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2018-07-17x86/MCE: Remove min interval polling limitationDewet Thibaut1-3/+0
commit b3b7c4795c ("x86/MCE: Serialize sysfs changes") introduced a min interval limitation when setting the check interval for polled MCEs. However, the logic is that 0 disables polling for corrected MCEs, see Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck. The limitation prevents disabling. Remove this limitation and allow the value 0 to disable polling again. Fixes: b3b7c4795c ("x86/MCE: Serialize sysfs changes") Signed-off-by: Dewet Thibaut <thibaut.dewet@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com> [ Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716084927.24869-1-alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com
2018-07-08Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-4/+8
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86/pti updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Two small fixes correcting the handling of SSB mitigations on AMD processors" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/bugs: Fix the AMD SSBD usage of the SPEC_CTRL MSR x86/bugs: Update when to check for the LS_CFG SSBD mitigation
2018-07-07x86/mtrr: Don't copy out-of-bounds data in mtrr_writeJann Horn1-1/+2
Don't access the provided buffer out of bounds - this can cause a kernel out-of-bounds read when invoked through sys_splice() or other things that use kernel_write()/__kernel_write(). Fixes: 7f8ec5a4f01a ("x86/mtrr: Convert to use strncpy_from_user() helper") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180706215003.156702-1-jannh@google.com
2018-07-03x86/bugs: Fix the AMD SSBD usage of the SPEC_CTRL MSRTom Lendacky1-3/+5
On AMD, the presence of the MSR_SPEC_CTRL feature does not imply that the SSBD mitigation support should use the SPEC_CTRL MSR. Other features could have caused the MSR_SPEC_CTRL feature to be set, while a different SSBD mitigation option is in place. Update the SSBD support to check for the actual SSBD features that will use the SPEC_CTRL MSR. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 6ac2f49edb1e ("x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usage") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702213602.29202.33151.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-07-03x86/bugs: Update when to check for the LS_CFG SSBD mitigationTom Lendacky1-1/+3
If either the X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD or X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD features are present, then there is no need to perform the check for the LS_CFG SSBD mitigation support. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702213553.29202.21089.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-06-24Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-2/+8
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "A set of fixes for x86: - Make Xen PV guest deal with speculative store bypass correctly - Address more fallout from the 5-Level pagetable handling. Undo an __initdata annotation to avoid section mismatch and malfunction when post init code would touch the freed variable. - Handle exception fixup in math_error() before calling notify_die(). The reverse call order incorrectly triggers notify_die() listeners for soemthing which is handled correctly at the site which issues the floating point instruction. - Fix an off by one in the LLC topology calculation on AMD - Handle non standard memory block sizes gracefully un UV platforms - Plug a memory leak in the microcode loader - Sanitize the purgatory build magic - Add the x86 specific device tree bindings directory to the x86 MAINTAINER file patterns" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm: Fix 'no5lvl' handling Revert "x86/mm: Mark __pgtable_l5_enabled __initdata" x86/CPU/AMD: Fix LLC ID bit-shift calculation MAINTAINERS: Add file patterns for x86 device tree bindings x86/microcode/intel: Fix memleak in save_microcode_patch() x86/platform/UV: Add kernel parameter to set memory block size x86/platform/UV: Use new set memory block size function x86/platform/UV: Add adjustable set memory block size function x86/build: Remove unnecessary preparation for purgatory Revert "kexec/purgatory: Add clean-up for purgatory directory" x86/xen: Add call of speculative_store_bypass_ht_init() to PV paths x86: Call fixup_exception() before notify_die() in math_error()
2018-06-24Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 pti fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "Two small updates for the speculative distractions: - Make it more clear to the compiler that array_index_mask_nospec() is not subject for optimizations. It's not perfect, but ... - Don't report XEN PV guests as vulnerable because their mitigation state depends on the hypervisor. Report unknown and refer to the hypervisor requirement" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/spectre_v1: Disable compiler optimizations over array_index_mask_nospec() x86/pti: Don't report XenPV as vulnerable
2018-06-24Merge branch 'ras-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-16/+33
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull ras fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "A set of fixes for RAS/MCE: - Improve the error message when the kernel cannot recover from a MCE so the maximum amount of information gets provided. - Individually check MCE recovery features on SkyLake CPUs instead of assuming none when the CAPID0 register does not advertise the general ability for recovery. - Prevent MCE to output inconsistent messages which first show an error location and then claim that the source is unknown. - Prevent overwriting MCi_STATUS in the attempt to gather more information when a fatal MCE has alreay been detected. This leads to empty status values in the printout and failing to react promptly on the fatal event" * 'ras-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mce: Fix incorrect "Machine check from unknown source" message x86/mce: Do not overwrite MCi_STATUS in mce_no_way_out() x86/mce: Check for alternate indication of machine check recovery on Skylake x86/mce: Improve error message when kernel cannot recover
2018-06-23x86/mm: Fix 'no5lvl' handlingKirill A. Shutemov1-0/+3
early_identify_cpu() has to use early version of pgtable_l5_enabled() that doesn't rely on cpu_feature_enabled(). Defining USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 before all includes does the trick. I lost the define in one of reworks of the original patch. Fixes: 372fddf70904 ("x86/mm: Introduce the 'no5lvl' kernel parameter") Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180622220841.54135-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2018-06-22x86/CPU/AMD: Fix LLC ID bit-shift calculationSuravee Suthikulpanit1-1/+1
The current logic incorrectly calculates the LLC ID from the APIC ID. Unless specified otherwise, the LLC ID should be calculated by removing the Core and Thread ID bits from the least significant end of the APIC ID. For more info, see "ApicId Enumeration Requirements" in any Fam17h PPR document. [ bp: Improve commit message. ] Fixes: 68091ee7ac3c ("Calculate last level cache ID from number of sharing threads") Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1528915390-30533-1-git-send-email-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com
2018-06-22Merge branch 'linus' into x86/urgentThomas Gleixner20-125/+498
Required to queue a dependent fix.
2018-06-22x86/microcode/intel: Fix memleak in save_microcode_patch()Zhenzhong Duan1-1/+4
Free useless ucode_patch entry when it's replaced. [ bp: Drop the memfree_patch() two-liner. ] Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Srinivas REDDY Eeda <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/888102f0-fd22-459d-b090-a1bd8a00cb2b@default
2018-06-22x86/mce: Fix incorrect "Machine check from unknown source" messageTony Luck1-8/+18
Some injection testing resulted in the following console log: mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 22: Machine Check Exception: f Bank 1: bd80000000100134 mce: [Hardware Error]: RIP 10:<ffffffffc05292dd> {pmem_do_bvec+0x11d/0x330 [nd_pmem]} mce: [Hardware Error]: TSC c51a63035d52 ADDR 3234bc4000 MISC 88 mce: [Hardware Error]: PROCESSOR 0:50654 TIME 1526502199 SOCKET 0 APIC 38 microcode 2000043 mce: [Hardware Error]: Run the above through 'mcelog --ascii' Kernel panic - not syncing: Machine check from unknown source This confused everybody because the first line quite clearly shows that we found a logged error in "Bank 1", while the last line says "unknown source". The problem is that the Linux code doesn't do the right thing for a local machine check that results in a fatal error. It turns out that we know very early in the handler whether the machine check is fatal. The call to mce_no_way_out() has checked all the banks for the CPU that took the local machine check. If it says we must crash, we can do so right away with the right messages. We do scan all the banks again. This means that we might initially not see a problem, but during the second scan find something fatal. If this happens we print a slightly different message (so I can see if it actually every happens). [ bp: Remove unneeded severity assignment. ] Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/52e049a497e86fd0b71c529651def8871c804df0.1527283897.git.tony.luck@intel.com
2018-06-22x86/mce: Do not overwrite MCi_STATUS in mce_no_way_out()Borislav Petkov1-8/+10
mce_no_way_out() does a quick check during #MC to see whether some of the MCEs logged would require the kernel to panic immediately. And it passes a struct mce where MCi_STATUS gets written. However, after having saved a valid status value, the next iteration of the loop which goes over the MCA banks on the CPU, overwrites the valid status value because we're using struct mce as storage instead of a temporary variable. Which leads to MCE records with an empty status value: mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 0: Machine Check Exception: 6 Bank 0: 0000000000000000 mce: [Hardware Error]: RIP 10:<ffffffffbd42fbd7> {trigger_mce+0x7/0x10} In order to prevent the loss of the status register value, return immediately when severity is a panic one so that we can panic immediately with the first fatal MCE logged. This is also the intention of this function and not to noodle over the banks while a fatal MCE is already logged. Tony: read the rest of the MCA bank to populate the struct mce fully. Suggested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180622095428.626-8-bp@alien8.de
2018-06-21x86/pti: Don't report XenPV as vulnerableJiri Kosina1-0/+4
Xen PV domain kernel is not by design affected by meltdown as it's enforcing split CR3 itself. Let's not report such systems as "Vulnerable" in sysfs (we're also already forcing PTI to off in X86_HYPER_XEN_PV cases); the security of the system ultimately depends on presence of mitigation in the Hypervisor, which can't be easily detected from DomU; let's report that. Reported-and-tested-by: Mike Latimer <mlatimer@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1806180959080.6203@cbobk.fhfr.pm [ Merge the user-visible string into a single line. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-06-14Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variablesLinus Torvalds1-1/+1
The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler supported. That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support directly. HOWEVER. It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file, the sane stack protector configuration would look like CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes, it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would disable it in the new config, resulting in: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing. The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users). This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes. The end result would generally look like this: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler infrastructure, not the user selections. Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-13treewide: kzalloc() -> kcalloc()Kees Cook3-3/+3
The kzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kcalloc(). This patch replaces cases of: kzalloc(a * b, gfp) with: kcalloc(a * b, gfp) as well as handling cases of: kzalloc(a * b * c, gfp) with: kzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp) as it's slightly less ugly than: kzalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp) This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like: kzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp) though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion. Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were dropped, since they're redundant. The Coccinelle script used for this was: // Fix redundant parens around sizeof(). @@ type TYPE; expression THING, E; @@ ( kzalloc( - (sizeof(TYPE)) * E + sizeof(TYPE) * E , ...) | kzalloc( - (sizeof(THING)) * E + sizeof(THING) * E , ...) ) // Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens. @@ expression COUNT; typedef u8; typedef __u8; @@ ( kzalloc( - sizeof(u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) ) // 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant. @@ type TYPE; expression THING; identifier COUNT_ID; constant COUNT_CONST; @@ ( - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) ) // 2-factor product, only identifiers. @@ identifier SIZE, COUNT; @@ - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - SIZE * COUNT + COUNT, SIZE , ...) // 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with // redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING; identifier STRIDE, COUNT; type TYPE; @@ ( kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING1, THING2; identifier COUNT; type TYPE1, TYPE2; @@ ( kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed. @@ identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT; @@ ( kzalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) ) // Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products, // when they're not all constants... @@ expression E1, E2, E3; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kzalloc( - (E1) * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kzalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kzalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * (E3) + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kzalloc( - E1 * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) ) // And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants, // keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument. @@ expression THING, E1, E2; type TYPE; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...) | kzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...) | kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kzalloc(C1 * C2, ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * E2 + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * E2 + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - (E1) * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - (E1) * (E2) + E1, E2 , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - E1 * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) ) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-10Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-24/+17
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 updates and fixes from Thomas Gleixner: - Fix the (late) fallout from the vector management rework causing hlist corruption and irq descriptor reference leaks caused by a missing sanity check. The straight forward fix triggered another long standing issue to surface. The pre rework code hid the issue due to being way slower, but now the chance that user space sees an EBUSY error return when updating irq affinities is way higher, though quite a bunch of userspace tools do not handle it properly despite the fact that EBUSY could be returned for at least 10 years. It turned out that the EBUSY return can be avoided completely by utilizing the existing delayed affinity update mechanism for irq remapped scenarios as well. That's a bit more error handling in the kernel, but avoids fruitless fingerpointing discussions with tool developers. - Decouple PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME as its going to be required for the upcoming Intel memory encryption support as well. - Handle legacy device ACPI detection properly for newer platforms - Fix the wrong argument ordering in the vector allocation tracepoint - Simplify the IDT setup code for the APIC=n case - Use the proper string helpers in the MTRR code - Remove a stale unused VDSO source file - Convert the microcode update lock to a raw spinlock as its used in atomic context. * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/intel_rdt: Enable CMT and MBM on new Skylake stepping x86/apic/vector: Print APIC control bits in debugfs genirq/affinity: Defer affinity setting if irq chip is busy x86/platform/uv: Use apic_ack_irq() x86/ioapic: Use apic_ack_irq() irq_remapping: Use apic_ack_irq() x86/apic: Provide apic_ack_irq() genirq/migration: Avoid out of line call if pending is not set genirq/generic_pending: Do not lose pending affinity update x86/apic/vector: Prevent hlist corruption and leaks x86/vector: Fix the args of vector_alloc tracepoint x86/idt: Simplify the idt_setup_apic_and_irq_gates() x86/platform/uv: Remove extra parentheses x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME x86: Mark native_set_p4d() as __always_inline x86/microcode: Make the late update update_lock a raw lock for RT x86/mtrr: Convert to use strncpy_from_user() helper x86/mtrr: Convert to use match_string() helper x86/vdso: Remove unused file x86/i8237: Register device based on FADT legacy boot flag
2018-06-09x86/intel_rdt: Enable CMT and MBM on new Skylake steppingTony Luck1-0/+2
New stepping of Skylake has fixes for cache occupancy and memory bandwidth monitoring. Update the code to enable these by default on newer steppings. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14 Cc: Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180608160732.9842-1-tony.luck@intel.com
2018-06-07x86/mce: Improve error message when kernel cannot recoverTony Luck1-0/+5
Since we added support to add recovery from some errors inside the kernel in: commit b2f9d678e28c ("x86/mce: Check for faults tagged in EXTABLE_CLASS_FAULT exception table entries") we have done a less than stellar job at reporting the cause of recoverable machine checks that occur in other parts of the kernel. The user just gets the unhelpful message: mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Action required: unknown MCACOD doubly unhelpful when they check the manual for the reported IA32_MSR_STATUS.MCACOD and see that it is listed as one of the standard recoverable values. Add an extra rule to the MCE severity table to catch this case and report it as: mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel Fixes: b2f9d678e28c ("x86/mce: Check for faults tagged in EXTABLE_CLASS_FAULT exception table entries") Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+ Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4cc7c465150a9a48b8b9f45d0b840278e77eb9b5.1527283897.git.tony.luck@intel.com
2018-06-06x86/bugs: Switch the selection of mitigation from CPU vendor to CPU featuresKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk1-8/+3
Both AMD and Intel can have SPEC_CTRL_MSR for SSBD. However AMD also has two more other ways of doing it - which are !SPEC_CTRL MSR ways. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-4-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
2018-06-06x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usageKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2-5/+13
The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling 124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf mentions that if CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[24] is set we should be using the SPEC_CTRL MSR (0x48) over the VIRT SPEC_CTRL MSR (0xC001_011f) for speculative store bypass disable. This in effect means we should clear the X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD flag so that we would prefer the SPEC_CTRL MSR. See the document titled: 124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf A copy of this document is available at https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889 Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-3-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
2018-06-06x86/bugs: Add AMD's variant of SSB_NOKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk1-1/+2
The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling 124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf mentions that the CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[26] will mean that the speculative store bypass disable is no longer needed. A copy of this document is available at: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889 Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-2-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
2018-06-05Merge branch 'x86-cache-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-25/+270
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 cache resource controller updates from Thomas Gleixner: "An update for the Intel Resource Director Technolgy (RDT) which adds a feedback driven software controller to runtime adjust the bandwidth allocation MSRs. This makes the allocations more accurate and allows to use bandwidth values in understandable units (MB/s) instead of using percentage based allocations as the original, still available, interface. The software controller can be enabled with a new mount option for the resctrl filesystem" * 'x86-cache-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Feedback loop to dynamically update mem bandwidth x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Prepare for feedback loop x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Add schemata support x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Add initialization support x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Enable/disable MBA software controller x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Documentation for MBA software controller(mba_sc)
2018-06-05Merge branch 'ras-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-9/+26
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 RAS updates from Thomas Gleixner: - Fix a stack out of bounds write in the MCE error injection code. - Avoid IPIs during CPU hotplug to read the MCx_MISC block address from a remote CPU. That's fragile and pointless because the block addresses are the same on all CPUs. So they can be read once and local. - Add support for MCE broadcasting on newer VIA Centaur CPUs. * 'ras-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/MCE/AMD: Read MCx_MISC block addresses on any CPU x86/MCE: Fix stack out-of-bounds write in mce-inject.c: Flags_read() x86/MCE: Enable MCE broadcasting on new Centaur CPUs
2018-06-05Merge branch 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-18/+17
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar: "Misc cleanups" * 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/apm: Fix spelling mistake: "caculate" -> "calculate" x86/mtrr: Rename main.c to mtrr.c and remove duplicate prefixes x86: Remove pr_fmt duplicate logging prefixes x86/early-quirks: Rename duplicate define of dev_err x86/bpf: Clean up non-standard comments, to make the code more readable
2018-06-05Merge branch 'x86-boot-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds8-60/+164
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar: - Centaur CPU updates (David Wang) - AMD and other CPU topology enumeration improvements and fixes (Borislav Petkov, Thomas Gleixner, Suravee Suthikulpanit) - Continued 5-level paging work (Kirill A. Shutemov) * 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm: Mark __pgtable_l5_enabled __initdata x86/mm: Mark p4d_offset() __always_inline x86/mm: Introduce the 'no5lvl' kernel parameter x86/mm: Stop pretending pgtable_l5_enabled is a variable x86/mm: Unify pgtable_l5_enabled usage in early boot code x86/boot/compressed/64: Fix trampoline page table address calculation x86/CPU: Move x86_cpuinfo::x86_max_cores assignment to detect_num_cpu_cores() x86/Centaur: Report correct CPU/cache topology x86/CPU: Move cpu_detect_cache_sizes() into init_intel_cacheinfo() x86/CPU: Make intel_num_cpu_cores() generic x86/CPU: Move cpu local function declarations to local header x86/CPU/AMD: Derive CPU topology from CPUID function 0xB when available x86/CPU: Modify detect_extended_topology() to return result x86/CPU/AMD: Calculate last level cache ID from number of sharing threads x86/CPU: Rename intel_cacheinfo.c to cacheinfo.c perf/events/amd/uncore: Fix amd_uncore_llc ID to use pre-defined cpu_llc_id x86/CPU/AMD: Have smp_num_siblings and cpu_llc_id always be present x86/Centaur: Initialize supported CPU features properly
2018-06-05Merge branch 'core-rcu-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull RCU updates from Ingo Molnar: - updates to the handling of expedited grace periods - updates to reduce lock contention in the rcu_node combining tree [ These are in preparation for the consolidation of RCU-bh, RCU-preempt, and RCU-sched into a single flavor, which was requested by Linus in response to a security flaw whose root cause included confusion between the multiple flavors of RCU ] - torture-test updates that save their users some time and effort - miscellaneous fixes * 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (44 commits) rcu/x86: Provide early rcu_cpu_starting() callback torture: Make kvm-find-errors.sh find build warnings rcutorture: Abbreviate kvm.sh summary lines rcutorture: Print end-of-test state in kvm.sh summary rcutorture: Print end-of-test state torture: Fold parse-torture.sh into parse-console.sh torture: Add a script to edit output from failed runs rcu: Update list of rcu_future_grace_period() trace events rcu: Drop early GP request check from rcu_gp_kthread() rcu: Simplify and inline cpu_needs_another_gp() rcu: The rcu_gp_cleanup() function does not need cpu_needs_another_gp() rcu: Make rcu_start_this_gp() check for out-of-range requests rcu: Add funnel locking to rcu_start_this_gp() rcu: Make rcu_start_future_gp() caller select grace period rcu: Inline rcu_start_gp_advanced() into rcu_start_future_gp() rcu: Clear request other than RCU_GP_FLAG_INIT at GP end rcu: Cleanup, don't put ->completed into an int rcu: Switch __rcu_process_callbacks() to rcu_accelerate_cbs() rcu: Avoid __call_rcu_core() root rcu_node ->lock acquisition rcu: Make rcu_migrate_callbacks wake GP kthread when needed ...
2018-06-04Merge branches 'x86/dma', 'x86/microcode', 'x86/mm' and 'x86/vdso' into ↵Ingo Molnar2-24/+15
x86/urgent Merge these small and simple 1-2 commit branches into the urgent branch. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-05-30Merge branch 'for-mingo' of ↵Ingo Molnar1-0/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-rcu into core/rcu Pull RCU fix from Paul E. McKenney: "This additional v4.18 pull request contains a single commit that fell through the cracks: Provide early rcu_cpu_starting() callback for the benefit of the x86/mtrr code, which needs RCU to be available on incoming CPUs earlier than has been the case in the past." Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-05-27x86/microcode: Make the late update update_lock a raw lock for RTScott Wood1-3/+3
__reload_late() is called from stop_machine context and thus cannot acquire a non-raw spinlock on PREEMPT_RT. Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <swood@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com> Cc: Pei Zhang <pezhang@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180524154420.24455-1-swood@redhat.com
2018-05-23x86/speculation: Simplify the CPU bug detection logicDominik Brodowski1-15/+7
Only CPUs which speculate can speculate. Therefore, it seems prudent to test for cpu_no_speculation first and only then determine whether a specific speculating CPU is susceptible to store bypass speculation. This is underlined by all CPUs currently listed in cpu_no_speculation were present in cpu_no_spec_store_bypass as well. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@suse.de Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180522090539.GA24668@light.dominikbrodowski.net
2018-05-23rcu/x86: Provide early rcu_cpu_starting() callbackPeter Zijlstra1-0/+4
The x86/mtrr code does horrific things because hardware. It uses stop_machine_from_inactive_cpu(), which does a wakeup (of the stopper thread on another CPU), which uses RCU, all before the CPU is onlined. RCU complains about this, because wakeups use RCU and RCU does (rightfully) not consider offline CPUs for grace-periods. Fix this by initializing RCU way early in the MTRR case. Tested-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> [ paulmck: Add !SMP support, per 0day Test Robot report. ]
2018-05-21Merge branch 'speck-v20' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-31/+470
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Merge speculative store buffer bypass fixes from Thomas Gleixner: - rework of the SPEC_CTRL MSR management to accomodate the new fancy SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable) bit handling. - the CPU bug and sysfs infrastructure for the exciting new Speculative Store Bypass 'feature'. - support for disabling SSB via LS_CFG MSR on AMD CPUs including Hyperthread synchronization on ZEN. - PRCTL support for dynamic runtime control of SSB - SECCOMP integration to automatically disable SSB for sandboxed processes with a filter flag for opt-out. - KVM integration to allow guests fiddling with SSBD including the new software MSR VIRT_SPEC_CTRL to handle the LS_CFG based oddities on AMD. - BPF protection against SSB .. this is just the core and x86 side, other architecture support will come separately. * 'speck-v20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (49 commits) bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set() x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host} x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update() x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static ...
2018-05-19x86/MCE/AMD: Read MCx_MISC block addresses on any CPUBorislav Petkov1-8/+7
We used rdmsr_safe_on_cpu() to make sure we're reading the proper CPU's MISC block addresses. However, that caused trouble with CPU hotplug due to the _on_cpu() helper issuing an IPI while IRQs are disabled. But we don't have to do that: the block addresses are the same on any CPU so we can read them on any CPU. (What practically happens is, we read them on the BSP and cache them, and for later reads, we service them from the cache). Suggested-by: Yazen Ghannam <Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-05-19Merge branch 'ras/urgent' into ras/coreThomas Gleixner2-16/+19
Pick up urgent fix as pending patch depends on it.
2018-05-19x86/MCE/AMD: Cache SMCA MISC block addressesBorislav Petkov1-15/+14
... into a global, two-dimensional array and service subsequent reads from that cache to avoid rdmsr_on_cpu() calls during CPU hotplug (IPIs with IRQs disabled). In addition, this fixes a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read due to wrong usage of the bank->blocks pointer. Fixes: 27bd59502702 ("x86/mce/AMD: Get address from already initialized block") Reported-by: Johannes Hirte <johannes.hirte@datenkhaos.de> Tested-by: Johannes Hirte <johannes.hirte@datenkhaos.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180414004230.GA2033@probook
2018-05-19x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Feedback loop to dynamically update mem bandwidthVikas Shivappa3-3/+128
mba_sc is a feedback loop where we periodically read MBM counters and try to restrict the bandwidth below a max value so the below is always true: "current bandwidth(cur_bw) < user specified bandwidth(user_bw)" The frequency of these checks is currently 1s and we just tag along the MBM overflow timer to do the updates. Doing it once in a second also makes the calculation of bandwidth easy. The steps of increase or decrease of bandwidth is the minimum granularity specified by the hardware. Although the MBA's goal is to restrict the bandwidth below a maximum, there may be a need to even increase the bandwidth. Since MBA controls the L2 external bandwidth where as MBM measures the L3 external bandwidth, we may end up restricting some rdtgroups unnecessarily. This may happen in the sequence where rdtgroup (set of jobs) had high "L3 <-> memory traffic" in initial phases -> mba_sc kicks in and reduced bandwidth percentage values -> but after some it has mostly "L2 <-> L3" traffic. In this scenario mba_sc increases the bandwidth percentage when there is lesser memory traffic. Signed-off-by: Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ravi.v.shankar@intel.com Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: vikas.shivappa@intel.com Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524263781-14267-7-git-send-email-vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
2018-05-19x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Prepare for feedback loopVikas Shivappa2-6/+48
This is a preparatory patch for the mba feedback loop. Add support to measure the "bandwidth in MBps" and the "delta bandwidth". Measure it by reading the MBM IA32_QM_CTR MSRs and calculating the amount of "bytes" moved. There is no user space interface for this and will only be used by the feedback loop patch. Signed-off-by: Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ravi.v.shankar@intel.com Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: vikas.shivappa@intel.com Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524263781-14267-6-git-send-email-vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
2018-05-19x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Add schemata supportVikas Shivappa2-6/+20
Currently when user updates the "schemata" with new MBA percentage values, kernel writes the corresponding bandwidth percentage values to the IA32_MBA_THRTL_MSR. When MBA is expressed in MBps, the schemata format is changed to have the per package memory bandwidth in MBps instead of being specified in percentage. Do not write the IA32_MBA_THRTL_MSRs when the schemata is updated as that is handled separately. Signed-off-by: Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ravi.v.shankar@intel.com Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: vikas.shivappa@intel.com Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524263781-14267-5-git-send-email-vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
2018-05-19x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Add initialization supportVikas Shivappa3-10/+33
When MBA software controller is enabled, a per domain storage is required for user specified bandwidth in "MBps" and the "percentage" values which are programmed into the IA32_MBA_THRTL_MSR. Add support for these data structures and initialization. The MBA percentage values have a default max value of 100 but however the max value in MBps is not available from the hardware so it's set to U32_MAX. This simply says that the control group can use all bandwidth by default but does not say what is the actual max bandwidth available. The actual bandwidth that is available may depend on lot of factors like QPI link, number of memory channels, memory channel frequency, its width and memory speed, how many channels are configured and also if memory interleaving is enabled. So there is no way to determine the maximum at runtime reliably. Signed-off-by: Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ravi.v.shankar@intel.com Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: vikas.shivappa@intel.com Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524263781-14267-4-git-send-email-vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
2018-05-19x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Enable/disable MBA software controllerVikas Shivappa3-0/+41
Currently user does memory bandwidth allocation(MBA) by specifying the bandwidth in percentage via the resctrl schemata file: "/sys/fs/resctrl/schemata" Add a new mount option "mba_MBps" to enable the user to specify MBA in MBps: $mount -t resctrl resctrl [-o cdp[,cdpl2][mba_MBps]] /sys/fs/resctrl Signed-off-by: Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ravi.v.shankar@intel.com Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: vikas.shivappa@intel.com Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524263781-14267-3-git-send-email-vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
2018-05-19x86/mm: Introduce the 'no5lvl' kernel parameterKirill A. Shutemov1-0/+15
This kernel parameter allows to force kernel to use 4-level paging even if hardware and kernel support 5-level paging. The option may be useful to work around regressions related to 5-level paging. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518103528.59260-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-05-19Merge branches 'x86/urgent' and 'core/urgent' into x86/boot, to pick up ↵Ingo Molnar4-7/+10
fixes and avoid conflicts Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-05-18x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NOKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk1-1/+1
The "336996 Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations" from May defines this as SSB_NO, hence lets sync-up. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-05-17KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBDTom Lendacky1-1/+2
Expose the new virtualized architectural mechanism, VIRT_SSBD, for using speculative store bypass disable (SSBD) under SVM. This will allow guests to use SSBD on hardware that uses non-architectural mechanisms for enabling SSBD. [ tglx: Folded the migration fixup from Paolo Bonzini ] Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-05-17x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFGThomas Gleixner1-0/+30
Add the necessary logic for supporting the emulated VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR to x86_virt_spec_ctrl(). If either X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD or X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL is set then use the new guest_virt_spec_ctrl argument to check whether the state must be modified on the host. The update reuses speculative_store_bypass_update() so the ZEN-specific sibling coordination can be reused. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-05-17x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logicThomas Gleixner1-7/+19
x86_spec_ctrL_mask is intended to mask out bits from a MSR_SPEC_CTRL value which are not to be modified. However the implementation is not really used and the bitmask was inverted to make a check easier, which was removed in "x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()" Aside of that it is missing the STIBP bit if it is supported by the platform, so if the mask would be used in x86_virt_spec_ctrl() then it would prevent a guest from setting STIBP. Add the STIBP bit if supported and use the mask in x86_virt_spec_ctrl() to sanitize the value which is supplied by the guest. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
2018-05-17x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()Thomas Gleixner1-11/+2
x86_spec_ctrl_set() is only used in bugs.c and the extra mask checks there provide no real value as both call sites can just write x86_spec_ctrl_base to MSR_SPEC_CTRL. x86_spec_ctrl_base is valid and does not need any extra masking or checking. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2018-05-17x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directlyThomas Gleixner1-10/+1
x86_spec_ctrl_base is the system wide default value for the SPEC_CTRL MSR. x86_spec_ctrl_get_default() returns x86_spec_ctrl_base and was intended to prevent modification to that variable. Though the variable is read only after init and globaly visible already. Remove the function and export the variable instead. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-11-24 00:25:10 +0300