<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git, branch v4.10.15</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.10.15</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.10.15'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2017-05-08T05:49:54+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 4.10.15</title>
<updated>2017-05-08T05:49:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-08T05:49:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b1cff0b2ed20d9a046a17605c544a914d365dfc8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b1cff0b2ed20d9a046a17605c544a914d365dfc8</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm ioctl: prevent stack leak in dm ioctl call</title>
<updated>2017-05-08T05:49:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Adrian Salido</name>
<email>salidoa@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-27T17:32:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=de7b7a35c99e4eaeffd43c208b2cbbe5964bef7f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:de7b7a35c99e4eaeffd43c208b2cbbe5964bef7f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4617f564c06117c7d1b611be49521a4430042287 upstream.

When calling a dm ioctl that doesn't process any data
(IOCTL_FLAGS_NO_PARAMS), the contents of the data field in struct
dm_ioctl are left initialized.  Current code is incorrectly extending
the size of data copied back to user, causing the contents of kernel
stack to be leaked to user.  Fix by only copying contents before data
and allow the functions processing the ioctl to override.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido &lt;salidoa@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alasdair G Kergon &lt;agk@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hwmon: (it87) Avoid registering the same chip on both SIO addresses</title>
<updated>2017-05-08T05:49:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guenter Roeck</name>
<email>linux@roeck-us.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-12T13:18:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8dee04de5defe97c38aa07590b533c6b487df75e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8dee04de5defe97c38aa07590b533c6b487df75e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8358378b22518d92424597503d3c1cd302a490b6 upstream.

IT8705F is known to respond on both SIO addresses. Registering it twice
may result in system lockups.

Reported-by: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Fixes: e84bd9535e2b ("hwmon: (it87) Add support for second Super-IO chip")
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Cc: Jean Delvare &lt;jdelvare@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>scsi: storvsc: Workaround for virtual DVD SCSI version</title>
<updated>2017-05-08T05:49:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Hemminger</name>
<email>stephen@networkplumber.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-07T17:15:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ad66b968a0e57438017abcbadfd725b84281d806'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ad66b968a0e57438017abcbadfd725b84281d806</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f1c635b439a5c01776fe3a25b1e2dc546ea82e6f upstream.

Hyper-V host emulation of SCSI for virtual DVD device reports SCSI
version 0 (UNKNOWN) but is still capable of supporting REPORTLUN.

Without this patch, a GEN2 Linux guest on Hyper-V will not boot 4.11
successfully with virtual DVD ROM device. What happens is that the SCSI
scan process falls back to doing sequential probing by INQUIRY.  But the
storvsc driver has a previous workaround that masks/blocks all errors
reports from INQUIRY (or MODE_SENSE) commands.  This workaround causes
the scan to then populate a full set of bogus LUN's on the target and
then sends kernel spinning off into a death spiral doing block reads on
the non-existent LUNs.

By setting the correct blacklist flags, the target with the DVD device
is scanned with REPORTLUN and that works correctly.

Patch needs to go in current 4.11, it is safe but not necessary in older
kernels.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;sthemmin@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: K. Y. Srinivasan &lt;kys@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Handle mismatched open calls</title>
<updated>2017-05-08T05:49:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sachin Prabhu</name>
<email>sprabhu@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-03T23:41:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fc08ba650a2b92e44e7db33db68a7b2a2a035656'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fc08ba650a2b92e44e7db33db68a7b2a2a035656</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 38bd49064a1ecb67baad33598e3d824448ab11ec upstream.

A signal can interrupt a SendReceive call which result in incoming
responses to the call being ignored. This is a problem for calls such as
open which results in the successful response being ignored. This
results in an open file resource on the server.

The patch looks into responses which were cancelled after being sent and
in case of successful open closes the open fids.

For this patch, the check is only done in SendReceive2()

RH-bz: 1403319

Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu &lt;sprabhu@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu &lt;sprabhu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper</title>
<updated>2017-05-08T05:49:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-31T14:24:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=43c1696e5e91dc946325c2968c29e60423659abc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:43c1696e5e91dc946325c2968c29e60423659abc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1e38da300e1e395a15048b0af1e5305bd91402f6 upstream.

The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so
parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and
lead to list corruptions or use after free.

Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.

The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a
lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an
atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can
race vs. the actual list operation.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org"
Cc: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701311521430.3457@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux 4.10.14</title>
<updated>2017-05-03T15:37:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-03T15:37:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d08276658dee67cc0961691578a84cd6c086aed6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d08276658dee67cc0961691578a84cd6c086aed6</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace/x86: Fix triple fault with graph tracing and suspend-to-ram</title>
<updated>2017-05-03T15:37:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-13T22:53:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3adeab312a65bba55df2b361f733be4a26c42dc6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3adeab312a65bba55df2b361f733be4a26c42dc6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 34a477e5297cbaa6ecc6e17c042a866e1cbe80d6 upstream.

On x86-32, with CONFIG_FIRMWARE and multiple CPUs, if you enable function
graph tracing and then suspend to RAM, it will triple fault and reboot when
it resumes.

The first fault happens when booting a secondary CPU:

startup_32_smp()
  load_ucode_ap()
    prepare_ftrace_return()
      ftrace_graph_is_dead()
        (accesses 'kill_ftrace_graph')

The early head_32.S code calls into load_ucode_ap(), which has an an
ftrace hook, so it calls prepare_ftrace_return(), which calls
ftrace_graph_is_dead(), which tries to access the global
'kill_ftrace_graph' variable with a virtual address, causing a fault
because the CPU is still in real mode.

The fix is to add a check in prepare_ftrace_return() to make sure it's
running in protected mode before continuing.  The check makes sure the
stack pointer is a virtual kernel address.  It's a bit of a hack, but
it's not very intrusive and it works well enough.

For reference, here are a few other (more difficult) ways this could
have potentially been fixed:

- Move startup_32_smp()'s call to load_ucode_ap() down to *after* paging
  is enabled.  (No idea what that would break.)

- Track down load_ucode_ap()'s entire callee tree and mark all the
  functions 'notrace'.  (Probably not realistic.)

- Pause graph tracing in ftrace_suspend_notifier_call() or bringup_cpu()
  or __cpu_up(), and ensure that the pause facility can be queried from
  real mode.

Reported-by: Paul Menzel &lt;pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paul Menzel &lt;pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Len Brown &lt;lenb@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c1272269a580660703ed2eccf44308e790c7a98.1492123841.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/hotplug: Serialize callback invocations proper</title>
<updated>2017-05-03T15:37:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-14T15:06:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=13d97094021757db39ad52e4be39662f2f685e5f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:13d97094021757db39ad52e4be39662f2f685e5f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dc434e056fe1dada20df7ba07f32739d3a701adf upstream.

The setup/remove_state/instance() functions in the hotplug core code are
serialized against concurrent CPU hotplug, but unfortunately not serialized
against themself.

As a consequence a concurrent invocation of these function results in
corruption of the callback machinery because two instances try to invoke
callbacks on remote cpus at the same time. This results in missing callback
invocations and initiator threads waiting forever on the completion.

The obvious solution to replace get_cpu_online() with cpu_hotplug_begin()
is not possible because at least one callsite calls into these functions
from a get_online_cpu() locked region.

Extend the protection scope of the cpuhp_state_mutex from solely protecting
the state arrays to cover the callback invocation machinery as well.

Fixes: 5b7aa87e0482 ("cpu/hotplug: Implement setup/removal interface")
Reported-and-tested-by: Bart Van Assche &lt;Bart.VanAssche@sandisk.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: mingo@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170314150645.g4tdyoszlcbajmna@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: can: usb: gs_usb: Fix buffer on stack</title>
<updated>2017-05-03T15:37:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maksim Salau</name>
<email>maksim.salau@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-23T17:31:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=bd7c4f5e1d25d4ab3f29158f679396e8ffe4d34c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd7c4f5e1d25d4ab3f29158f679396e8ffe4d34c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b05c73bd1e3ec60357580eb042ee932a5ed754d5 upstream.

Allocate buffers on HEAP instead of STACK for local structures
that are to be sent using usb_control_msg().

Signed-off-by: Maksim Salau &lt;maksim.salau@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
