0,memdev=memdimm2,id=dimm2,slot=2 \
        -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm3,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=0,memdev=memdimm3,id=dimm3,slot=3 \
        -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm4,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=1,memdev=memdimm4,id=dimm4,slot=4 \
        -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm5,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=1,memdev=memdimm5,id=dimm5,slot=5 \
        -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm6,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=1,memdev=memdimm6,id=dimm6,slot=6 \

Fixes: 4fbce633910e ("mm/memory_hotplug.c: make register_mem_sect_under_node() a callback of walk_memory_range()")
Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour &lt;ldufour@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador &lt;osalvador@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" &lt;rafael@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Nathan Lynch &lt;nathanl@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Scott Cheloha &lt;cheloha@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915094143.79181-3-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: replace memmap_context by meminit_context</title>
<updated>2020-10-07T06:00:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Laurent Dufour</name>
<email>ldufour@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-26T04:19:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=25eaea1b33f2569f69a82dfddb3fb05384143bd0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:25eaea1b33f2569f69a82dfddb3fb05384143bd0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c1d0da83358a2316d9be7f229f26126dbaa07468 upstream.

Patch series "mm: fix memory to node bad links in sysfs", v3.

Sometimes, firmware may expose interleaved memory layout like this:

 Early memory node ranges
   node   1: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000011fffffff]
   node   2: [mem 0x0000000120000000-0x000000014fffffff]
   node   1: [mem 0x0000000150000000-0x00000001ffffffff]
   node   0: [mem 0x0000000200000000-0x000000048fffffff]
   node   2: [mem 0x0000000490000000-0x00000007ffffffff]

In that case, we can see memory blocks assigned to multiple nodes in
sysfs:

  $ ls -l /sys/devices/system/memory/memory21
  total 0
  lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root     0 Aug 24 05:27 node1 -&gt; ../../node/node1
  lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root     0 Aug 24 05:27 node2 -&gt; ../../node/node2
  -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 online
  -r--r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 phys_device
  -r--r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 phys_index
  drwxr-xr-x 2 root root     0 Aug 24 05:27 power
  -r--r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 removable
  -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 state
  lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root     0 Aug 24 05:25 subsystem -&gt; ../../../../bus/memory
  -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:25 uevent
  -r--r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 valid_zones

The same applies in the node's directory with a memory21 link in both
the node1 and node2's directory.

This is wrong but doesn't prevent the system to run.  However when
later, one of these memory blocks is hot-unplugged and then hot-plugged,
the system is detecting an inconsistency in the sysfs layout and a
BUG_ON() is raised:

  kernel BUG at /Users/laurent/src/linux-ppc/mm/memory_hotplug.c:1084!
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp pseries_rng rng_core vmx_crypto gf128mul binfmt_misc ip_tables x_tables xfs libcrc32c crc32c_vpmsum autofs4
  CPU: 8 PID: 10256 Comm: drmgr Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #25
  Call Trace:
    add_memory_resource+0x23c/0x340 (unreliable)
    __add_memory+0x5c/0xf0
    dlpar_add_lmb+0x1b4/0x500
    dlpar_memory+0x1f8/0xb80
    handle_dlpar_errorlog+0xc0/0x190
    dlpar_store+0x198/0x4a0
    kobj_attr_store+0x30/0x50
    sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0x90
    kernfs_fop_write+0x1b0/0x290
    vfs_write+0xe8/0x290
    ksys_write+0xdc/0x130
    system_call_exception+0x160/0x270
    system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c

This has been seen on PowerPC LPAR.

The root cause of this issue is that when node's memory is registered,
the range used can overlap another node's range, thus the memory block
is registered to multiple nodes in sysfs.

There are two issues here:

 (a) The sysfs memory and node's layouts are broken due to these
     multiple links

 (b) The link errors in link_mem_sections() should not lead to a system
     panic.

To address (a) register_mem_sect_under_node should not rely on the
system state to detect whether the link operation is triggered by a hot
plug operation or not.  This is addressed by the patches 1 and 2 of this
series.

Issue (b) will be addressed separately.

This patch (of 2):

The memmap_context enum is used to detect whether a memory operation is
due to a hot-add operation or happening at boot time.

Make it general to the hotplug operation and rename it as
meminit_context.

There is no functional change introduced by this patch

Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour &lt;ldufour@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador &lt;osalvador@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" &lt;rafael@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Nathan Lynch &lt;nathanl@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Scott Cheloha &lt;cheloha@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915094143.79181-1-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915132624.9723-1-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: Restore __latent_entropy attribute on net_rand_state</title>
<updated>2020-10-07T06:00:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thibaut Sautereau</name>
<email>thibaut.sautereau@ssi.gouv.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-02T15:16:11+00:00</published>
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[ Upstream commit 09a6b0bc3be793ca8cba580b7992d73e9f68f15d ]

Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") broke compilation and was temporarily fixed by Linus in
83bdc7275e62 ("random32: remove net_rand_state from the latent entropy
gcc plugin") by entirely moving net_rand_state out of the things handled
by the latent_entropy GCC plugin.

From what I understand when reading the plugin code, using the
__latent_entropy attribute on a declaration was the wrong part and
simply keeping the __latent_entropy attribute on the variable definition
was the correct fix.

Fixes: 83bdc7275e62 ("random32: remove net_rand_state from the latent entropy gcc plugin")
Acked-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Emese Revfy &lt;re.emese@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thibaut Sautereau &lt;thibaut.sautereau@ssi.gouv.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
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