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Use the new one.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/de3b7ffc30a55178913a7d3865216aa7accf6c40.1515775666.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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__builtin_return_address(1) is unreliable without frame pointers.
With defconfig on kmalloc_pagealloc_invalid_free test I am getting:
BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in (null)
Pass caller PC from callers explicitly.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9b01bc2d237a4df74ff8472a3bf6b7635908de01.1514378558.git.dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>a
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "kasan: detect invalid frees".
KASAN detects double-frees, but does not detect invalid-frees (when a
pointer into a middle of heap object is passed to free). We recently had
a very unpleasant case in crypto code which freed an inner object inside
of a heap allocation. This left unnoticed during free, but totally
corrupted heap and later lead to a bunch of random crashes all over kernel
code.
Detect invalid frees.
This patch (of 5):
Detect frees of pointers into middle of large heap objects.
I dropped const from kasan_kfree_large() because it starts propagating
through a bunch of functions in kasan_report.c, slab/slub nearest_obj(),
all of their local variables, fixup_red_left(), etc.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1b45b4fe1d20fc0de1329aab674c1dd973fee723.1514378558.git.dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>a
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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clang's AddressSanitizer implementation adds redzones on either side of
alloca()ed buffers. These redzones are 32-byte aligned and at least 32
bytes long.
__asan_alloca_poison() is passed the size and address of the allocated
buffer, *excluding* the redzones on either side. The left redzone will
always be to the immediate left of this buffer; but AddressSanitizer may
need to add padding between the end of the buffer and the right redzone.
If there are any 8-byte chunks inside this padding, we should poison
those too.
__asan_allocas_unpoison() is just passed the top and bottom of the dynamic
stack area, so unpoisoning is simpler.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204191735.132544-4-paullawrence@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pointers printed with %p are now hashed by default. Kasan needs the
actual address. We can use the new printk specifier %px for this
purpose.
Use %px instead of %p to print addresses.
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
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gcc-7 produces this warning:
mm/kasan/report.c: In function 'kasan_report':
mm/kasan/report.c:351:3: error: 'info.first_bad_addr' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
print_shadow_for_address(info->first_bad_addr);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
mm/kasan/report.c:360:27: note: 'info.first_bad_addr' was declared here
The code seems fine as we only print info.first_bad_addr when there is a
shadow, and we always initialize it in that case, but this is relatively
hard for gcc to figure out after the latest rework.
Adding an intialization to the most likely value together with the other
struct members shuts up that warning.
Fixes: b235b9808664 ("kasan: unify report headers")
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9641417/
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170725152739.4176967-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Suggested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Suggested-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The helper function get_wild_bug_type() does not need to be in global
scope, so make it static.
Cleans up sparse warning:
"symbol 'get_wild_bug_type' was not declared. Should it be static?"
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622090049.10658-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Makes the report easier to read.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302134851.101218-10-andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Changes double-free report header from
BUG: Double free or freeing an invalid pointer
Unexpected shadow byte: 0xFB
to
BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in kmalloc_oob_left+0xe5/0xef
This makes a bug uniquely identifiable by the first report line. To
account for removing of the unexpected shadow value, print shadow bytes
at the end of the report as in reports for other kinds of bugs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302134851.101218-9-andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Moves page description after the stacks since it's less important.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302134851.101218-8-andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Changes slab object description from:
Object at ffff880068388540, in cache kmalloc-128 size: 128
to:
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880068388540
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address is located 123 bytes inside of
128-byte region [ffff880068388540, ffff8800683885c0)
Makes it more explanatory and adds information about relative offset of
the accessed address to the start of the object.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302134851.101218-7-andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Change report header format from:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in unwind_get_return_address+0x28a/0x2c0 at addr ffff880069437950
Read of size 8 by task insmod/3925
to:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in unwind_get_return_address+0x28a/0x2c0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff880069437950 by task insmod/3925
The exact access address is not usually important, so move it to the
second line. This also makes the header look visually balanced.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302134851.101218-6-andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Simplify logic for describing a memory address. Add addr_to_page()
helper function.
Makes the code easier to follow.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302134851.101218-5-andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Change stack traces headers from:
Allocated:
PID = 42
to:
Allocated by task 42:
Makes the report one line shorter and look better.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302134851.101218-4-andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Unify KASAN report header format for different kinds of bad memory
accesses. Makes the code simpler.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302134851.101218-3-andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "kasan: improve error reports", v2.
This patchset improves KASAN reports by making them easier to read and a
little more detailed. Also improves mm/kasan/report.c readability.
Effectively changes a use-after-free report to:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kmalloc_uaf+0xaa/0xb6 [test_kasan]
Write of size 1 at addr ffff88006aa59da8 by task insmod/3951
CPU: 1 PID: 3951 Comm: insmod Tainted: G B 4.10.0+ #84
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x292/0x398
print_address_description+0x73/0x280
kasan_report.part.2+0x207/0x2f0
__asan_report_store1_noabort+0x2c/0x30
kmalloc_uaf+0xaa/0xb6 [test_kasan]
kmalloc_tests_init+0x4f/0xa48 [test_kasan]
do_one_initcall+0xf3/0x390
do_init_module+0x215/0x5d0
load_module+0x54de/0x82b0
SYSC_init_module+0x3be/0x430
SyS_init_module+0x9/0x10
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
RIP: 0033:0x7f22cfd0b9da
RSP: 002b:00007ffe69118a78 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000555671242090 RCX: 00007f22cfd0b9da
RDX: 00007f22cffcaf88 RSI: 000000000004df7e RDI: 00007f22d0399000
RBP: 00007f22cffcaf88 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007f22cfd07d0a R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000555671243190
R13: 000000000001fe81 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 3951:
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
save_stack+0x43/0xd0
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x82/0x270
kmalloc_uaf+0x56/0xb6 [test_kasan]
kmalloc_tests_init+0x4f/0xa48 [test_kasan]
do_one_initcall+0xf3/0x390
do_init_module+0x215/0x5d0
load_module+0x54de/0x82b0
SYSC_init_module+0x3be/0x430
SyS_init_module+0x9/0x10
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Freed by task 3951:
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
save_stack+0x43/0xd0
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
kmalloc_uaf+0x85/0xb6 [test_kasan]
kmalloc_tests_init+0x4f/0xa48 [test_kasan]
do_one_initcall+0xf3/0x390
do_init_module+0x215/0x5d0
load_module+0x54de/0x82b0
SYSC_init_module+0x3be/0x430
SyS_init_module+0x9/0x10
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88006aa59da0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16 of size 16
The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of
16-byte region [ffff88006aa59da0, ffff88006aa59db0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0001aa9640 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x100000000000100(slab)
raw: 0100000000000100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180800080
raw: ffffea0001abe380 0000000700000007 ffff88006c401b40 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88006aa59c80: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc
ffff88006aa59d00: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc
>ffff88006aa59d80: fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc
^
ffff88006aa59e00: fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc
ffff88006aa59e80: fb fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc
==================================================================
from:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kmalloc_uaf+0xaa/0xb6 [test_kasan] at addr ffff88006c4dcb28
Write of size 1 by task insmod/3984
CPU: 1 PID: 3984 Comm: insmod Tainted: G B 4.10.0+ #83
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x292/0x398
kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70
kasan_report.part.1+0x20e/0x4e0
__asan_report_store1_noabort+0x2c/0x30
kmalloc_uaf+0xaa/0xb6 [test_kasan]
kmalloc_tests_init+0x4f/0xa48 [test_kasan]
do_one_initcall+0xf3/0x390
do_init_module+0x215/0x5d0
load_module+0x54de/0x82b0
SYSC_init_module+0x3be/0x430
SyS_init_module+0x9/0x10
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
RIP: 0033:0x7feca0f779da
RSP: 002b:00007ffdfeae5218 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a064c13090 RCX: 00007feca0f779da
RDX: 00007feca1236f88 RSI: 000000000004df7e RDI: 00007feca1605000
RBP: 00007feca1236f88 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007feca0f73d0a R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000055a064c14190
R13: 000000000001fe81 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000004
Object at ffff88006c4dcb20, in cache kmalloc-16 size: 16
Allocated:
PID = 3984
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
save_stack+0x43/0xd0
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x82/0x270
kmalloc_uaf+0x56/0xb6 [test_kasan]
kmalloc_tests_init+0x4f/0xa48 [test_kasan]
do_one_initcall+0xf3/0x390
do_init_module+0x215/0x5d0
load_module+0x54de/0x82b0
SYSC_init_module+0x3be/0x430
SyS_init_module+0x9/0x10
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Freed:
PID = 3984
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
save_stack+0x43/0xd0
kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0
kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
kmalloc_uaf+0x85/0xb6 [test_kasan]
kmalloc_tests_init+0x4f/0xa48 [test_kasan]
do_one_initcall+0xf3/0x390
do_init_module+0x215/0x5d0
load_module+0x54de/0x82b0
SYSC_init_module+0x3be/0x430
SyS_init_module+0x9/0x10
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88006c4dca00: fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc
ffff88006c4dca80: fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc
>ffff88006c4dcb00: fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc
^
ffff88006c4dcb80: fb fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc
ffff88006c4dcc00: fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc
==================================================================
This patch (of 9):
Introduce get_shadow_bug_type() function, which determines bug type
based on the shadow value for a particular kernel address. Introduce
get_wild_bug_type() function, which determines bug type for addresses
which don't have a corresponding shadow value.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302134851.101218-2-andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Disable kasan after the first report. There are several reasons for
this:
- Single bug quite often has multiple invalid memory accesses causing
storm in the dmesg.
- Write OOB access might corrupt metadata so the next report will print
bogus alloc/free stacktraces.
- Reports after the first easily could be not bugs by itself but just
side effects of the first one.
Given that multiple reports usually only do harm, it makes sense to
disable kasan after the first one. If user wants to see all the
reports, the boot-time parameter kasan_multi_shot must be used.
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: wrote changelog and doc, added missing include]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170323154416.30257-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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After much waiting I finally reproduced a KASAN issue, only to find my
trace-buffer empty of useful information because it got spooled out :/
Make kasan_report honour the /proc/sys/kernel/traceoff_on_warning
interface.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170125164106.3514-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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If user sets panic_on_warn, he wants kernel to panic if there is
anything barely wrong with the kernel. KASAN-detected errors are
definitely not less benign than an arbitrary kernel WARNING.
Panic after KASAN errors if panic_on_warn is set.
We use this for continuous fuzzing where we want kernel to stop and
reboot on any error.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1476694764-31986-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Gcc revision 241896 implements use-after-scope detection. Will be
available in gcc 7. Support it in KASAN.
Gcc emits 2 new callbacks to poison/unpoison large stack objects when
they go in/out of scope. Implement the callbacks and add a test.
[dvyukov@google.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1479998292-144502-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1479226045-145148-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.0+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently we just dump stack in case of double free bug.
Let's dump all info about the object that we have.
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: change double free message per Alexander]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470153654-30160-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-6-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The state of object currently tracked in two places - shadow memory, and
the ->state field in struct kasan_alloc_meta. We can get rid of the
latter. The will save us a little bit of memory. Also, this allow us
to move free stack into struct kasan_alloc_meta, without increasing
memory consumption. So now we should always know when the last time the
object was freed. This may be useful for long delayed use-after-free
bugs.
As a side effect this fixes following UBSAN warning:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in mm/kasan/quarantine.c:102:13
member access within misaligned address ffff88000d1efebc for type 'struct qlist_node'
which requires 8 byte alignment
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-5-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Reported-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Size of slab object already stored in cache->object_size.
Note, that kmalloc() internally rounds up size of allocation, so
object_size may be not equal to alloc_size, but, usually we don't need
to know the exact size of allocated object. In case if we need that
information, we still can figure it out from the report. The dump of
shadow memory allows to identify the end of allocated memory, and
thereby the exact allocation size.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-4-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
For KASAN builds:
- switch SLUB allocator to using stackdepot instead of storing the
allocation/deallocation stacks in the objects;
- change the freelist hook so that parts of the freelist can be put
into the quarantine.
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468601423-28676-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468347165-41906-3-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.
When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to
KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE. The object is poisoned and put into quarantine
instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent
access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is
able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated.
When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes
KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator. From now on the
allocator may reuse it for another allocation. Before that happens,
it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it
retains the allocation/deallocation stacks).
When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old
allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped. Therefore a use of this
object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning.
Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't
reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a
use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place.
Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.
Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues. When a
cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are
moved into the global quarantine queue. Whenever a kmalloc call allows
memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue
until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the
maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical
memory).
As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report
accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is
increased. Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse
it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect
incorrect accesses to it.
Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator.
Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. A number of improvements have been
suggested by Andrey Ryabinin.
[glider@google.com: v9]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot
will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory
chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by
handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta
structures in the allocated memory chunks.
IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary
duplication.
Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once
KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB
to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack
bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.
Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the
mm/page_owner.c debugging facility.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t]
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Add KASAN hooks to SLAB allocator.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: unified support for SLUB and SLAB
allocators" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Kernel style prefers a single string over split strings when the string is
'user-visible'.
Miscellanea:
- Add a missing newline
- Realign arguments
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> [percpu]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Currently we already taint the kernel in some cases. E.g. if we hit some
bug in slub memory we call object_err() which will taint the kernel with
TAINT_BAD_PAGE flag. But for other kind of bugs kernel left untainted.
Always taint with TAINT_BAD_PAGE if kasan found some bug. This is useful
for automated testing.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Update the reference to the kasan prototype repository on github, since it
was renamed.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
We decided to use KASAN as the short name of the tool and
KernelAddressSanitizer as the full one. Update log messages according to
that.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Makes KASAN accurately determine the type of the bad access. If the shadow
byte value is in the [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) range we can look at
the next shadow byte to determine the type of the access.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Update the names of the bad access types to better reflect the type of
the access that happended and make these error types "literals" that can
be used for classification and deduplication in scripts.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Each access with address lower than
kasan_shadow_to_mem(KASAN_SHADOW_START) is reported as user-memory-access.
This is not always true, the accessed address might not be in user space.
Fix this by reporting such accesses as null-ptr-derefs or
wild-memory-accesses.
There's another reason for this change. For userspace ASan we have a
bunch of systems that analyze error types for the purpose of
classification and deduplication. Sooner of later we will write them to
KASAN as well. Then clearly and explicitly stated error types will bring
value.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
When we end up calling kasan_report in real mode, our shadow mapping for
the spinlock variable will show poisoned. This will result in us calling
kasan_report_error with lock_report spin lock held. To prevent this
disable kasan reporting when we are priting error w.r.t kasan.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
We can't use generic functions like print_hex_dump to access kasan shadow
region. This require us to setup another kasan shadow region for the
address passed (kasan shadow address). Some architectures won't be able
to do that. Hence make a copy of the shadow region row and pass that to
generic functions.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Use is_module_address instead
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The function only disable/enable reporting. In the later patch we will be
adding a kasan early enable/disable. Rename kasan_enabled to properly
reflect its function.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Update my email address.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This feature let us to detect accesses out of bounds of global variables.
This will work as for globals in kernel image, so for globals in modules.
Currently this won't work for symbols in user-specified sections (e.g.
__init, __read_mostly, ...)
The idea of this is simple. Compiler increases each global variable by
redzone size and add constructors invoking __asan_register_globals()
function. Information about global variable (address, size, size with
redzone ...) passed to __asan_register_globals() so we could poison
variable's redzone.
This patch also forces module_alloc() to return 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned
address making shadow memory handling (
kasan_module_alloc()/kasan_module_free() ) more simple. Such alignment
guarantees that each shadow page backing modules address space correspond
to only one module_alloc() allocation.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Stack instrumentation allows to detect out of bounds memory accesses for
variables allocated on stack. Compiler adds redzones around every
variable on stack and poisons redzones in function's prologue.
Such approach significantly increases stack usage, so all in-kernel stacks
size were doubled.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated by
slub. Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as
redzone. Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by
caller number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object
(including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (inaccessible).
We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object.
There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire
size of really allocated area. Such callers could validly access whole
allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible.
Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's
metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Add kernel address sanitizer hooks to mark allocated page's addresses as
accessible in corresponding shadow region. Mark freed pages as
inaccessible.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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