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This is the 5.7.12 stable release
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
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[ Upstream commit 76be93fc0702322179bb0ea87295d820ee46ad14 ]
Previously TLP may send multiple probes of new data in one
flight. This happens when the sender is cwnd limited. After the
initial TLP containing new data is sent, the sender receives another
ACK that acks partial inflight. It may re-arm another TLP timer
to send more, if no further ACK returns before the next TLP timeout
(PTO) expires. The sender may send in theory a large amount of TLP
until send queue is depleted. This only happens if the sender sees
such irregular uncommon ACK pattern. But it is generally undesirable
behavior during congestion especially.
The original TLP design restrict only one TLP probe per inflight as
published in "Reducing Web Latency: the Virtue of Gentle Aggression",
SIGCOMM 2013. This patch changes TLP to send at most one probe
per inflight.
Note that if the sender is app-limited, TLP retransmits old data
and did not have this issue.
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5df96f2b9f58a5d2dc1f30fe7de75e197f2c25f2 upstream.
Commit adc0daad366b62ca1bce3e2958a40b0b71a8b8b3 ("dm: report suspended
device during destroy") broke integrity recalculation.
The problem is dm_suspended() returns true not only during suspend,
but also during resume. So this race condition could occur:
1. dm_integrity_resume calls queue_work(ic->recalc_wq, &ic->recalc_work)
2. integrity_recalc (&ic->recalc_work) preempts the current thread
3. integrity_recalc calls if (unlikely(dm_suspended(ic->ti))) goto unlock_ret;
4. integrity_recalc exits and no recalculating is done.
To fix this race condition, add a function dm_post_suspending that is
only true during the postsuspend phase and use it instead of
dm_suspended().
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka redhat com>
Fixes: adc0daad366b ("dm: report suspended device during destroy")
Cc: stable vger kernel org # v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e0b3e0b1a04367fc15c07f44e78361545b55357c upstream.
The !ATOMIC_IOMAP version of io_maping_init_wc will always return
success, even when the ioremap fails.
Since the ATOMIC_IOMAP version returns NULL when the init fails, and
callers check for a NULL return on error this is unexpected.
During a device probe, where the ioremap failed, a crash can look like
this:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000210000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 177 Comm:
RIP: 0010:fill_page_dma [i915]
gen8_ppgtt_create [i915]
i915_ppgtt_create [i915]
intel_gt_init [i915]
i915_gem_init [i915]
i915_driver_probe [i915]
pci_device_probe
really_probe
driver_probe_device
The remap failure occurred much earlier in the probe. If it had been
propagated, the driver would have exited with an error.
Return NULL on ioremap failure.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: detect ioremap_wc() errors earlier]
Fixes: cafaf14a5d8f ("io-mapping: Always create a struct to hold metadata about the io-mapping")
Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200721171936.81563-1-michael.j.ruhl@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3bef735ad7b7d987069181e7b58588043cbd1509 upstream.
After commit fdc85222d58e ("kernfs: kvmalloc xattr value instead of
kmalloc"), simple xattr entry is allocated with kvmalloc() instead of
kmalloc(), so we should release it with kvfree() instead of kfree().
Fixes: fdc85222d58e ("kernfs: kvmalloc xattr value instead of kmalloc")
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>
Cc: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.7]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200704051608.15043-1-cgxu519@mykernel.net
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c463bb2a8f8d7d97aa414bf7714fc77e9d3b10df ]
This event code represents the state of a removable cover of a device.
Value 0 means that the cover is open or removed, value 1 means that the
cover is closed.
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Merlijn Wajer <merlijn@wizzup.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200612125402.18393-2-merlijn@wizzup.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f88814cc2578c121e6edef686365036db72af0ed ]
Commit
bf67fad19e493b ("efi: Use more granular check for availability for variable services")
introduced a check into the efivarfs, efi-pstore and other drivers that
aborts loading of the module if not all three variable runtime services
(GetVariable, SetVariable and GetNextVariable) are supported. However, this
results in efivarfs being unavailable entirely if only SetVariable support
is missing, which is only needed if you want to make any modifications.
Also, efi-pstore and the sysfs EFI variable interface could be backed by
another implementation of the 'efivars' abstraction, in which case it is
completely irrelevant which services are supported by the EFI firmware.
So make the generic 'efivars' abstraction dependent on the availibility of
the GetVariable and GetNextVariable EFI runtime services, and add a helper
'efivar_supports_writes()' to find out whether the currently active efivars
abstraction supports writes (and wire it up to the availability of
SetVariable for the generic one).
Then, use the efivar_supports_writes() helper to decide whether to permit
efivarfs to be mounted read-write, and whether to enable efi-pstore or the
sysfs EFI variable interface altogether.
Fixes: bf67fad19e493b ("efi: Use more granular check for availability for variable services")
Reported-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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This is the 5.7.10 stable release
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
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commit bb0de3131f4c60a9bf976681e0fe4d1e55c7a821 upstream.
The sockmap code currently ignores the value of attach_bpf_fd when
detaching a program. This is contrary to the usual behaviour of
checking that attach_bpf_fd represents the currently attached
program.
Ensure that attach_bpf_fd is indeed the currently attached
program. It turns out that all sockmap selftests already do this,
which indicates that this is unlikely to cause breakage.
Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200629095630.7933-5-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6348dd291e3653534a9e28e6917569bc9967b35b upstream.
There exists a sleep-while-atomic bug while accessing the dmabuf->name
under mutex in the dmabuffs_dname(). This is caused from the SELinux
permissions checks on a process where it tries to validate the inherited
files from fork() by traversing them through iterate_fd() (which
traverse files under spin_lock) and call
match_file(security/selinux/hooks.c) where the permission checks happen.
This audit information is logged using dump_common_audit_data() where it
calls d_path() to get the file path name. If the file check happen on
the dmabuf's fd, then it ends up in ->dmabuffs_dname() and use mutex to
access dmabuf->name. The flow will be like below:
flush_unauthorized_files()
iterate_fd()
spin_lock() --> Start of the atomic section.
match_file()
file_has_perm()
avc_has_perm()
avc_audit()
slow_avc_audit()
common_lsm_audit()
dump_common_audit_data()
audit_log_d_path()
d_path()
dmabuffs_dname()
mutex_lock()--> Sleep while atomic.
Call trace captured (on 4.19 kernels) is below:
___might_sleep+0x204/0x208
__might_sleep+0x50/0x88
__mutex_lock_common+0x5c/0x1068
__mutex_lock_common+0x5c/0x1068
mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x50
dmabuffs_dname+0xa0/0x170
d_path+0x84/0x290
audit_log_d_path+0x74/0x130
common_lsm_audit+0x334/0x6e8
slow_avc_audit+0xb8/0xf8
avc_has_perm+0x154/0x218
file_has_perm+0x70/0x180
match_file+0x60/0x78
iterate_fd+0x128/0x168
selinux_bprm_committing_creds+0x178/0x248
security_bprm_committing_creds+0x30/0x48
install_exec_creds+0x1c/0x68
load_elf_binary+0x3a4/0x14e0
search_binary_handler+0xb0/0x1e0
So, use spinlock to access dmabuf->name to avoid sleep-while-atomic.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.3+]
Signed-off-by: Charan Teja Kalla <charante@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
[sumits: added comment to spinlock_t definition to avoid warning]
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/a83e7f0d-4e54-9848-4b58-e1acdbe06735@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a50ca29523b18baea548bdf5df9b4b923c2bb4f6 upstream.
This adds more hardware IDs for Elan touchpads found in various Lenovo
laptops.
Signed-off-by: Dave Wang <dave.wang@emc.com.tw>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000201d5a8bd$9fead3f0$dfc07bd0$@emc.com.tw
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 08d5470308ac3598e7709d08b8979ce6e9de8da2 upstream.
Commit 8e20fc391711 ("serial_core: Move sysrq functions from header
file") converted the inline sysrq helpers to exported functions which
are now called for every received character, interrupt and break signal
also on systems without CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ_SERIAL instead of being
optimised away by the compiler.
Inlining these helpers again also avoids the function call overhead when
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ_SERIAL is enabled (e.g. when the port is not used as
a console).
Fixes: 8e20fc391711 ("serial_core: Move sysrq functions from header file")
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200610152232.16925-3-johan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 10652a9e9fe3fbcaca090f99cd3060ac3fee2913 upstream.
This reverts commit da9a5aa3402db0ff3b57216d8dbf2478e1046cae.
In order to ease backporting a fix for a sysrq regression, revert this
rewrite which was since added on top.
The other sysrq helpers now bail out early when sysrq is not enabled;
it's better to keep that pattern here as well.
Note that the __releases() attribute won't be needed after the follow-on
fix either.
Fixes: da9a5aa3402d ("serial: core: Refactor uart_unlock_and_check_sysrq()")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200610152232.16925-2-johan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bfe373f608cf81b7626dfeb904001b0e867c5110 ]
Else there may be magic numbers in /sys/kernel/debug/block/*/state.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 14b032b8f8fce03a546dcf365454bec8c4a58d7d ]
In order for no_refcnt and is_data to be the lowest order two
bits in the 'val' we have to pad out the bitfield of the u8.
Fixes: ad0f75e5f57c ("cgroup: fix cgroup_sk_alloc() for sk_clone_lock()")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ad0f75e5f57ccbceec13274e1e242f2b5a6397ed ]
When we clone a socket in sk_clone_lock(), its sk_cgrp_data is
copied, so the cgroup refcnt must be taken too. And, unlike the
sk_alloc() path, sock_update_netprioidx() is not called here.
Therefore, it is safe and necessary to grab the cgroup refcnt
even when cgroup_sk_alloc is disabled.
sk_clone_lock() is in BH context anyway, the in_interrupt()
would terminate this function if called there. And for sk_alloc()
skcd->val is always zero. So it's safe to factor out the code
to make it more readable.
The global variable 'cgroup_sk_alloc_disabled' is used to determine
whether to take these reference counts. It is impossible to make
the reference counting correct unless we save this bit of information
in skcd->val. So, add a new bit there to record whether the socket
has already taken the reference counts. This obviously relies on
kmalloc() to align cgroup pointers to at least 4 bytes,
ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN is certainly larger than that.
This bug seems to be introduced since the beginning, commit
d979a39d7242 ("cgroup: duplicate cgroup reference when cloning sockets")
tried to fix it but not compeletely. It seems not easy to trigger until
the recent commit 090e28b229af
("netprio_cgroup: Fix unlimited memory leak of v2 cgroups") was merged.
Fixes: bd1060a1d671 ("sock, cgroup: add sock->sk_cgroup")
Reported-by: Cameron Berkenpas <cam@neo-zeon.de>
Reported-by: Peter Geis <pgwipeout@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Lu Fengqi <lufq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Daniël Sonck <dsonck92@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhang Qiang <qiang.zhang@windriver.com>
Tested-by: Cameron Berkenpas <cam@neo-zeon.de>
Tested-by: Peter Geis <pgwipeout@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 469aceddfa3ed16e17ee30533fae45e90f62efd8 ]
Toshiaki pointed out that we now have two very similar functions to extract
the L3 protocol number in the presence of VLAN tags. And Daniel pointed out
that the unbounded parsing loop makes it possible for maliciously crafted
packets to loop through potentially hundreds of tags.
Fix both of these issues by consolidating the two parsing functions and
limiting the VLAN tag parsing to a max depth of 8 tags. As part of this,
switch over __vlan_get_protocol() to use skb_header_pointer() instead of
pskb_may_pull(), to avoid the possible side effects of the latter and keep
the skb pointer 'const' through all the parsing functions.
v2:
- Use limit of 8 tags instead of 32 (matching XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT)
Reported-by: Toshiaki Makita <toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Fixes: d7bf2ebebc2b ("sched: consistently handle layer3 header accesses in the presence of VLANs")
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d7bf2ebebc2bd61ab95e2a8e33541ef282f303d4 ]
There are a couple of places in net/sched/ that check skb->protocol and act
on the value there. However, in the presence of VLAN tags, the value stored
in skb->protocol can be inconsistent based on whether VLAN acceleration is
enabled. The commit quoted in the Fixes tag below fixed the users of
skb->protocol to use a helper that will always see the VLAN ethertype.
However, most of the callers don't actually handle the VLAN ethertype, but
expect to find the IP header type in the protocol field. This means that
things like changing the ECN field, or parsing diffserv values, stops
working if there's a VLAN tag, or if there are multiple nested VLAN
tags (QinQ).
To fix this, change the helper to take an argument that indicates whether
the caller wants to skip the VLAN tags or not. When skipping VLAN tags, we
make sure to skip all of them, so behaviour is consistent even in QinQ
mode.
To make the helper usable from the ECN code, move it to if_vlan.h instead
of pkt_sched.h.
v3:
- Remove empty lines
- Move vlan variable definitions inside loop in skb_protocol()
- Also use skb_protocol() helper in IP{,6}_ECN_decapsulate() and
bpf_skb_ecn_set_ce()
v2:
- Use eth_type_vlan() helper in skb_protocol()
- Also fix code that reads skb->protocol directly
- Change a couple of 'if/else if' statements to switch constructs to avoid
calling the helper twice
Reported-by: Ilya Ponetayev <i.ponetaev@ndmsystems.com>
Fixes: d8b9605d2697 ("net: sched: fix skb->protocol use in case of accelerated vlan path")
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.7.9 stable release
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
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commit 63960260457a02af2a6cb35d75e6bdb17299c882 upstream.
When evaluating access control over kallsyms visibility, credentials at
open() time need to be used, not the "current" creds (though in BPF's
case, this has likely always been the same). Plumb access to associated
file->f_cred down through bpf_dump_raw_ok() and its callers now that
kallsysm_show_value() has been refactored to take struct cred.
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7105e828c087 ("bpf: allow for correlation of maps and helpers in dump")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 160251842cd35a75edfb0a1d76afa3eb674ff40a upstream.
In order to perform future tests against the cred saved during open(),
switch kallsyms_show_value() to operate on a cred, and have all current
callers pass current_cred(). This makes it very obvious where callers
are checking the wrong credential in their "read" contexts. These will
be fixed in the coming patches.
Additionally switch return value to bool, since it is always used as a
direct permission check, not a 0-on-success, negative-on-error style
function return.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a9b59159d338d414acaa8e2f569d129d51c76452 ]
To ensure btf_ctx_access() is safe the verifier checks that the BTF
arg type is an int, enum, or pointer. When the function does the
BTF arg lookup it uses the calculation 'arg = off / 8' using the
fact that registers are 8B. This requires that the first arg is
in the first reg, the second in the second, and so on. However,
for __int128 the arg will consume two registers by default LLVM
implementation. So this will cause the arg layout assumed by the
'arg = off / 8' calculation to be incorrect.
Because __int128 is uncommon this patch applies the easiest fix and
will force int types to be sizeof(u64) or smaller so that they will
fit in a single register.
v2: remove unneeded parens per Andrii's feedback
Fixes: 9e15db66136a1 ("bpf: Implement accurate raw_tp context access via BTF")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/159303723962.11287.13309537171132420717.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 23e390cdbe6f85827a43d38f9288dcd3066fa376 ]
inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 to indicate the acceptance of the xattr
and 1 to reject it. If the LSM does not know about the xattr, it's
expected to return -EOPNOTSUPP, which is the correct default value for
this hook. BPF LSM, currently, uses 0 as the default value and thereby
falsely allows all overlay fs xattributes to be copied up.
The iteration logic is also updated from the "bail-on-fail"
call_int_hook to continue on the non-decisive -EOPNOTSUPP and bail out
on other values.
Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e91b48162332480f5840902268108bb7fb7a44c7 ]
So that the target task will exit the wait_event_interruptible-like
loop and call task_work_run() asap.
The patch turns "bool notify" into 0,TWA_RESUME,TWA_SIGNAL enum, the
new TWA_SIGNAL flag implies signal_wake_up(). However, it needs to
avoid the race with recalc_sigpending(), so the patch also adds the
new JOBCTL_TASK_WORK bit included in JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK.
TODO: once this patch is merged we need to change all current users
of task_work_add(notify = true) to use TWA_RESUME.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Linux 5.7.7
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
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This commit adds Intel PECI client driver.
OpenBMC-Staging-Count: 2
Signed-off-by: Jae Hyun Yoo <jae.hyun.yoo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
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This commit adds driver implementation for PECI bus core into linux
driver framework.
PECI (Platform Environment Control Interface) is a one-wire bus interface
that provides a communication channel from Intel processors and chipset
components to external monitoring or control devices. PECI is designed to
support the following sideband functions:
* Processor and DRAM thermal management
- Processor fan speed control is managed by comparing Digital Thermal
Sensor (DTS) thermal readings acquired via PECI against the
processor-specific fan speed control reference point, or TCONTROL. Both
TCONTROL and DTS thermal readings are accessible via the processor PECI
client. These variables are referenced to a common temperature, the TCC
activation point, and are both defined as negative offsets from that
reference.
- PECI based access to the processor package configuration space provides
a means for Baseboard Management Controllers (BMC) or other platform
management devices to actively manage the processor and memory power
and thermal features.
* Platform Manageability
- Platform manageability functions including thermal, power, and error
monitoring. Note that platform 'power' management includes monitoring
and control for both the processor and DRAM subsystem to assist with
data center power limiting.
- PECI allows read access to certain error registers in the processor MSR
space and status monitoring registers in the PCI configuration space
within the processor and downstream devices.
- PECI permits writes to certain registers in the processor PCI
configuration space.
* Processor Interface Tuning and Diagnostics
- Processor interface tuning and diagnostics capabilities
(Intel Interconnect BIST). The processors Intel Interconnect Built In
Self Test (Intel IBIST) allows for infield diagnostic capabilities in
the Intel UPI and memory controller interfaces. PECI provides a port to
execute these diagnostics via its PCI Configuration read and write
capabilities.
* Failure Analysis
- Output the state of the processor after a failure for analysis via
Crashdump.
PECI uses a single wire for self-clocking and data transfer. The bus
requires no additional control lines. The physical layer is a self-clocked
one-wire bus that begins each bit with a driven, rising edge from an idle
level near zero volts. The duration of the signal driven high depends on
whether the bit value is a logic '0' or logic '1'. PECI also includes
variable data transfer rate established with every message. In this way, it
is highly flexible even though underlying logic is simple.
The interface design was optimized for interfacing between an Intel
processor and chipset components in both single processor and multiple
processor environments. The single wire interface provides low board
routing overhead for the multiple load connections in the congested routing
area near the processor and chipset components. Bus speed, error checking,
and low protocol overhead provides adequate link bandwidth and reliability
to transfer critical device operating conditions and configuration
information.
This implementation provides the basic framework to add PECI extensions to
the Linux bus and device models. A hardware specific 'Adapter' driver can
be attached to the PECI bus to provide sideband functions described above.
It is also possible to access all devices on an adapter from userspace
through the /dev interface. A device specific 'Client' driver also can be
attached to the PECI bus so each processor client's features can be
supported by the 'Client' driver through an adapter connection in the bus.
OpenBMC-Staging-Count: 2
Signed-off-by: Jason M Biils <jason.m.bills@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yunge Zhu <yunge.zhu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jae Hyun Yoo <jae.hyun.yoo@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Haiyue Wang <haiyue.wang@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Feist <james.feist@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Vernon Mauery <vernon.mauery@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
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commit 8e742aa79780b13cd300a42198c1a4cea9c89905 upstream.
After the commit below, truncate() on x86 32bit uses ksys_ftruncate(). But
ksys_ftruncate() truncates the offset to unsigned long.
Switch the type of offset to loff_t which is what do_sys_ftruncate()
expects.
Fixes: 121b32a58a3a (x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments)
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200610114851.28549-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 97dd1abd026ae4e6a82fa68645928404ad483409 ]
qed_chain_get_element_left{,_u32} returned 0 when the difference
between producer and consumer page count was equal to the total
page count.
Fix this by conditional expanding of producer value (vs
unconditional). This allowed to eliminate normalizaton against
total page count, which was the cause of this bug.
Misc: replace open-coded constants with common defines.
Fixes: a91eb52abb50 ("qed: Revisit chain implementation")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Kalderon <michal.kalderon@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 16ecf10e815d70d11d2300243f4a3b4c7c5acac7 ]
When using first-level translation for IOVA, currently the U/S bit in the
page table is cleared which implies DMA requests with user privilege are
blocked. As the result, following error messages might be observed when
passing through a device to user level:
DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 3
DMAR: [DMA Read] Request device [41:00.0] PASID 1 fault addr 7ecdcd000
[fault reason 129] SM: U/S set 0 for first-level translation
with user privilege
This fixes it by setting U/S bit in the first level page table and makes
IOVA over first level compatible with previous second-level translation.
Fixes: b802d070a52a1 ("iommu/vt-d: Use iova over first level")
Reported-by: Xin Zeng <xin.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200622231345.29722-3-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7dfc06a0f25b593a9f51992f540c0f80a57f3629 ]
It is possible that the first event in the event log is not actually a
log header at all, but rather a normal event. This leads to the cast in
__calc_tpm2_event_size being an invalid conversion, which means that
the values read are effectively garbage. Depending on the first event's
contents, this leads either to apparently normal behaviour, a crash or
a freeze.
While this behaviour of the firmware is not in accordance with the
TCG Client EFI Specification, this happens on a Dell Precision 5510
with the TPM enabled but hidden from the OS ("TPM On" disabled, state
otherwise untouched). The EFI firmware claims that the TPM is present
and active and that it supports the TCG 2.0 event log format.
Fortunately, this can be worked around by simply checking the header
of the first event and the event log header signature itself.
Commit b4f1874c6216 ("tpm: check event log version before reading final
events") addressed a similar issue also found on Dell models.
Fixes: 6b0326190205 ("efi: Attempt to get the TCG2 event log in the boot stub")
Signed-off-by: Fabian Vogt <fvogt@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1927248.evlx2EsYKh@linux-e202.suse.de
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1165773
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fb7861d14c8d7edac65b2fcb6e8031cb138457b2 ]
In the current code, ->ndo_start_xmit() can be executed recursively only
10 times because of stack memory.
But, in the case of the vxlan, 10 recursion limit value results in
a stack overflow.
In the current code, the nested interface is limited by 8 depth.
There is no critical reason that the recursion limitation value should
be 10.
So, it would be good to be the same value with the limitation value of
nesting interface depth.
Test commands:
ip link add vxlan10 type vxlan vni 10 dstport 4789 srcport 4789 4789
ip link set vxlan10 up
ip a a 192.168.10.1/24 dev vxlan10
ip n a 192.168.10.2 dev vxlan10 lladdr fc:22:33:44:55:66 nud permanent
for i in {9..0}
do
let A=$i+1
ip link add vxlan$i type vxlan vni $i dstport 4789 srcport 4789 4789
ip link set vxlan$i up
ip a a 192.168.$i.1/24 dev vxlan$i
ip n a 192.168.$i.2 dev vxlan$i lladdr fc:22:33:44:55:66 nud permanent
bridge fdb add fc:22:33:44:55:66 dev vxlan$A dst 192.168.$i.2 self
done
hping3 192.168.10.2 -2 -d 60000
Splat looks like:
[ 103.814237][ T1127] =============================================================================
[ 103.871955][ T1127] BUG kmalloc-2k (Tainted: G B ): Padding overwritten. 0x00000000897a2e4f-0x000
[ 103.873187][ T1127] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 103.873187][ T1127]
[ 103.874252][ T1127] INFO: Slab 0x000000005cccc724 objects=5 used=5 fp=0x0000000000000000 flags=0x10000000001020
[ 103.881323][ T1127] CPU: 3 PID: 1127 Comm: hping3 Tainted: G B 5.7.0+ #575
[ 103.882131][ T1127] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 103.883006][ T1127] Call Trace:
[ 103.883324][ T1127] dump_stack+0x96/0xdb
[ 103.883716][ T1127] slab_err+0xad/0xd0
[ 103.884106][ T1127] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30
[ 103.884620][ T1127] ? get_partial_node.isra.78+0x140/0x360
[ 103.885214][ T1127] slab_pad_check.part.53+0xf7/0x160
[ 103.885769][ T1127] ? pskb_expand_head+0x110/0xe10
[ 103.886316][ T1127] check_slab+0x97/0xb0
[ 103.886763][ T1127] alloc_debug_processing+0x84/0x1a0
[ 103.887308][ T1127] ___slab_alloc+0x5a5/0x630
[ 103.887765][ T1127] ? pskb_expand_head+0x110/0xe10
[ 103.888265][ T1127] ? lock_downgrade+0x730/0x730
[ 103.888762][ T1127] ? pskb_expand_head+0x110/0xe10
[ 103.889244][ T1127] ? __slab_alloc+0x3e/0x80
[ 103.889675][ T1127] __slab_alloc+0x3e/0x80
[ 103.890108][ T1127] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xc7/0x420
[ ... ]
Fixes: 11a766ce915f ("net: Increase xmit RECURSION_LIMIT to 10.")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9b38cc704e844e41d9cf74e647bff1d249512cb3 upstream.
Ziqian reported lockup when adding retprobe on _raw_spin_lock_irqsave.
My test was also able to trigger lockdep output:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
5.6.0-rc6+ #6 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
sched-messaging/2767 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff9a492798 (&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff9a491a18 (&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock));
lock(&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock));
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
1 lock held by sched-messaging/2767:
#0: ffffffff9a491a18 (&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 PID: 2767 Comm: sched-messaging Not tainted 5.6.0-rc6+ #6
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x96/0xe0
__lock_acquire.cold.57+0x173/0x2b7
? native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x42b/0x9e0
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x590/0x590
? __lock_acquire+0xf63/0x4030
lock_acquire+0x15a/0x3d0
? kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x36/0x70
? kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
trampoline_handler+0xf8/0x940
? kprobe_fault_handler+0x380/0x380
? find_held_lock+0x3a/0x1c0
kretprobe_trampoline+0x25/0x50
? lock_acquired+0x392/0xbc0
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70
? __get_valid_kprobe+0x1f0/0x1f0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3b/0x40
? finish_task_switch+0x4b9/0x6d0
? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
The code within the kretprobe handler checks for probe reentrancy,
so we won't trigger any _raw_spin_lock_irqsave probe in there.
The problem is in outside kprobe_flush_task, where we call:
kprobe_flush_task
kretprobe_table_lock
raw_spin_lock_irqsave
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave
where _raw_spin_lock_irqsave triggers the kretprobe and installs
kretprobe_trampoline handler on _raw_spin_lock_irqsave return.
The kretprobe_trampoline handler is then executed with already
locked kretprobe_table_locks, and first thing it does is to
lock kretprobe_table_locks ;-) the whole lockup path like:
kprobe_flush_task
kretprobe_table_lock
raw_spin_lock_irqsave
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave ---> probe triggered, kretprobe_trampoline installed
---> kretprobe_table_locks locked
kretprobe_trampoline
trampoline_handler
kretprobe_hash_lock(current, &head, &flags); <--- deadlock
Adding kprobe_busy_begin/end helpers that mark code with fake
probe installed to prevent triggering of another kprobe within
this code.
Using these helpers in kprobe_flush_task, so the probe recursion
protection check is hit and the probe is never set to prevent
above lockup.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/158927059835.27680.7011202830041561604.stgit@devnote2
Fixes: ef53d9c5e4da ("kprobes: improve kretprobe scalability with hashed locking")
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A . R . Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Cc: "Naveen N . Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: "Ziqian SUN (Zamir)" <zsun@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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handlers
commit 7b97d868b7ab2448859668de9222b8af43f76e78 upstream.
In the ext4 filesystem with errors=panic, if one process is recording
errno in the superblock when invoking jbd2_journal_abort() due to some
error cases, it could be raced by another __ext4_abort() which is
setting the SB_RDONLY flag but missing panic because errno has not been
recorded.
jbd2_journal_commit_transaction()
jbd2_journal_abort()
journal->j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT;
jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno()
| ext4_journal_check_start()
| __ext4_abort()
| sb->s_flags |= SB_RDONLY;
| if (!JBD2_REC_ERR)
| return;
journal->j_flags |= JBD2_REC_ERR;
Finally, it will no longer trigger panic because the filesystem has
already been set read-only. Fix this by introduce j_abort_mutex to make
sure journal abort is completed before panic, and remove JBD2_REC_ERR
flag.
Fixes: 4327ba52afd03 ("ext4, jbd2: ensure entering into panic after recording an error in superblock")
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200609073540.3810702-1-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b5292111de9bb70cba3489075970889765302136 ]
Commit 130f4caf145c ("libata: Ensure ata_port probe has completed before
detach") may cause system freeze during suspend.
Using async_synchronize_full() in PM callbacks is wrong, since async
callbacks that are already scheduled may wait for not-yet-scheduled
callbacks, causes a circular dependency.
Instead of using big hammer like async_synchronize_full(), use async
cookie to make sure port probe are synced, without affecting other
scheduled PM callbacks.
Fixes: 130f4caf145c ("libata: Ensure ata_port probe has completed before detach")
Suggested-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Tested-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1867983
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3a39e778690500066b31fe982d18e2e394d3bce2 ]
Use the following command to test nfsv4(size of file1M is 1MB):
mount -t nfs -o vers=4.0,actimeo=60 127.0.0.1/dir1 /mnt
cp file1M /mnt
du -h /mnt/file1M -->0 within 60s, then 1M
When write is done(cp file1M /mnt), will call this:
nfs_writeback_done
nfs4_write_done
nfs4_write_done_cb
nfs_writeback_update_inode
nfs_post_op_update_inode_force_wcc_locked(change, ctime, mtime
nfs_post_op_update_inode_force_wcc_locked
nfs_set_cache_invalid
nfs_refresh_inode_locked
nfs_update_inode
nfsd write response contains change, ctime, mtime, the flag will be
clear after nfs_update_inode. Howerver, write response does not contain
space_used, previous open response contains space_used whose value is 0,
so inode->i_blocks is still 0.
nfs_getattr -->called by "du -h"
do_update |= force_sync || nfs_attribute_cache_expired -->false in 60s
cache_validity = READ_ONCE(NFS_I(inode)->cache_validity)
do_update |= cache_validity & (NFS_INO_INVALID_ATTR -->false
if (do_update) {
__nfs_revalidate_inode
}
Within 60s, does not send getattr request to nfsd, thus "du -h /mnt/file1M"
is 0.
Add a NFS_INO_INVALID_BLOCKS flag, set it when nfsv4 write is done.
Fixes: 16e143751727 ("NFS: More fine grained attribute tracking")
Signed-off-by: Zheng Bin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bd93f003b7462ae39a43c531abca37fe7073b866 ]
Clang normally does not warn about certain issues in inline functions when
it only happens in an eliminated code path. However if something else
goes wrong, it does tend to complain about the definition of hweight_long()
on 32-bit targets:
include/linux/bitops.h:75:41: error: shift count >= width of type [-Werror,-Wshift-count-overflow]
return sizeof(w) == 4 ? hweight32(w) : hweight64(w);
^~~~~~~~~~~~
include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:29:49: note: expanded from macro 'hweight64'
define hweight64(w) (__builtin_constant_p(w) ? __const_hweight64(w) : __arch_hweight64(w))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:21:76: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight64'
define __const_hweight64(w) (__const_hweight32(w) + __const_hweight32((w) >> 32))
^ ~~
include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:20:49: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight32'
define __const_hweight32(w) (__const_hweight16(w) + __const_hweight16((w) >> 16))
^
include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:19:72: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight16'
define __const_hweight16(w) (__const_hweight8(w) + __const_hweight8((w) >> 8 ))
^
include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:12:9: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight8'
(!!((w) & (1ULL << 2))) + \
Adding an explicit cast to __u64 avoids that warning and makes it easier
to read other output.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200505135513.65265-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3234ac664a870e6ea69ae3a57d824cd7edbeacc5 ]
Close the hole of holding a mapping over kernel driver takeover event of
a given address range.
Commit 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
introduced CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM with the goal of protecting the
kernel against scenarios where a /dev/mem user tramples memory that a
kernel driver owns. However, this protection only prevents *new* read(),
write() and mmap() requests. Established mappings prior to the driver
calling request_mem_region() are left alone.
Especially with persistent memory, and the core kernel metadata that is
stored there, there are plentiful scenarios for a /dev/mem user to
violate the expectations of the driver and cause amplified damage.
Teach request_mem_region() to find and shoot down active /dev/mem
mappings that it believes it has successfully claimed for the exclusive
use of the driver. Effectively a driver call to request_mem_region()
becomes a hole-punch on the /dev/mem device.
The typical usage of unmap_mapping_range() is part of
truncate_pagecache() to punch a hole in a file, but in this case the
implementation is only doing the "first half" of a hole punch. Namely it
is just evacuating current established mappings of the "hole", and it
relies on the fact that /dev/mem establishes mappings in terms of
absolute physical address offsets. Once existing mmap users are
invalidated they can attempt to re-establish the mapping, or attempt to
continue issuing read(2) / write(2) to the invalidated extent, but they
will then be subject to the CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM checking that can
block those subsequent accesses.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159009507306.847224.8502634072429766747.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 97eda5dcc2cde5dcc778bef7a9344db3b6bf8ef5 ]
When STMFX supply is stopped, spurious interrupt can occur. To avoid that,
disable the interrupt in suspend before disabling the regulator and
re-enable it at the end of resume.
Fixes: 06252ade9156 ("mfd: Add ST Multi-Function eXpander (STMFX) core driver")
Signed-off-by: Amelie Delaunay <amelie.delaunay@st.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5d363120aa548ba52d58907a295eee25f8207ed2 ]
This patch adds new config_ep_by_speed_and_alt function which
extends the config_ep_by_speed about alt parameter.
This additional parameter allows to find proper usb_ss_ep_comp_descriptor.
Problem has appeared during testing f_tcm (BOT/UAS) driver function.
f_tcm function for SS use array of headers for both BOT/UAS alternate
setting:
static struct usb_descriptor_header *uasp_ss_function_desc[] = {
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &bot_intf_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_ss_bi_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &bot_bi_ep_comp_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_ss_bo_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &bot_bo_ep_comp_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_intf_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_ss_bi_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_bi_ep_comp_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_bi_pipe_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_ss_bo_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_bo_ep_comp_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_bo_pipe_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_ss_status_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_status_in_ep_comp_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_status_pipe_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_ss_cmd_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_cmd_comp_desc,
(struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_cmd_pipe_desc,
NULL,
};
The first 5 descriptors are associated with BOT alternate setting,
and others are associated with UAS.
During handling UAS alternate setting f_tcm driver invokes
config_ep_by_speed and this function sets incorrect companion endpoint
descriptor in usb_ep object.
Instead setting ep->comp_desc to uasp_bi_ep_comp_desc function in this
case set ep->comp_desc to uasp_ss_bi_desc.
This is due to the fact that it searches endpoint based on endpoint
address:
for_each_ep_desc(speed_desc, d_spd) {
chosen_desc = (struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *)*d_spd;
if (chosen_desc->bEndpoitAddress == _ep->address)
goto ep_found;
}
And in result it uses the descriptor from BOT alternate setting
instead UAS.
Finally, it causes that controller driver during enabling endpoints
detect that just enabled endpoint for bot.
Signed-off-by: Jayshri Pawar <jpawar@cadence.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawel Laszczak <pawell@cadence.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d375b356e687f2eefb51ddc3f1f2414cfa498f86 ]
On some systems the firmware may not describe all the ports
connected to a component (e.g, for security reasons). This
could be especially problematic for "funnels" where we could
end up in modifying memory beyond the allocated space for
refcounts.
e.g, for a funnel with input ports listed 0, 3, 5, nr_inport = 3.
However the we could access refcnts[5] while checking for
references, like :
[ 526.110401] ==================================================================
[ 526.117988] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in funnel_enable+0x54/0x1b0
[ 526.124706] Read of size 4 at addr ffffff8135f9549c by task bash/1114
[ 526.131324]
[ 526.132886] CPU: 3 PID: 1114 Comm: bash Tainted: G S 5.4.25 #232
[ 526.140397] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SC7180 IDP (DT)
[ 526.147113] Call trace:
[ 526.149653] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x188
[ 526.153431] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[ 526.156852] dump_stack+0xdc/0x144
[ 526.160370] print_address_description+0x3c/0x494
[ 526.165211] __kasan_report+0x144/0x168
[ 526.169170] kasan_report+0x10/0x18
[ 526.172769] check_memory_region+0x1a4/0x1b4
[ 526.177164] __kasan_check_read+0x18/0x24
[ 526.181292] funnel_enable+0x54/0x1b0
[ 526.185072] coresight_enable_path+0x104/0x198
[ 526.189649] coresight_enable+0x118/0x26c
...
[ 526.237782] Allocated by task 280:
[ 526.241298] __kasan_kmalloc+0xf0/0x1ac
[ 526.245249] kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14
[ 526.248849] __kmalloc+0x28c/0x3b4
[ 526.252361] coresight_register+0x88/0x250
[ 526.256587] funnel_probe+0x15c/0x228
[ 526.260365] dynamic_funnel_probe+0x20/0x2c
[ 526.264679] amba_probe+0xbc/0x158
[ 526.268193] really_probe+0x144/0x408
[ 526.271970] driver_probe_device+0x70/0x140
...
[ 526.316810]
[ 526.318364] Freed by task 0:
[ 526.321344] (stack is not available)
[ 526.325024]
[ 526.326580] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff8135f95480
[ 526.326580] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
[ 526.339439] The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of
[ 526.339439] 128-byte region [ffffff8135f95480, ffffff8135f95500)
[ 526.351399] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 526.356342] page:ffffffff04b7e500 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffffff814b00c380 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 526.366711] flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head)
[ 526.371475] raw: 4000000000010200 ffffffff05034008 ffffffff0501eb08 ffffff814b00c380
[ 526.379435] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 526.387393] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 526.393128]
[ 526.394681] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 526.399619] ffffff8135f95380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 526.407046] ffffff8135f95400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 526.414473] >ffffff8135f95480: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 526.421900] ^
[ 526.426029] ffffff8135f95500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 526.433456] ffffff8135f95580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 526.440883] ==================================================================
To keep the code simple, we now track the maximum number of
possible input/output connections to/from this component
@ nr_inport and nr_outport in platform_data, respectively.
Thus the output connections could be sparse and code is
adjusted to skip the unspecified connections.
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org>
Tested-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org>
Tested-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200518180242.7916-13-mathieu.poirier@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3c73bc52195def14165c3a7d91bdbb33b51725f5 ]
The threaded interrupt handler may still be called after the
usb_gadget_disconnect is called, it causes the structures used
at interrupt handler was freed before it uses, eg the
usb_request. This issue usually occurs we remove the udc function
during the transfer. Below is the example when doing stress
test for android switch function, the EP0's request is freed
by .unbind (configfs_composite_unbind -> composite_dev_cleanup),
but the threaded handler accesses this request during handling
setup packet request.
In fact, there is no protection between unbind the udc
and udc interrupt handling, so we have to avoid the interrupt
handler is occurred or scheduled during the .unbind flow.
init: Sending signal 9 to service 'adbd' (pid 18077) process group...
android_work: did not send uevent (0 0 000000007bec2039)
libprocessgroup: Successfully killed process cgroup uid 0 pid 18077 in 6ms
init: Service 'adbd' (pid 18077) received signal 9
init: Sending signal 9 to service 'adbd' (pid 18077) process group...
libprocessgroup: Successfully killed process cgroup uid 0 pid 18077 in 0ms
init: processing action (init.svc.adbd=stopped) from (/init.usb.configfs.rc:14)
init: Received control message 'start' for 'adbd' from pid: 399 (/vendor/bin/hw/android.hardware.usb@1.
init: starting service 'adbd'...
read descriptors
read strings
Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 000000000000002a
android_work: sent uevent USB_STATE=CONNECTED
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x96000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
CM = 0, WnR = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000e97f1000
using random self ethernet address
[000000000000002a] pgd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 232 Comm: irq/68-5b110000 Not tainted 5.4.24-06075-g94a6b52b5815 #92
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP MEK (DT)
pstate: 00400085 (nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO)
using random host ethernet address
pc : composite_setup+0x5c/0x1730
lr : android_setup+0xc0/0x148
sp : ffff80001349bba0
x29: ffff80001349bba0 x28: ffff00083a50da00
x27: ffff8000124e6000 x26: ffff800010177950
x25: 0000000000000040 x24: ffff000834e18010
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
x21: ffff00083a50da00 x20: ffff00082e75ec40
x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000001
x11: ffff80001180fb58 x10: 0000000000000040
x9 : ffff8000120fc980 x8 : 0000000000000000
x7 : ffff00083f98df50 x6 : 0000000000000100
x5 : 00000307e8978431 x4 : ffff800011386788
x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff800012342000
x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff800010c6d3a0
Call trace:
composite_setup+0x5c/0x1730
android_setup+0xc0/0x148
cdns3_ep0_delegate_req+0x64/0x90
cdns3_check_ep0_interrupt_proceed+0x384/0x738
cdns3_device_thread_irq_handler+0x124/0x6e0
cdns3_thread_irq+0x94/0xa0
irq_thread_fn+0x30/0xa0
irq_thread+0x150/0x248
kthread+0xfc/0x128
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Code: 910e8000 f9400693 12001ed7 79400f79 (3940aa61)
---[ end trace c685db37f8773fba ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
Kernel Offset: disabled
CPU features: 0x0002,20002008
Memory Limit: none
Rebooting in 5 seconds..
Reviewed-by: Jun Li <jun.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 24c5efe41c29ee3e55bcf5a1c9f61ca8709622e8 upstream.
gss_mech_register() calls svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor() for each
flavour, but gss_mech_unregister() does not call auth_domain_put().
This is unbalanced and makes it impossible to reload the module.
Change svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor() to return the registered
auth_domain, and save it for later release.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v2.6.12+)
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206651
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 46d26819a5056f4831649c5887ad5c71a16d86f7 upstream.
Sometimes it is better to unregister individual nodes instead of trying
to do them all at once with software_node_unregister_nodes(), so create
software_node_unregister() so that you can unregister them one at a
time.
This is especially important when creating nodes in a hierarchy, with
parent -> children representations. Children always need to be removed
before a parent is, as the swnode logic assumes this is going to be the
case.
Fix up the lib/test_printf.c fwnode_pointer() test which to use this new
function as it had the problem of tearing things down in the backwards
order.
Fixes: f1ce39df508d ("lib/test_printf: Add tests for %pfw printk modifier")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200524153041.2361-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4fda230ecddc2573ed88632e98b69b0b9b68c0ad upstream.
Sub-devices of a real DMA device might exist on a separate segment than
the real DMA device and its IOMMU. These devices should still have a
valid device_domain_info, but the current dma alias model won't
allocate info for the subdevice.
This patch adds a segment member to struct device_domain_info and uses
the sub-device's BDF so that these sub-devices won't alias to other
devices.
Fixes: 2b0140c69637e ("iommu/vt-d: Use pci_real_dma_dev() for mapping")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.6+
Signed-off-by: Jon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>
Acked-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200527165617.297470-3-jonathan.derrick@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a4e91825d7e1252f7cba005f1451e5464b23c15d ]
Add PCI IDs for AMD Renoir (4000-series Ryzen CPUs). This is necessary
to enable support for temperature sensors via the k10temp module.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200510204842.2603-2-amonakov@ispras.ru
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 62a7f3009a460001eb46984395280dd900bc4ef4 ]
Move the IDs to pci_ids.h so it can be used by next patch.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200508065343.32751-1-kai.heng.feng@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 3d060856adfc59afb9d029c233141334cfaba418 upstream.
Initializing struct pages is a long task and keeping interrupts disabled
for the duration of this operation introduces a number of problems.
1. jiffies are not updated for long period of time, and thus incorrect time
is reported. See proposed solution and discussion here:
lkml/20200311123848.118638-1-shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com
2. It prevents farther improving deferred page initialization by allowing
intra-node multi-threading.
We are keeping interrupts disabled to solve a rather theoretical problem
that was never observed in real world (See 3a2d7fa8a3d5).
Let's keep interrupts enabled. In case we ever encounter a scenario where
an interrupt thread wants to allocate large amount of memory this early in
boot we can deal with that by growing zone (see deferred_grow_zone()) by
the needed amount before starting deferred_init_memmap() threads.
Before:
[ 1.232459] node 0 initialised, 12058412 pages in 1ms
After:
[ 1.632580] node 0 initialised, 12051227 pages in 436ms
Fixes: 3a2d7fa8a3d5 ("mm: disable interrupts while initializing deferred pages")
Reported-by: Shile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: Yiqian Wei <yiwei@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.17+]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200403140952.17177-3-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 47227d27e2fcb01a9e8f5958d8997cf47a820afc ]
The memcmp KASAN self-test fails on a kernel with both KASAN and
FORTIFY_SOURCE.
When FORTIFY_SOURCE is on, a number of functions are replaced with
fortified versions, which attempt to check the sizes of the operands.
However, these functions often directly invoke __builtin_foo() once they
have performed the fortify check. Using __builtins may bypass KASAN
checks if the compiler decides to inline it's own implementation as
sequence of instructions, rather than emit a function call that goes out
to a KASAN-instrumented implementation.
Why is only memcmp affected?
============================
Of the string and string-like functions that kasan_test tests, only memcmp
is replaced by an inline sequence of instructions in my testing on x86
with gcc version 9.2.1 20191008 (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2).
I believe this is due to compiler heuristics. For example, if I annotate
kmalloc calls with the alloc_size annotation (and disable some fortify
compile-time checking!), the compiler will replace every memset except the
one in kmalloc_uaf_memset with inline instructions. (I have some WIP
patches to add this annotation.)
Does this affect other functions in string.h?
=============================================
Yes. Anything that uses __builtin_* rather than __real_* could be
affected. This looks like:
- strncpy
- strcat
- strlen
- strlcpy maybe, under some circumstances?
- strncat under some circumstances
- memset
- memcpy
- memmove
- memcmp (as noted)
- memchr
- strcpy
Whether a function call is emitted always depends on the compiler. Most
bugs should get caught by FORTIFY_SOURCE, but the missed memcmp test shows
that this is not always the case.
Isn't FORTIFY_SOURCE disabled with KASAN?
========================================-
The string headers on all arches supporting KASAN disable fortify with
kasan, but only when address sanitisation is _also_ disabled. For example
from x86:
#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && !defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__)
/*
* For files that are not instrumented (e.g. mm/slub.c) we
* should use not instrumented version of mem* functions.
*/
#define memcpy(dst, src, len) __memcpy(dst, src, len)
#define memmove(dst, src, len) __memmove(dst, src, len)
#define memset(s, c, n) __memset(s, c, n)
#ifndef __NO_FORTIFY
#define __NO_FORTIFY /* FORTIFY_SOURCE uses __builtin_memcpy, etc. */
#endif
#endif
This comes from commit 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the
option of fortified string.h functions"), and doesn't work when KASAN is
enabled and the file is supposed to be sanitised - as with test_kasan.c
I'm pretty sure this is not wrong, but not as expansive it should be:
* we shouldn't use __builtin_memcpy etc in files where we don't have
instrumentation - it could devolve into a function call to memcpy,
which will be instrumented. Rather, we should use __memcpy which
by convention is not instrumented.
* we also shouldn't be using __builtin_memcpy when we have a KASAN
instrumented file, because it could be replaced with inline asm
that will not be instrumented.
What is correct behaviour?
==========================
Firstly, there is some overlap between fortification and KASAN: both
provide some level of _runtime_ checking. Only fortify provides
compile-time checking.
KASAN and fortify can pick up different things at runtime:
- Some fortify functions, notably the string functions, could easily be
modified to consider sub-object sizes (e.g. members within a struct),
and I have some WIP patches to do this. KASAN cannot detect these
because it cannot insert poision between members of a struct.
- KASAN can detect many over-reads/over-writes when the sizes of both
operands are unknown, which fortify cannot.
So there are a couple of options:
1) Flip the test: disable fortify in santised files and enable it in
unsanitised files. This at least stops us missing KASAN checking, but
we lose the fortify checking.
2) Make the fortify code always call out to real versions. Do this only
for KASAN, for fear of losing the inlining opportunities we get from
__builtin_*.
(We can't use kasan_check_{read,write}: because the fortify functions are
_extern inline_, you can't include _static_ inline functions without a
compiler warning. kasan_check_{read,write} are static inline so we can't
use them even when they would otherwise be suitable.)
Take approach 2 and call out to real versions when KASAN is enabled.
Use __underlying_foo to distinguish from __real_foo: __real_foo always
refers to the kernel's implementation of foo, __underlying_foo could be
either the kernel implementation or the __builtin_foo implementation.
This is sometimes enough to make the memcmp test succeed with
FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled. It is at least enough to get the function call
into the module. One more fix is needed to make it reliable: see the next
patch.
Fixes: 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200423154503.5103-3-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 836e66c218f355ec01ba57671c85abf32961dcea ]
Lorenz recently reported:
In our TC classifier cls_redirect [0], we use the following sequence of
helper calls to decapsulate a GUE (basically IP + UDP + custom header)
encapsulated packet:
bpf_skb_adjust_room(skb, -encap_len, BPF_ADJ_ROOM_MAC, BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO)
bpf_redirect(skb->ifindex, BPF_F_INGRESS)
It seems like some checksums of the inner headers are not validated in
this case. For example, a TCP SYN packet with invalid TCP checksum is
still accepted by the network stack and elicits a SYN ACK. [...]
That is, we receive the following packet from the driver:
| ETH | IP | UDP | GUE | IP | TCP |
skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY
ip_summed is CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY because our NICs do rx checksum offloading.
On this packet we run skb_adjust_room_mac(-encap_len), and get the following:
| ETH | IP | TCP |
skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY
Note that ip_summed is still CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY. After bpf_redirect()'ing
into the ingress, we end up in tcp_v4_rcv(). There, skb_checksum_init() is
turned into a no-op due to CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY.
The bpf_skb_adjust_room() helper is not aware of protocol specifics. Internally,
it handles the CHECKSUM_COMPLETE case via skb_postpull_rcsum(), but that does
not cover CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY. In this case skb->csum_level of the original
skb prior to bpf_skb_adjust_room() call was 0, that is, covering UDP. Right now
there is no way to adjust the skb->csum_level. NICs that have checksum offload
disabled (CHECKSUM_NONE) or that support CHECKSUM_COMPLETE are not affected.
Use a safe default for CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY by resetting to CHECKSUM_NONE and
add a flag to the helper called BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_NO_CSUM_RESET that allows users
from opting out. Opting out is useful for the case where we don't remove/add
full protocol headers, or for the case where a user wants to adjust the csum
level manually e.g. through bpf_csum_level() helper that is added in subsequent
patch.
The bpf_skb_proto_{4_to_6,6_to_4}() for NAT64/46 translation from the BPF
bpf_skb_change_proto() helper uses bpf_skb_net_hdr_{push,pop}() pair internally
as well but doesn't change layers, only transitions between v4 to v6 and vice
versa, therefore no adoption is required there.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200424185556.7358-1-lmb@cloudflare.com/
Fixes: 2be7e212d541 ("bpf: add bpf_skb_adjust_room helper")
Reported-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Reported-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACAyw9-uU_52esMd1JjuA80fRPHJv5vsSg8GnfW3t_qDU4aVKQ@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/11a90472e7cce83e76ddbfce81fdfce7bfc68808.1591108731.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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