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2020-08-04Merge tag 'v5.7.12' into dev-5.7dev-5.7Joel Stanley6-4/+12
This is the 5.7.12 stable release Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
2020-07-31tcp: allow at most one TLP probe per flightYuchung Cheng1-1/+3
[ Upstream commit 76be93fc0702322179bb0ea87295d820ee46ad14 ] Previously TLP may send multiple probes of new data in one flight. This happens when the sender is cwnd limited. After the initial TLP containing new data is sent, the sender receives another ACK that acks partial inflight. It may re-arm another TLP timer to send more, if no further ACK returns before the next TLP timeout (PTO) expires. The sender may send in theory a large amount of TLP until send queue is depleted. This only happens if the sender sees such irregular uncommon ACK pattern. But it is generally undesirable behavior during congestion especially. The original TLP design restrict only one TLP probe per inflight as published in "Reducing Web Latency: the Virtue of Gentle Aggression", SIGCOMM 2013. This patch changes TLP to send at most one probe per inflight. Note that if the sender is app-limited, TLP retransmits old data and did not have this issue. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-29dm integrity: fix integrity recalculation that is improperly skippedMikulas Patocka1-0/+1
commit 5df96f2b9f58a5d2dc1f30fe7de75e197f2c25f2 upstream. Commit adc0daad366b62ca1bce3e2958a40b0b71a8b8b3 ("dm: report suspended device during destroy") broke integrity recalculation. The problem is dm_suspended() returns true not only during suspend, but also during resume. So this race condition could occur: 1. dm_integrity_resume calls queue_work(ic->recalc_wq, &ic->recalc_work) 2. integrity_recalc (&ic->recalc_work) preempts the current thread 3. integrity_recalc calls if (unlikely(dm_suspended(ic->ti))) goto unlock_ret; 4. integrity_recalc exits and no recalculating is done. To fix this race condition, add a function dm_post_suspending that is only true during the postsuspend phase and use it instead of dm_suspended(). Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka redhat com> Fixes: adc0daad366b ("dm: report suspended device during destroy") Cc: stable vger kernel org # v4.18+ Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-29io-mapping: indicate mapping failureMichael J. Ruhl1-1/+4
commit e0b3e0b1a04367fc15c07f44e78361545b55357c upstream. The !ATOMIC_IOMAP version of io_maping_init_wc will always return success, even when the ioremap fails. Since the ATOMIC_IOMAP version returns NULL when the init fails, and callers check for a NULL return on error this is unexpected. During a device probe, where the ioremap failed, a crash can look like this: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000210000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 PID: 177 Comm: RIP: 0010:fill_page_dma [i915] gen8_ppgtt_create [i915] i915_ppgtt_create [i915] intel_gt_init [i915] i915_gem_init [i915] i915_driver_probe [i915] pci_device_probe really_probe driver_probe_device The remap failure occurred much earlier in the probe. If it had been propagated, the driver would have exited with an error. Return NULL on ioremap failure. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: detect ioremap_wc() errors earlier] Fixes: cafaf14a5d8f ("io-mapping: Always create a struct to hold metadata about the io-mapping") Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200721171936.81563-1-michael.j.ruhl@intel.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-29vfs/xattr: mm/shmem: kernfs: release simple xattr entry in a right wayChengguang Xu1-1/+2
commit 3bef735ad7b7d987069181e7b58588043cbd1509 upstream. After commit fdc85222d58e ("kernfs: kvmalloc xattr value instead of kmalloc"), simple xattr entry is allocated with kvmalloc() instead of kmalloc(), so we should release it with kvfree() instead of kfree(). Fixes: fdc85222d58e ("kernfs: kvmalloc xattr value instead of kmalloc") Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz> Cc: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.7] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200704051608.15043-1-cgxu519@mykernel.net Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-29Input: add `SW_MACHINE_COVER`Merlijn Wajer1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit c463bb2a8f8d7d97aa414bf7714fc77e9d3b10df ] This event code represents the state of a removable cover of a device. Value 0 means that the cover is open or removed, value 1 means that the cover is closed. Reviewed-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com> Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Signed-off-by: Merlijn Wajer <merlijn@wizzup.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200612125402.18393-2-merlijn@wizzup.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-07-29efi/efivars: Expose RT service availability via efivars abstractionArd Biesheuvel1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit f88814cc2578c121e6edef686365036db72af0ed ] Commit bf67fad19e493b ("efi: Use more granular check for availability for variable services") introduced a check into the efivarfs, efi-pstore and other drivers that aborts loading of the module if not all three variable runtime services (GetVariable, SetVariable and GetNextVariable) are supported. However, this results in efivarfs being unavailable entirely if only SetVariable support is missing, which is only needed if you want to make any modifications. Also, efi-pstore and the sysfs EFI variable interface could be backed by another implementation of the 'efivars' abstraction, in which case it is completely irrelevant which services are supported by the EFI firmware. So make the generic 'efivars' abstraction dependent on the availibility of the GetVariable and GetNextVariable EFI runtime services, and add a helper 'efivar_supports_writes()' to find out whether the currently active efivars abstraction supports writes (and wire it up to the availability of SetVariable for the generic one). Then, use the efivar_supports_writes() helper to decide whether to permit efivarfs to be mounted read-write, and whether to enable efi-pstore or the sysfs EFI variable interface altogether. Fixes: bf67fad19e493b ("efi: Use more granular check for availability for variable services") Reported-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> Tested-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-07-22Merge tag 'v5.7.10' into dev-5.7Joel Stanley9-16/+162
This is the 5.7.10 stable release Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
2020-07-22bpf: sockmap: Require attach_bpf_fd when detaching a programLorenz Bauer2-2/+24
commit bb0de3131f4c60a9bf976681e0fe4d1e55c7a821 upstream. The sockmap code currently ignores the value of attach_bpf_fd when detaching a program. This is contrary to the usual behaviour of checking that attach_bpf_fd represents the currently attached program. Ensure that attach_bpf_fd is indeed the currently attached program. It turns out that all sockmap selftests already do this, which indicates that this is unlikely to cause breakage. Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200629095630.7933-5-lmb@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-22dmabuf: use spinlock to access dmabuf->nameCharan Teja Kalla1-0/+1
commit 6348dd291e3653534a9e28e6917569bc9967b35b upstream. There exists a sleep-while-atomic bug while accessing the dmabuf->name under mutex in the dmabuffs_dname(). This is caused from the SELinux permissions checks on a process where it tries to validate the inherited files from fork() by traversing them through iterate_fd() (which traverse files under spin_lock) and call match_file(security/selinux/hooks.c) where the permission checks happen. This audit information is logged using dump_common_audit_data() where it calls d_path() to get the file path name. If the file check happen on the dmabuf's fd, then it ends up in ->dmabuffs_dname() and use mutex to access dmabuf->name. The flow will be like below: flush_unauthorized_files() iterate_fd() spin_lock() --> Start of the atomic section. match_file() file_has_perm() avc_has_perm() avc_audit() slow_avc_audit() common_lsm_audit() dump_common_audit_data() audit_log_d_path() d_path() dmabuffs_dname() mutex_lock()--> Sleep while atomic. Call trace captured (on 4.19 kernels) is below: ___might_sleep+0x204/0x208 __might_sleep+0x50/0x88 __mutex_lock_common+0x5c/0x1068 __mutex_lock_common+0x5c/0x1068 mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x50 dmabuffs_dname+0xa0/0x170 d_path+0x84/0x290 audit_log_d_path+0x74/0x130 common_lsm_audit+0x334/0x6e8 slow_avc_audit+0xb8/0xf8 avc_has_perm+0x154/0x218 file_has_perm+0x70/0x180 match_file+0x60/0x78 iterate_fd+0x128/0x168 selinux_bprm_committing_creds+0x178/0x248 security_bprm_committing_creds+0x30/0x48 install_exec_creds+0x1c/0x68 load_elf_binary+0x3a4/0x14e0 search_binary_handler+0xb0/0x1e0 So, use spinlock to access dmabuf->name to avoid sleep-while-atomic. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.3+] Signed-off-by: Charan Teja Kalla <charante@codeaurora.org> Reviewed-by: Michael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com> Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> [sumits: added comment to spinlock_t definition to avoid warning] Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/a83e7f0d-4e54-9848-4b58-e1acdbe06735@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-22Input: elan_i2c - add more hardware ID for Lenovo laptopsDave Wang1-0/+7
commit a50ca29523b18baea548bdf5df9b4b923c2bb4f6 upstream. This adds more hardware IDs for Elan touchpads found in various Lenovo laptops. Signed-off-by: Dave Wang <dave.wang@emc.com.tw> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000201d5a8bd$9fead3f0$dfc07bd0$@emc.com.tw Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-22serial: core: fix sysrq overhead regressionJohan Hovold1-5/+98
commit 08d5470308ac3598e7709d08b8979ce6e9de8da2 upstream. Commit 8e20fc391711 ("serial_core: Move sysrq functions from header file") converted the inline sysrq helpers to exported functions which are now called for every received character, interrupt and break signal also on systems without CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ_SERIAL instead of being optimised away by the compiler. Inlining these helpers again also avoids the function call overhead when CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ_SERIAL is enabled (e.g. when the port is not used as a console). Fixes: 8e20fc391711 ("serial_core: Move sysrq functions from header file") Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200610152232.16925-3-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-22Revert "serial: core: Refactor uart_unlock_and_check_sysrq()"Johan Hovold1-1/+2
commit 10652a9e9fe3fbcaca090f99cd3060ac3fee2913 upstream. This reverts commit da9a5aa3402db0ff3b57216d8dbf2478e1046cae. In order to ease backporting a fix for a sysrq regression, revert this rewrite which was since added on top. The other sysrq helpers now bail out early when sysrq is not enabled; it's better to keep that pattern here as well. Note that the __releases() attribute won't be needed after the follow-on fix either. Fixes: da9a5aa3402d ("serial: core: Refactor uart_unlock_and_check_sysrq()") Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200610152232.16925-2-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-22blk-mq-debugfs: update blk_queue_flag_name[] accordingly for new flagsHou Tao1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit bfe373f608cf81b7626dfeb904001b0e867c5110 ] Else there may be magic numbers in /sys/kernel/debug/block/*/state. Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-07-22cgroup: Fix sock_cgroup_data on big-endian.Cong Wang1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 14b032b8f8fce03a546dcf365454bec8c4a58d7d ] In order for no_refcnt and is_data to be the lowest order two bits in the 'val' we have to pad out the bitfield of the u8. Fixes: ad0f75e5f57c ("cgroup: fix cgroup_sk_alloc() for sk_clone_lock()") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-22cgroup: fix cgroup_sk_alloc() for sk_clone_lock()Cong Wang2-3/+7
[ Upstream commit ad0f75e5f57ccbceec13274e1e242f2b5a6397ed ] When we clone a socket in sk_clone_lock(), its sk_cgrp_data is copied, so the cgroup refcnt must be taken too. And, unlike the sk_alloc() path, sock_update_netprioidx() is not called here. Therefore, it is safe and necessary to grab the cgroup refcnt even when cgroup_sk_alloc is disabled. sk_clone_lock() is in BH context anyway, the in_interrupt() would terminate this function if called there. And for sk_alloc() skcd->val is always zero. So it's safe to factor out the code to make it more readable. The global variable 'cgroup_sk_alloc_disabled' is used to determine whether to take these reference counts. It is impossible to make the reference counting correct unless we save this bit of information in skcd->val. So, add a new bit there to record whether the socket has already taken the reference counts. This obviously relies on kmalloc() to align cgroup pointers to at least 4 bytes, ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN is certainly larger than that. This bug seems to be introduced since the beginning, commit d979a39d7242 ("cgroup: duplicate cgroup reference when cloning sockets") tried to fix it but not compeletely. It seems not easy to trigger until the recent commit 090e28b229af ("netprio_cgroup: Fix unlimited memory leak of v2 cgroups") was merged. Fixes: bd1060a1d671 ("sock, cgroup: add sock->sk_cgroup") Reported-by: Cameron Berkenpas <cam@neo-zeon.de> Reported-by: Peter Geis <pgwipeout@gmail.com> Reported-by: Lu Fengqi <lufq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Reported-by: Daniël Sonck <dsonck92@gmail.com> Reported-by: Zhang Qiang <qiang.zhang@windriver.com> Tested-by: Cameron Berkenpas <cam@neo-zeon.de> Tested-by: Peter Geis <pgwipeout@gmail.com> Tested-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-22vlan: consolidate VLAN parsing code and limit max parsing depthToke Høiland-Jørgensen1-35/+22
[ Upstream commit 469aceddfa3ed16e17ee30533fae45e90f62efd8 ] Toshiaki pointed out that we now have two very similar functions to extract the L3 protocol number in the presence of VLAN tags. And Daniel pointed out that the unbounded parsing loop makes it possible for maliciously crafted packets to loop through potentially hundreds of tags. Fix both of these issues by consolidating the two parsing functions and limiting the VLAN tag parsing to a max depth of 8 tags. As part of this, switch over __vlan_get_protocol() to use skb_header_pointer() instead of pskb_may_pull(), to avoid the possible side effects of the latter and keep the skb pointer 'const' through all the parsing functions. v2: - Use limit of 8 tags instead of 32 (matching XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT) Reported-by: Toshiaki Makita <toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com> Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Fixes: d7bf2ebebc2b ("sched: consistently handle layer3 header accesses in the presence of VLANs") Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-22sched: consistently handle layer3 header accesses in the presence of VLANsToke Høiland-Jørgensen1-0/+28
[ Upstream commit d7bf2ebebc2bd61ab95e2a8e33541ef282f303d4 ] There are a couple of places in net/sched/ that check skb->protocol and act on the value there. However, in the presence of VLAN tags, the value stored in skb->protocol can be inconsistent based on whether VLAN acceleration is enabled. The commit quoted in the Fixes tag below fixed the users of skb->protocol to use a helper that will always see the VLAN ethertype. However, most of the callers don't actually handle the VLAN ethertype, but expect to find the IP header type in the protocol field. This means that things like changing the ECN field, or parsing diffserv values, stops working if there's a VLAN tag, or if there are multiple nested VLAN tags (QinQ). To fix this, change the helper to take an argument that indicates whether the caller wants to skip the VLAN tags or not. When skipping VLAN tags, we make sure to skip all of them, so behaviour is consistent even in QinQ mode. To make the helper usable from the ECN code, move it to if_vlan.h instead of pkt_sched.h. v3: - Remove empty lines - Move vlan variable definitions inside loop in skb_protocol() - Also use skb_protocol() helper in IP{,6}_ECN_decapsulate() and bpf_skb_ecn_set_ce() v2: - Use eth_type_vlan() helper in skb_protocol() - Also fix code that reads skb->protocol directly - Change a couple of 'if/else if' statements to switch constructs to avoid calling the helper twice Reported-by: Ilya Ponetayev <i.ponetaev@ndmsystems.com> Fixes: d8b9605d2697 ("net: sched: fix skb->protocol use in case of accelerated vlan path") Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-21Merge tag 'v5.7.9' into dev-5.7Joel Stanley6-7/+18
This is the 5.7.9 stable release Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
2020-07-16bpf: Check correct cred for CAP_SYSLOG in bpf_dump_raw_ok()Kees Cook1-2/+2
commit 63960260457a02af2a6cb35d75e6bdb17299c882 upstream. When evaluating access control over kallsyms visibility, credentials at open() time need to be used, not the "current" creds (though in BPF's case, this has likely always been the same). Plumb access to associated file->f_cred down through bpf_dump_raw_ok() and its callers now that kallsysm_show_value() has been refactored to take struct cred. Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7105e828c087 ("bpf: allow for correlation of maps and helpers in dump") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-16kallsyms: Refactor kallsyms_show_value() to take credKees Cook2-3/+4
commit 160251842cd35a75edfb0a1d76afa3eb674ff40a upstream. In order to perform future tests against the cred saved during open(), switch kallsyms_show_value() to operate on a cred, and have all current callers pass current_cred(). This makes it very obvious where callers are checking the wrong credential in their "read" contexts. These will be fixed in the coming patches. Additionally switch return value to bool, since it is always used as a direct permission check, not a 0-on-success, negative-on-error style function return. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-16bpf: Do not allow btf_ctx_access with __int128 typesJohn Fastabend1-0/+5
[ Upstream commit a9b59159d338d414acaa8e2f569d129d51c76452 ] To ensure btf_ctx_access() is safe the verifier checks that the BTF arg type is an int, enum, or pointer. When the function does the BTF arg lookup it uses the calculation 'arg = off / 8' using the fact that registers are 8B. This requires that the first arg is in the first reg, the second in the second, and so on. However, for __int128 the arg will consume two registers by default LLVM implementation. So this will cause the arg layout assumed by the 'arg = off / 8' calculation to be incorrect. Because __int128 is uncommon this patch applies the easiest fix and will force int types to be sizeof(u64) or smaller so that they will fit in a single register. v2: remove unneeded parens per Andrii's feedback Fixes: 9e15db66136a1 ("bpf: Implement accurate raw_tp context access via BTF") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/159303723962.11287.13309537171132420717.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-07-09security: Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattrKP Singh1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 23e390cdbe6f85827a43d38f9288dcd3066fa376 ] inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 to indicate the acceptance of the xattr and 1 to reject it. If the LSM does not know about the xattr, it's expected to return -EOPNOTSUPP, which is the correct default value for this hook. BPF LSM, currently, uses 0 as the default value and thereby falsely allows all overlay fs xattributes to be copied up. The iteration logic is also updated from the "bail-on-fail" call_int_hook to continue on the non-decisive -EOPNOTSUPP and bail out on other values. Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks") Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-07-09task_work: teach task_work_add() to do signal_wake_up()Oleg Nesterov2-2/+7
[ Upstream commit e91b48162332480f5840902268108bb7fb7a44c7 ] So that the target task will exit the wait_event_interruptible-like loop and call task_work_run() asap. The patch turns "bool notify" into 0,TWA_RESUME,TWA_SIGNAL enum, the new TWA_SIGNAL flag implies signal_wake_up(). However, it needs to avoid the race with recalc_sigpending(), so the patch also adds the new JOBCTL_TASK_WORK bit included in JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK. TODO: once this patch is merged we need to change all current users of task_work_add(notify = true) to use TWA_RESUME. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7 Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-07-08Merge tag 'v5.7.7' into dev-5.7Joel Stanley32-39/+157
Linux 5.7.7 Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
2020-07-08mfd: intel-peci-client: Add Intel PECI client driverJae Hyun Yoo1-0/+119
This commit adds Intel PECI client driver. OpenBMC-Staging-Count: 2 Signed-off-by: Jae Hyun Yoo <jae.hyun.yoo@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
2020-07-08peci: Add support for PECI bus driver coreJae Hyun Yoo1-0/+150
This commit adds driver implementation for PECI bus core into linux driver framework. PECI (Platform Environment Control Interface) is a one-wire bus interface that provides a communication channel from Intel processors and chipset components to external monitoring or control devices. PECI is designed to support the following sideband functions: * Processor and DRAM thermal management - Processor fan speed control is managed by comparing Digital Thermal Sensor (DTS) thermal readings acquired via PECI against the processor-specific fan speed control reference point, or TCONTROL. Both TCONTROL and DTS thermal readings are accessible via the processor PECI client. These variables are referenced to a common temperature, the TCC activation point, and are both defined as negative offsets from that reference. - PECI based access to the processor package configuration space provides a means for Baseboard Management Controllers (BMC) or other platform management devices to actively manage the processor and memory power and thermal features. * Platform Manageability - Platform manageability functions including thermal, power, and error monitoring. Note that platform 'power' management includes monitoring and control for both the processor and DRAM subsystem to assist with data center power limiting. - PECI allows read access to certain error registers in the processor MSR space and status monitoring registers in the PCI configuration space within the processor and downstream devices. - PECI permits writes to certain registers in the processor PCI configuration space. * Processor Interface Tuning and Diagnostics - Processor interface tuning and diagnostics capabilities (Intel Interconnect BIST). The processors Intel Interconnect Built In Self Test (Intel IBIST) allows for infield diagnostic capabilities in the Intel UPI and memory controller interfaces. PECI provides a port to execute these diagnostics via its PCI Configuration read and write capabilities. * Failure Analysis - Output the state of the processor after a failure for analysis via Crashdump. PECI uses a single wire for self-clocking and data transfer. The bus requires no additional control lines. The physical layer is a self-clocked one-wire bus that begins each bit with a driven, rising edge from an idle level near zero volts. The duration of the signal driven high depends on whether the bit value is a logic '0' or logic '1'. PECI also includes variable data transfer rate established with every message. In this way, it is highly flexible even though underlying logic is simple. The interface design was optimized for interfacing between an Intel processor and chipset components in both single processor and multiple processor environments. The single wire interface provides low board routing overhead for the multiple load connections in the congested routing area near the processor and chipset components. Bus speed, error checking, and low protocol overhead provides adequate link bandwidth and reliability to transfer critical device operating conditions and configuration information. This implementation provides the basic framework to add PECI extensions to the Linux bus and device models. A hardware specific 'Adapter' driver can be attached to the PECI bus to provide sideband functions described above. It is also possible to access all devices on an adapter from userspace through the /dev interface. A device specific 'Client' driver also can be attached to the PECI bus so each processor client's features can be supported by the 'Client' driver through an adapter connection in the bus. OpenBMC-Staging-Count: 2 Signed-off-by: Jason M Biils <jason.m.bills@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yunge Zhu <yunge.zhu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jae Hyun Yoo <jae.hyun.yoo@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Haiyue Wang <haiyue.wang@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: James Feist <james.feist@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Vernon Mauery <vernon.mauery@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
2020-06-30syscalls: Fix offset type of ksys_ftruncate()Jiri Slaby1-1/+1
commit 8e742aa79780b13cd300a42198c1a4cea9c89905 upstream. After the commit below, truncate() on x86 32bit uses ksys_ftruncate(). But ksys_ftruncate() truncates the offset to unsigned long. Switch the type of offset to loff_t which is what do_sys_ftruncate() expects. Fixes: 121b32a58a3a (x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments) Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200610114851.28549-1-jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-30net: qed: fix left elements count calculationAlexander Lobakin1-10/+16
[ Upstream commit 97dd1abd026ae4e6a82fa68645928404ad483409 ] qed_chain_get_element_left{,_u32} returned 0 when the difference between producer and consumer page count was equal to the total page count. Fix this by conditional expanding of producer value (vs unconditional). This allowed to eliminate normalizaton against total page count, which was the cause of this bug. Misc: replace open-coded constants with common defines. Fixes: a91eb52abb50 ("qed: Revisit chain implementation") Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Kalderon <michal.kalderon@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-30iommu/vt-d: Set U/S bit in first level page table by defaultLu Baolu1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 16ecf10e815d70d11d2300243f4a3b4c7c5acac7 ] When using first-level translation for IOVA, currently the U/S bit in the page table is cleared which implies DMA requests with user privilege are blocked. As the result, following error messages might be observed when passing through a device to user level: DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 3 DMAR: [DMA Read] Request device [41:00.0] PASID 1 fault addr 7ecdcd000 [fault reason 129] SM: U/S set 0 for first-level translation with user privilege This fixes it by setting U/S bit in the first level page table and makes IOVA over first level compatible with previous second-level translation. Fixes: b802d070a52a1 ("iommu/vt-d: Use iova over first level") Reported-by: Xin Zeng <xin.zeng@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200622231345.29722-3-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-30efi/tpm: Verify event log header before parsingFabian Vogt1-1/+13
[ Upstream commit 7dfc06a0f25b593a9f51992f540c0f80a57f3629 ] It is possible that the first event in the event log is not actually a log header at all, but rather a normal event. This leads to the cast in __calc_tpm2_event_size being an invalid conversion, which means that the values read are effectively garbage. Depending on the first event's contents, this leads either to apparently normal behaviour, a crash or a freeze. While this behaviour of the firmware is not in accordance with the TCG Client EFI Specification, this happens on a Dell Precision 5510 with the TPM enabled but hidden from the OS ("TPM On" disabled, state otherwise untouched). The EFI firmware claims that the TPM is present and active and that it supports the TCG 2.0 event log format. Fortunately, this can be worked around by simply checking the header of the first event and the event log header signature itself. Commit b4f1874c6216 ("tpm: check event log version before reading final events") addressed a similar issue also found on Dell models. Fixes: 6b0326190205 ("efi: Attempt to get the TCG2 event log in the boot stub") Signed-off-by: Fabian Vogt <fvogt@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1927248.evlx2EsYKh@linux-e202.suse.de Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1165773 Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-30net: core: reduce recursion limit valueTaehee Yoo1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit fb7861d14c8d7edac65b2fcb6e8031cb138457b2 ] In the current code, ->ndo_start_xmit() can be executed recursively only 10 times because of stack memory. But, in the case of the vxlan, 10 recursion limit value results in a stack overflow. In the current code, the nested interface is limited by 8 depth. There is no critical reason that the recursion limitation value should be 10. So, it would be good to be the same value with the limitation value of nesting interface depth. Test commands: ip link add vxlan10 type vxlan vni 10 dstport 4789 srcport 4789 4789 ip link set vxlan10 up ip a a 192.168.10.1/24 dev vxlan10 ip n a 192.168.10.2 dev vxlan10 lladdr fc:22:33:44:55:66 nud permanent for i in {9..0} do let A=$i+1 ip link add vxlan$i type vxlan vni $i dstport 4789 srcport 4789 4789 ip link set vxlan$i up ip a a 192.168.$i.1/24 dev vxlan$i ip n a 192.168.$i.2 dev vxlan$i lladdr fc:22:33:44:55:66 nud permanent bridge fdb add fc:22:33:44:55:66 dev vxlan$A dst 192.168.$i.2 self done hping3 192.168.10.2 -2 -d 60000 Splat looks like: [ 103.814237][ T1127] ============================================================================= [ 103.871955][ T1127] BUG kmalloc-2k (Tainted: G B ): Padding overwritten. 0x00000000897a2e4f-0x000 [ 103.873187][ T1127] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 103.873187][ T1127] [ 103.874252][ T1127] INFO: Slab 0x000000005cccc724 objects=5 used=5 fp=0x0000000000000000 flags=0x10000000001020 [ 103.881323][ T1127] CPU: 3 PID: 1127 Comm: hping3 Tainted: G B 5.7.0+ #575 [ 103.882131][ T1127] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 103.883006][ T1127] Call Trace: [ 103.883324][ T1127] dump_stack+0x96/0xdb [ 103.883716][ T1127] slab_err+0xad/0xd0 [ 103.884106][ T1127] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30 [ 103.884620][ T1127] ? get_partial_node.isra.78+0x140/0x360 [ 103.885214][ T1127] slab_pad_check.part.53+0xf7/0x160 [ 103.885769][ T1127] ? pskb_expand_head+0x110/0xe10 [ 103.886316][ T1127] check_slab+0x97/0xb0 [ 103.886763][ T1127] alloc_debug_processing+0x84/0x1a0 [ 103.887308][ T1127] ___slab_alloc+0x5a5/0x630 [ 103.887765][ T1127] ? pskb_expand_head+0x110/0xe10 [ 103.888265][ T1127] ? lock_downgrade+0x730/0x730 [ 103.888762][ T1127] ? pskb_expand_head+0x110/0xe10 [ 103.889244][ T1127] ? __slab_alloc+0x3e/0x80 [ 103.889675][ T1127] __slab_alloc+0x3e/0x80 [ 103.890108][ T1127] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xc7/0x420 [ ... ] Fixes: 11a766ce915f ("net: Increase xmit RECURSION_LIMIT to 10.") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-24kretprobe: Prevent triggering kretprobe from within kprobe_flush_taskJiri Olsa1-0/+4
commit 9b38cc704e844e41d9cf74e647bff1d249512cb3 upstream. Ziqian reported lockup when adding retprobe on _raw_spin_lock_irqsave. My test was also able to trigger lockdep output: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.6.0-rc6+ #6 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- sched-messaging/2767 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff9a492798 (&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff9a491a18 (&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)); lock(&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 1 lock held by sched-messaging/2767: #0: ffffffff9a491a18 (&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50 stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 2767 Comm: sched-messaging Not tainted 5.6.0-rc6+ #6 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x96/0xe0 __lock_acquire.cold.57+0x173/0x2b7 ? native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x42b/0x9e0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x590/0x590 ? __lock_acquire+0xf63/0x4030 lock_acquire+0x15a/0x3d0 ? kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x36/0x70 ? kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0 kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0 trampoline_handler+0xf8/0x940 ? kprobe_fault_handler+0x380/0x380 ? find_held_lock+0x3a/0x1c0 kretprobe_trampoline+0x25/0x50 ? lock_acquired+0x392/0xbc0 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70 ? __get_valid_kprobe+0x1f0/0x1f0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3b/0x40 ? finish_task_switch+0x4b9/0x6d0 ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70 The code within the kretprobe handler checks for probe reentrancy, so we won't trigger any _raw_spin_lock_irqsave probe in there. The problem is in outside kprobe_flush_task, where we call: kprobe_flush_task kretprobe_table_lock raw_spin_lock_irqsave _raw_spin_lock_irqsave where _raw_spin_lock_irqsave triggers the kretprobe and installs kretprobe_trampoline handler on _raw_spin_lock_irqsave return. The kretprobe_trampoline handler is then executed with already locked kretprobe_table_locks, and first thing it does is to lock kretprobe_table_locks ;-) the whole lockup path like: kprobe_flush_task kretprobe_table_lock raw_spin_lock_irqsave _raw_spin_lock_irqsave ---> probe triggered, kretprobe_trampoline installed ---> kretprobe_table_locks locked kretprobe_trampoline trampoline_handler kretprobe_hash_lock(current, &head, &flags); <--- deadlock Adding kprobe_busy_begin/end helpers that mark code with fake probe installed to prevent triggering of another kprobe within this code. Using these helpers in kprobe_flush_task, so the probe recursion protection check is hit and the probe is never set to prevent above lockup. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/158927059835.27680.7011202830041561604.stgit@devnote2 Fixes: ef53d9c5e4da ("kprobes: improve kretprobe scalability with hashed locking") Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: "Gustavo A . R . Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: "Naveen N . Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: "Ziqian SUN (Zamir)" <zsun@redhat.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-24ext4, jbd2: ensure panic by fix a race between jbd2 abort and ext4 error ↵zhangyi (F)1-1/+5
handlers commit 7b97d868b7ab2448859668de9222b8af43f76e78 upstream. In the ext4 filesystem with errors=panic, if one process is recording errno in the superblock when invoking jbd2_journal_abort() due to some error cases, it could be raced by another __ext4_abort() which is setting the SB_RDONLY flag but missing panic because errno has not been recorded. jbd2_journal_commit_transaction() jbd2_journal_abort() journal->j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT; jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno() | ext4_journal_check_start() | __ext4_abort() | sb->s_flags |= SB_RDONLY; | if (!JBD2_REC_ERR) | return; journal->j_flags |= JBD2_REC_ERR; Finally, it will no longer trigger panic because the filesystem has already been set read-only. Fix this by introduce j_abort_mutex to make sure journal abort is completed before panic, and remove JBD2_REC_ERR flag. Fixes: 4327ba52afd03 ("ext4, jbd2: ensure entering into panic after recording an error in superblock") Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200609073540.3810702-1-yi.zhang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-24libata: Use per port sync for detachKai-Heng Feng1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit b5292111de9bb70cba3489075970889765302136 ] Commit 130f4caf145c ("libata: Ensure ata_port probe has completed before detach") may cause system freeze during suspend. Using async_synchronize_full() in PM callbacks is wrong, since async callbacks that are already scheduled may wait for not-yet-scheduled callbacks, causes a circular dependency. Instead of using big hammer like async_synchronize_full(), use async cookie to make sure port probe are synced, without affecting other scheduled PM callbacks. Fixes: 130f4caf145c ("libata: Ensure ata_port probe has completed before detach") Suggested-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Tested-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com> BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1867983 Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-24nfs: set invalid blocks after NFSv4 writesZheng Bin1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 3a39e778690500066b31fe982d18e2e394d3bce2 ] Use the following command to test nfsv4(size of file1M is 1MB): mount -t nfs -o vers=4.0,actimeo=60 127.0.0.1/dir1 /mnt cp file1M /mnt du -h /mnt/file1M -->0 within 60s, then 1M When write is done(cp file1M /mnt), will call this: nfs_writeback_done nfs4_write_done nfs4_write_done_cb nfs_writeback_update_inode nfs_post_op_update_inode_force_wcc_locked(change, ctime, mtime nfs_post_op_update_inode_force_wcc_locked nfs_set_cache_invalid nfs_refresh_inode_locked nfs_update_inode nfsd write response contains change, ctime, mtime, the flag will be clear after nfs_update_inode. Howerver, write response does not contain space_used, previous open response contains space_used whose value is 0, so inode->i_blocks is still 0. nfs_getattr -->called by "du -h" do_update |= force_sync || nfs_attribute_cache_expired -->false in 60s cache_validity = READ_ONCE(NFS_I(inode)->cache_validity) do_update |= cache_validity & (NFS_INO_INVALID_ATTR -->false if (do_update) { __nfs_revalidate_inode } Within 60s, does not send getattr request to nfsd, thus "du -h /mnt/file1M" is 0. Add a NFS_INO_INVALID_BLOCKS flag, set it when nfsv4 write is done. Fixes: 16e143751727 ("NFS: More fine grained attribute tracking") Signed-off-by: Zheng Bin <zhengbin13@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-24include/linux/bitops.h: avoid clang shift-count-overflow warningsArnd Bergmann1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit bd93f003b7462ae39a43c531abca37fe7073b866 ] Clang normally does not warn about certain issues in inline functions when it only happens in an eliminated code path. However if something else goes wrong, it does tend to complain about the definition of hweight_long() on 32-bit targets: include/linux/bitops.h:75:41: error: shift count >= width of type [-Werror,-Wshift-count-overflow] return sizeof(w) == 4 ? hweight32(w) : hweight64(w); ^~~~~~~~~~~~ include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:29:49: note: expanded from macro 'hweight64' define hweight64(w) (__builtin_constant_p(w) ? __const_hweight64(w) : __arch_hweight64(w)) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:21:76: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight64' define __const_hweight64(w) (__const_hweight32(w) + __const_hweight32((w) >> 32)) ^ ~~ include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:20:49: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight32' define __const_hweight32(w) (__const_hweight16(w) + __const_hweight16((w) >> 16)) ^ include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:19:72: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight16' define __const_hweight16(w) (__const_hweight8(w) + __const_hweight8((w) >> 8 )) ^ include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:12:9: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight8' (!!((w) & (1ULL << 2))) + \ Adding an explicit cast to __u64 avoids that warning and makes it easier to read other output. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200505135513.65265-1-arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-24/dev/mem: Revoke mappings when a driver claims the regionDan Williams1-0/+6
[ Upstream commit 3234ac664a870e6ea69ae3a57d824cd7edbeacc5 ] Close the hole of holding a mapping over kernel driver takeover event of a given address range. Commit 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges") introduced CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM with the goal of protecting the kernel against scenarios where a /dev/mem user tramples memory that a kernel driver owns. However, this protection only prevents *new* read(), write() and mmap() requests. Established mappings prior to the driver calling request_mem_region() are left alone. Especially with persistent memory, and the core kernel metadata that is stored there, there are plentiful scenarios for a /dev/mem user to violate the expectations of the driver and cause amplified damage. Teach request_mem_region() to find and shoot down active /dev/mem mappings that it believes it has successfully claimed for the exclusive use of the driver. Effectively a driver call to request_mem_region() becomes a hole-punch on the /dev/mem device. The typical usage of unmap_mapping_range() is part of truncate_pagecache() to punch a hole in a file, but in this case the implementation is only doing the "first half" of a hole punch. Namely it is just evacuating current established mappings of the "hole", and it relies on the fact that /dev/mem establishes mappings in terms of absolute physical address offsets. Once existing mmap users are invalidated they can attempt to re-establish the mapping, or attempt to continue issuing read(2) / write(2) to the invalidated extent, but they will then be subject to the CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM checking that can block those subsequent accesses. Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Fixes: 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges") Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159009507306.847224.8502634072429766747.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-24mfd: stmfx: Disable IRQ in suspend to avoid spurious interruptAmelie Delaunay1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 97eda5dcc2cde5dcc778bef7a9344db3b6bf8ef5 ] When STMFX supply is stopped, spurious interrupt can occur. To avoid that, disable the interrupt in suspend before disabling the regulator and re-enable it at the end of resume. Fixes: 06252ade9156 ("mfd: Add ST Multi-Function eXpander (STMFX) core driver") Signed-off-by: Amelie Delaunay <amelie.delaunay@st.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-24usb: gadget: Fix issue with config_ep_by_speed functionPawel Laszczak1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit 5d363120aa548ba52d58907a295eee25f8207ed2 ] This patch adds new config_ep_by_speed_and_alt function which extends the config_ep_by_speed about alt parameter. This additional parameter allows to find proper usb_ss_ep_comp_descriptor. Problem has appeared during testing f_tcm (BOT/UAS) driver function. f_tcm function for SS use array of headers for both BOT/UAS alternate setting: static struct usb_descriptor_header *uasp_ss_function_desc[] = { (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &bot_intf_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_ss_bi_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &bot_bi_ep_comp_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_ss_bo_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &bot_bo_ep_comp_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_intf_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_ss_bi_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_bi_ep_comp_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_bi_pipe_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_ss_bo_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_bo_ep_comp_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_bo_pipe_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_ss_status_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_status_in_ep_comp_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_status_pipe_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_ss_cmd_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_cmd_comp_desc, (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &uasp_cmd_pipe_desc, NULL, }; The first 5 descriptors are associated with BOT alternate setting, and others are associated with UAS. During handling UAS alternate setting f_tcm driver invokes config_ep_by_speed and this function sets incorrect companion endpoint descriptor in usb_ep object. Instead setting ep->comp_desc to uasp_bi_ep_comp_desc function in this case set ep->comp_desc to uasp_ss_bi_desc. This is due to the fact that it searches endpoint based on endpoint address: for_each_ep_desc(speed_desc, d_spd) { chosen_desc = (struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *)*d_spd; if (chosen_desc->bEndpoitAddress == _ep->address) goto ep_found; } And in result it uses the descriptor from BOT alternate setting instead UAS. Finally, it causes that controller driver during enabling endpoints detect that just enabled endpoint for bot. Signed-off-by: Jayshri Pawar <jpawar@cadence.com> Signed-off-by: Pawel Laszczak <pawell@cadence.com> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-24coresight: Fix support for sparsely populated portsSuzuki K Poulose1-4/+6
[ Upstream commit d375b356e687f2eefb51ddc3f1f2414cfa498f86 ] On some systems the firmware may not describe all the ports connected to a component (e.g, for security reasons). This could be especially problematic for "funnels" where we could end up in modifying memory beyond the allocated space for refcounts. e.g, for a funnel with input ports listed 0, 3, 5, nr_inport = 3. However the we could access refcnts[5] while checking for references, like : [ 526.110401] ================================================================== [ 526.117988] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in funnel_enable+0x54/0x1b0 [ 526.124706] Read of size 4 at addr ffffff8135f9549c by task bash/1114 [ 526.131324] [ 526.132886] CPU: 3 PID: 1114 Comm: bash Tainted: G S 5.4.25 #232 [ 526.140397] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SC7180 IDP (DT) [ 526.147113] Call trace: [ 526.149653] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x188 [ 526.153431] show_stack+0x20/0x2c [ 526.156852] dump_stack+0xdc/0x144 [ 526.160370] print_address_description+0x3c/0x494 [ 526.165211] __kasan_report+0x144/0x168 [ 526.169170] kasan_report+0x10/0x18 [ 526.172769] check_memory_region+0x1a4/0x1b4 [ 526.177164] __kasan_check_read+0x18/0x24 [ 526.181292] funnel_enable+0x54/0x1b0 [ 526.185072] coresight_enable_path+0x104/0x198 [ 526.189649] coresight_enable+0x118/0x26c ... [ 526.237782] Allocated by task 280: [ 526.241298] __kasan_kmalloc+0xf0/0x1ac [ 526.245249] kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 [ 526.248849] __kmalloc+0x28c/0x3b4 [ 526.252361] coresight_register+0x88/0x250 [ 526.256587] funnel_probe+0x15c/0x228 [ 526.260365] dynamic_funnel_probe+0x20/0x2c [ 526.264679] amba_probe+0xbc/0x158 [ 526.268193] really_probe+0x144/0x408 [ 526.271970] driver_probe_device+0x70/0x140 ... [ 526.316810] [ 526.318364] Freed by task 0: [ 526.321344] (stack is not available) [ 526.325024] [ 526.326580] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff8135f95480 [ 526.326580] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 [ 526.339439] The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of [ 526.339439] 128-byte region [ffffff8135f95480, ffffff8135f95500) [ 526.351399] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 526.356342] page:ffffffff04b7e500 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffffff814b00c380 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 526.366711] flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head) [ 526.371475] raw: 4000000000010200 ffffffff05034008 ffffffff0501eb08 ffffff814b00c380 [ 526.379435] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 526.387393] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 526.393128] [ 526.394681] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 526.399619] ffffff8135f95380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 526.407046] ffffff8135f95400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 526.414473] >ffffff8135f95480: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 526.421900] ^ [ 526.426029] ffffff8135f95500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 526.433456] ffffff8135f95580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 526.440883] ================================================================== To keep the code simple, we now track the maximum number of possible input/output connections to/from this component @ nr_inport and nr_outport in platform_data, respectively. Thus the output connections could be sparse and code is adjusted to skip the unspecified connections. Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Cc: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org> Reported-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org> Tested-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org> Tested-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200518180242.7916-13-mathieu.poirier@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-24usb: gadget: core: sync interrupt before unbind the udcPeter Chen1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 3c73bc52195def14165c3a7d91bdbb33b51725f5 ] The threaded interrupt handler may still be called after the usb_gadget_disconnect is called, it causes the structures used at interrupt handler was freed before it uses, eg the usb_request. This issue usually occurs we remove the udc function during the transfer. Below is the example when doing stress test for android switch function, the EP0's request is freed by .unbind (configfs_composite_unbind -> composite_dev_cleanup), but the threaded handler accesses this request during handling setup packet request. In fact, there is no protection between unbind the udc and udc interrupt handling, so we have to avoid the interrupt handler is occurred or scheduled during the .unbind flow. init: Sending signal 9 to service 'adbd' (pid 18077) process group... android_work: did not send uevent (0 0 000000007bec2039) libprocessgroup: Successfully killed process cgroup uid 0 pid 18077 in 6ms init: Service 'adbd' (pid 18077) received signal 9 init: Sending signal 9 to service 'adbd' (pid 18077) process group... libprocessgroup: Successfully killed process cgroup uid 0 pid 18077 in 0ms init: processing action (init.svc.adbd=stopped) from (/init.usb.configfs.rc:14) init: Received control message 'start' for 'adbd' from pid: 399 (/vendor/bin/hw/android.hardware.usb@1. init: starting service 'adbd'... read descriptors read strings Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 000000000000002a android_work: sent uevent USB_STATE=CONNECTED Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000e97f1000 using random self ethernet address [000000000000002a] pgd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 232 Comm: irq/68-5b110000 Not tainted 5.4.24-06075-g94a6b52b5815 #92 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP MEK (DT) pstate: 00400085 (nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO) using random host ethernet address pc : composite_setup+0x5c/0x1730 lr : android_setup+0xc0/0x148 sp : ffff80001349bba0 x29: ffff80001349bba0 x28: ffff00083a50da00 x27: ffff8000124e6000 x26: ffff800010177950 x25: 0000000000000040 x24: ffff000834e18010 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff00083a50da00 x20: ffff00082e75ec40 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000001 x11: ffff80001180fb58 x10: 0000000000000040 x9 : ffff8000120fc980 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : ffff00083f98df50 x6 : 0000000000000100 x5 : 00000307e8978431 x4 : ffff800011386788 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff800012342000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff800010c6d3a0 Call trace: composite_setup+0x5c/0x1730 android_setup+0xc0/0x148 cdns3_ep0_delegate_req+0x64/0x90 cdns3_check_ep0_interrupt_proceed+0x384/0x738 cdns3_device_thread_irq_handler+0x124/0x6e0 cdns3_thread_irq+0x94/0xa0 irq_thread_fn+0x30/0xa0 irq_thread+0x150/0x248 kthread+0xfc/0x128 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Code: 910e8000 f9400693 12001ed7 79400f79 (3940aa61) ---[ end trace c685db37f8773fba ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x0002,20002008 Memory Limit: none Rebooting in 5 seconds.. Reviewed-by: Jun Li <jun.li@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-22sunrpc: clean up properly in gss_mech_unregister()NeilBrown2-1/+3
commit 24c5efe41c29ee3e55bcf5a1c9f61ca8709622e8 upstream. gss_mech_register() calls svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor() for each flavour, but gss_mech_unregister() does not call auth_domain_put(). This is unbalanced and makes it impossible to reload the module. Change svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor() to return the registered auth_domain, and save it for later release. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v2.6.12+) Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206651 Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-22software node: implement software_node_unregister()Greg Kroah-Hartman1-0/+1
commit 46d26819a5056f4831649c5887ad5c71a16d86f7 upstream. Sometimes it is better to unregister individual nodes instead of trying to do them all at once with software_node_unregister_nodes(), so create software_node_unregister() so that you can unregister them one at a time. This is especially important when creating nodes in a hierarchy, with parent -> children representations. Children always need to be removed before a parent is, as the swnode logic assumes this is going to be the case. Fix up the lib/test_printf.c fwnode_pointer() test which to use this new function as it had the problem of tearing things down in the backwards order. Fixes: f1ce39df508d ("lib/test_printf: Add tests for %pfw printk modifier") Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Tested-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200524153041.2361-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-22iommu/vt-d: Allocate domain info for real DMA sub-devicesJon Derrick1-0/+1
commit 4fda230ecddc2573ed88632e98b69b0b9b68c0ad upstream. Sub-devices of a real DMA device might exist on a separate segment than the real DMA device and its IOMMU. These devices should still have a valid device_domain_info, but the current dma alias model won't allocate info for the subdevice. This patch adds a segment member to struct device_domain_info and uses the sub-device's BDF so that these sub-devices won't alias to other devices. Fixes: 2b0140c69637e ("iommu/vt-d: Use pci_real_dma_dev() for mapping") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.6+ Signed-off-by: Jon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com> Acked-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200527165617.297470-3-jonathan.derrick@intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-22x86/amd_nb: Add AMD family 17h model 60h PCI IDsAlexander Monakov1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit a4e91825d7e1252f7cba005f1451e5464b23c15d ] Add PCI IDs for AMD Renoir (4000-series Ryzen CPUs). This is necessary to enable support for temperature sensors via the k10temp module. Signed-off-by: Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200510204842.2603-2-amonakov@ispras.ru Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-22serial: 8250_pci: Move Pericom IDs to pci_ids.hKai-Heng Feng1-0/+6
[ Upstream commit 62a7f3009a460001eb46984395280dd900bc4ef4 ] Move the IDs to pci_ids.h so it can be used by next patch. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200508065343.32751-1-kai.heng.feng@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-22mm: initialize deferred pages with interrupts enabledPavel Tatashin1-0/+2
commit 3d060856adfc59afb9d029c233141334cfaba418 upstream. Initializing struct pages is a long task and keeping interrupts disabled for the duration of this operation introduces a number of problems. 1. jiffies are not updated for long period of time, and thus incorrect time is reported. See proposed solution and discussion here: lkml/20200311123848.118638-1-shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com 2. It prevents farther improving deferred page initialization by allowing intra-node multi-threading. We are keeping interrupts disabled to solve a rather theoretical problem that was never observed in real world (See 3a2d7fa8a3d5). Let's keep interrupts enabled. In case we ever encounter a scenario where an interrupt thread wants to allocate large amount of memory this early in boot we can deal with that by growing zone (see deferred_grow_zone()) by the needed amount before starting deferred_init_memmap() threads. Before: [ 1.232459] node 0 initialised, 12058412 pages in 1ms After: [ 1.632580] node 0 initialised, 12051227 pages in 436ms Fixes: 3a2d7fa8a3d5 ("mm: disable interrupts while initializing deferred pages") Reported-by: Shile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Cc: Yiqian Wei <yiwei@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.17+] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200403140952.17177-3-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-22string.h: fix incompatibility between FORTIFY_SOURCE and KASANDaniel Axtens1-12/+48
[ Upstream commit 47227d27e2fcb01a9e8f5958d8997cf47a820afc ] The memcmp KASAN self-test fails on a kernel with both KASAN and FORTIFY_SOURCE. When FORTIFY_SOURCE is on, a number of functions are replaced with fortified versions, which attempt to check the sizes of the operands. However, these functions often directly invoke __builtin_foo() once they have performed the fortify check. Using __builtins may bypass KASAN checks if the compiler decides to inline it's own implementation as sequence of instructions, rather than emit a function call that goes out to a KASAN-instrumented implementation. Why is only memcmp affected? ============================ Of the string and string-like functions that kasan_test tests, only memcmp is replaced by an inline sequence of instructions in my testing on x86 with gcc version 9.2.1 20191008 (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2). I believe this is due to compiler heuristics. For example, if I annotate kmalloc calls with the alloc_size annotation (and disable some fortify compile-time checking!), the compiler will replace every memset except the one in kmalloc_uaf_memset with inline instructions. (I have some WIP patches to add this annotation.) Does this affect other functions in string.h? ============================================= Yes. Anything that uses __builtin_* rather than __real_* could be affected. This looks like: - strncpy - strcat - strlen - strlcpy maybe, under some circumstances? - strncat under some circumstances - memset - memcpy - memmove - memcmp (as noted) - memchr - strcpy Whether a function call is emitted always depends on the compiler. Most bugs should get caught by FORTIFY_SOURCE, but the missed memcmp test shows that this is not always the case. Isn't FORTIFY_SOURCE disabled with KASAN? ========================================- The string headers on all arches supporting KASAN disable fortify with kasan, but only when address sanitisation is _also_ disabled. For example from x86: #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && !defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__) /* * For files that are not instrumented (e.g. mm/slub.c) we * should use not instrumented version of mem* functions. */ #define memcpy(dst, src, len) __memcpy(dst, src, len) #define memmove(dst, src, len) __memmove(dst, src, len) #define memset(s, c, n) __memset(s, c, n) #ifndef __NO_FORTIFY #define __NO_FORTIFY /* FORTIFY_SOURCE uses __builtin_memcpy, etc. */ #endif #endif This comes from commit 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions"), and doesn't work when KASAN is enabled and the file is supposed to be sanitised - as with test_kasan.c I'm pretty sure this is not wrong, but not as expansive it should be: * we shouldn't use __builtin_memcpy etc in files where we don't have instrumentation - it could devolve into a function call to memcpy, which will be instrumented. Rather, we should use __memcpy which by convention is not instrumented. * we also shouldn't be using __builtin_memcpy when we have a KASAN instrumented file, because it could be replaced with inline asm that will not be instrumented. What is correct behaviour? ========================== Firstly, there is some overlap between fortification and KASAN: both provide some level of _runtime_ checking. Only fortify provides compile-time checking. KASAN and fortify can pick up different things at runtime: - Some fortify functions, notably the string functions, could easily be modified to consider sub-object sizes (e.g. members within a struct), and I have some WIP patches to do this. KASAN cannot detect these because it cannot insert poision between members of a struct. - KASAN can detect many over-reads/over-writes when the sizes of both operands are unknown, which fortify cannot. So there are a couple of options: 1) Flip the test: disable fortify in santised files and enable it in unsanitised files. This at least stops us missing KASAN checking, but we lose the fortify checking. 2) Make the fortify code always call out to real versions. Do this only for KASAN, for fear of losing the inlining opportunities we get from __builtin_*. (We can't use kasan_check_{read,write}: because the fortify functions are _extern inline_, you can't include _static_ inline functions without a compiler warning. kasan_check_{read,write} are static inline so we can't use them even when they would otherwise be suitable.) Take approach 2 and call out to real versions when KASAN is enabled. Use __underlying_foo to distinguish from __real_foo: __real_foo always refers to the kernel's implementation of foo, __underlying_foo could be either the kernel implementation or the __builtin_foo implementation. This is sometimes enough to make the memcmp test succeed with FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled. It is at least enough to get the function call into the module. One more fix is needed to make it reliable: see the next patch. Fixes: 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions") Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200423154503.5103-3-dja@axtens.net Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-22bpf: Fix up bpf_skb_adjust_room helper's skb csum settingDaniel Borkmann1-0/+8
[ Upstream commit 836e66c218f355ec01ba57671c85abf32961dcea ] Lorenz recently reported: In our TC classifier cls_redirect [0], we use the following sequence of helper calls to decapsulate a GUE (basically IP + UDP + custom header) encapsulated packet: bpf_skb_adjust_room(skb, -encap_len, BPF_ADJ_ROOM_MAC, BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO) bpf_redirect(skb->ifindex, BPF_F_INGRESS) It seems like some checksums of the inner headers are not validated in this case. For example, a TCP SYN packet with invalid TCP checksum is still accepted by the network stack and elicits a SYN ACK. [...] That is, we receive the following packet from the driver: | ETH | IP | UDP | GUE | IP | TCP | skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY ip_summed is CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY because our NICs do rx checksum offloading. On this packet we run skb_adjust_room_mac(-encap_len), and get the following: | ETH | IP | TCP | skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY Note that ip_summed is still CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY. After bpf_redirect()'ing into the ingress, we end up in tcp_v4_rcv(). There, skb_checksum_init() is turned into a no-op due to CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY. The bpf_skb_adjust_room() helper is not aware of protocol specifics. Internally, it handles the CHECKSUM_COMPLETE case via skb_postpull_rcsum(), but that does not cover CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY. In this case skb->csum_level of the original skb prior to bpf_skb_adjust_room() call was 0, that is, covering UDP. Right now there is no way to adjust the skb->csum_level. NICs that have checksum offload disabled (CHECKSUM_NONE) or that support CHECKSUM_COMPLETE are not affected. Use a safe default for CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY by resetting to CHECKSUM_NONE and add a flag to the helper called BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_NO_CSUM_RESET that allows users from opting out. Opting out is useful for the case where we don't remove/add full protocol headers, or for the case where a user wants to adjust the csum level manually e.g. through bpf_csum_level() helper that is added in subsequent patch. The bpf_skb_proto_{4_to_6,6_to_4}() for NAT64/46 translation from the BPF bpf_skb_change_proto() helper uses bpf_skb_net_hdr_{push,pop}() pair internally as well but doesn't change layers, only transitions between v4 to v6 and vice versa, therefore no adoption is required there. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200424185556.7358-1-lmb@cloudflare.com/ Fixes: 2be7e212d541 ("bpf: add bpf_skb_adjust_room helper") Reported-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com> Reported-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACAyw9-uU_52esMd1JjuA80fRPHJv5vsSg8GnfW3t_qDU4aVKQ@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/11a90472e7cce83e76ddbfce81fdfce7bfc68808.1591108731.git.daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>