<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git, branch v3.2.81</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v3.2.81</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v3.2.81'/>
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<updated>2016-06-15T20:28:15+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 3.2.81</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:28:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-15T20:28:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c5d5c18b211dabbfac73670c65dfa4243800adf7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c5d5c18b211dabbfac73670c65dfa4243800adf7</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix a kernel infoleak in x25 module</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:28:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kangjie Lu</name>
<email>kangjielu@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-08T16:10:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=132c5255a23f505ffefe03cfc1f01ee9c82f3e09'/>
<id>urn:sha1:132c5255a23f505ffefe03cfc1f01ee9c82f3e09</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 79e48650320e6fba48369fccf13fd045315b19b8 upstream.

Stack object "dte_facilities" is allocated in x25_rx_call_request(),
which is supposed to be initialized in x25_negotiate_facilities.
However, 5 fields (8 bytes in total) are not initialized. This
object is then copied to userland via copy_to_user, thus infoleak
occurs.

Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu &lt;kjlu@gatech.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:28:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kangjie Lu</name>
<email>kangjielu@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-03T20:46:24+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:114253841cddf0f87b19ab8b0091abea41c58735</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5f8e44741f9f216e33736ea4ec65ca9ac03036e6 upstream.

The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.

Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu &lt;kjlu@gatech.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix infoleak in llc</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:28:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kangjie Lu</name>
<email>kangjielu@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-03T20:35:05+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3ec6a22dc6ded2c350e1d47513d316c55e9330c1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b8670c09f37bdf2847cc44f36511a53afc6161fd upstream.

The stack object “info” has a total size of 12 bytes. Its last byte
is padding which is not initialized and leaked via “put_cmsg”.

Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu &lt;kjlu@gatech.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nf_conntrack: avoid kernel pointer value leak in slab name</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:28:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-14T18:11:44+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9f9aa476de1b6bd8fe179dfd9b204972c8c98791</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 31b0b385f69d8d5491a4bca288e25e63f1d945d0 upstream.

The slab name ends up being visible in the directory structure under
/sys, and even if you don't have access rights to the file you can see
the filenames.

Just use a 64-bit counter instead of the pointer to the 'net' structure
to generate a unique name.

This code will go away in 4.7 when the conntrack code moves to a single
kmemcache, but this is the backportable simple solution to avoiding
leaking kernel pointers to user space.

Fixes: 5b3501faa874 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: per netns nf_conntrack_cachep")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>get_rock_ridge_filename(): handle malformed NM entries</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:28:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-05T20:25:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d4203ded7550f38e69b18c37c1e0a67064fc02a8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d4203ded7550f38e69b18c37c1e0a67064fc02a8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 99d825822eade8d827a1817357cbf3f889a552d6 upstream.

Payloads of NM entries are not supposed to contain NUL.  When we run
into such, only the part prior to the first NUL goes into the
concatenation (i.e. the directory entry name being encoded by a bunch
of NM entries).  We do stop when the amount collected so far + the
claimed amount in the current NM entry exceed 254.  So far, so good,
but what we return as the total length is the sum of *claimed*
sizes, not the actual amount collected.  And that can grow pretty
large - not unlimited, since you'd need to put CE entries in
between to be able to get more than the maximum that could be
contained in one isofs directory entry / continuation chunk and
we are stop once we'd encountered 32 CEs, but you can get about 8Kb
easily.  And that's what will be passed to readdir callback as the
name length.  8Kb __copy_to_user() from a buffer allocated by
__get_free_page()

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>parisc: fix a bug when syscall number of tracee is __NR_Linux_syscalls</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:28:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry V. Levin</name>
<email>ldv@altlinux.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-27T01:56:11+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2a1b4220685a9d4afa788f3d468d1cffe0e4c6dd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f0b22d1bb2a37a665a969e95785c75a4f49d1499 upstream.

Do not load one entry beyond the end of the syscall table when the
syscall number of a traced process equals to __NR_Linux_syscalls.
Similar bug with regular processes was fixed by commit 3bb457af4fa8
("[PARISC] Fix bug when syscall nr is __NR_Linux_syscalls").

This bug was found by strace test suite.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin &lt;ldv@altlinux.org&gt;
Acked-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: prevent accessing /proc/&lt;PID&gt;/environ until it's ready</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:28:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-05T23:22:26+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:99cfe931aa948c3af2f288f9d603bddbbc456a90</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3 upstream.

If /proc/&lt;PID&gt;/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.

Fix this as it is done for /proc/&lt;PID&gt;/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero.  It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().

This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.

The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/&lt;PID&gt;/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.

Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&amp;t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Cc: Emese Revfy &lt;re.emese@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Pax Team &lt;pageexec@freemail.hu&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mguzik@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Jarod Wilson &lt;jarod@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: hash - Fix page length clamping in hash walk</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:28:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-04T09:52:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=05c5678247404392ef9b0e57b1f1250a50db0aa7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:05c5678247404392ef9b0e57b1f1250a50db0aa7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 13f4bb78cf6a312bbdec367ba3da044b09bf0e29 upstream.

The crypto hash walk code is broken when supplied with an offset
greater than or equal to PAGE_SIZE.  This patch fixes it by adjusting
walk-&gt;pg and walk-&gt;offset when this happens.

Reported-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ACPICA: Dispatcher: Update thread ID for recursive method calls</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:28:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Prarit Bhargava</name>
<email>prarit@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-04T05:48:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=dd99371637aa1dca140c3f06e38a7abe708b45f1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dd99371637aa1dca140c3f06e38a7abe708b45f1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 93d68841a23a5779cef6fb9aa0ef32e7c5bd00da upstream.

ACPICA commit 7a3bd2d962f221809f25ddb826c9e551b916eb25

Set the mutex owner thread ID.
Original patch from: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=115121
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/7a3bd2d9
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt; # On a Dell XPS 13 9350
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore &lt;robert.moore@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng &lt;lv.zheng@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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