kernel/linux.git, branch v4.14.51

Linux 4.14.51

2018-06-20T19:03:02+00:00

tcp: do not overshoot window_clamp in tcp_rcv_space_adjust()

2018-06-20T19:03:02+00:00

commit 02db55718d53f9d426cee504c27fb768e9ed4ffe upstream. While rcvbuf is properly clamped by tcp_rmem[2], rcvwin is left to a potentially too big value. It has no serious effect, since : 1) tcp_grow_window() has very strict checks. 2) window_clamp can be mangled by user space to any value anyway. tcp_init_buffer_space() and companions use tcp_full_space(), we use tcp_win_from_space() to avoid reloading sk->sk_rcvbuf Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Acked-by: Wei Wang Acked-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Benjamin Gilbert Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Btrfs: make raid6 rebuild retry more

2018-06-20T19:03:02+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8810f7517a3bc4ca2d41d022446d3f5fd6b77c09 ] There is a scenario that can end up with rebuild process failing to return good content, i.e. suppose that all disks can be read without problems and if the content that was read out doesn't match its checksum, currently for raid6 btrfs at most retries twice, - the 1st retry is to rebuild with all other stripes, it'll eventually be a raid5 xor rebuild, - if the 1st fails, the 2nd retry will deliberately fail parity p so that it will do raid6 style rebuild, however, the chances are that another non-parity stripe content also has something corrupted, so that the above retries are not able to return correct content, and users will think of this as data loss. More seriouly, if the loss happens on some important internal btree roots, it could refuse to mount. This extends btrfs to do more retries and each retry fails only one stripe. Since raid6 can tolerate 2 disk failures, if there is one more failure besides the failure on which we're recovering, this can always work. The worst case is to retry as many times as the number of raid6 disks, but given the fact that such a scenario is really rare in practice, it's still acceptable. Signed-off-by: Liu Bo Signed-off-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Btrfs: fix scrub to repair raid6 corruption

2018-06-20T19:03:02+00:00

[ Upstream commit 762221f095e3932669093466aaf4b85ed9ad2ac1 ] The raid6 corruption is that, suppose that all disks can be read without problems and if the content that was read out doesn't match its checksum, currently for raid6 btrfs at most retries twice, - the 1st retry is to rebuild with all other stripes, it'll eventually be a raid5 xor rebuild, - if the 1st fails, the 2nd retry will deliberately fail parity p so that it will do raid6 style rebuild, however, the chances are that another non-parity stripe content also has something corrupted, so that the above retries are not able to return correct content. We've fixed normal reads to rebuild raid6 correctly with more retries in Patch "Btrfs: make raid6 rebuild retry more"[1], this is to fix scrub to do the exactly same rebuild process. [1]: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10091755/ Signed-off-by: Liu Bo Signed-off-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "Btrfs: fix scrub to repair raid6 corruption"

2018-06-20T19:03:01+00:00

This reverts commit d91bb7c6988bd6450284c762b33f2e1ea3fe7c97. This commit used an incorrect log message. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Reported-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: kexec: fix kdump register saving on panic()

2018-06-20T19:03:01+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2d7b3c64431245c95b05a441669c074da10db943 ] When a panic() occurs, the kexec code uses smp_send_stop() to stop the other CPUs, but this results in the CPU register state not being saved, and gdb is unable to inspect the state of other CPUs. Commit 0ee59413c967 ("x86/panic: replace smp_send_stop() with kdump friendly version in panic path") addressed the issue on x86, but ignored other architectures. Address the issue on ARM by splitting out the crash stop implementation to crash_smp_send_stop() and adding the necessary protection. Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: 8758/1: decompressor: restore r1 and r2 just before jumping to the kernel

2018-06-20T19:03:01+00:00

[ Upstream commit f2ae9de019e4e2807d812ec4fe1df7c34788a0a0 ] The hypervisor setup before __enter_kernel destroys the value sotred in r1. The value needs to be restored just before the jump. Fixes: 6b52f7bdb888 ("ARM: hyp-stub: Use r1 for the soft-restart address") Signed-off-by: Łukasz Stelmach Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: 8753/1: decompressor: add a missing parameter to the addruart macro

2018-06-20T19:03:01+00:00

[ Upstream commit e07e3c33b9c0b5751ade624f44325c9bf2487ea6 ] In commit 639da5ee374b ("ARM: add an extra temp register to the low level debugging addruart macro") an additional temporary register was added to the addruart macro, but the decompressor code wasn't updated. Fixes: 639da5ee374b ("ARM: add an extra temp register to the low level debugging addruart macro") Signed-off-by: Łukasz Stelmach Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

efi/libstub/arm64: Handle randomized TEXT_OFFSET

2018-06-20T19:03:01+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4f74d72aa7067e75af92fbab077e6d7d0210be66 ] When CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_TEXT_OFFSET=y, TEXT_OFFSET is an arbitrary multiple of PAGE_SIZE in the interval [0, 2MB). The EFI stub does not account for the potential misalignment of TEXT_OFFSET relative to EFI_KIMG_ALIGN, and produces a randomized physical offset which is always a round multiple of EFI_KIMG_ALIGN. This may result in statically allocated objects whose alignment exceeds PAGE_SIZE to appear misaligned in memory. This has been observed to result in spurious stack overflow reports and failure to make use of the IRQ stacks, and theoretically could result in a number of other issues. We can OR in the low bits of TEXT_OFFSET to ensure that we have the necessary offset (and hence preserve the misalignment of TEXT_OFFSET relative to EFI_KIMG_ALIGN), so let's do that. Reported-by: Kim Phillips Tested-by: Kim Phillips [ardb: clarify comment and commit log, drop unneeded parens] Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6f26b3671184c36d ("arm64: kaslr: increase randomization granularity") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518140841.9731-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

parisc: Move setup_profiling_timer() out of init section

2018-06-20T19:03:01+00:00

[ Upstream commit 01f56832cfb6fcc204e7203f46841b6185ebd574 ] No other architecture has setup_profiling_timer() in the init section, thus on parisc we face this section mismatch warning: Reference from the function devm_device_add_group() to the function .init.text:setup_profiling_timer() Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman