diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 |
2 files changed, 21 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index bc8c43b22460..405a9a61bb89 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", }; #undef pr_fmt @@ -332,6 +333,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) { + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED; + /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + goto specv2_set_mode; + } if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) goto retpoline_auto; break; @@ -369,6 +377,7 @@ retpoline_auto: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); } +specv2_set_mode: spectre_v2_enabled = mode; pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); @@ -391,9 +400,16 @@ retpoline_auto: /* * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect - * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that. + * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted + * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't + * supported. + * + * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because + * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if + * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not + * enable IBRS around firmware calls. */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 43a927eb9c09..df28e931d732 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1005,6 +1005,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS); + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED); + if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown)) return; |