summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/mm/kasan
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
2020-08-10Merge tag 'kbuild-v5.9' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada: - run the checker (e.g. sparse) after the compiler - remove unneeded cc-option tests for old compiler flags - fix tar-pkg to install dtbs - introduce ccflags-remove-y and asflags-remove-y syntax - allow to trace functions in sub-directories of lib/ - introduce hostprogs-always-y and userprogs-always-y syntax - various Makefile cleanups * tag 'kbuild-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: kbuild: stop filtering out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) from cc-option base kbuild: include scripts/Makefile.* only when relevant CONFIG is enabled kbuild: introduce hostprogs-always-y and userprogs-always-y kbuild: sort hostprogs before passing it to ifneq kbuild: move host .so build rules to scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile kbuild: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones kbuild: trace functions in subdirectories of lib/ kbuild: introduce ccflags-remove-y and asflags-remove-y kbuild: do not export LDFLAGS_vmlinux kbuild: always create directories of targets powerpc/boot: add DTB to 'targets' kbuild: buildtar: add dtbs support kbuild: remove cc-option test of -ffreestanding kbuild: remove cc-option test of -fno-stack-protector Revert "kbuild: Create directory for target DTB" kbuild: run the checker after the compiler
2020-08-07kasan: remove kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to()Vincenzo Frascino1-15/+0
kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to() is defined in kasan code but never used. The function was introduced as part of the commit: commit 9f7d416c36124667 ("kprobes: Unpoison stack in jprobe_return() for KASAN") ... where it was necessary because x86's jprobe_return() would leave stale shadow on the stack, and was an oddity in that regard. Since then, jprobes were removed entirely, and as of commit: commit 80006dbee674f9fa ("kprobes/x86: Remove jprobe implementation") ... there have been no callers of this function. Remove the declaration and the implementation. Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200706143505.23299-1-vincenzo.frascino@arm.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07kasan: record and print the free trackWalter Wu7-45/+80
Move free track from kasan_alloc_meta to kasan_free_meta in order to make struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta size are both 16 bytes. It is a good size because it is the minimal redzone size and a good number of alignment. For free track, we make some modifications as shown below: 1) Remove the free_track from struct kasan_alloc_meta. 2) Add the free_track into struct kasan_free_meta. 3) Add a macro KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK in order to check whether it can print free stack in KASAN report. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162440.23887-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Co-developed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601051022.1230-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07rcu: kasan: record and print call_rcu() call stackWalter Wu4-7/+55
Patch series "kasan: memorize and print call_rcu stack", v8. This patchset improves KASAN reports by making them to have call_rcu() call stack information. It is useful for programmers to solve use-after-free or double-free memory issue. The KASAN report was as follows(cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x58/0x60 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x24/0x38 kasan_set_free_info+0x18/0x20 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x170 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 kfree+0x98/0x270 kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x1c/0x60 Last call_rcu(): kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 call_rcu+0x8c/0x580 kasan_rcu_uaf+0xf4/0xf8 Generic KASAN will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and print up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. it is only suitable for generic KASAN. This feature considers the size of struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta, we try to optimize the structure layout and size, lets it get better memory consumption. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ This patch (of 4): This feature will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and prints up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. When call_rcu() is called, we store the call_rcu() call stack into slub alloc meta-data, so that the KASAN report can print rcu stack. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162401.23816-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162123.23713-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050847.1096-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050927.1153-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-07-07kbuild: remove cc-option test of -fno-stack-protectorMasahiro Yamada1-1/+1
Some Makefiles already pass -fno-stack-protector unconditionally. For example, arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile, arch/x86/xen/Makefile. No problem report so far about hard-coding this option. So, we can assume all supported compilers know -fno-stack-protector. GCC 4.8 and Clang support this option (https://godbolt.org/z/_HDGzN) Get rid of cc-option from -fno-stack-protector. Remove CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE, which is always 'y'. Note: arch/mips/vdso/Makefile adds -fno-stack-protector twice, first unconditionally, and second conditionally. I removed the second one. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
2020-06-05mm: remove __ARCH_HAS_5LEVEL_HACK and include/asm-generic/5level-fixup.hMike Rapoport1-11/+0
There are no architectures that use include/asm-generic/5level-fixup.h therefore it can be removed along with __ARCH_HAS_5LEVEL_HACK define and the code it surrounds Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry.kdev@gmail.com> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <ley.foon.tan@intel.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200414153455.21744-15-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-02kasan: move kasan_report() into report.cAndrey Konovalov2-21/+20
The kasan_report() functions belongs to report.c, as it's a common functions that does error reporting. Reported-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/78a81fde6eeda9db72a7fd55fbc33173a515e4b1.1589297433.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-02kasan: fix clang compilation warning due to stack protectorAndrey Konovalov1-8/+13
KASAN uses a single cc-option invocation to disable both conserve-stack and stack-protector flags. The former flag is not present in Clang, which causes cc-option to fail, and results in stack-protector being enabled. Fix by using separate cc-option calls for each flag. Also collect all flags in a variable to avoid calling cc-option multiple times for different files. Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c2f0c8e4048852ae014f4a391d96ca42d27e3255.1590779332.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-05-23kasan: disable branch tracing for core runtimeMarco Elver3-10/+8
During early boot, while KASAN is not yet initialized, it is possible to enter reporting code-path and end up in kasan_report(). While uninitialized, the branch there prevents generating any reports, however, under certain circumstances when branches are being traced (TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING), we may recurse deep enough to cause kernel reboots without warning. To prevent similar issues in future, we should disable branch tracing for the core runtime. [elver@google.com: remove duplicate DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING, per Qian Cai] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200517011732.GE24705@shao2-debian/ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200522075207.157349-1-elver@google.com Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r//20200517011732.GE24705@shao2-debian/ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200519182459.87166-1-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-05-14kasan: add missing functions declarations to kasan.hAndrey Konovalov1-2/+32
KASAN is currently missing declarations for __asan_report* and __hwasan* functions. This can lead to compiler warnings. Reported-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/45b445a76a79208918f0cc44bfabebaea909b54d.1589297433.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-05-14kasan: consistently disable debugging featuresAndrey Konovalov1-5/+10
KASAN is incompatible with some kernel debugging/tracing features. There's been multiple patches that disable those feature for some of KASAN files one by one. Instead of prolonging that, disable these features for all KASAN files at once. Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/29bd753d5ff5596425905b0b07f51153e2345cc1.1589297433.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-07kasan: unset panic_on_warn before calling panic()Kees Cook1-1/+9
As done in the full WARN() handler, panic_on_warn needs to be cleared before calling panic() to avoid recursive panics. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com> Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200227193516.32566-6-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-07kasan: stackdepot: move filter_irq_stacks() to stackdepot.cAlexander Potapenko1-23/+0
filter_irq_stacks() can be used by other tools (e.g. KMSAN), so it needs to be moved to a common location. lib/stackdepot.c seems a good place, as filter_irq_stacks() is usually applied to the output of stack_trace_save(). This patch has been previously mailed as part of KMSAN RFC patch series. [glider@google.co: nds32: linker script: add SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT\ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200311121002.241430-1-glider@google.com [glider@google.com: add IRQENTRY_TEXT and SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT to linker script] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200311121124.243352-1-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200220141916.55455-3-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-02kasan: detect negative size in memory operation functionWalter Wu7-20/+53
Patch series "fix the missing underflow in memory operation function", v4. The patchset helps to produce a KASAN report when size is negative in memory operation functions. It is helpful for programmer to solve an undefined behavior issue. Patch 1 based on Dmitry's review and suggestion, patch 2 is a test in order to verify the patch 1. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 [2]https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com/ This patch (of 2): KASAN missed detecting size is a negative number in memset(), memcpy(), and memmove(), it will cause out-of-bounds bug. So needs to be detected by KASAN. If size is a negative number, then it has a reason to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type. Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. KASAN report is shown below: BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task cat/72 CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0x10c/0x164 print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378 __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0 kasan_report+0xc/0x18 check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0 memmove+0x34/0x88 kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 [cai@lca.pw: fix -Wdeclaration-after-statement warn] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1583509030-27939-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw [peterz@infradead.org: fix objtool warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305095436.GV2596@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112065302.7015-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-01-31Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.6-mw0' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux Pull RISC-V updates from Palmer Dabbelt: "This contains a handful of patches for this merge window: - Support for kasan - 32-bit physical addresses on rv32i-based systems - Support for CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL - DT entry for the FU540 GPIO controller, which has recently had a device driver merged These boot a buildroot-based system on QEMU's virt board for me" * tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.6-mw0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux: riscv: dts: Add DT support for SiFive FU540 GPIO driver riscv: mm: add support for CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL riscv: keep 32-bit kernel to 32-bit phys_addr_t kasan: Add riscv to KASAN documentation. riscv: Add KASAN support kasan: No KASAN's memmove check if archs don't have it.
2020-01-23kasan: No KASAN's memmove check if archs don't have it.Nick Hu1-0/+2
If archs don't have memmove then the C implementation from lib/string.c is used, and then it's instrumented by compiler. So there is no need to add KASAN's memmove to manual checks. Signed-off-by: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
2019-12-31x86/kasan: Print original address on #GPJann Horn1-0/+40
Make #GP exceptions caused by out-of-bounds KASAN shadow accesses easier to understand by computing the address of the original access and printing that. More details are in the comments in the patch. This turns an error like this: kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe017577ddf75b7dd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI into this: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe017577ddf75b7dd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x00badbeefbadbee8-0x00badbeefbadbeef] The hook is placed in architecture-independent code, but is currently only wired up to the X86 exception handler because I'm not sufficiently familiar with the address space layout and exception handling mechanisms on other architectures. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191218231150.12139-4-jannh@google.com
2019-12-18kasan: use apply_to_existing_page_range() for releasing vmalloc shadowDaniel Axtens1-3/+6
kasan_release_vmalloc uses apply_to_page_range to release vmalloc shadow. Unfortunately, apply_to_page_range can allocate memory to fill in page table entries, which is not what we want. Also, kasan_release_vmalloc is called under free_vmap_area_lock, so if apply_to_page_range does allocate memory, we get a sleep in atomic bug: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/page_alloc.c:4681 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 15087, name: Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x199/0x216 lib/dump_stack.c:118 ___might_sleep.cold.97+0x1f5/0x238 kernel/sched/core.c:6800 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6753 prepare_alloc_pages mm/page_alloc.c:4681 [inline] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3cd/0x890 mm/page_alloc.c:4730 alloc_pages_current+0x10c/0x210 mm/mempolicy.c:2211 alloc_pages include/linux/gfp.h:532 [inline] __get_free_pages+0xc/0x40 mm/page_alloc.c:4786 __pte_alloc_one_kernel include/asm-generic/pgalloc.h:21 [inline] pte_alloc_one_kernel include/asm-generic/pgalloc.h:33 [inline] __pte_alloc_kernel+0x1d/0x200 mm/memory.c:459 apply_to_pte_range mm/memory.c:2031 [inline] apply_to_pmd_range mm/memory.c:2068 [inline] apply_to_pud_range mm/memory.c:2088 [inline] apply_to_p4d_range mm/memory.c:2108 [inline] apply_to_page_range+0x77d/0xa00 mm/memory.c:2133 kasan_release_vmalloc+0xa7/0xc0 mm/kasan/common.c:970 __purge_vmap_area_lazy+0xcbb/0x1f30 mm/vmalloc.c:1313 try_purge_vmap_area_lazy mm/vmalloc.c:1332 [inline] free_vmap_area_noflush+0x2ca/0x390 mm/vmalloc.c:1368 free_unmap_vmap_area mm/vmalloc.c:1381 [inline] remove_vm_area+0x1cc/0x230 mm/vmalloc.c:2209 vm_remove_mappings mm/vmalloc.c:2236 [inline] __vunmap+0x223/0xa20 mm/vmalloc.c:2299 __vfree+0x3f/0xd0 mm/vmalloc.c:2356 __vmalloc_area_node mm/vmalloc.c:2507 [inline] __vmalloc_node_range+0x5d5/0x810 mm/vmalloc.c:2547 __vmalloc_node mm/vmalloc.c:2607 [inline] __vmalloc_node_flags mm/vmalloc.c:2621 [inline] vzalloc+0x6f/0x80 mm/vmalloc.c:2666 alloc_one_pg_vec_page net/packet/af_packet.c:4233 [inline] alloc_pg_vec net/packet/af_packet.c:4258 [inline] packet_set_ring+0xbc0/0x1b50 net/packet/af_packet.c:4342 packet_setsockopt+0xed7/0x2d90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3695 __sys_setsockopt+0x29b/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2117 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2133 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2130 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:2130 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x780 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Switch to using the apply_to_existing_page_range() helper instead, which won't allocate memory. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/apply_to_existing_pages/apply_to_existing_page_range/] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191205140407.1874-2-dja@axtens.net Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9ef4 ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory") Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-18kasan: fix crashes on access to memory mapped by vm_map_ram()Andrey Ryabinin1-9/+18
With CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC=y any use of memory obtained via vm_map_ram() will crash because there is no shadow backing that memory. Instead of sprinkling additional kasan_populate_vmalloc() calls all over the vmalloc code, move it into alloc_vmap_area(). This will fix vm_map_ram() and simplify the code a bit. [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: v2] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191205095942.1761-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.comLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191204204534.32202-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9ef4 ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05mm/kasan/common.c: fix compile errorzhong jiang1-0/+1
I hit the following compile error in arch/x86/ mm/kasan/common.c: In function kasan_populate_vmalloc: mm/kasan/common.c:797:2: error: implicit declaration of function flush_cache_vmap; did you mean flush_rcu_work? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] flush_cache_vmap(shadow_start, shadow_end); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ flush_rcu_work cc1: some warnings being treated as errors Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1575363013-43761-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9ef4 ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory") Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-01kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memoryDaniel Axtens3-0/+237
Patch series "kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory", v11. Currently, vmalloc space is backed by the early shadow page. This means that kasan is incompatible with VMAP_STACK. This series provides a mechanism to back vmalloc space with real, dynamically allocated memory. I have only wired up x86, because that's the only currently supported arch I can work with easily, but it's very easy to wire up other architectures, and it appears that there is some work-in-progress code to do this on arm64 and s390. This has been discussed before in the context of VMAP_STACK: - https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202009 - https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/22/198 - https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/19/822 In terms of implementation details: Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE. Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings later on. We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow memory. Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that: - Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations. - Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN: * ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance) * ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=1) This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the end of the world. The benchmarks are also a stress-test for the vmalloc subsystem: they're not indicative of an overall 2x slowdown! This patch (of 4): Hook into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically allocate real shadow memory to back the mappings. Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE. Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings later on. We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow memory. To avoid the difficulties around swapping mappings around, this code expects that the part of the shadow region that covers the vmalloc space will not be covered by the early shadow page, but will be left unmapped. This will require changes in arch-specific code. This allows KASAN with VMAP_STACK, and may be helpful for architectures that do not have a separate module space (e.g. powerpc64, which I am currently working on). It also allows relaxing the module alignment back to PAGE_SIZE. Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that: - Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations. - Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN: * ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance) * ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=3D1) This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the end of the world. The full benchmark results are: Performance No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN fix_size_alloc_test 662004 11404956 17.23 19144610 28.92 1.68 full_fit_alloc_test 710950 12029752 16.92 13184651 18.55 1.10 long_busy_list_alloc_test 9431875 43990172 4.66 82970178 8.80 1.89 random_size_alloc_test 5033626 23061762 4.58 47158834 9.37 2.04 fix_align_alloc_test 1252514 15276910 12.20 31266116 24.96 2.05 random_size_align_alloc_te 1648501 14578321 8.84 25560052 15.51 1.75 align_shift_alloc_test 147 830 5.65 5692 38.72 6.86 pcpu_alloc_test 80732 125520 1.55 140864 1.74 1.12 Total Cycles 119240774314 763211341128 6.40 1390338696894 11.66 1.82 Sequential, 2 cpus No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN fix_size_alloc_test 1423150 14276550 10.03 27733022 19.49 1.94 full_fit_alloc_test 1754219 14722640 8.39 15030786 8.57 1.02 long_busy_list_alloc_test 11451858 52154973 4.55 107016027 9.34 2.05 random_size_alloc_test 5989020 26735276 4.46 68885923 11.50 2.58 fix_align_alloc_test 2050976 20166900 9.83 50491675 24.62 2.50 random_size_align_alloc_te 2858229 17971700 6.29 38730225 13.55 2.16 align_shift_alloc_test 405 6428 15.87 26253 64.82 4.08 pcpu_alloc_test 127183 151464 1.19 216263 1.70 1.43 Total Cycles 54181269392 308723699764 5.70 650772566394 12.01 2.11 fix_size_alloc_test 1420404 14289308 10.06 27790035 19.56 1.94 full_fit_alloc_test 1736145 14806234 8.53 15274301 8.80 1.03 long_busy_list_alloc_test 11404638 52270785 4.58 107550254 9.43 2.06 random_size_alloc_test 6017006 26650625 4.43 68696127 11.42 2.58 fix_align_alloc_test 2045504 20280985 9.91 50414862 24.65 2.49 random_size_align_alloc_te 2845338 17931018 6.30 38510276 13.53 2.15 align_shift_alloc_test 472 3760 7.97 9656 20.46 2.57 pcpu_alloc_test 118643 132732 1.12 146504 1.23 1.10 Total Cycles 54040011688 309102805492 5.72 651325675652 12.05 2.11 [dja@axtens.net: fixups] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191120052719.7201-1-dja@axtens.net Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D202009 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191031093909.9228-2-dja@axtens.net Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [shadow rework] Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Co-developed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-25mm: introduce compound_nr()Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)1-1/+1
Replace 1 << compound_order(page) with compound_nr(page). Minor improvements in readability. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190721104612.19120-4-willy@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-25mm: introduce page_size()Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)1-5/+3
Patch series "Make working with compound pages easier", v2. These three patches add three helpers and convert the appropriate places to use them. This patch (of 3): It's unnecessarily hard to find out the size of a potentially huge page. Replace 'PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page)' with page_size(page). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190721104612.19120-2-willy@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-25kasan: add memory corruption identification for software tag-based modeWalter Wu4-13/+91
Add memory corruption identification at bug report for software tag-based mode. The report shows whether it is "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound" error instead of "invalid-access" error. This will make it easier for programmers to see the memory corruption problem. We extend the slab to store five old free pointer tag and free backtrace, we can check if the tagged address is in the slab record and make a good guess if the object is more like "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound". therefore every slab memory corruption can be identified whether it's "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound". [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: simplify & clenup code] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3318f9d7-a760-3cc8-b700-f06108ae745f@virtuozzo.com] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190821180332.11450-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-08-25mm/kasan: fix false positive invalid-free reports with CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS=yAndrey Ryabinin1-2/+8
The code like this: ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); page = virt_to_page(ptr); offset = offset_in_page(ptr); kfree(page_address(page) + offset); may produce false-positive invalid-free reports on the kernel with CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS=y. In the example above we lose the original tag assigned to 'ptr', so kfree() gets the pointer with 0xFF tag. In kfree() we check that 0xFF tag is different from the tag in shadow hence print false report. Instead of just comparing tags, do the following: 1) Check that shadow doesn't contain KASAN_TAG_INVALID. Otherwise it's double-free and it doesn't matter what tag the pointer have. 2) If pointer tag is different from 0xFF, make sure that tag in the shadow is the same as in the pointer. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190819172540.19581-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Fixes: 7f94ffbc4c6a ("kasan: add hooks implementation for tag-based mode") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reported-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12mm/kasan: change kasan_check_{read,write} to return booleanMarco Elver4-16/+27
This changes {,__}kasan_check_{read,write} functions to return a boolean denoting if the access was valid or not. [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: include types.h for "bool"] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190705184949.13cdd021@canb.auug.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626142014.141844-3-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12mm/kasan: introduce __kasan_check_{read,write}Marco Elver1-6/+4
Patch series "mm/kasan: Add object validation in ksize()", v3. This patch (of 5): This introduces __kasan_check_{read,write}. __kasan_check functions may be used from anywhere, even compilation units that disable instrumentation selectively. This change eliminates the need for the __KASAN_INTERNAL definition. [elver@google.com: v5] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190708170706.174189-2-elver@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626142014.141844-2-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12mm/kasan: print frame description for stack bugsMarco Elver2-0/+170
This adds support for printing stack frame description on invalid stack accesses. The frame description is embedded by the compiler, which is parsed and then pretty-printed. Currently, we can only print the stack frame info for accesses to the task's own stack, but not accesses to other tasks' stacks. Example of what it looks like: page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected addr ffff8880673ef98a is located in stack of task insmod/2008 at offset 106 in frame: kasan_stack_oob+0x0/0xf5 [test_kasan] this frame has 2 objects: [32, 36) 'i' [96, 106) 'stack_array' Memory state around the buggy address: Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198435 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522100048.146841-1-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-06-02kasan: initialize tag to 0xff in __kasan_kmallocNathan Chancellor1-1/+1
When building with -Wuninitialized and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS unset, Clang warns: mm/kasan/common.c:484:40: warning: variable 'tag' is uninitialized when used here [-Wuninitialized] kasan_unpoison_shadow(set_tag(object, tag), size); ^~~ set_tag ignores tag in this configuration but clang doesn't realize it at this point in its pipeline, as it points to arch_kasan_set_tag as being the point where it is used, which will later be expanded to (void *)(object) without a use of tag. Initialize tag to 0xff, as it removes this warning and doesn't change the meaning of the code. Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/465 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190502163057.6603-1-natechancellor@gmail.com Fixes: 7f94ffbc4c6a ("kasan: add hooks implementation for tag-based mode") Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-07Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-4/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux Pull arm64 updates from Will Deacon: "Mostly just incremental improvements here: - Introduce AT_HWCAP2 for advertising CPU features to userspace - Expose SVE2 availability to userspace - Support for "data cache clean to point of deep persistence" (DC PODP) - Honour "mitigations=off" on the cmdline and advertise status via sysfs - CPU timer erratum workaround (Neoverse-N1 #1188873) - Introduce perf PMU driver for the SMMUv3 performance counters - Add config option to disable the kuser helpers page for AArch32 tasks - Futex modifications to ensure liveness under contention - Rework debug exception handling to seperate kernel and user handlers - Non-critical fixes and cleanup" * tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (92 commits) Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass arm64: Fix size of __early_cpu_boot_status clocksource/arm_arch_timer: Use arch_timer_read_counter to access stable counters clocksource/arm_arch_timer: Remove use of workaround static key clocksource/arm_arch_timer: Drop use of static key in arch_timer_reg_read_stable clocksource/arm_arch_timer: Direcly assign set_next_event workaround arm64: Use arch_timer_read_counter instead of arch_counter_get_cntvct watchdog/sbsa: Use arch_timer_read_counter instead of arch_counter_get_cntvct ARM: vdso: Remove dependency with the arch_timer driver internals arm64: Apply ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 to Neoverse-N1 arm64: Add part number for Neoverse N1 arm64: Make ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 depend on COMPAT arm64: Restrict ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 mitigation to AArch32 arm64: mm: Remove pte_unmap_nested() arm64: Fix compiler warning from pte_unmap() with -Wunused-but-set-variable arm64: compat: Reduce address limit for 64K pages ...
2019-05-06Merge branch 'core-stacktrace-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-25/+17
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull stack trace updates from Ingo Molnar: "So Thomas looked at the stacktrace code recently and noticed a few weirdnesses, and we all know how such stories of crummy kernel code meeting German engineering perfection end: a 45-patch series to clean it all up! :-) Here's the changes in Thomas's words: 'Struct stack_trace is a sinkhole for input and output parameters which is largely pointless for most usage sites. In fact if embedded into other data structures it creates indirections and extra storage overhead for no benefit. Looking at all usage sites makes it clear that they just require an interface which is based on a storage array. That array is either on stack, global or embedded into some other data structure. Some of the stack depot usage sites are outright wrong, but fortunately the wrongness just causes more stack being used for nothing and does not have functional impact. Another oddity is the inconsistent termination of the stack trace with ULONG_MAX. It's pointless as the number of entries is what determines the length of the stored trace. In fact quite some call sites remove the ULONG_MAX marker afterwards with or without nasty comments about it. Not all architectures do that and those which do, do it inconsistenly either conditional on nr_entries == 0 or unconditionally. The following series cleans that up by: 1) Removing the ULONG_MAX termination in the architecture code 2) Removing the ULONG_MAX fixups at the call sites 3) Providing plain storage array based interfaces for stacktrace and stackdepot. 4) Cleaning up the mess at the callsites including some related cleanups. 5) Removing the struct stack_trace based interfaces This is not changing the struct stack_trace interfaces at the architecture level, but it removes the exposure to the generic code'" * 'core-stacktrace-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (45 commits) x86/stacktrace: Use common infrastructure stacktrace: Provide common infrastructure lib/stackdepot: Remove obsolete functions stacktrace: Remove obsolete functions livepatch: Simplify stack trace retrieval tracing: Remove the last struct stack_trace usage tracing: Simplify stack trace retrieval tracing: Make ftrace_trace_userstack() static and conditional tracing: Use percpu stack trace buffer more intelligently tracing: Simplify stacktrace retrieval in histograms lockdep: Simplify stack trace handling lockdep: Remove save argument from check_prev_add() lockdep: Remove unused trace argument from print_circular_bug() drm: Simplify stacktrace handling dm persistent data: Simplify stack trace handling dm bufio: Simplify stack trace retrieval btrfs: ref-verify: Simplify stack trace retrieval dma/debug: Simplify stracktrace retrieval fault-inject: Simplify stacktrace retrieval mm/page_owner: Simplify stack trace handling ...
2019-04-29mm/kasan: Simplify stacktrace handlingThomas Gleixner2-21/+16
Replace the indirection through struct stack_trace by using the storage array based interfaces. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425094801.963261479@linutronix.de
2019-04-14mm/kasan: Remove the ULONG_MAX stack trace hackeryThomas Gleixner1-3/+0
No architecture terminates the stack trace with ULONG_MAX anymore. Remove the cruft. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410103644.750219625@linutronix.de
2019-04-09kasan: Makefile: Replace -pg with CC_FLAGS_FTRACETorsten Duwe1-3/+3
In preparation for arm64 supporting ftrace built on other compiler options, let's have Makefiles remove the $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) flags, whatever these may be, rather than assuming '-pg'. There should be no functional change as a result of this patch. Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2019-04-03x86/uaccess, kasan: Fix KASAN vs SMAPPeter Zijlstra3-2/+14
KASAN inserts extra code for every LOAD/STORE emitted by te compiler. Much of this code is simple and safe to run with AC=1, however the kasan_report() function, called on error, is most certainly not safe to call with AC=1. Therefore wrap kasan_report() in user_access_{save,restore}; which for x86 SMAP, saves/restores EFLAGS and clears AC before calling the real function. Also ensure all the functions are without __fentry__ hook. The function tracer is also not safe. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-03-29kasan: fix variable 'tag' set but not used warningQian Cai1-1/+4
set_tag() compiles away when CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS=n, so make arch_kasan_set_tag() a static inline function to fix warnings below. mm/kasan/common.c: In function '__kasan_kmalloc': mm/kasan/common.c:475:5: warning: variable 'tag' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] u8 tag; ^~~ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190307185244.54648-1-cai@lca.pw Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-12treewide: add checks for the return value of memblock_alloc*()Mike Rapoport1-2/+8
Add check for the return value of memblock_alloc*() functions and call panic() in case of error. The panic message repeats the one used by panicing memblock allocators with adjustment of parameters to include only relevant ones. The replacement was mostly automated with semantic patches like the one below with manual massaging of format strings. @@ expression ptr, size, align; @@ ptr = memblock_alloc(size, align); + if (!ptr) + panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n", __func__, size, align); [anders.roxell@linaro.org: use '%pa' with 'phys_addr_t' type] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131161046.21886-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org [rppt@linux.ibm.com: fix format strings for panics after memblock_alloc] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548950940-15145-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com [rppt@linux.ibm.com: don't panic if the allocation in sparse_buffer_init fails] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131074018.GD28876@rapoport-lnx [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix xtensa printk warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548057848-15136-20-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <ren_guo@c-sky.com> [c-sky] Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> [MIPS] Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> [s390] Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> [Xen] Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k] Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> [xtensa] Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-06kasan: fix coccinelle warnings in kasan_p*_tableAndrey Konovalov1-3/+3
kasan_p4d_table(), kasan_pmd_table() and kasan_pud_table() are declared as returning bool, but return 0 instead of false, which produces a coccinelle warning. Fix it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1fa6fadf644859e8a6a8ecce258444b49be8c7ee.1551716733.git.andreyknvl@google.com Fixes: 0207df4fa1a8 ("kernel/memremap, kasan: make ZONE_DEVICE with work with KASAN") Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-06kasan: fix kasan_check_read/write definitionsArnd Bergmann1-0/+2
Building little-endian allmodconfig kernels on arm64 started failing with the generated atomic.h implementation, since we now try to call kasan helpers from the EFI stub: aarch64-linux-gnu-ld: drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.stub.o: in function `atomic_set': include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:44: undefined reference to `__efistub_kasan_check_write' I suspect that we get similar problems in other files that explicitly disable KASAN for some reason but call atomic_t based helper functions. We can fix this by checking the predefined __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ macro that the compiler sets instead of checking CONFIG_KASAN, but this in turn requires a small hack in mm/kasan/common.c so we do see the extern declaration there instead of the inline function. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181211133453.2835077-1-arnd@arndb.de Fixes: b1864b828644 ("locking/atomics: build atomic headers as required") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reported-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>, Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-06kasan: remove use after scope bugs detection.Andrey Ryabinin3-25/+0
Use after scope bugs detector seems to be almost entirely useless for the linux kernel. It exists over two years, but I've seen only one valid bug so far [1]. And the bug was fixed before it has been reported. There were some other use-after-scope reports, but they were false-positives due to different reasons like incompatibility with structleak plugin. This feature significantly increases stack usage, especially with GCC < 9 version, and causes a 32K stack overflow. It probably adds performance penalty too. Given all that, let's remove use-after-scope detector entirely. While preparing this patch I've noticed that we mistakenly enable use-after-scope detection for clang compiler regardless of CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA setting. This is also fixed now. [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<20171129052106.rhgbjhhis53hkgfn@wfg-t540p.sh.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190111185842.13978-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> [arm64] Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-02-21kasan: prevent tracing of tags.cAndrey Konovalov1-0/+2
Similarly to commit 0d0c8de8788b ("kasan: mark file common so ftrace doesn't trace it") add the -pg flag to mm/kasan/tags.c to prevent conflicts with tracing. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9c4c3ce5ccfb894c7fe66d91de7c1da2787b4da4.1550602886.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-02-21kasan: fix random seed generation for tag-based modeAndrey Konovalov1-1/+1
There are two issues with assigning random percpu seeds right now: 1. We use for_each_possible_cpu() to iterate over cpus, but cpumask is not set up yet at the moment of kasan_init(), and thus we only set the seed for cpu #0. 2. A call to get_random_u32() always returns the same number and produces a message in dmesg, since the random subsystem is not yet initialized. Fix 1 by calling kasan_init_tags() after cpumask is set up. Fix 2 by using get_cycles() instead of get_random_u32(). This gives us lower quality random numbers, but it's good enough, as KASAN is meant to be used as a debugging tool and not a mitigation. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1f815cc914b61f3516ed4cc9bfd9eeca9bd5d9de.1550677973.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-02-21kasan: fix assigning tags twiceAndrey Konovalov1-12/+17
When an object is kmalloc()'ed, two hooks are called: kasan_slab_alloc() and kasan_kmalloc(). Right now we assign a tag twice, once in each of the hooks. Fix it by assigning a tag only in the former hook. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ce8c6431da735aa7ec051fd6497153df690eb021.1549921721.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-02-02kasan: mark file common so ftrace doesn't trace itAnders Roxell1-0/+1
When option CONFIG_KASAN is enabled toghether with ftrace, function ftrace_graph_caller() gets in to a recursion, via functions kasan_check_read() and kasan_check_write(). Breakpoint 2, ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179 179 mcount_get_pc x0 // function's pc (gdb) bt #0 ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179 #1 0xffffff90101406c8 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:151 #2 0xffffff90106fd084 in kasan_check_write (p=0xffffffc06c170878, size=4) at ../mm/kasan/common.c:105 #3 0xffffff90104a2464 in atomic_add_return (v=<optimized out>, i=<optimized out>) at ./include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:71 #4 atomic_inc_return (v=<optimized out>) at ./include/generated/atomic-fallback.h:284 #5 trace_graph_entry (trace=0xffffffc03f5ff380) at ../kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c:441 #6 0xffffff9010481774 in trace_graph_entry_watchdog (trace=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/trace/trace_selftest.c:741 #7 0xffffff90104a185c in function_graph_enter (ret=<optimized out>, func=<optimized out>, frame_pointer=18446743799894897728, retp=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c:196 #8 0xffffff9010140628 in prepare_ftrace_return (self_addr=18446743592948977792, parent=0xffffffc03f5ff418, frame_pointer=18446743799894897728) at ../arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c:231 #9 0xffffff90101406f4 in ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:182 Backtrace stopped: previous frame identical to this frame (corrupt stack?) (gdb) Rework so that the kasan implementation isn't traced. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181212183447.15890-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-09kasan: fix krealloc handling for tag-based modeAndrey Konovalov1-20/+43
Right now tag-based KASAN can retag the memory that is reallocated via krealloc and return a differently tagged pointer even if the same slab object gets used and no reallocated technically happens. There are a few issues with this approach. One is that krealloc callers can't rely on comparing the return value with the passed argument to check whether reallocation happened. Another is that if a caller knows that no reallocation happened, that it can access object memory through the old pointer, which leads to false positives. Look at nf_ct_ext_add() to see an example. Fix this by keeping the same tag if the memory don't actually gets reallocated during krealloc. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bb2a71d17ed072bcc528cbee46fcbd71a6da3be4.1546540962.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-09kasan, arm64: use ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN instead of manual aligningAndrey Konovalov1-2/+0
Instead of changing cache->align to be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE in kasan_cache_create() we can reuse the ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN macro. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/52ddd881916bcc153a9924c154daacde78522227.1546540962.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Suggested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-05mm: treewide: remove unused address argument from pte_alloc functionsJoel Fernandes (Google)1-1/+1
Patch series "Add support for fast mremap". This series speeds up the mremap(2) syscall by copying page tables at the PMD level even for non-THP systems. There is concern that the extra 'address' argument that mremap passes to pte_alloc may do something subtle architecture related in the future that may make the scheme not work. Also we find that there is no point in passing the 'address' to pte_alloc since its unused. This patch therefore removes this argument tree-wide resulting in a nice negative diff as well. Also ensuring along the way that the enabled architectures do not do anything funky with the 'address' argument that goes unnoticed by the optimization. Build and boot tested on x86-64. Build tested on arm64. The config enablement patch for arm64 will be posted in the future after more testing. The changes were obtained by applying the following Coccinelle script. (thanks Julia for answering all Coccinelle questions!). Following fix ups were done manually: * Removal of address argument from pte_fragment_alloc * Removal of pte_alloc_one_fast definitions from m68k and microblaze. // Options: --include-headers --no-includes // Note: I split the 'identifier fn' line, so if you are manually // running it, please unsplit it so it runs for you. virtual patch @pte_alloc_func_def depends on patch exists@ identifier E2; identifier fn =~ "^(__pte_alloc|pte_alloc_one|pte_alloc|__pte_alloc_kernel|pte_alloc_one_kernel)$"; type T2; @@ fn(... - , T2 E2 ) { ... } @pte_alloc_func_proto_noarg depends on patch exists@ type T1, T2, T3, T4; identifier fn =~ "^(__pte_alloc|pte_alloc_one|pte_alloc|__pte_alloc_kernel|pte_alloc_one_kernel)$"; @@ ( - T3 fn(T1, T2); + T3 fn(T1); | - T3 fn(T1, T2, T4); + T3 fn(T1, T2); ) @pte_alloc_func_proto depends on patch exists@ identifier E1, E2, E4; type T1, T2, T3, T4; identifier fn =~ "^(__pte_alloc|pte_alloc_one|pte_alloc|__pte_alloc_kernel|pte_alloc_one_kernel)$"; @@ ( - T3 fn(T1 E1, T2 E2); + T3 fn(T1 E1); | - T3 fn(T1 E1, T2 E2, T4 E4); + T3 fn(T1 E1, T2 E2); ) @pte_alloc_func_call depends on patch exists@ expression E2; identifier fn =~ "^(__pte_alloc|pte_alloc_one|pte_alloc|__pte_alloc_kernel|pte_alloc_one_kernel)$"; @@ fn(... -, E2 ) @pte_alloc_macro depends on patch exists@ identifier fn =~ "^(__pte_alloc|pte_alloc_one|pte_alloc|__pte_alloc_kernel|pte_alloc_one_kernel)$"; identifier a, b, c; expression e; position p; @@ ( - #define fn(a, b, c) e + #define fn(a, b) e | - #define fn(a, b) e + #define fn(a) e ) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181108181201.88826-2-joelaf@google.com Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Suggested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28mm: convert totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages variables to atomicArun KS1-1/+1
totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages are made static inline function. Main motivation was that managed_page_count_lock handling was complicating things. It was discussed in length here, https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/995739/#1181785 So it seemes better to remove the lock and convert variables to atomic, with preventing poteintial store-to-read tearing as a bonus. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542090790-21750-4-git-send-email-arunks@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org> Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28kasan: add SPDX-License-Identifier mark to source filesAndrey Konovalov8-0/+8
This patch adds a "SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0" mark to all source files under mm/kasan. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bce2d1e618afa5142e81961ab8fa4b4165337380.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28kasan: add __must_check annotations to kasan hooksAndrey Konovalov1-6/+9
This patch adds __must_check annotations to kasan hooks that return a pointer to make sure that a tagged pointer always gets propagated. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/03b269c5e453945f724bfca3159d4e1333a8fb1c.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Suggested-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-11-16 08:56:37 +0300