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dev-5.8-intel
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[ Upstream commit e9d4709fcc26353df12070566970f080e651f0c9 ]
When a usrjquota or grpjquota mount option is used multiple times, we
will leak memory allocated for the file name. Make sure the last setting
is used and all the previous ones are properly freed.
Reported-by: syzbot+c9e294bbe0333a6b7640@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a805c111650cdba6ee880f528abdd03c1af82089 ]
It is trivial to trigger a WARN_ON_ONCE(1) in iomap_dio_actor() by
unprivileged users which would taint the kernel, or worse - panic if
panic_on_warn or panic_on_taint is set. Hence, just convert it to
pr_warn_ratelimited() to let users know their workloads are racing.
Thank Dave Chinner for the initial analysis of the racing reproducers.
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2a6ca4baed620303d414934aa1b7b0a8e7bab05f ]
There's an overflow bug in the realtime allocator. If the rt volume is
large enough to handle a single allocation request that is larger than
the maximum bmap extent length and the rt bitmap ends exactly on a
bitmap block boundary, it's possible that the near allocator will try to
check the freeness of a range that extends past the end of the bitmap.
This fails with a corruption error and shuts down the fs.
Therefore, constrain maxlen so that the range scan cannot run off the
end of the rt bitmap.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8859bf2b1278d064a139e3031451524a49a56bd0 ]
unlock_new_inode() is only meant to be called after a new inode has
already been inserted into the hash table. But reiserfs_new_inode() can
call it even before it has inserted the inode, triggering the WARNING in
unlock_new_inode(). Fix this by only calling unlock_new_inode() if the
inode has the I_NEW flag set, indicating that it's in the table.
This addresses the syzbot report "WARNING in unlock_new_inode"
(https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=187510916eb6a14598f7).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200628070057.820213-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+187510916eb6a14598f7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 044e2e26f214e5ab26af85faffd8d1e4ec066931 ]
When we fail to read inode, some data accessed in udf_evict_inode() may
be uninitialized. Move the accesses to !is_bad_inode() branch.
Reported-by: syzbot+91f02b28f9bb5f5f1341@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 44ac6b829c4e173fdf6df18e6dd86aecf9a3dc99 ]
Although UDF standard allows it, we don't support sparing table larger
than a single block. Check it during mount so that we don't try to
access memory beyond end of buffer.
Reported-by: syzbot+9991561e714f597095da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4f8c94022f0bc3babd0a124c0a7dcdd7547bd94e ]
Number of bytes allocated for mft record should be equal to the mft record
size stored in ntfs superblock as reported by syzbot, userspace might
trigger out-of-bounds read by dereferencing ctx->attr in ntfs_attr_find()
Reported-by: syzbot+aed06913f36eff9b544e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: syzbot+aed06913f36eff9b544e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com>
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=aed06913f36eff9b544e
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200824022804.226242-1-rkovhaev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3d2825c8c6105b0f36f3ff72760799fa2e71420e ]
This patch fixes the following memory detected by kmemleak and umount
gfs2 filesystem which removed the last lockspace:
unreferenced object 0xffff9264f482f600 (size 192):
comm "dlm_controld", pid 325, jiffies 4294690276 (age 48.136s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 6e 6f 64 65 73 00 00 00 ........nodes...
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000060481d7>] make_space+0x41/0x130
[<000000008d905d46>] configfs_mkdir+0x1a2/0x5f0
[<00000000729502cf>] vfs_mkdir+0x155/0x210
[<000000000369bcf1>] do_mkdirat+0x6d/0x110
[<00000000cc478a33>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[<00000000ce9ccf01>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The patch just remembers the "nodes" entry pointer in space as I think
it's created as subdirectory when parent "spaces" is created. In
function drop_space() we will lost the pointer reference to nds because
configfs_remove_default_groups(). However as this subdirectory is always
available when "spaces" exists it will just be freed when "spaces" will be
freed.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit af8c53c8bc087459b1aadd4c94805d8272358d79 ]
If userspace asked fsmap to try to count the number of entries, we cannot
return more than UINT_MAX entries because fmh_entries is u32.
Therefore, stop counting if we hit this limit or else we will waste time
to return truncated results.
Fixes: 0c9ec4beecac ("ext4: support GETFSMAP ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201001222148.GA49520@magnolia
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit aa2f77920b743c44e02e2dc8474bbf8bd30007a2 ]
inline_data is mutually exclusive to DAX so enabling both of them triggers
the following issue:
------------------------------------------
# mkfs.ext4 -F -O inline_data /dev/pmem1
...
# mount /dev/pmem1 /mnt
# echo 'test' >/mnt/file
# lsattr -l /mnt/file
/mnt/file Inline_Data
# xfs_io -c "chattr +x" /mnt/file
# xfs_io -c "lsattr -v" /mnt/file
[dax] /mnt/file
# umount /mnt
# mount /dev/pmem1 /mnt
# cat /mnt/file
cat: /mnt/file: Numerical result out of range
------------------------------------------
Fixes: b383a73f2b83 ("fs/ext4: Introduce DAX inode flag")
Signed-off-by: Xiao Yang <yangx.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200828084330.15776-1-yangx.jy@cn.fujitsu.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5b3dc19dda6691e8ab574e8eede1aef6f02a4f1c ]
ext4_mb_discard_group_preallocations() can be releasing group lock with
preallocations accumulated on its local list. Thus although
discard_pa_seq was incremented and concurrent allocating processes will
be retrying allocations, it can happen that premature ENOSPC error is
returned because blocks used for preallocations are not available for
reuse yet. Make sure we always free locally accumulated preallocations
before releasing group lock.
Fixes: 07b5b8e1ac40 ("ext4: mballoc: introduce pcpu seqcnt for freeing PA to improve ENOSPC handling")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924150959.4335-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 70022da804f0f3f152115688885608c39182082e ]
As we test disk offline/online with running fsstress, we find fsstress
process is keeping running state.
kworker/u32:3-262 [004] ...1 140.787471: ext4_mb_discard_preallocations: dev 8,32 needed 114
....
kworker/u32:3-262 [004] ...1 140.787471: ext4_mb_discard_preallocations: dev 8,32 needed 114
ext4_mb_new_blocks
repeat:
ext4_mb_discard_preallocations_should_retry(sb, ac, &seq)
freed = ext4_mb_discard_preallocations
ext4_mb_discard_group_preallocations
this_cpu_inc(discard_pa_seq);
---> freed == 0
seq_retry = ext4_get_discard_pa_seq_sum
for_each_possible_cpu(__cpu)
__seq += per_cpu(discard_pa_seq, __cpu);
if (seq_retry != *seq) {
*seq = seq_retry;
ret = true;
}
As we see seq_retry is sum of discard_pa_seq every cpu, if
ext4_mb_discard_group_preallocations return zero discard_pa_seq in this
cpu maybe increase one, so condition "seq_retry != *seq" have always
been met.
Ritesh Harjani suggest to in ext4_mb_discard_group_preallocations function we
only increase discard_pa_seq when there is some PA to free.
Fixes: 07b5b8e1ac40 ("ext4: mballoc: introduce pcpu seqcnt for freeing PA to improve ENOSPC handling")
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916113859.1556397-3-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 50b7d85680086126d7bd91dae81d57d4cb1ab6b7 ]
ramfs needs to check that pages are both physically contiguous and
contiguous in the file. If the page cache happens to have, eg, page A for
index 0 of the file, no page for index 1, and page A+1 for index 2, then
an mmap of the first two pages of the file will succeed when it should
fail.
Fixes: 642fb4d1f1dd ("[PATCH] NOMMU: Provide shared-writable mmap support on ramfs")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200914122239.GO6583@casper.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1d0e850a49a5b56f8f3cb51e74a11e2fedb96be6 ]
Fix cell removal by inserting a more final state than AFS_CELL_FAILED that
indicates that the cell has been unpublished in case the manager is already
requeued and will go through again. The new AFS_CELL_REMOVED state will
just immediately leave the manager function.
Going through a second time in the AFS_CELL_FAILED state will cause it to
try to remove the cell again, potentially leading to the proc list being
removed.
Fixes: 989782dcdc91 ("afs: Overhaul cell database management")
Reported-by: syzbot+b994ecf2b023f14832c1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0e0db88e1eb44a91ae8d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+2d0585e5efcd43d113c2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+1ecc2f9d3387f1d79d42@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+18d51774588492bf3f69@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+a5e4946b04d6ca8fa5f3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 286377f6bdf71568a4cf07104fe44006ae0dba6d ]
When the afs module is removed, one of the things that has to be done is to
purge the cell database. afs_cell_purge() cancels the management timer and
then starts the cell manager work item to do the purging. This does a
single run through and then assumes that all cells are now purged - but
this is no longer the case.
With the introduction of alias detection, a later cell in the database can
now be holding an active count on an earlier cell (cell->alias_of). The
purge scan passes by the earlier cell first, but this can't be got rid of
until it has discarded the alias. Ordinarily, afs_unuse_cell() would
handle this by setting the management timer to trigger another pass - but
afs_set_cell_timer() doesn't do anything if the namespace is being removed
(net->live == false). rmmod then hangs in the wait on cells_outstanding in
afs_cell_purge().
Fix this by making afs_set_cell_timer() directly queue the cell manager if
net->live is false. This causes additional management passes.
Queueing the cell manager increments cells_outstanding to make sure the
wait won't complete until all cells are destroyed.
Fixes: 8a070a964877 ("afs: Detect cell aliases 1 - Cells with root volumes")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 88c853c3f5c0a07c5db61b494ee25152535cfeee ]
Management of the lifetime of afs_cell struct has some problems due to the
usage counter being used to determine whether objects of that type are in
use in addition to whether anyone might be interested in the structure.
This is made trickier by cell objects being cached for a period of time in
case they're quickly reused as they hold the result of a setup process that
may be slow (DNS lookups, AFS RPC ops).
Problems include the cached root volume from alias resolution pinning its
parent cell record, rmmod occasionally hanging and occasionally producing
assertion failures.
Fix this by splitting the count of active users from the struct reference
count. Things then work as follows:
(1) The cell cache keeps +1 on the cell's activity count and this has to
be dropped before the cell can be removed. afs_manage_cell() tries to
exchange the 1 to a 0 with the cells_lock write-locked, and if
successful, the record is removed from the net->cells.
(2) One struct ref is 'owned' by the activity count. That is put when the
active count is reduced to 0 (final_destruction label).
(3) A ref can be held on a cell whilst it is queued for management on a
work queue without confusing the active count. afs_queue_cell() is
added to wrap this.
(4) The queue's ref is dropped at the end of the management. This is
split out into a separate function, afs_manage_cell_work().
(5) The root volume record is put after a cell is removed (at the
final_destruction label) rather then in the RCU destruction routine.
(6) Volumes hold struct refs, but aren't active users.
(7) Both counts are displayed in /proc/net/afs/cells.
There are some management function changes:
(*) afs_put_cell() now just decrements the refcount and triggers the RCU
destruction if it becomes 0. It no longer sets a timer to have the
manager do this.
(*) afs_use_cell() and afs_unuse_cell() are added to increase and decrease
the active count. afs_unuse_cell() sets the management timer.
(*) afs_queue_cell() is added to queue a cell with approprate refs.
There are also some other fixes:
(*) Don't let /proc/net/afs/cells access a cell's vllist if it's NULL.
(*) Make sure that candidate cells in lookups are properly destroyed
rather than being simply kfree'd. This ensures the bits it points to
are destroyed also.
(*) afs_dec_cells_outstanding() is now called in cell destruction rather
than at "final_destruction". This ensures that cell->net is still
valid to the end of the destructor.
(*) As a consequence of the previous two changes, move the increment of
net->cells_outstanding that was at the point of insertion into the
tree to the allocation routine to correctly balance things.
Fixes: 989782dcdc91 ("afs: Overhaul cell database management")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 92e3cc91d8f51ce64a8b7c696377180953dd316e ]
There are a number of problems that are being seen by the rapidly mounting
and unmounting an afs dynamic root with an explicit cell and volume
specified (which should probably be rejected, but that's a separate issue):
What the tests are doing is to look up/create a cell record for the name
given and then tear it down again without actually using it to try to talk
to a server. This is repeated endlessly, very fast, and the new cell
collides with the old one if it's not quick enough to reuse it.
It appears (as suggested by Hillf Danton) that the search through the RB
tree under a read_seqbegin_or_lock() under RCU conditions isn't safe and
that it's not blocking the write_seqlock(), despite taking two passes at
it. He suggested that the code should take a ref on the cell it's
attempting to look at - but this shouldn't be necessary until we've
compared the cell names. It's possible that I'm missing a barrier
somewhere.
However, using an RCU search for this is overkill, really - we only need to
access the cell name in a few places, and they're places where we're may
end up sleeping anyway.
Fix this by switching to an R/W semaphore instead.
Additionally, draw the down_read() call inside the function (renamed to
afs_find_cell()) since all the callers were taking the RCU read lock (or
should've been[*]).
[*] afs_probe_cell_name() should have been, but that doesn't appear to be
involved in the bug reports.
The symptoms of this look like:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xf27d208691691fdb: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x93e924348b48fed8-0x93e924348b48fedf]
...
RIP: 0010:strncasecmp lib/string.c:52 [inline]
RIP: 0010:strncasecmp+0x5f/0x240 lib/string.c:43
afs_lookup_cell_rcu+0x313/0x720 fs/afs/cell.c:88
afs_lookup_cell+0x2ee/0x1440 fs/afs/cell.c:249
afs_parse_source fs/afs/super.c:290 [inline]
...
Fixes: 989782dcdc91 ("afs: Overhaul cell database management")
Reported-by: syzbot+459a5dce0b4cb70fd076@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ae284d87abade58c8db7760c808f311ef1ce693c ]
syzkaller found that with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, unmounting an
f2fs filesystem could result in the following splat:
kobject: 'loop5' ((____ptrval____)): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 250)
kobject: 'f2fs_xattr_entry-7:5' ((____ptrval____)): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 750)
------------[ cut here ]------------
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x98
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 699 at lib/debugobjects.c:485 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 699 Comm: syz-executor.5 Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc8+ #101
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4d8
show_stack+0x34/0x48
dump_stack+0x174/0x1f8
panic+0x360/0x7a0
__warn+0x244/0x2ec
report_bug+0x240/0x398
bug_handler+0x50/0xc0
call_break_hook+0x160/0x1d8
brk_handler+0x30/0xc0
do_debug_exception+0x184/0x340
el1_dbg+0x48/0xb0
el1_sync_handler+0x170/0x1c8
el1_sync+0x80/0x100
debug_print_object+0x180/0x240
debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x200/0x430
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x190/0x210
kfree+0x13c/0x460
f2fs_put_super+0x624/0xa58
generic_shutdown_super+0x120/0x300
kill_block_super+0x94/0xf8
kill_f2fs_super+0x244/0x308
deactivate_locked_super+0x104/0x150
deactivate_super+0x118/0x148
cleanup_mnt+0x27c/0x3c0
__cleanup_mnt+0x28/0x38
task_work_run+0x10c/0x248
do_notify_resume+0x9d4/0x1188
work_pending+0x8/0x34c
Like the error handling for f2fs_register_sysfs(), we need to wait for
the kobject to be destroyed before returning to prevent a potential
use-after-free.
Fixes: bf9e697ecd42 ("f2fs: expose features to sysfs entry")
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Cc: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <jamie@nuviainc.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f6322f3f1212e005e7e6aa82ceb62be53030a64b ]
syzbot reported:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 PID: 6860 Comm: syz-executor835 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc8-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:utf8_casefold+0x43/0x1b0 fs/unicode/utf8-core.c:107
[...]
Call Trace:
f2fs_init_casefolded_name fs/f2fs/dir.c:85 [inline]
__f2fs_setup_filename fs/f2fs/dir.c:118 [inline]
f2fs_prepare_lookup+0x3bf/0x640 fs/f2fs/dir.c:163
f2fs_lookup+0x10d/0x920 fs/f2fs/namei.c:494
__lookup_hash+0x115/0x240 fs/namei.c:1445
filename_create+0x14b/0x630 fs/namei.c:3467
user_path_create fs/namei.c:3524 [inline]
do_mkdirat+0x56/0x310 fs/namei.c:3664
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[...]
The problem is that an inode has F2FS_CASEFOLD_FL set, but the
filesystem doesn't have the casefold feature flag set, and therefore
super_block::s_encoding is NULL.
Fix this by making sanity_check_inode() reject inodes that have
F2FS_CASEFOLD_FL when the filesystem doesn't have the casefold feature.
Reported-by: syzbot+05139c4039d0679e19ff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 2c2eb7a300cd ("f2fs: Support case-insensitive file name lookups")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d88850bd5516a77c6f727e8b6cefb64e0cc929c7 ]
Fix some off-by-one errors in xfs_rtalloc_query_range. The highest key
in the realtime bitmap is always one less than the number of rt extents,
which means that the key clamp at the start of the function is wrong.
The 4th argument to xfs_rtfind_forw is the highest rt extent that we
want to probe, which means that passing 1 less than the high key is
wrong. Finally, drop the rem variable that controls the loop because we
can compare the iteration point (rtstart) against the high key directly.
The sordid history of this function is that the original commit (fb3c3)
incorrectly passed (high_rec->ar_startblock - 1) as the 'limit' parameter
to xfs_rtfind_forw. This was wrong because the "high key" is supposed
to be the largest key for which the caller wants result rows, not the
key for the first row that could possibly be outside the range that the
caller wants to see.
A subsequent attempt (8ad56) to strengthen the parameter checking added
incorrect clamping of the parameters to the number of rt blocks in the
system (despite the bitmap functions all taking units of rt extents) to
avoid querying ranges past the end of rt bitmap file but failed to fix
the incorrect _rtfind_forw parameter. The original _rtfind_forw
parameter error then survived the conversion of the startblock and
blockcount fields to rt extents (a0e5c), and the most recent off-by-one
fix (a3a37) thought it was patching a problem when the end of the rt
volume is not in use, but none of these fixes actually solved the
original problem that the author was confused about the "limit" argument
to xfs_rtfind_forw.
Sadly, all four of these patches were written by this author and even
his own usage of this function and rt testing were inadequate to get
this fixed quickly.
Original-problem: fb3c3de2f65c ("xfs: add a couple of queries to iterate free extents in the rtbitmap")
Not-fixed-by: 8ad560d2565e ("xfs: strengthen rtalloc query range checks")
Not-fixed-by: a0e5c435babd ("xfs: fix xfs_rtalloc_rec units")
Fixes: a3a374bf1889 ("xfs: fix off-by-one error in xfs_rtalloc_query_range")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit a2d24bcb97dc7b0be1cb891e60ae133bdf36c786 ]
"mount -o local_lock=posix..." was broken by the mount API conversion
due to the missing constant.
Fixes: e38bb238ed8c ("NFS: Convert mount option parsing to use functionality from fs_parser.h")
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8ffa90e1145c70c7ac47f14b59583b2296d89e72 ]
Refactor xfs_getfsmap to improve its performance: instead of indirectly
calling a function that copies one record to userspace at a time, create
a shadow buffer in the kernel and copy the whole array once at the end.
On the author's computer, this reduces the runtime on his /home by ~20%.
This also eliminates a deadlock when running GETFSMAP against the
realtime device. The current code locks the rtbitmap to create
fsmappings and copies them into userspace, having not released the
rtbitmap lock. If the userspace buffer is an mmap of a sparse file that
itself resides on the realtime device, the write page fault will recurse
into the fs for allocation, which will deadlock on the rtbitmap lock.
Fixes: 4c934c7dd60c ("xfs: report realtime space information via the rtbitmap")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit acd1ac3aa22fd58803a12d26b1ab7f70232f8d8d ]
If userspace asked fsmap to count the number of entries, we cannot
return more than UINT_MAX entries because fmh_entries is u32.
Therefore, stop counting if we hit this limit or else we will waste time
to return truncated results.
Fixes: e89c041338ed ("xfs: implement the GETFSMAP ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 671459676ab0e1d371c8d6b184ad1faa05b6941e ]
Nathan popped up on #xfs and pointed out that we fail to handle
finobt btree blocks in xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn(). This means they
always fall through the entire magic number matching code to "recover
immediately". Whilst most of the time this is the correct behaviour,
occasionally it will be incorrect and could potentially overwrite
more recent metadata because we don't check the LSN in the on disk
metadata at all.
This bug has been present since the finobt was first introduced, and
is a potential cause of the occasional xfs_iget_check_free_state()
failures we see that indicate that the inode btree state does not
match the on disk inode state.
Fixes: aafc3c246529 ("xfs: support the XFS_BTNUM_FINOBT free inode btree type")
Reported-by: Nathan Scott <nathans@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 09cad07547445bf3a41683e4d3abcd154c123ef5 ]
Fix data race in prepend_path() with re-reading mnt->mnt_ns twice
without holding the lock.
is_mounted() does check for NULL, but is_anon_ns(mnt->mnt_ns) might
re-read the pointer again which could be NULL already, if in between
reads one of kern_unmount()/kern_unmount_array()/umount_tree() sets
mnt->mnt_ns to NULL.
This is seen in production with the following stack trace:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000048
...
RIP: 0010:prepend_path.isra.4+0x1ce/0x2e0
Call Trace:
d_path+0xe6/0x150
proc_pid_readlink+0x8f/0x100
vfs_readlink+0xf8/0x110
do_readlinkat+0xfd/0x120
__x64_sys_readlinkat+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x42/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: f2683bd8d5bd ("[PATCH] fix d_absolute_path() interplay with fsmount()")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 67197a4f28d28d0b073ab0427b03cb2ee5382578 ]
Currently __set_oom_adj loops through all processes in the system to keep
oom_score_adj and oom_score_adj_min in sync between processes sharing
their mm. This is done for any task with more that one mm_users, which
includes processes with multiple threads (sharing mm and signals).
However for such processes the loop is unnecessary because their signal
structure is shared as well.
Android updates oom_score_adj whenever a tasks changes its role
(background/foreground/...) or binds to/unbinds from a service, making it
more/less important. Such operation can happen frequently. We noticed
that updates to oom_score_adj became more expensive and after further
investigation found out that the patch mentioned in "Fixes" introduced a
regression. Using Pixel 4 with a typical Android workload, write time to
oom_score_adj increased from ~3.57us to ~362us. Moreover this regression
linearly depends on the number of multi-threaded processes running on the
system.
Mark the mm with a new MMF_MULTIPROCESS flag bit when task is created with
(CLONE_VM && !CLONE_THREAD && !CLONE_VFORK). Change __set_oom_adj to use
MMF_MULTIPROCESS instead of mm_users to decide whether oom_score_adj
update should be synchronized between multiple processes. To prevent
races between clone() and __set_oom_adj(), when oom_score_adj of the
process being cloned might be modified from userspace, we use
oom_adj_mutex. Its scope is changed to global.
The combination of (CLONE_VM && !CLONE_THREAD) is rarely used except for
the case of vfork(). To prevent performance regressions of vfork(), we
skip taking oom_adj_mutex and setting MMF_MULTIPROCESS when CLONE_VFORK is
specified. Clearing the MMF_MULTIPROCESS flag (when the last process
sharing the mm exits) is left out of this patch to keep it simple and
because it is believed that this threading model is rare. Should there
ever be a need for optimizing that case as well, it can be done by hooking
into the exit path, likely following the mm_update_next_owner pattern.
With the combination of (CLONE_VM && !CLONE_THREAD && !CLONE_VFORK) being
quite rare, the regression is gone after the change is applied.
[surenb@google.com: v3]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200902012558.2335613-1-surenb@google.com
Fixes: 44a70adec910 ("mm, oom_adj: make sure processes sharing mm have same view of oom_score_adj")
Reported-by: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me>
Cc: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200824153036.3201505-1-surenb@google.com
Debugged-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a6901d4d148dcbad7efb3174afbdf68c995618c2 ]
We can skip most of the initialisation, although spinlocks still
need explicit initialisation as architectures may use a non-zero
value to indicate unlocked. The comment is no longer useful as
attach_page_private() handles the refcount now.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3d3dc274ce736227e3197868ff749cff2f175f63 ]
Freshly allocated memory contains garbage, better make sure
to init all struct v2r1_disk_dqblk fields to avoid KMSAN report:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in qtree_entry_unused+0x137/0x1b0 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:218
CPU: 0 PID: 23373 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x21c/0x280 lib/dump_stack.c:118
kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:122
__msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:219
qtree_entry_unused+0x137/0x1b0 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:218
v2r1_mem2diskdqb+0x43d/0x710 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:285
qtree_write_dquot+0x226/0x870 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:394
v2_write_dquot+0x1ad/0x280 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:333
dquot_commit+0x4af/0x600 fs/quota/dquot.c:482
ext4_write_dquot fs/ext4/super.c:5934 [inline]
ext4_mark_dquot_dirty+0x4d8/0x6a0 fs/ext4/super.c:5985
mark_dquot_dirty fs/quota/dquot.c:347 [inline]
mark_all_dquot_dirty fs/quota/dquot.c:385 [inline]
dquot_alloc_inode+0xc05/0x12b0 fs/quota/dquot.c:1755
__ext4_new_inode+0x8204/0x9d70 fs/ext4/ialloc.c:1155
ext4_tmpfile+0x41a/0x850 fs/ext4/namei.c:2686
vfs_tmpfile+0x2a2/0x570 fs/namei.c:3283
do_tmpfile fs/namei.c:3316 [inline]
path_openat+0x4035/0x6a90 fs/namei.c:3359
do_filp_open+0x2b8/0x710 fs/namei.c:3395
do_sys_openat2+0xa88/0x1140 fs/open.c:1168
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1184 [inline]
__do_compat_sys_openat fs/open.c:1242 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_openat+0x2a4/0x310 fs/open.c:1240
__ia32_compat_sys_openat+0x56/0x70 fs/open.c:1240
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0x129/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:139
do_fast_syscall_32+0x6a/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162
do_SYSENTER_32+0x73/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:205
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x4d/0x5c
RIP: 0023:0xf7ff4549
Code: b8 01 10 06 03 74 b4 01 10 07 03 74 b0 01 10 08 03 74 d8 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 eb 0d 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 002b:00000000f55cd0cc EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000127
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000ffffff9c RCX: 0000000020000000
RDX: 0000000000410481 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:143 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x66/0xd0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:126
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x8a/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:80
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2907 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2916 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x2bb/0x4b0 mm/slub.c:3982
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:559 [inline]
getdqbuf+0x56/0x150 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:52
qtree_write_dquot+0xf2/0x870 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:378
v2_write_dquot+0x1ad/0x280 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:333
dquot_commit+0x4af/0x600 fs/quota/dquot.c:482
ext4_write_dquot fs/ext4/super.c:5934 [inline]
ext4_mark_dquot_dirty+0x4d8/0x6a0 fs/ext4/super.c:5985
mark_dquot_dirty fs/quota/dquot.c:347 [inline]
mark_all_dquot_dirty fs/quota/dquot.c:385 [inline]
dquot_alloc_inode+0xc05/0x12b0 fs/quota/dquot.c:1755
__ext4_new_inode+0x8204/0x9d70 fs/ext4/ialloc.c:1155
ext4_tmpfile+0x41a/0x850 fs/ext4/namei.c:2686
vfs_tmpfile+0x2a2/0x570 fs/namei.c:3283
do_tmpfile fs/namei.c:3316 [inline]
path_openat+0x4035/0x6a90 fs/namei.c:3359
do_filp_open+0x2b8/0x710 fs/namei.c:3395
do_sys_openat2+0xa88/0x1140 fs/open.c:1168
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1184 [inline]
__do_compat_sys_openat fs/open.c:1242 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_openat+0x2a4/0x310 fs/open.c:1240
__ia32_compat_sys_openat+0x56/0x70 fs/open.c:1240
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0x129/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:139
do_fast_syscall_32+0x6a/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162
do_SYSENTER_32+0x73/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:205
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x4d/0x5c
Fixes: 498c60153ebb ("quota: Implement quota format with 64-bit space and inode limits")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924183619.4176790-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5ffce3cc22a0e89813ed0c7162a68b639aef9ab6 ]
Commit 5833112df7e9 tried to make it so that a remap operation would
force the log out to disk if the filesystem is mounted with mandatory
synchronous writes. Unfortunately, that commit failed to handle the
case where the inode or the file descriptor require mandatory
synchronous writes.
Refactor the check into into a helper that will look for all three
conditions, and now we can treat reflink just like any other synchronous
write.
Fixes: 5833112df7e9 ("xfs: reflink should force the log out if mounted with wsync")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 14284fedf59f1647264f4603d64418cf1fcd3eb0 ]
When bringing (portions of) a page uptodate, we were marking blocks that
were zeroed as being uptodate, but not blocks that were read from storage.
Like the previous commit, this problem was found with generic/127 and
a kernel which failed readahead I/Os. This bug causes writes to be
silently lost when working with flaky storage.
Fixes: 9dc55f1389f9 ("iomap: add support for sub-pagesize buffered I/O without buffer heads")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e6e7ca92623a43156100306861272e04d46385fc ]
If we find a page in write_begin which is !Uptodate, we need
to clear any error on the page before starting to read data
into it. This matches how filemap_fault(), do_read_cache_page()
and generic_file_buffered_read() handle PageError on !Uptodate pages.
When calling iomap_set_range_uptodate() in __iomap_write_begin(), blocks
were not being marked as uptodate.
This was found with generic/127 and a specially modified kernel which
would fail (some) readahead I/Os. The test read some bytes in a prior
page which caused readahead to extend into page 0x34. There was
a subsequent write to page 0x34, followed by a read to page 0x34.
Because the blocks were still marked as !Uptodate, the read caused all
blocks to be re-read, overwriting the write. With this change, and the
next one, the bytes which were written are marked as being Uptodate, so
even though the page is still marked as !Uptodate, the blocks containing
the written data are not re-read from storage.
Fixes: 9dc55f1389f9 ("iomap: add support for sub-pagesize buffered I/O without buffer heads")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 154f7cb86809a3a796bffbc7a5a7ce0dee585eaa ]
Commit 1c11b63eff2a ("btrfs: replace pending/pinned chunks lists with io
tree") introduced btrfs_device::alloc_state extent io tree, but it
doesn't initialize the fs_info and owner member.
This means the following features are not properly supported:
- Fs owner report for insert_state() error
Without fs_info initialized, although btrfs_err() won't panic, it
won't output which fs is causing the error.
- Wrong owner for trace events
alloc_state will get the owner as pinned extents.
Fix this by assiging proper fs_info and owner for
btrfs_device::alloc_state.
Fixes: 1c11b63eff2a ("btrfs: replace pending/pinned chunks lists with io tree")
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5e895bd4d5233cb054447d0491d4e63c8496d419 ]
When an encryption policy has the IV_INO_LBLK_32 flag set, the IV
generation method involves hashing the inode number. This is different
from fscrypt's other IV generation methods, where the inode number is
either not used at all or is included directly in the IVs.
Therefore, in principle IV_INO_LBLK_32 can work with any length inode
number. However, currently fscrypt gets the inode number from
inode::i_ino, which is 'unsigned long'. So currently the implementation
limit is actually 32 bits (like IV_INO_LBLK_64), since longer inode
numbers will have been truncated by the VFS on 32-bit platforms.
Fix fscrypt_supported_v2_policy() to enforce the correct limit.
This doesn't actually matter currently, since only ext4 and f2fs support
IV_INO_LBLK_32, and they both only support 32-bit inode numbers. But we
might as well fix it in case it matters in the future.
Ideally inode::i_ino would instead be made 64-bit, but for now it's not
needed. (Note, this limit does *not* prevent filesystems with 64-bit
inode numbers from adding fscrypt support, since IV_INO_LBLK_* support
is optional and is useful only on certain hardware.)
Fixes: e3b1078bedd3 ("fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_32 policies")
Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200824203841.1707847-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 3c3317daef0afa0cd541fc9c1bfd6ce8bbf1129a upstream.
When mounting with modefromsid mount option, it was possible to
get the error on stat of a fifo or char or block device:
"cannot stat <filename>: Operation not supported"
Special devices can be stored as reparse points by some servers
(e.g. Windows NFS server and when using the SMB3.1.1 POSIX
Extensions) but when the modefromsid mount option is used
the client attempts to get the ACL for the file which requires
opening with OPEN_REPARSE_POINT create option.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3c6e65e679182d55779ef6f8582f0945af4319b0 upstream.
To servers which do not support directory leases (e.g. Samba)
it is wasteful to try to open_shroot (ie attempt to cache the
root directory handle). Skip attempt to open_shroot when
server does not indicate support for directory leases.
Cuts the number of requests on mount from 17 to 15, and
cuts the number of requests on stat of the root directory
from 4 to 3.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.1+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9934430e2178d5164eb1ac91a9b092f9e7e64745 upstream.
We were setting the uid/gid to the default in each dir entry
in the parsing of the POSIX query dir response, rather
than attempting to map the user and group SIDs returned by
the server to well known SIDs (or upcall if not found).
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 62593011247c8a8cfeb0c86aff84688b196727c2 upstream.
TCP server info field server->total_read is modified in parallel by
demultiplex thread and decrypt offload worker thread. server->total_read
is used in calculation to discard the remaining data of PDU which is
not read into memory.
Because of parallel modification, server->total_read can get corrupted
and can result in discarding the valid data of next PDU.
Signed-off-by: Rohith Surabattula <rohiths@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> #5.4+
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0bd294b55a5de442370c29fa53bab17aef3ff318 upstream.
In crypt_message, when smb2_get_enc_key returns error, we need to
return the error back to the caller. If not, we end up processing
the message further, causing a kernel oops due to unwarranted access
of memory.
Call Trace:
smb3_receive_transform+0x120/0x870 [cifs]
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0xb53/0xc20 [cifs]
? cifs_handle_standard+0x190/0x190 [cifs]
kthread+0x116/0x130
? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d367cb960ce88914898cbfa43645c2e43ede9465 upstream.
The "end" pointer is either NULL or it points to the next byte to parse.
If there isn't a next byte then dereferencing "end" is an off-by-one out
of bounds error. And, of course, if it's NULL that leads to an Oops.
Printing "*end" doesn't seem very useful so let's delete this code.
Also for the last debug statement, I noticed that it should be printing
"sequence_end" instead of "end" so fix that as well.
Reported-by: Dominik Maier <dmaier@sect.tu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c2bb80b8bdd04dfe32364b78b61b6a47f717af52 upstream.
With suitably crafted reiserfs image and mount command reiserfs will
crash when trying to verify that XATTR_ROOT directory can be looked up
in / as that recurses back to xattr code like:
xattr_lookup+0x24/0x280 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:395
reiserfs_xattr_get+0x89/0x540 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:677
reiserfs_get_acl+0x63/0x690 fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c:209
get_acl+0x152/0x2e0 fs/posix_acl.c:141
check_acl fs/namei.c:277 [inline]
acl_permission_check fs/namei.c:309 [inline]
generic_permission+0x2ba/0x550 fs/namei.c:353
do_inode_permission fs/namei.c:398 [inline]
inode_permission+0x234/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:463
lookup_one_len+0xa6/0x200 fs/namei.c:2557
reiserfs_lookup_privroot+0x85/0x1e0 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:972
reiserfs_fill_super+0x2b51/0x3240 fs/reiserfs/super.c:2176
mount_bdev+0x24f/0x360 fs/super.c:1417
Fix the problem by bailing from reiserfs_xattr_get() when xattrs are not
yet initialized.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+9b33c9b118d77ff59b6f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4443390e08d34d5771ab444f601cf71b3c9634a4 upstream.
reiserfs_read_locked_inode() didn't initialize key length properly. Use
_make_cpu_key() macro for key initialization so that all key member are
properly initialized.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+d94d02749498bb7bab4b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ec0fa0b659144d9c68204d23f627b6a65fa53e50 ]
The afs filesystem has a lock[*] that it uses to serialise I/O operations
going to the server (vnode->io_lock), as the server will only perform one
modification operation at a time on any given file or directory. This
prevents the the filesystem from filling up all the call slots to a server
with calls that aren't going to be executed in parallel anyway, thereby
allowing operations on other files to obtain slots.
[*] Note that is probably redundant for directories at least since
i_rwsem is used to serialise directory modifications and
lookup/reading vs modification. The server does allow parallel
non-modification ops, however.
When a file truncation op completes, we truncate the in-memory copy of the
file to match - but we do it whilst still holding the io_lock, the idea
being to prevent races with other operations.
However, if writeback starts in a worker thread simultaneously with
truncation (whilst notify_change() is called with i_rwsem locked, writeback
pays it no heed), it may manage to set PG_writeback bits on the pages that
will get truncated before afs_setattr_success() manages to call
truncate_pagecache(). Truncate will then wait for those pages - whilst
still inside io_lock:
# cat /proc/8837/stack
[<0>] wait_on_page_bit_common+0x184/0x1e7
[<0>] truncate_inode_pages_range+0x37f/0x3eb
[<0>] truncate_pagecache+0x3c/0x53
[<0>] afs_setattr_success+0x4d/0x6e
[<0>] afs_wait_for_operation+0xd8/0x169
[<0>] afs_do_sync_operation+0x16/0x1f
[<0>] afs_setattr+0x1fb/0x25d
[<0>] notify_change+0x2cf/0x3c4
[<0>] do_truncate+0x7f/0xb2
[<0>] do_sys_ftruncate+0xd1/0x104
[<0>] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x3a
[<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The writeback operation, however, stalls indefinitely because it needs to
get the io_lock to proceed:
# cat /proc/5940/stack
[<0>] afs_get_io_locks+0x58/0x1ae
[<0>] afs_begin_vnode_operation+0xc7/0xd1
[<0>] afs_store_data+0x1b2/0x2a3
[<0>] afs_write_back_from_locked_page+0x418/0x57c
[<0>] afs_writepages_region+0x196/0x224
[<0>] afs_writepages+0x74/0x156
[<0>] do_writepages+0x2d/0x56
[<0>] __writeback_single_inode+0x84/0x207
[<0>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x238/0x3cf
[<0>] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x68/0x9f
[<0>] wb_writeback+0x145/0x26c
[<0>] wb_do_writeback+0x16a/0x194
[<0>] wb_workfn+0x74/0x177
[<0>] process_one_work+0x174/0x264
[<0>] worker_thread+0x117/0x1b9
[<0>] kthread+0xec/0xf1
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
and thus deadlock has occurred.
Note that whilst afs_setattr() calls filemap_write_and_wait(), the fact
that the caller is holding i_rwsem doesn't preclude more pages being
dirtied through an mmap'd region.
Fix this by:
(1) Use the vnode validate_lock to mediate access between afs_setattr()
and afs_writepages():
(a) Exclusively lock validate_lock in afs_setattr() around the whole
RPC operation.
(b) If WB_SYNC_ALL isn't set on entry to afs_writepages(), trying to
shared-lock validate_lock and returning immediately if we couldn't
get it.
(c) If WB_SYNC_ALL is set, wait for the lock.
The validate_lock is also used to validate a file and to zap its cache
if the file was altered by a third party, so it's probably a good fit
for this.
(2) Move the truncation outside of the io_lock in setattr, using the same
hook as is used for local directory editing.
This requires the old i_size to be retained in the operation record as
we commit the revised status to the inode members inside the io_lock
still, but we still need to know if we reduced the file size.
Fixes: d2ddc776a458 ("afs: Overhaul volume and server record caching and fileserver rotation")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8a018eb55e3ac033592afbcb476b0ffe64465b12 ]
Calling pipe2() with O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE could results in memory
leaks unless watch_queue_init() is successful.
In case of watch_queue_init() failure in pipe2() we are left
with inode and pipe_inode_info instances that need to be freed. That
failure exit has been introduced in commit c73be61cede5 ("pipe: Add
general notification queue support") and its handling should've been
identical to nearby treatment of alloc_file_pseudo() failures - it
is dealing with the same situation. As it is, the mainline kernel
leaks in that case.
Another problem is that CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE and !CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
cases are treated differently (and the former leaks just pipe_inode_info,
the latter - both pipe_inode_info and inode).
Fixed by providing a dummy wacth_queue_init() in !CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
case and by having failures of wacth_queue_init() handled the same way
we handle alloc_file_pseudo() ones.
Fixes: c73be61cede5 ("pipe: Add general notification queue support")
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a466c85edc6fbe845facc8f57c408c544f42899e ]
When closing and freeing the source device we could end up doing our
final blkdev_put() on the bdev, which will grab the bd_mutex. As such
we want to be holding as few locks as possible, so move this call
outside of the dev_replace->lock_finishing_cancel_unmount lock. Since
we're modifying the fs_devices we need to make sure we're holding the
uuid_mutex here, so take that as well.
There's a report from syzbot probably hitting one of the cases where
the bd_mutex and device_list_mutex are taken in the wrong order, however
it's not with device replace, like this patch fixes. As there's no
reproducer available so far, we can't verify the fix.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000fc04d105afcf86d7@google.com/
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=84a0634dc5d21d488419
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.0/6878 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88804c17d780 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x30/0x520 fs/block_dev.c:1804
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880908cfce0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: close_fs_devices.part.0+0x2e/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1159
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #4 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
btrfs_finish_chunk_alloc+0x281/0xf90 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:5255
btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x2f3/0x700 fs/btrfs/block-group.c:2109
__btrfs_end_transaction+0xf5/0x690 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:916
find_free_extent_update_loop fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:3807 [inline]
find_free_extent+0x23b7/0x2e60 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4127
btrfs_reserve_extent+0x166/0x460 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4206
cow_file_range+0x3de/0x9b0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1063
btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x2cf/0x1410 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1838
writepage_delalloc+0x150/0x460 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3439
__extent_writepage+0x441/0xd00 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3653
extent_write_cache_pages.constprop.0+0x69d/0x1040 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4249
extent_writepages+0xcd/0x2b0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4370
do_writepages+0xec/0x290 mm/page-writeback.c:2352
__writeback_single_inode+0x125/0x1400 fs/fs-writeback.c:1461
writeback_sb_inodes+0x53d/0xf40 fs/fs-writeback.c:1721
wb_writeback+0x2ad/0xd40 fs/fs-writeback.c:1894
wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2039 [inline]
wb_workfn+0x2dc/0x13e0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2080
process_one_work+0x94c/0x1670 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
kthread+0x3b5/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
-> #3 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
__sb_start_write+0x234/0x470 fs/super.c:1672
sb_start_intwrite include/linux/fs.h:1690 [inline]
start_transaction+0xbe7/0x1170 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:624
find_free_extent_update_loop fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:3789 [inline]
find_free_extent+0x25e1/0x2e60 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4127
btrfs_reserve_extent+0x166/0x460 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4206
cow_file_range+0x3de/0x9b0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1063
btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x2cf/0x1410 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1838
writepage_delalloc+0x150/0x460 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3439
__extent_writepage+0x441/0xd00 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3653
extent_write_cache_pages.constprop.0+0x69d/0x1040 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4249
extent_writepages+0xcd/0x2b0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4370
do_writepages+0xec/0x290 mm/page-writeback.c:2352
__writeback_single_inode+0x125/0x1400 fs/fs-writeback.c:1461
writeback_sb_inodes+0x53d/0xf40 fs/fs-writeback.c:1721
wb_writeback+0x2ad/0xd40 fs/fs-writeback.c:1894
wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2039 [inline]
wb_workfn+0x2dc/0x13e0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2080
process_one_work+0x94c/0x1670 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
kthread+0x3b5/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
-> #2 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__flush_work+0x60e/0xac0 kernel/workqueue.c:3041
wb_shutdown+0x180/0x220 mm/backing-dev.c:355
bdi_unregister+0x174/0x590 mm/backing-dev.c:872
del_gendisk+0x820/0xa10 block/genhd.c:933
loop_remove drivers/block/loop.c:2192 [inline]
loop_control_ioctl drivers/block/loop.c:2291 [inline]
loop_control_ioctl+0x3b1/0x480 drivers/block/loop.c:2257
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:739
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #1 (loop_ctl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
lo_open+0x19/0xd0 drivers/block/loop.c:1893
__blkdev_get+0x759/0x1aa0 fs/block_dev.c:1507
blkdev_get fs/block_dev.c:1639 [inline]
blkdev_open+0x227/0x300 fs/block_dev.c:1753
do_dentry_open+0x4b9/0x11b0 fs/open.c:817
do_open fs/namei.c:3251 [inline]
path_openat+0x1b9a/0x2730 fs/namei.c:3368
do_filp_open+0x17e/0x3c0 fs/namei.c:3395
do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x420 fs/open.c:1168
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1184 [inline]
__do_sys_open fs/open.c:1192 [inline]
__se_sys_open fs/open.c:1188 [inline]
__x64_sys_open+0x119/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1188
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #0 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4426
lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xae0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5006
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
blkdev_put+0x30/0x520 fs/block_dev.c:1804
btrfs_close_bdev fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1117 [inline]
btrfs_close_bdev fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1107 [inline]
btrfs_close_one_device fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1133 [inline]
close_fs_devices.part.0+0x1a4/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1161
close_fs_devices fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1193 [inline]
btrfs_close_devices+0x95/0x1f0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1179
close_ctree+0x688/0x6cb fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4149
generic_shutdown_super+0x144/0x370 fs/super.c:464
kill_anon_super+0x36/0x60 fs/super.c:1108
btrfs_kill_super+0x38/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2265
deactivate_locked_super+0x94/0x160 fs/super.c:335
deactivate_super+0xad/0xd0 fs/super.c:366
cleanup_mnt+0x3a3/0x530 fs/namespace.c:1118
task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:163 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e1/0x200 kernel/entry/common.c:190
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0x2e0 kernel/entry/common.c:265
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&bdev->bd_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> &fs_devs->device_list_mutex
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
lock(sb_internal#2);
lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
lock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by syz-executor.0/6878:
#0: ffff88809070c0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#70){++++}-{3:3}, at: deactivate_super+0xa5/0xd0 fs/super.c:365
#1: ffffffff8a5b37a8 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_close_devices+0x23/0x1f0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1178
#2: ffff8880908cfce0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: close_fs_devices.part.0+0x2e/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1159
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 6878 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
check_noncircular+0x324/0x3e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1827
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4426
lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xae0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5006
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
blkdev_put+0x30/0x520 fs/block_dev.c:1804
btrfs_close_bdev fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1117 [inline]
btrfs_close_bdev fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1107 [inline]
btrfs_close_one_device fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1133 [inline]
close_fs_devices.part.0+0x1a4/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1161
close_fs_devices fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1193 [inline]
btrfs_close_devices+0x95/0x1f0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1179
close_ctree+0x688/0x6cb fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4149
generic_shutdown_super+0x144/0x370 fs/super.c:464
kill_anon_super+0x36/0x60 fs/super.c:1108
btrfs_kill_super+0x38/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2265
deactivate_locked_super+0x94/0x160 fs/super.c:335
deactivate_super+0xad/0xd0 fs/super.c:366
cleanup_mnt+0x3a3/0x530 fs/namespace.c:1118
task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:163 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e1/0x200 kernel/entry/common.c:190
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0x2e0 kernel/entry/common.c:265
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x460027
RSP: 002b:00007fff59216328 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000076035 RCX: 0000000000460027
RDX: 0000000000403188 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 00007fff592163d0
RBP: 0000000000000333 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000000b
R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff59217460
R13: 0000000002df2a60 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff59217460
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
[ add syzbot reference ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fad8e0de4426a776c9bcb060555e7c09e2d08db6 ]
syzbot reports a potential lock deadlock between the normal IO path and
->show_fdinfo():
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.9.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.2/19710 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888098ddc450 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: io_write+0x6b5/0xb30 fs/io_uring.c:3296
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880a11b8428 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xe9a/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8348
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
__io_uring_show_fdinfo fs/io_uring.c:8417 [inline]
io_uring_show_fdinfo+0x194/0xc70 fs/io_uring.c:8460
seq_show+0x4a8/0x700 fs/proc/fd.c:65
seq_read+0x432/0x1070 fs/seq_file.c:208
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:734 [inline]
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:721 [inline]
do_iter_read+0x48e/0x6e0 fs/read_write.c:955
vfs_readv+0xe5/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1073
kernel_readv fs/splice.c:355 [inline]
default_file_splice_read.constprop.0+0x4e6/0x9e0 fs/splice.c:412
do_splice_to+0x137/0x170 fs/splice.c:871
splice_direct_to_actor+0x307/0x980 fs/splice.c:950
do_splice_direct+0x1b3/0x280 fs/splice.c:1059
do_sendfile+0x55f/0xd40 fs/read_write.c:1540
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1601 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1587 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cc/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1587
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #1 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
seq_read+0x61/0x1070 fs/seq_file.c:155
pde_read fs/proc/inode.c:306 [inline]
proc_reg_read+0x221/0x300 fs/proc/inode.c:318
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:734 [inline]
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:721 [inline]
do_iter_read+0x48e/0x6e0 fs/read_write.c:955
vfs_readv+0xe5/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1073
kernel_readv fs/splice.c:355 [inline]
default_file_splice_read.constprop.0+0x4e6/0x9e0 fs/splice.c:412
do_splice_to+0x137/0x170 fs/splice.c:871
splice_direct_to_actor+0x307/0x980 fs/splice.c:950
do_splice_direct+0x1b3/0x280 fs/splice.c:1059
do_sendfile+0x55f/0xd40 fs/read_write.c:1540
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1601 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1587 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cc/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1587
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #0 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4441
lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xaf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5029
percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
__sb_start_write+0x228/0x450 fs/super.c:1672
io_write+0x6b5/0xb30 fs/io_uring.c:3296
io_issue_sqe+0x18f/0x5c50 fs/io_uring.c:5719
__io_queue_sqe+0x280/0x1160 fs/io_uring.c:6175
io_queue_sqe+0x692/0xfa0 fs/io_uring.c:6254
io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6324 [inline]
io_submit_sqes+0x1761/0x2400 fs/io_uring.c:6521
__do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xeac/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8349
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
sb_writers#4 --> &p->lock --> &ctx->uring_lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
lock(&p->lock);
lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
lock(sb_writers#4);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor.2/19710:
#0: ffff8880a11b8428 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xe9a/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8348
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 19710 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
check_noncircular+0x324/0x3e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1827
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4441
lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xaf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5029
percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
__sb_start_write+0x228/0x450 fs/super.c:1672
io_write+0x6b5/0xb30 fs/io_uring.c:3296
io_issue_sqe+0x18f/0x5c50 fs/io_uring.c:5719
__io_queue_sqe+0x280/0x1160 fs/io_uring.c:6175
io_queue_sqe+0x692/0xfa0 fs/io_uring.c:6254
io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6324 [inline]
io_submit_sqes+0x1761/0x2400 fs/io_uring.c:6521
__do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xeac/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8349
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45e179
Code: 3d b2 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 0b b2 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f1194e74c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001aa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000082c0 RCX: 000000000045e179
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 000000000118cf98 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000118cf4c
R13: 00007ffd1aa5756f R14: 00007f1194e759c0 R15: 000000000118cf4c
Fix this by just not diving into details if we fail to trylock the
io_uring mutex. We know the ctx isn't going away during this operation,
but we cannot safely iterate buffers/files/personalities if we don't
hold the io_uring mutex.
Reported-by: syzbot+2f8fa4e860edc3066aba@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 313b085851c13ca08320372a05a7047ea25d3dd4 ]
We need to move the closing of the src_device out of all the device
replace locking, but we definitely want to zero out the superblock
before we commit the last time to make sure the device is properly
removed. Handle this by pushing btrfs_scratch_superblocks into
btrfs_dev_replace_finishing, and then later on we'll move the src_device
closing and freeing stuff where we need it to be.
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 64b7f674c292207624b3d788eda2dde3dc1415df upstream.
On setxattr() syscall path due to an apprent typo the size of a dynamically
allocated memory chunk for storing struct smb2_file_full_ea_info object is
computed incorrectly, to be more precise the first addend is the size of
a pointer instead of the wanted object size. Coincidentally it makes no
difference on 64-bit platforms, however on 32-bit targets the following
memcpy() writes 4 bytes of data outside of the dynamically allocated memory.
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-16 (Not tainted): Redzone overwritten
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: 0x79e69a6f-0x9e5cdecf @offset=368. First byte 0x73 instead of 0xcc
INFO: Slab 0xd36d2454 objects=85 used=51 fp=0xf7d0fc7a flags=0x35000201
INFO: Object 0x6f171df3 @offset=352 fp=0x00000000
Redzone 5d4ff02d: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ................
Object 6f171df3: 00 00 00 00 00 05 06 00 73 6e 72 75 62 00 66 69 ........snrub.fi
Redzone 79e69a6f: 73 68 32 0a sh2.
Padding 56254d82: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
CPU: 0 PID: 8196 Comm: attr Tainted: G B 5.9.0-rc8+ #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x54/0x6e
print_trailer+0x12c/0x134
check_bytes_and_report.cold+0x3e/0x69
check_object+0x18c/0x250
free_debug_processing+0xfe/0x230
__slab_free+0x1c0/0x300
kfree+0x1d3/0x220
smb2_set_ea+0x27d/0x540
cifs_xattr_set+0x57f/0x620
__vfs_setxattr+0x4e/0x60
__vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x4e/0x100
__vfs_setxattr_locked+0xae/0xd0
vfs_setxattr+0x4e/0xe0
setxattr+0x12c/0x1a0
path_setxattr+0xa4/0xc0
__ia32_sys_lsetxattr+0x1d/0x20
__do_fast_syscall_32+0x40/0x70
do_fast_syscall_32+0x29/0x60
do_SYSENTER_32+0x15/0x20
entry_SYSENTER_32+0x9f/0xf2
Fixes: 5517554e4313 ("cifs: Add support for writing attributes on SMB2+")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Zapolskiy <vladimir@tuxera.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d1a819a2ec2d3b5e6a8f8a9f67386bda0ad315bc upstream.
Tetsuo Handa reports that splice() can return 0 before the real EOF, if
the data in the splice source pipe is an empty pipe buffer. That empty
pipe buffer case doesn't happen in any normal situation, but you can
trigger it by doing a write to a pipe that fails due to a page fault.
Tetsuo has a test-case to show the behavior:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
const int fd = open("/tmp/testfile", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600);
int pipe_fd[2] = { -1, -1 };
pipe(pipe_fd);
write(pipe_fd[1], NULL, 4096);
/* This splice() should wait unless interrupted. */
return !splice(pipe_fd[0], NULL, fd, NULL, 65536, 0);
}
which results in
write(5, NULL, 4096) = -1 EFAULT (Bad address)
splice(4, NULL, 3, NULL, 65536, 0) = 0
and this can confuse splice() users into believing they have hit EOF
prematurely.
The issue was introduced when the pipe write code started pre-allocating
the pipe buffers before copying data from user space.
This is modified verion of Tetsuo's original patch.
Fixes: a194dfe6e6f6 ("pipe: Rearrange sequence in pipe_write() to preallocate slot")
Link:https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20201005121339.4063-1-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp/
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8ff006e57ad3a25f909c456d053aa498b6673a39 upstream.
syzbot reported warning message:
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1d6/0x29e lib/dump_stack.c:118
register_lock_class+0xf06/0x1520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:893
__lock_acquire+0xfd/0x2ae0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4320
lock_acquire+0x148/0x720 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5029
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:354 [inline]
exfat_cache_inval_inode+0x30/0x280 fs/exfat/cache.c:226
exfat_evict_inode+0x124/0x270 fs/exfat/inode.c:660
evict+0x2bb/0x6d0 fs/inode.c:576
exfat_fill_super+0x1e07/0x27d0 fs/exfat/super.c:681
get_tree_bdev+0x3e9/0x5f0 fs/super.c:1342
vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline]
path_mount+0x179d/0x29e0 fs/namespace.c:3192
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x126/0x180 fs/namespace.c:3390
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
If exfat_read_root() returns an error, spinlock is used in
exfat_evict_inode() without initialization. This patch combines
exfat_cache_init_inode() with exfat_inode_init_once() to initialize
spinlock by slab constructor.
Fixes: c35b6810c495 ("exfat: add exfat cache")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+b91107320911a26c9a95@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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