kernel/linux.git, branch v4.14.118

Linux 4.14.118

2019-05-10T15:53:15+00:00

arm64: futex: Bound number of LDXR/STXR loops in FUTEX_WAKE_OP

2019-05-10T15:53:15+00:00

commit 03110a5cb2161690ae5ac04994d47ed0cd6cef75 upstream. Our futex implementation makes use of LDXR/STXR loops to perform atomic updates to user memory from atomic context. This can lead to latency problems if we end up spinning around the LL/SC sequence at the expense of doing something useful. Rework our futex atomic operations so that we return -EAGAIN if we fail to update the futex word after 128 attempts. The core futex code will reschedule if necessary and we'll try again later. Cc: Fixes: 6170a97460db ("arm64: Atomic operations") Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

locking/futex: Allow low-level atomic operations to return -EAGAIN

2019-05-10T15:53:15+00:00

commit 6b4f4bc9cb22875f97023984a625386f0c7cc1c0 upstream. Some futex() operations, including FUTEX_WAKE_OP, require the kernel to perform an atomic read-modify-write of the futex word via the userspace mapping. These operations are implemented by each architecture in arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() and futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(), which are called in atomic context with the relevant hash bucket locks held. Although these routines may return -EFAULT in response to a page fault generated when accessing userspace, they are expected to succeed (i.e. return 0) in all other cases. This poses a problem for architectures that do not provide bounded forward progress guarantees or fairness of contended atomic operations and can lead to starvation in some cases. In these problematic scenarios, we must return back to the core futex code so that we can drop the hash bucket locks and reschedule if necessary, much like we do in the case of a page fault. Allow architectures to return -EAGAIN from their implementations of arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() and futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(), which will cause the core futex code to reschedule if necessary and return back to the architecture code later on. Cc: Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ASoC: Intel: avoid Oops if DMA setup fails

2019-05-10T15:53:15+00:00

commit 0efa3334d65b7f421ba12382dfa58f6ff5bf83c4 upstream. Currently in sst_dsp_new() if we get an error return from sst_dma_new() we just print an error message and then still complete the function successfully. This means that we are trying to run without sst->dma properly set up, which will result in NULL pointer dereference when sst->dma is later used. This was happening for me in sst_dsp_dma_get_channel(): struct sst_dma *dma = dsp->dma; ... dma->ch = dma_request_channel(mask, dma_chan_filter, dsp); This resulted in: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 IP: sst_dsp_dma_get_channel+0x4f/0x125 [snd_soc_sst_firmware] Fix this by adding proper error handling for the case where we fail to set up DMA. This change only affects Haswell and Broadwell systems. Baytrail systems explicilty opt-out of DMA via sst->pdata->resindex_dma_base being set to -1. Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

UAS: fix alignment of scatter/gather segments

2019-05-10T15:53:15+00:00

commit 3ae62a42090f1ed48e2313ed256a1182a85fb575 upstream. This is the UAS version of 747668dbc061b3e62bc1982767a3a1f9815fcf0e usb-storage: Set virt_boundary_mask to avoid SG overflows We are not as likely to be vulnerable as storage, as it is unlikelier that UAS is run over a controller without native support for SG, but the issue exists. The issue has been existing since the inception of the driver. Fixes: 115bb1ffa54c ("USB: Add UAS driver") Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections

2019-05-10T15:53:15+00:00

commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream. The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for BR/EDR connections as well. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow

2019-05-10T15:53:15+00:00

commit a1616a5ac99ede5d605047a9012481ce7ff18b16 upstream. Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name" field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command. This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079. Signed-off-by: Young Xiao Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: qla2xxx: Fix incorrect region-size setting in optrom SYSFS routines

2019-05-10T15:53:14+00:00

commit 5cbdae10bf11f96e30b4d14de7b08c8b490e903c upstream. Commit e6f77540c067 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Fix an integer overflow in sysfs code") incorrectly set 'optrom_region_size' to 'start+size', which can overflow option-rom boundaries when 'start' is non-zero. Continue setting optrom_region_size to the proper adjusted value of 'size'. Fixes: e6f77540c067 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Fix an integer overflow in sysfs code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Vasquez Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

intel_th: pci: Add Comet Lake support

2019-05-10T15:53:14+00:00

commit e60e9a4b231a20a199d7a61caadc48693c30d695 upstream. This adds support for Intel TH on Comet Lake. Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

usb-storage: Set virt_boundary_mask to avoid SG overflows

2019-05-10T15:53:14+00:00

commit 747668dbc061b3e62bc1982767a3a1f9815fcf0e upstream. The USB subsystem has always had an unusual requirement for its scatter-gather transfers: Each element in the scatterlist (except the last one) must have a length divisible by the bulk maxpacket size. This is a particular issue for USB mass storage, which uses SG lists created by the block layer rather than setting up its own. So far we have scraped by okay because most devices have a logical block size of 512 bytes or larger, and the bulk maxpacket sizes for USB 2 and below are all <= 512. However, USB 3 has a bulk maxpacket size of 1024. Since the xhci-hcd driver includes native SG support, this hasn't mattered much. But now people are trying to use USB-3 mass storage devices with USBIP, and the vhci-hcd driver currently does not have full SG support. The result is an overflow error, when the driver attempts to implement an SG transfer of 63 512-byte blocks as a single 3584-byte (7 blocks) transfer followed by seven 4096-byte (8 blocks) transfers. The device instead sends 31 1024-byte packets followed by a 512-byte packet, and this overruns the first SG buffer. Ideally this would be fixed by adding better SG support to vhci-hcd. But for now it appears we can work around the problem by asking the block layer to respect the maxpacket limitation, through the use of the virt_boundary_mask. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern Reported-by: Seth Bollinger Tested-by: Seth Bollinger CC: Ming Lei Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman