Tianocore/edk2.git/MdeModulePkg/Universal/LockBox, branch dependabot/github_actions/actions/github-script-9

MdeModulePkg: Apply uncrustify changes

2021-12-07T17:24:28+00:00

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3737 Apply uncrustify changes to .c/.h files in the MdeModulePkg package Cc: Andrew Fish Cc: Leif Lindholm Cc: Michael D Kinney Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki Reviewed-by: Liming Gao

MdeModulePkg: Change use of EFI_D_* to DEBUG_*

2021-12-07T17:24:28+00:00

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3739 Update all use of EFI_D_* defines in DEBUG() macros to DEBUG_* defines. Cc: Andrew Fish Cc: Leif Lindholm Cc: Michael Kubacki Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney Reviewed-by: Liming Gao

MdeModulePkg: Replace BSD License with BSD+Patent License

2019-04-09T17:58:08+00:00

https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1373 Replace BSD 2-Clause License with BSD+Patent License. This change is based on the following emails: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-February/036260.html https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2018-October/030385.html RFCs with detailed process for the license change: V3: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/038116.html V2: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/037669.html V1: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/037500.html Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney Reviewed-by: Hao Wu Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang

MdeModulePkg/SmmLockBox: Update to consume SpeculationBarrier

2018-12-25T01:16:04+00:00

REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1417 Since BaseLib API AsmLfence() is a x86 arch specific API and should be avoided using in generic codes, this commit replaces the usage of AsmLfence() with arch-generic API SpeculationBarrier(). Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Jiewen Yao Cc: Liming Gao Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Hao Wu Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang

MdeModulePkg/SmmLockBox: [CVE-2017-5753] Fix bounds check bypass

2018-09-30T05:06:42+00:00

REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1194 Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the processor may speculate as to what will be executed. If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not otherwise be accessed. This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the SmmLockBox driver and insert AsmLfence API to mitigate the bounds check bypass issue. For SMI handler SmmLockBoxHandler(): Under "case EFI_SMM_LOCK_BOX_COMMAND_SAVE:", the 'CommBuffer' (controlled external inputs) is passed to function SmmLockBoxSave(). 'TempLockBoxParameterSave.Length' can be a potential cross boundary access of the 'CommBuffer' during speculative execution. This cross boundary access is later passed as parameter 'Length' into function SaveLockBox(). Within function SaveLockBox(), the value of 'Length' can be inferred by code: "CopyMem ((VOID *)(UINTN)SmramBuffer, (VOID *)(UINTN)Buffer, Length);". One can observe which part of the content within 'Buffer' was brought into cache to possibly reveal the value of 'Length'. Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the boundary/range checks of 'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution. And there is a similar case under "case EFI_SMM_LOCK_BOX_COMMAND_UPDATE:" function SmmLockBoxUpdate() as well. This commits also handles it. A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the 'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation And the document at: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Hao Wu Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao Reviewed-by: Star Zeng Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek

MdeModulePkg SmmLockBox: Return actual data length in SmmLockBoxRestore

2018-08-16T01:02:14+00:00

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1082 Current code only returns actual data length in case of return status buffer too small. If caller provided a buffer that's large enough to restore data from lock box, actual data length is not returned. It needs to be updated in case of return status as success as well. Cc: Jiewen Yao Cc: Anbazhagan Baraneedharan Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao

MdeModulePkg: Clean up source files

2018-06-28T03:19:45+00:00

1. Do not use tab characters 2. No trailing white space in one line 3. All files must end with CRLF Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Liming Gao Reviewed-by: Star Zeng

MdeModulePkg SmmLockBox: Return updated Length for EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL

2018-02-26T06:03:23+00:00

The updated Length value should be returned for EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL case. Cc: Jiewen Yao Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao

MdeModulePkg: Error Level is not used correctly

2017-04-12T00:56:12+00:00

Cc: Feng Tian Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jeff Fan Reviewed-by: Feng Tian

MdeModulePkg: Convert all .uni files to utf-8

2015-12-15T04:56:23+00:00

To convert these files I ran: $ python3 BaseTools/Scripts/ConvertUni.py MdeModulePkg Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jordan Justen Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney Reviewed-by: Feng Tian git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19257 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524