<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git, branch v4.14.127</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.127</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.127'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2019-06-17T17:52:45+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 4.14.127</title>
<updated>2019-06-17T17:52:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-17T17:52:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e861d0673eb8dc9b616269f70bf8a07d7524877e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e861d0673eb8dc9b616269f70bf8a07d7524877e</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: enforce tcp_min_snd_mss in tcp_mtu_probing()</title>
<updated>2019-06-17T17:52:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-16T00:47:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f2aa4f1a05e0987e812809dbc489bd294fdae5ae'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f2aa4f1a05e0987e812809dbc489bd294fdae5ae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 967c05aee439e6e5d7d805e195b3a20ef5c433d6 upstream.

If mtu probing is enabled tcp_mtu_probing() could very well end up
with a too small MSS.

Use the new sysctl tcp_min_snd_mss to make sure MSS search
is performed in an acceptable range.

CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Bruce Curtis &lt;brucec@netflix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: add tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl</title>
<updated>2019-06-17T17:52:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-16T00:44:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=cd6f35b8421ff20365ff711c0ac7647fd70e9af7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cd6f35b8421ff20365ff711c0ac7647fd70e9af7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5f3e2bf008c2221478101ee72f5cb4654b9fc363 upstream.

Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
SYN/ACK messages.

This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
overhead.

Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.

In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
to a saner value.

We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
reasons.

Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
in commit c39508d6f118 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
from 64 to 88.

We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.

CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Bruce Curtis &lt;brucec@netflix.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits</title>
<updated>2019-06-17T17:52:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-16T00:40:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9daf226ff92679d09aeca1b5c1240e3607153336'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9daf226ff92679d09aeca1b5c1240e3607153336</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f070ef2ac66716357066b683fb0baf55f8191a2e upstream.

Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender
to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory
usage and/or overflow 32bit counters.

TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes,
so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting
of retransmit queue.

A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP
did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded.

Note that this counter might increase in the case applications
use SO_SNDBUF socket option to lower sk_sndbuf.

CVE-2019-11478 : tcp_fragment, prevent fragmenting a packet when the
	socket is already using more than half the allowed space

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Bruce Curtis &lt;brucec@netflix.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs</title>
<updated>2019-06-17T17:52:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-16T00:31:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d632920554c5aec81d8a79c23dac07efcbabbd54'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d632920554c5aec81d8a79c23dac07efcbabbd54</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff upstream.

Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :

	BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) &lt; pcount);

This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48

An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.

This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)-&gt;tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.

Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.

CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)-&gt;tcp_gso_segs

Backport notes, provided by Joao Martins &lt;joao.m.martins@oracle.com&gt;

v4.15 or since commit 737ff314563 ("tcp: use sequence distance to
detect reordering") had switched from the packet-based FACK tracking and
switched to sequence-based.

v4.14 and older still have the old logic and hence on
tcp_skb_shift_data() needs to retain its original logic and have
@fack_count in sync. In other words, we keep the increment of pcount with
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) to later used that to update fack_count. To make it
more explicit we track the new skb that gets incremented to pcount in
@next_pcount, and we get to avoid the constant invocation of
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) all together.

Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Bruce Curtis &lt;brucec@netflix.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: reduce tcp_fastretrans_alert() verbosity</title>
<updated>2019-06-17T17:52:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-06T05:21:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b2ea53195d020f0ddd712c176eb2efcf8981a0bf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b2ea53195d020f0ddd712c176eb2efcf8981a0bf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8ba6ddaaf86c4c6814774e4e4ef158b732bd9f9f upstream.

With upcoming rb-tree implementation, the checks will trigger
more often, and this is expected.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Amit Shah &lt;amit@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux 4.14.126</title>
<updated>2019-06-15T09:55:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-15T09:55:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a74d0e937a3acaea08ec0a7bfa047b8e0a6b6303'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a74d0e937a3acaea08ec0a7bfa047b8e0a6b6303</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: seq: Cover unsubscribe_port() in list_mutex</title>
<updated>2019-06-15T09:55:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-12T09:37:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6351d118c8c9a7deb71d86aee8efff2264777b6d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6351d118c8c9a7deb71d86aee8efff2264777b6d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7c32ae35fbf9cffb7aa3736f44dec10c944ca18e upstream.

The call of unsubscribe_port() which manages the group count and
module refcount from delete_and_unsubscribe_port() looks racy; it's
not covered by the group list lock, and it's likely a cause of the
reported unbalance at port deletion.  Let's move the call inside the
group list_mutex to plug the hole.

Reported-by: syzbot+e4c8abb920efa77bace9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drm: don't block fb changes for async plane updates</title>
<updated>2019-06-15T09:55:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helen Koike</name>
<email>helen.koike@collabora.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-03T16:56:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ff8386d94855909d0a0d6cf0489bd0c3c7cfbacb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ff8386d94855909d0a0d6cf0489bd0c3c7cfbacb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 89a4aac0ab0e6f5eea10d7bf4869dd15c3de2cd4 upstream.

In the case of a normal sync update, the preparation of framebuffers (be
it calling drm_atomic_helper_prepare_planes() or doing setups with
drm_framebuffer_get()) are performed in the new_state and the respective
cleanups are performed in the old_state.

In the case of async updates, the preparation is also done in the
new_state but the cleanups are done in the new_state (because updates
are performed in place, i.e. in the current state).

The current code blocks async udpates when the fb is changed, turning
async updates into sync updates, slowing down cursor updates and
introducing regressions in igt tests with errors of type:

"CRITICAL: completed 97 cursor updated in a period of 30 flips, we
expect to complete approximately 15360 updates, with the threshold set
at 7680"

Fb changes in async updates were prevented to avoid the following scenario:

- Async update, oldfb = NULL, newfb = fb1, prepare fb1, cleanup fb1
- Async update, oldfb = fb1, newfb = fb2, prepare fb2, cleanup fb2
- Non-async commit, oldfb = fb2, newfb = fb1, prepare fb1, cleanup fb2 (wrong)
Where we have a single call to prepare fb2 but double cleanup call to fb2.

To solve the above problems, instead of blocking async fb changes, we
place the old framebuffer in the new_state object, so when the code
performs cleanups in the new_state it will cleanup the old_fb and we
will have the following scenario instead:

- Async update, oldfb = NULL, newfb = fb1, prepare fb1, no cleanup
- Async update, oldfb = fb1, newfb = fb2, prepare fb2, cleanup fb1
- Non-async commit, oldfb = fb2, newfb = fb1, prepare fb1, cleanup fb2

Where calls to prepare/cleanup are balanced.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.14+
Fixes: 25dc194b34dd ("drm: Block fb changes for async plane updates")
Suggested-by: Boris Brezillon &lt;boris.brezillon@collabora.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Helen Koike &lt;helen.koike@collabora.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon &lt;boris.brezillon@collabora.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas &lt;nicholas.kazlauskas@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon &lt;boris.brezillon@collabora.com&gt;
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190603165610.24614-6-helen.koike@collabora.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "drm/nouveau: add kconfig option to turn off nouveau legacy contexts. (v3)"</title>
<updated>2019-06-15T09:54:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-13T07:36:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9091d4924476b50f5587f4524504a3748b68a794'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9091d4924476b50f5587f4524504a3748b68a794</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 140ae656e3b7476719a2b15b96527c73c5acf90b which is
commit b30a43ac7132cdda833ac4b13dd1ebd35ace14b7 upstream.

Sven reports:
	Commit 1e07d63749 ("drm/nouveau: add kconfig option to turn off nouveau
	legacy contexts. (v3)") has caused a build failure for me when I
	actually tried that option (CONFIG_NOUVEAU_LEGACY_CTX_SUPPORT=n):

	,----
	| Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready  (#1)
	|   Building modules, stage 2.
	|   MODPOST 290 modules
	| ERROR: "drm_legacy_mmap" [drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau.ko] undefined!
	| scripts/Makefile.modpost:91: recipe for target '__modpost' failed
	`----

	Upstream does not have that problem, as commit bed2dd8421 ("drm/ttm:
	Quick-test mmap offset in ttm_bo_mmap()") has removed the use of
	drm_legacy_mmap from nouveau_ttm.c.  Unfortunately that commit does not
	apply in 5.1.9.

The ensuing discussion proposed a number of one-off patches, but no
solid agreement was made, so just revert the commit for now to get
people's systems building again.

Reported-by: Sven Joachim &lt;svenjoac@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch&gt;
Cc: Dave Airlie &lt;airlied@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Backlund &lt;tmb@mageia.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
