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commit bdd65589593edd79b6a12ce86b3b7a7c6dae5208 upstream.
0day reported a possible circular locking dependency:
Chain exists of:
&irq_desc_lock_class --> console_owner --> &port_lock_key
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&port_lock_key);
lock(console_owner);
lock(&port_lock_key);
lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
The reason for this is a printk() in the i8259 interrupt chip driver
which is invoked with the irq descriptor lock held, which reverses the
lock operations vs. printk() from arbitrary contexts.
Switch the printk() to printk_deferred() to avoid that.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87365abt2v.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d2286ba7d574ba3103a421a2f9ec17cb5b0d87a1 upstream.
Prevent setting the tscdeadline timer if the lapic is hw disabled.
Fixes: bce87cce88 (KVM: x86: consolidate different ways to test for in-kernel LAPIC)
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1596165141-28874-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 039a7a30ec102ec866d382a66f87f6f7654f8140 ]
If a user task's stack is empty, or if it only has user regs, ORC
reports it as a reliable empty stack. But arch_stack_walk_reliable()
incorrectly treats it as unreliable.
That happens because the only success path for user tasks is inside the
loop, which only iterates on non-empty stacks. Generally, a user task
must end in a user regs frame, but an empty stack is an exception to
that rule.
Thanks to commit 71c95825289f ("x86/unwind/orc: Fix error handling in
__unwind_start()"), unwind_start() now sets state->error appropriately.
So now for both ORC and FP unwinders, unwind_done() and !unwind_error()
always means the end of the stack was successfully reached. So the
success path for kthreads is no longer needed -- it can also be used for
empty user tasks.
Reported-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f136a4e5f019219cbc4f4da33b30c2f44fa65b84.1594994374.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 372a8eaa05998cd45b3417d0e0ffd3a70978211a ]
The ORC unwinder fails to unwind newly forked tasks which haven't yet
run on the CPU. It correctly reads the 'ret_from_fork' instruction
pointer from the stack, but it incorrectly interprets that value as a
call stack address rather than a "signal" one, so the address gets
incorrectly decremented in the call to orc_find(), resulting in bad ORC
data.
Fix it by forcing 'ret_from_fork' frames to be signal frames.
Reported-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f91a8778dde8aae7f71884b5df2b16d552040441.1594994374.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit de2b41be8fcccb2f5b6c480d35df590476344201 upstream.
On x86-32 the idt_table with 256 entries needs only 2048 bytes. It is
page-aligned, but the end of the .bss..page_aligned section is not
guaranteed to be page-aligned.
As a result, objects from other .bss sections may end up on the same 4k
page as the idt_table, and will accidentially get mapped read-only during
boot, causing unexpected page-faults when the kernel writes to them.
This could be worked around by making the objects in the page aligned
sections page sized, but that's wrong.
Explicit sections which store only page aligned objects have an implicit
guarantee that the object is alone in the page in which it is placed. That
works for all objects except the last one. That's inconsistent.
Enforcing page sized objects for these sections would wreckage memory
sanitizers, because the object becomes artificially larger than it should
be and out of bound access becomes legit.
Align the end of the .bss..page_aligned and .data..page_aligned section on
page-size so all objects places in these sections are guaranteed to have
their own page.
[ tglx: Amended changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200721093448.10417-1-joro@8bytes.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 81e96851ea32deb2c921c870eecabf335f598aeb ]
The clang integrated assembler requires the 'cmp' instruction to
have a length prefix here:
arch/x86/math-emu/wm_sqrt.S:212:2: error: ambiguous instructions require an explicit suffix (could be 'cmpb', 'cmpw', or 'cmpl')
cmp $0xffffffff,-24(%ebp)
^
Make this a 32-bit comparison, which it was clearly meant to be.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200527135352.1198078-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e3beca48a45b5e0e6e6a4e0124276b8248dcc9bb ]
Quite some non OF/ACPI users of irqdomains allocate firmware nodes of type
IRQCHIP_FWNODE_NAMED or IRQCHIP_FWNODE_NAMED_ID and free them right after
creating the irqdomain. The only purpose of these FW nodes is to convey
name information. When this was introduced the core code did not store the
pointer to the node in the irqdomain. A recent change stored the firmware
node pointer in irqdomain for other reasons and missed to notice that the
usage sites which do the alloc_fwnode/create_domain/free_fwnode sequence
are broken by this. Storing a dangling pointer is dangerous itself, but in
case that the domain is destroyed later on this leads to a double free.
Remove the freeing of the firmware node after creating the irqdomain from
all affected call sites to cure this.
Fixes: 711419e504eb ("irqdomain: Add the missing assignment of domain->fwnode for named fwnode")
Reported-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/873661qakd.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit baedb87d1b53532f81b4bd0387f83b05d4f7eb9a upstream.
Setting interrupt affinity on inactive interrupts is inconsistent when
hierarchical irq domains are enabled. The core code should just store the
affinity and not call into the irq chip driver for inactive interrupts
because the chip drivers may not be in a state to handle such requests.
X86 has a hacky workaround for that but all other irq chips have not which
causes problems e.g. on GIC V3 ITS.
Instead of adding more ugly hacks all over the place, solve the problem in
the core code. If the affinity is set on an inactive interrupt then:
- Store it in the irq descriptors affinity mask
- Update the effective affinity to reflect that so user space has
a consistent view
- Don't call into the irq chip driver
This is the core equivalent of the X86 workaround and works correctly
because the affinity setting is established in the irq chip when the
interrupt is activated later on.
Note, that this is only effective when hierarchical irq domains are enabled
by the architecture. Doing it unconditionally would break legacy irq chip
implementations.
For hierarchial irq domains this works correctly as none of the drivers can
have a dependency on affinity setting in inactive state by design.
Remove the X86 workaround as it is not longer required.
Fixes: 02edee152d6e ("x86/apic/vector: Ignore set_affinity call for inactive interrupts")
Reported-by: Ali Saidi <alisaidi@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Ali Saidi <alisaidi@amazon.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200529015501.15771-1-alisaidi@amazon.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/877dv2rv25.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5714ee50bb4375bd586858ad800b1d9772847452 upstream.
This fixes a regression encountered while running the
gdb.base/corefile.exp test in GDB's test suite.
In my testing, the typo prevented the sw_reserved field of struct
fxregs_state from being output to the kernel XSAVES area. Thus the
correct mask corresponding to XCR0 was not present in the core file for
GDB to interrogate, resulting in the following behavior:
[kev@f32-1 gdb]$ ./gdb -q testsuite/outputs/gdb.base/corefile/corefile testsuite/outputs/gdb.base/corefile/corefile.core
Reading symbols from testsuite/outputs/gdb.base/corefile/corefile...
[New LWP 232880]
warning: Unexpected size of section `.reg-xstate/232880' in core file.
With the typo fixed, the test works again as expected.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Buettner <kevinb@redhat.com>
Fixes: 9e4636545933 ("copy_xstate_to_kernel(): don't leave parts of destination uninitialized")
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 679b2ec8e060ca7a90441aff5e7d384720a41b76 ]
This kernel configuration is basically enabling/disabling sr driver quirks
detection. While these quirks are for fairly rare devices (very old CD
burners, and a glucometer), the additional detection of these models is a
very minimal amount of code.
The logic behind the quirks is always built into the sr driver.
This also removes the config from all the defconfig files that are enabling
this already.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200223191144.726-1-flameeyes@flameeyes.com
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7ad816762f9bf89e940e618ea40c43138b479e10 ]
Previously, kernel floating point code would run with the MXCSR control
register value last set by userland code by the thread that was active
on the CPU core just before kernel call. This could affect calculation
results if rounding mode was changed, or a crash if a FPU/SIMD exception
was unmasked.
Restore MXCSR to the kernel's default value.
[ bp: Carve out from a bigger patch by Petteri, add feature check, add
FNINIT call too (amluto). ]
Signed-off-by: Petteri Aimonen <jpa@git.mail.kapsi.fi>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207979
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200624114646.28953-2-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 7c83d096aed055a7763a03384f92115363448b71 upstream.
Mark CR4.TSD as being possibly owned by the guest as that is indeed the
case on VMX. Without TSD being tagged as possibly owned by the guest, a
targeted read of CR4 to get TSD could observe a stale value. This bug
is benign in the current code base as the sole consumer of TSD is the
emulator (for RDTSC) and the emulator always "reads" the entirety of CR4
when grabbing bits.
Add a build-time assertion in to ensure VMX doesn't hand over more CR4
bits without also updating x86.
Fixes: 52ce3c21aec3 ("x86,kvm,vmx: Don't trap writes to CR4.TSD")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200703040422.31536-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d74fcfc1f0ff4b6c26ecef1f9e48d8089ab4eaac upstream.
Inject a #GP on MOV CR4 if CR4.LA57 is toggled in 64-bit mode, which is
illegal per Intel's SDM:
CR4.LA57
57-bit linear addresses (bit 12 of CR4) ... blah blah blah ...
This bit cannot be modified in IA-32e mode.
Note, the pseudocode for MOV CR doesn't call out the fault condition,
which is likely why the check was missed during initial development.
This is arguably an SDM bug and will hopefully be fixed in future
release of the SDM.
Fixes: fd8cb433734ee ("KVM: MMU: Expose the LA57 feature to VM.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sebastien Boeuf <sebastien.boeuf@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200703021714.5549-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5ecad245de2ae23dc4e2dbece92f8ccfbaed2fa7 upstream.
Bit 8 would be the "global" bit, which does not quite make sense for non-leaf
page table entries. Intel ignores it; AMD ignores it in PDEs and PDPEs, but
reserves it in PML4Es.
Probably, earlier versions of the AMD manual documented it as reserved in PDPEs
as well, and that behavior made it into KVM as well as kvm-unit-tests; fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Fixes: a0c0feb57992 ("KVM: x86: reserve bit 8 of non-leaf PDPEs and PML4Es in 64-bit mode on AMD", 2014-09-03)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c7aadc09321d8f9a1d3bd1e6d8a47222ecddf6c5 ]
Marco crashed in bad_iret with a Clang11/KCSAN build due to
overflowing the stack. Now that we run C code on it, expand it to a
full page.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reported-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200618144801.819246178@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 16accae3d97f97d7f61c4ee5d0002bccdef59088 ]
This patch fixes a bug introduced by:
fd3ae1e1587d6 ("perf/x86/rapl: Move RAPL support to common x86 code")
The Kconfig variable name was wrong. It was missing the CONFIG_ prefix.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eraniangoogle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200528201614.250182-1-eranian@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fd3ae1e1587d64ef8cc8e361903d33625458073e ]
To prepare for support of both Intel and AMD RAPL.
As per the AMD PPR, Fam17h support Package RAPL counters to monitor power usage.
The RAPL counter operates as with Intel RAPL, and as such it is beneficial
to share the code.
No change in functionality.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200527224659.206129-2-eranian@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 2c18bd525c47f882f033b0a813ecd09c93e1ecdf upstream.
Memory bandwidth is calculated reading the monitoring counter
at two intervals and calculating the delta. It is the software’s
responsibility to read the count often enough to avoid having
the count roll over _twice_ between reads.
The current code hardcodes the bandwidth monitoring counter's width
to 24 bits for AMD. This is due to default base counter width which
is 24. Currently, AMD does not implement the CPUID 0xF.[ECX=1]:EAX
to adjust the counter width. But, the AMD hardware supports much
wider bandwidth counter with the default width of 44 bits.
Kernel reads these monitoring counters every 1 second and adjusts the
counter value for overflow. With 24 bits and scale value of 64 for AMD,
it can only measure up to 1GB/s without overflowing. For the rates
above 1GB/s this will fail to measure the bandwidth.
Fix the issue setting the default width to 44 bits by adjusting the
offset.
AMD future products will implement CPUID 0xF.[ECX=1]:EAX.
[ bp: Let the line stick out and drop {}-brackets around a single
statement. ]
Fixes: 4d05bf71f157 ("x86/resctrl: Introduce AMD QOS feature")
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/159129975546.62538.5656031125604254041.stgit@naples-babu.amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bb5570ad3b54e7930997aec76ab68256d5236d94 upstream.
x86 CPUs can suffer severe performance drops if a tight loop, such as
the ones in __clear_user(), straddles a 16-byte instruction fetch
window, or worse, a 64-byte cacheline. This issues was discovered in the
SUSE kernel with the following commit,
1153933703d9 ("x86/asm/64: Micro-optimize __clear_user() - Use immediate constants")
which increased the code object size from 10 bytes to 15 bytes and
caused the 8-byte copy loop in __clear_user() to be split across a
64-byte cacheline.
Aligning the start of the loop to 16-bytes makes this fit neatly inside
a single instruction fetch window again and restores the performance of
__clear_user() which is used heavily when reading from /dev/zero.
Here are some numbers from running libmicro's read_z* and pread_z*
microbenchmarks which read from /dev/zero:
Zen 1 (Naples)
libmicro-file
5.7.0-rc6 5.7.0-rc6 5.7.0-rc6
revert-1153933703d9+ align16+
Time mean95-pread_z100k 9.9195 ( 0.00%) 5.9856 ( 39.66%) 5.9938 ( 39.58%)
Time mean95-pread_z10k 1.1378 ( 0.00%) 0.7450 ( 34.52%) 0.7467 ( 34.38%)
Time mean95-pread_z1k 0.2623 ( 0.00%) 0.2251 ( 14.18%) 0.2252 ( 14.15%)
Time mean95-pread_zw100k 9.9974 ( 0.00%) 6.0648 ( 39.34%) 6.0756 ( 39.23%)
Time mean95-read_z100k 9.8940 ( 0.00%) 5.9885 ( 39.47%) 5.9994 ( 39.36%)
Time mean95-read_z10k 1.1394 ( 0.00%) 0.7483 ( 34.33%) 0.7482 ( 34.33%)
Note that this doesn't affect Haswell or Broadwell microarchitectures
which seem to avoid the alignment issue by executing the loop straight
out of the Loop Stream Detector (verified using perf events).
Fixes: 1153933703d9 ("x86/asm/64: Micro-optimize __clear_user() - Use immediate constants")
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200618102002.30034-1-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a13b9d0b97211579ea63b96c606de79b963c0f47 upstream.
The X86_CR4_FSGSBASE bit of CR4 should not change after boot[1]. Older
kernels should enforce this bit to zero, and newer kernels need to
enforce it depending on boot-time configuration (e.g. "nofsgsbase").
To support a pinned bit being either 1 or 0, use an explicit mask in
combination with the expected pinned bit values.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200527103147.GI325280@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/202006082013.71E29A42@keescook
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bf09fb6cba4f7099620cc9ed32d94c27c4af992e upstream.
Remove support for context switching between the guest's and host's
desired UMWAIT_CONTROL. Propagating the guest's value to hardware isn't
required for correct functionality, e.g. KVM intercepts reads and writes
to the MSR, and the latency effects of the settings controlled by the
MSR are not architecturally visible.
As a general rule, KVM should not allow the guest to control power
management settings unless explicitly enabled by userspace, e.g. see
KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS. E.g. Intel's SDM explicitly states that C0.2
can improve the performance of SMT siblings. A devious guest could
disable C0.2 so as to improve the performance of their workloads at the
detriment to workloads running in the host or on other VMs.
Wholesale removal of UMWAIT_CONTROL context switching also fixes a race
condition where updates from the host may cause KVM to enter the guest
with the incorrect value. Because updates are are propagated to all
CPUs via IPI (SMP function callback), the value in hardware may be
stale with respect to the cached value and KVM could enter the guest
with the wrong value in hardware. As above, the guest can't observe the
bad value, but it's a weird and confusing wart in the implementation.
Removal also fixes the unnecessary usage of VMX's atomic load/store MSR
lists. Using the lists is only necessary for MSRs that are required for
correct functionality immediately upon VM-Enter/VM-Exit, e.g. EFER on
old hardware, or for MSRs that need to-the-uop precision, e.g. perf
related MSRs. For UMWAIT_CONTROL, the effects are only visible in the
kernel via TPAUSE/delay(), and KVM doesn't do any form of delay in
vcpu_vmx_run(). Using the atomic lists is undesirable as they are more
expensive than direct RDMSR/WRMSR.
Furthermore, even if giving the guest control of the MSR is legitimate,
e.g. in pass-through scenarios, it's not clear that the benefits would
outweigh the overhead. E.g. saving and restoring an MSR across a VMX
roundtrip costs ~250 cycles, and if the guest diverged from the host
that cost would be paid on every run of the guest. In other words, if
there is a legitimate use case then it should be enabled by a new
per-VM capability.
Note, KVM still needs to emulate MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL so that it can
correctly expose other WAITPKG features to the guest, e.g. TPAUSE,
UMWAIT and UMONITOR.
Fixes: 6e3ba4abcea56 ("KVM: vmx: Emulate MSR IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jingqi Liu <jingqi.liu@intel.com>
Cc: Tao Xu <tao3.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200623005135.10414-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2dbebf7ae1ed9a420d954305e2c9d5ed39ec57c3 upstream.
Explicitly pass the L2 GPA to kvm_arch_write_log_dirty(), which for all
intents and purposes is vmx_write_pml_buffer(), instead of having the
latter pull the GPA from vmcs.GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS. If the dirty bit
update is the result of KVM emulation (rare for L2), then the GPA in the
VMCS may be stale and/or hold a completely unrelated GPA.
Fixes: c5f983f6e8455 ("nVMX: Implement emulated Page Modification Logging")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200622215832.22090-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bf10bd0be53282183f374af23577b18b5fbf7801 upstream.
Only MSR address range 0x800 through 0x8ff is architecturally reserved
and dedicated for accessing APIC registers in x2APIC mode.
Fixes: 0105d1a52640 ("KVM: x2apic interface to lapic")
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200616073307.16440-1-xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cc5277fe66cf3ad68f41f1c539b2ef0d5e432974 ]
The callers don't expect *d_cdp to be set to an error pointer, they only
check for NULL. This leads to a static checker warning:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c:2648 __init_one_rdt_domain()
warn: 'd_cdp' could be an error pointer
This would not trigger a bug in this specific case because
__init_one_rdt_domain() calls it with a valid domain that would not have
a negative id and thus not trigger the return of the ERR_PTR(). If this
was a negative domain id then the call to rdt_find_domain() in
domain_add_cpu() would have returned the ERR_PTR() much earlier and the
creation of the domain with an invalid id would have been prevented.
Even though a bug is not triggered currently the right and safe thing to
do is to set the pointer to NULL because that is what can be checked for
when the caller is handling the CDP and non-CDP cases.
Fixes: 52eb74339a62 ("x86/resctrl: Fix rdt_find_domain() return value and checks")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200602193611.GA190851@mwanda
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 9b38cc704e844e41d9cf74e647bff1d249512cb3 upstream.
Ziqian reported lockup when adding retprobe on _raw_spin_lock_irqsave.
My test was also able to trigger lockdep output:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
5.6.0-rc6+ #6 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
sched-messaging/2767 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff9a492798 (&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff9a491a18 (&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock));
lock(&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock));
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
1 lock held by sched-messaging/2767:
#0: ffffffff9a491a18 (&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 PID: 2767 Comm: sched-messaging Not tainted 5.6.0-rc6+ #6
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x96/0xe0
__lock_acquire.cold.57+0x173/0x2b7
? native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x42b/0x9e0
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x590/0x590
? __lock_acquire+0xf63/0x4030
lock_acquire+0x15a/0x3d0
? kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x36/0x70
? kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
trampoline_handler+0xf8/0x940
? kprobe_fault_handler+0x380/0x380
? find_held_lock+0x3a/0x1c0
kretprobe_trampoline+0x25/0x50
? lock_acquired+0x392/0xbc0
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70
? __get_valid_kprobe+0x1f0/0x1f0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3b/0x40
? finish_task_switch+0x4b9/0x6d0
? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
The code within the kretprobe handler checks for probe reentrancy,
so we won't trigger any _raw_spin_lock_irqsave probe in there.
The problem is in outside kprobe_flush_task, where we call:
kprobe_flush_task
kretprobe_table_lock
raw_spin_lock_irqsave
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave
where _raw_spin_lock_irqsave triggers the kretprobe and installs
kretprobe_trampoline handler on _raw_spin_lock_irqsave return.
The kretprobe_trampoline handler is then executed with already
locked kretprobe_table_locks, and first thing it does is to
lock kretprobe_table_locks ;-) the whole lockup path like:
kprobe_flush_task
kretprobe_table_lock
raw_spin_lock_irqsave
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave ---> probe triggered, kretprobe_trampoline installed
---> kretprobe_table_locks locked
kretprobe_trampoline
trampoline_handler
kretprobe_hash_lock(current, &head, &flags); <--- deadlock
Adding kprobe_busy_begin/end helpers that mark code with fake
probe installed to prevent triggering of another kprobe within
this code.
Using these helpers in kprobe_flush_task, so the probe recursion
protection check is hit and the probe is never set to prevent
above lockup.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/158927059835.27680.7011202830041561604.stgit@devnote2
Fixes: ef53d9c5e4da ("kprobes: improve kretprobe scalability with hashed locking")
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A . R . Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Cc: "Naveen N . Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: "Ziqian SUN (Zamir)" <zsun@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bc310baf2ba381c648983c7f4748327f17324562 upstream.
The final build stage of the x86 kernel captures some symbol
addresses from the decompressor binary and copies them into zoffset.h.
It uses sed with a regular expression that matches the address, symbol
type and symbol name, and mangles the captured addresses and the names
of symbols of interest into #define directives that are added to
zoffset.h
The symbol type is indicated by a single letter, which we match
strictly: only letters in the set 'ABCDGRSTVW' are matched, even
though the actual symbol type is relevant and therefore ignored.
Commit bc7c9d620 ("efi/libstub/x86: Force 'hidden' visibility for
extern declarations") made a change to the way external symbol
references are classified, resulting in 'startup_32' now being
emitted as a hidden symbol. This prevents the use of GOT entries to
refer to this symbol via its absolute address, which recent toolchains
(including Clang based ones) already avoid by default, making this
change a no-op in the majority of cases.
However, as it turns out, the LLVM linker classifies such hidden
symbols as symbols with static linkage in fully linked ELF binaries,
causing tools such as NM to output a lowercase 't' rather than an upper
case 'T' for the type of such symbols. Since our sed expression only
matches upper case letters for the symbol type, the line describing
startup_32 is disregarded, resulting in a build error like the following
arch/x86/boot/header.S:568:18: error: symbol 'ZO_startup_32' can not be
undefined in a subtraction expression
init_size: .long (0x00000000008fd000 - ZO_startup_32 +
(((0x0000000001f6361c + ((0x0000000001f6361c >> 8) + 65536)
- 0x00000000008c32e5) + 4095) & ~4095)) # kernel initialization size
Given that we are only interested in the value of the symbol, let's match
any character in the set 'a-zA-Z' instead.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1f1fbc70c10e81f70e9fbe2102d439c883269811 ]
With commit dc20b2d52653 ("x86/idt: Move interrupt gate initialization to
IDT code") non assigned system vectors are also marked as used in
'used_vectors' (now 'system_vectors') bitmap. This makes checks in
arch_show_interrupts() whether a particular system vector is allocated to
always pass and e.g. 'Hyper-V reenlightenment interrupts' entry always
shows up in /proc/interrupts.
Another side effect of having all unassigned system vectors marked as used
is that irq_matrix_debug_show() will wrongly count them among 'System'
vectors.
As it is now ensured that alloc_intr_gate() is not called after init, it is
possible to leave unused entries in 'system_vectors' unset to fix these
issues.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200428093824.1451532-4-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit de308d1815c9e8fe602a958c5c76142ff6501d75 ]
The commit
c84cb3735fd5 ("x86/apic: Move TSC deadline timer debug printk")
removed the message which said that the deadline timer was enabled.
It added a pr_debug() message which is issued when deadline timer
validation succeeds.
Well, issued only when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is enabled - otherwise
pr_debug() calls get optimized away if DEBUG is not defined in the
compilation unit.
Therefore, make the above message pr_info() so that it is visible in
dmesg.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200525104218.27018-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e2ac07c06058ae2d58b45bbf2a2a352771d76fcb ]
Since the purgatory is a special stand-alone binary, various profiling
and sanitizing options must be disabled. Having these options enabled
typically will cause dependencies on various special symbols exported by
special libs / stubs used by these frameworks. Since the purgatory is
special, it is not linked against these stubs causing missing symbols in
the purgatory if these options are not disabled.
Sync the set of disabled profiling and sanitizing options with that from
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile, adding
-DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING to the CFLAGS and setting:
GCOV_PROFILE := n
UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
This fixes broken references to ftrace_likely_update() when
CONFIG_TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING is enabled and to __gcov_init() and
__gcov_exit() when CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200317130841.290418-1-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a4e91825d7e1252f7cba005f1451e5464b23c15d ]
Add PCI IDs for AMD Renoir (4000-series Ryzen CPUs). This is necessary
to enable support for temperature sensors via the k10temp module.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200510204842.2603-2-amonakov@ispras.ru
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b3f79ae45904ae987a7c06a9e8d6084d7b73e67f ]
Add the new PCI Device 18h IDs for AMD Family 19h systems. Note that
Family 19h systems will not have a new PCI root device ID.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200110015651.14887-4-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 67d631b7c05eff955ccff4139327f0f92a5117e5 ]
This currently leaks kernel physical addresses into userspace.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200229231120.1147527-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5214028dd89e49ba27007c3ee475279e584261f0 ]
For the 32-bit kernel, as described in
6d92bc9d483a ("x86/build: Build compressed x86 kernels as PIE"),
pre-2.26 binutils generates R_386_32 relocations in PIE mode. Since the
startup code does not perform relocation, any reloc entry with R_386_32
will remain as 0 in the executing code.
Commit
974f221c84b0 ("x86/boot: Move compressed kernel to the end of the
decompression buffer")
added a new symbol _end but did not mark it hidden, which doesn't give
the correct offset on older linkers. This causes the compressed kernel
to be copied beyond the end of the decompression buffer, rather than
flush against it. This region of memory may be reserved or already
allocated for other purposes by the bootloader.
Mark _end as hidden to fix. This changes the relocation from R_386_32 to
R_386_RELATIVE even on the pre-2.26 binutils.
For 64-bit, this is not strictly necessary, as the 64-bit kernel is only
built as PIE if the linker supports -z noreloc-overflow, which implies
binutils-2.27+, but for consistency, mark _end as hidden here too.
The below illustrates the before/after impact of the patch using
binutils-2.25 and gcc-4.6.4 (locally compiled from source) and QEMU.
Disassembly before patch:
48: 8b 86 60 02 00 00 mov 0x260(%esi),%eax
4e: 2d 00 00 00 00 sub $0x0,%eax
4f: R_386_32 _end
Disassembly after patch:
48: 8b 86 60 02 00 00 mov 0x260(%esi),%eax
4e: 2d 00 f0 76 00 sub $0x76f000,%eax
4f: R_386_RELATIVE *ABS*
Dump from extract_kernel before patch:
early console in extract_kernel
input_data: 0x0207c098 <--- this is at output + init_size
input_len: 0x0074fef1
output: 0x01000000
output_len: 0x00fa63d0
kernel_total_size: 0x0107c000
needed_size: 0x0107c000
Dump from extract_kernel after patch:
early console in extract_kernel
input_data: 0x0190d098 <--- this is at output + init_size - _end
input_len: 0x0074fef1
output: 0x01000000
output_len: 0x00fa63d0
kernel_total_size: 0x0107c000
needed_size: 0x0107c000
Fixes: 974f221c84b0 ("x86/boot: Move compressed kernel to the end of the decompression buffer")
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200207214926.3564079-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0348801151b5aefbcf9d6e9b9e30aceb3a2a7b13 ]
vmap does not take a gfp_t, the flags argument is for VM_* flags.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200414131348.444715-3-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1ff865e343c2b59469d7e41d370a980a3f972c71 ]
As reported by objtool:
lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: .altinstr_replacement+0x0: alternative modifies stack
lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: .altinstr_replacement+0x7: alternative modifies stack
the smap_{save,restore}() alternatives violate (the newly enforced)
rule on stack invariance. That is, due to there only being a single
ORC table it must be valid to any alternative. These alternatives
violate this with the direct result that unwinds will not be correct
when it hits between the PUSH and POP instructions.
Rewrite the functions to only have a conditional jump.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200429101802.GI13592@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 2ebac8bb3c2d35f5135466490fc8eeaf3f3e2d37 upstream.
Consult only the basic exit reason, i.e. bits 15:0 of vmcs.EXIT_REASON,
when determining whether a nested VM-Exit should be reflected into L1 or
handled by KVM in L0.
For better or worse, the switch statement in nested_vmx_exit_reflected()
currently defaults to "true", i.e. reflects any nested VM-Exit without
dedicated logic. Because the case statements only contain the basic
exit reason, any VM-Exit with modifier bits set will be reflected to L1,
even if KVM intended to handle it in L0.
Practically speaking, this only affects EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY,
i.e. a #MC that occurs on nested VM-Enter would be incorrectly routed to
L1, as "failed VM-Entry" is the only modifier that KVM can currently
encounter. The SMM modifiers will never be generated as KVM doesn't
support/employ a SMI Transfer Monitor. Ditto for "exit from enclave",
as KVM doesn't yet support virtualizing SGX, i.e. it's impossible to
enter an enclave in a KVM guest (L1 or L2).
Fixes: 644d711aa0e1 ("KVM: nVMX: Deciding if L0 or L1 should handle an L2 exit")
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200227174430.26371-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6c0238c4a62b3a0b1201aeb7e33a4636d552a436 upstream.
Restoring the ASID from the hsave area on VMEXIT is wrong, because its
value depends on the handling of TLB flushes. Just skipping the field in
copy_vmcb_control_area will do.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a3535be731c2a343912578465021f50937f7b099 upstream.
Async page faults have to be trapped in the host (L1 in this case),
since the APF reason was passed from L0 to L1 and stored in the L1 APF
data page. This was completely reversed: the page faults were passed
to the guest, a L2 hypervisor.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5c911beff20aa8639e7a1f28988736c13e03ed54 upstream.
Skip the Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier that is triggered on a VMCS
switch when running with spectre_v2_user=on/auto if the switch is
between two VMCSes in the same guest, i.e. between vmcs01 and vmcs02.
The IBPB is intended to prevent one guest from attacking another, which
is unnecessary in the nested case as it's the same guest from KVM's
perspective.
This all but eliminates the overhead observed for nested VMX transitions
when running with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y and spectre_v2_user=on/auto, which
can be significant, e.g. roughly 3x on current systems.
Reported-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Cc: KarimAllah Raslan <karahmed@amazon.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 15d45071523d ("KVM/x86: Add IBPB support")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200501163117.4655-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
[Invert direction of bool argument. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 17fae1294ad9d711b2c3dd0edef479d40c76a5e8 upstream.
An interesting thing happened when a guest Linux instance took a machine
check. The VMM unmapped the bad page from guest physical space and
passed the machine check to the guest.
Linux took all the normal actions to offline the page from the process
that was using it. But then guest Linux crashed because it said there
was a second machine check inside the kernel with this stack trace:
do_memory_failure
set_mce_nospec
set_memory_uc
_set_memory_uc
change_page_attr_set_clr
cpa_flush
clflush_cache_range_opt
This was odd, because a CLFLUSH instruction shouldn't raise a machine
check (it isn't consuming the data). Further investigation showed that
the VMM had passed in another machine check because is appeared that the
guest was accessing the bad page.
Fix is to check the scope of the poison by checking the MCi_MISC register.
If the entire page is affected, then unmap the page. If only part of the
page is affected, then mark the page as uncacheable.
This assumes that VMMs will do the logical thing and pass in the "whole
page scope" via the MCi_MISC register (since they unmapped the entire
page).
[ bp: Adjust to x86/entry changes. ]
Fixes: 284ce4011ba6 ("x86/memory_failure: Introduce {set, clear}_mce_nospec()")
Reported-by: Jue Wang <juew@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jue Wang <juew@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520163546.GA7977@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e649b3f0188f8fd34dd0dde8d43fd3312b902fb2 upstream.
Commit b1394e745b94 ("KVM: x86: fix APIC page invalidation") tried
to fix inappropriate APIC page invalidation by re-introducing arch
specific kvm_arch_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range() and calling it from
kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start. However, the patch left a
possible race where the VMCS APIC address cache is updated *before*
it is unmapped:
(Invalidator) kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start()
(Invalidator) kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD)
(KVM VCPU) vcpu_enter_guest()
(KVM VCPU) kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page()
(Invalidator) actually unmap page
Because of the above race, there can be a mismatch between the
host physical address stored in the APIC_ACCESS_PAGE VMCS field and
the host physical address stored in the EPT entry for the APIC GPA
(0xfee0000). When this happens, the processor will not trap APIC
accesses, and will instead show the raw contents of the APIC-access page.
Because Windows OS periodically checks for unexpected modifications to
the LAPIC register, this will show up as a BSOD crash with BugCheck
CRITICAL_STRUCTURE_CORRUPTION (109) we are currently seeing in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1751017.
The root cause of the issue is that kvm_arch_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range()
cannot guarantee that no additional references are taken to the pages in
the range before kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(). Fortunately,
this case is supported by the MMU notifier API, as documented in
include/linux/mmu_notifier.h:
* If the subsystem
* can't guarantee that no additional references are taken to
* the pages in the range, it has to implement the
* invalidate_range() notifier to remove any references taken
* after invalidate_range_start().
The fix therefore is to reload the APIC-access page field in the VMCS
from kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range() instead of ..._range_start().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b1394e745b94 ("KVM: x86: fix APIC page invalidation")
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197951
Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <eiichi.tsukata@nutanix.com>
Message-Id: <20200606042627.61070-1-eiichi.tsukata@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 384dea1c9183880be183cfaae161d99aafd16df6 upstream.
When userspace configures KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP, KVM will manage the
presence of X86_EFLAGS_TF via kvm_set/get_rflags on vcpus. The actual
rflag bit is therefore hidden from callers.
That includes init_emulate_ctxt() which uses the value returned from
kvm_get_flags() to set ctxt->tf. As a result, x86_emulate_instruction()
will skip a single step, leaving singlestep_rip stale and not returning
to userspace.
This resolves the issue by observing the vcpu guest_debug configuration
alongside ctxt->tf in x86_emulate_instruction(), performing the single
step if set.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felipe Franciosi <felipe@nutanix.com>
Message-Id: <20200519081048.8204-1-felipe@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6129ed877d409037b79866327102c9dc59a302fe upstream.
Set the mmio_value to '0' instead of simply clearing the present bit to
squash a benign warning in kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask() that complains
about the mmio_value overlapping the lower GFN mask on systems with 52
bits of PA space.
Opportunistically clean up the code and comments.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d43e2675e96fc ("KVM: x86: only do L1TF workaround on affected processors")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200527084909.23492-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0813c40556fce1eeefb996e020cc5339e0b84137 upstream.
The mask in the extra_regs for Intel Tremont need to be extended to
allow more defined bits.
"Outstanding Requests" (bit 63) is only available on MSR_OFFCORE_RSP0;
Fixes: 6daeb8737f8a ("perf/x86/intel: Add Tremont core PMU support")
Reported-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200501125442.7030-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 140fd4ac78d385e6c8e6a5757585f6c707085f87 upstream.
On MacBook6,1 reboot would hang unless parameter reboot=pci is added.
Make it automatic.
Signed-off-by: Hill Ma <maahiuzeon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200425200641.GA1554@cslab.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4d8df8cbb9156b0a0ab3f802b80cb5db57acc0bf upstream.
Currently, it is possible to enable indirect branch speculation even after
it was force-disabled using the PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE option. Moreover, the
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL command gives afterwards an incorrect result
(force-disabled when it is in fact enabled). This also is inconsistent
vs. STIBP and the documention which cleary states that
PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE cannot be undone.
Fix this by actually enforcing force-disabled indirect branch
speculation. PR_SPEC_ENABLE called after PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE now fails
with -EPERM as described in the documentation.
Fixes: 9137bb27e60e ("x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 21998a351512eba4ed5969006f0c55882d995ada upstream.
When STIBP is unavailable or enhanced IBRS is available, Linux
force-disables the IBPB mitigation of Spectre-BTB even when simultaneous
multithreading is disabled. While attempts to enable IBPB using
prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, ...) fail with
EPERM, the seccomp syscall (or its prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...) equivalent)
which are used e.g. by Chromium or OpenSSH succeed with no errors but the
application remains silently vulnerable to cross-process Spectre v2 attacks
(classical BTB poisoning). At the same time the SYSFS reporting
(/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2) displays that IBPB is
conditionally enabled when in fact it is unconditionally disabled.
STIBP is useful only when SMT is enabled. When SMT is disabled and STIBP is
unavailable, it makes no sense to force-disable also IBPB, because IBPB
protects against cross-process Spectre-BTB attacks regardless of the SMT
state. At the same time since missing STIBP was only observed on AMD CPUs,
AMD does not recommend using STIBP, but recommends using IBPB, so disabling
IBPB because of missing STIBP goes directly against AMD's advice:
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf
Similarly, enhanced IBRS is designed to protect cross-core BTB poisoning
and BTB-poisoning attacks from user space against kernel (and
BTB-poisoning attacks from guest against hypervisor), it is not designed
to prevent cross-process (or cross-VM) BTB poisoning between processes (or
VMs) running on the same core. Therefore, even with enhanced IBRS it is
necessary to flush the BTB during context-switches, so there is no reason
to force disable IBPB when enhanced IBRS is available.
Enable the prctl control of IBPB even when STIBP is unavailable or enhanced
IBRS is available.
Fixes: 7cc765a67d8e ("x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dbbe2ad02e9df26e372f38cc3e70dab9222c832e upstream.
On context switch the change of TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB are evaluated
to adjust the mitigations accordingly. This is optimized to avoid the
expensive MSR write if not needed.
This optimization is buggy and allows an attacker to shutdown the SSBD
protection of a victim process.
The update logic reads the cached base value for the speculation control
MSR which has neither the SSBD nor the STIBP bit set. It then OR's the
SSBD bit only when TIF_SSBD is different and requests the MSR update.
That means if TIF_SSBD of the previous and next task are the same, then
the base value is not updated, even if TIF_SSBD is set. The MSR write is
not requested.
Subsequently if the TIF_STIBP bit differs then the STIBP bit is updated
in the base value and the MSR is written with a wrong SSBD value.
This was introduced when the per task/process conditional STIPB
switching was added on top of the existing SSBD switching.
It is exploitable if the attacker creates a process which enforces SSBD
and has the contrary value of STIBP than the victim process (i.e. if the
victim process enforces STIBP, the attacker process must not enforce it;
if the victim process does not enforce STIBP, the attacker process must
enforce it) and schedule it on the same core as the victim process. If
the victim runs after the attacker the victim becomes vulnerable to
Spectre V4.
To fix this, update the MSR value independent of the TIF_SSBD difference
and dependent on the SSBD mitigation method available. This ensures that
a subsequent STIPB initiated MSR write has the correct state of SSBD.
[ tglx: Handle X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD & X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD correctly
and massaged changelog ]
Fixes: 5bfbe3ad5840 ("x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1574051e52cb4b5b7f7509cfd729b76ca1117808 upstream.
The Intel C620 Platform Controller Hub has MROM functions that have non-PCI
registers (undocumented in the public spec) where BAR 0 is supposed to be,
which results in messages like this:
pci 0000:00:11.0: [Firmware Bug]: reg 0x30: invalid BAR (can't size)
Mark these MROM functions as having non-compliant BARs so we don't try to
probe any of them. There are no other BARs on these devices.
See the Intel C620 Series Chipset Platform Controller Hub Datasheet,
May 2019, Document Number 336067-007US, sec 2.1, 35.5, 35.6.
[bhelgaas: commit log, add 0xa26d]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1589513467-17070-1-git-send-email-lixiaochun.2888@163.com
Signed-off-by: Xiaochun Lee <lixc17@lenovo.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d8ad6d39c35d2b44b3d48b787df7f3359381dcbf upstream.
'jiffies' and 'jiffies_64' are meant to alias (two different symbols that
share the same address). Most architectures make the symbols alias to the
same address via a linker script assignment in their
arch/<arch>/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S:
jiffies = jiffies_64;
which is effectively a definition of jiffies.
jiffies and jiffies_64 are both forward declared for all architectures in
include/linux/jiffies.h. jiffies_64 is defined in kernel/time/timer.c.
x86_64 was peculiar in that it wasn't doing the above linker script
assignment, but rather was:
1. defining jiffies in arch/x86/kernel/time.c instead via the linker script.
2. overriding the symbol jiffies_64 from kernel/time/timer.c in
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.s via 'jiffies_64 = jiffies;'.
As Fangrui notes:
In LLD, symbol assignments in linker scripts override definitions in
object files. GNU ld appears to have the same behavior. It would
probably make sense for LLD to error "duplicate symbol" but GNU ld
is unlikely to adopt for compatibility reasons.
This results in an ODR violation (UB), which seems to have survived
thus far. Where it becomes harmful is when;
1. -fno-semantic-interposition is used:
As Fangrui notes:
Clang after LLVM commit 5b22bcc2b70d
("[X86][ELF] Prefer to lower MC_GlobalAddress operands to .Lfoo$local")
defaults to -fno-semantic-interposition similar semantics which help
-fpic/-fPIC code avoid GOT/PLT when the referenced symbol is defined
within the same translation unit. Unlike GCC
-fno-semantic-interposition, Clang emits such relocations referencing
local symbols for non-pic code as well.
This causes references to jiffies to refer to '.Ljiffies$local' when
jiffies is defined in the same translation unit. Likewise, references to
jiffies_64 become references to '.Ljiffies_64$local' in translation units
that define jiffies_64. Because these differ from the names used in the
linker script, they will not be rewritten to alias one another.
2. Full LTO
Full LTO effectively treats all source files as one translation
unit, causing these local references to be produced everywhere. When
the linker processes the linker script, there are no longer any
references to jiffies_64' anywhere to replace with 'jiffies'. And
thus '.Ljiffies$local' and '.Ljiffies_64$local' no longer alias
at all.
In the process of porting patches enabling Full LTO from arm64 to x86_64,
spooky bugs have been observed where the kernel appeared to boot, but init
doesn't get scheduled.
Avoid the ODR violation by matching other architectures and define jiffies
only by linker script. For -fno-semantic-interposition + Full LTO, there
is no longer a global definition of jiffies for the compiler to produce a
local symbol which the linker script won't ensure aliases to jiffies_64.
Fixes: 40747ffa5aa8 ("asmlinkage: Make jiffies visible")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com>
Debugged-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Debugged-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Suggested-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Haarman <inglorion@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> # build+boot on
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/852
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200602193100.229287-1-inglorion@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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