diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 128 |
1 files changed, 122 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index a84a83f8881e..122f2d2f3e96 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1168,7 +1168,8 @@ Format: {"off" | "on" | "skip[mbr]"} efi= [EFI] - Format: { "old_map", "nochunk", "noruntime", "debug" } + Format: { "old_map", "nochunk", "noruntime", "debug", + "nosoftreserve" } old_map [X86-64]: switch to the old ioremap-based EFI runtime services mapping. 32-bit still uses this one by default. @@ -1177,6 +1178,12 @@ firmware implementations. noruntime : disable EFI runtime services support debug: enable misc debug output + nosoftreserve: The EFI_MEMORY_SP (Specific Purpose) + attribute may cause the kernel to reserve the + memory range for a memory mapping driver to + claim. Specify efi=nosoftreserve to disable this + reservation and treat the memory by its base type + (i.e. EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY / "System RAM"). efi_no_storage_paranoia [EFI; X86] Using this parameter you can use more than 50% of @@ -1189,15 +1196,21 @@ updating original EFI memory map. Region of memory which aa attribute is added to is from ss to ss+nn. + If efi_fake_mem=2G@4G:0x10000,2G@0x10a0000000:0x10000 is specified, EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE(0x10000) attribute is added to range 0x100000000-0x180000000 and 0x10a0000000-0x1120000000. + If efi_fake_mem=8G@9G:0x40000 is specified, the + EFI_MEMORY_SP(0x40000) attribute is added to + range 0x240000000-0x43fffffff. + Using this parameter you can do debugging of EFI memmap - related feature. For example, you can do debugging of + related features. For example, you can do debugging of Address Range Mirroring feature even if your box - doesn't support it. + doesn't support it, or mark specific memory as + "soft reserved". efivar_ssdt= [EFI; X86] Name of an EFI variable that contains an SSDT that is to be dynamically loaded by Linux. If there are @@ -2055,6 +2068,25 @@ KVM MMU at runtime. Default is 0 (off) + kvm.nx_huge_pages= + [KVM] Controls the software workaround for the + X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT bug. + force : Always deploy workaround. + off : Never deploy workaround. + auto : Deploy workaround based on the presence of + X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT. + + Default is 'auto'. + + If the software workaround is enabled for the host, + guests do need not to enable it for nested guests. + + kvm.nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio= + [KVM] Controls how many 4KiB pages are periodically zapped + back to huge pages. 0 disables the recovery, otherwise if + the value is N KVM will zap 1/Nth of the 4KiB pages every + minute. The default is 60. + kvm-amd.nested= [KVM,AMD] Allow nested virtualization in KVM/SVM. Default is 1 (enabled) @@ -2454,6 +2486,12 @@ SMT on vulnerable CPUs off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation + On TAA-affected machines, mds=off can be prevented by + an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities are + mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable + this mitigation, you need to specify tsx_async_abort=off + too. + Not specifying this option is equivalent to mds=full. @@ -2636,6 +2674,13 @@ ssbd=force-off [ARM64] l1tf=off [X86] mds=off [X86] + tsx_async_abort=off [X86] + kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] + + Exceptions: + This does not have any effect on + kvm.nx_huge_pages when + kvm.nx_huge_pages=force. auto (default) Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT @@ -2651,6 +2696,7 @@ be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT. Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86] mds=full,nosmt [X86] + tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86] mminit_loglevel= [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this @@ -3083,9 +3129,9 @@ [X86,PV_OPS] Disable paravirtualized VMware scheduler clock and use the default one. - no-steal-acc [X86,KVM] Disable paravirtualized steal time accounting. - steal time is computed, but won't influence scheduler - behaviour + no-steal-acc [X86,KVM,ARM64] Disable paravirtualized steal time + accounting. steal time is computed, but won't + influence scheduler behaviour nolapic [X86-32,APIC] Do not enable or use the local APIC. @@ -4848,6 +4894,76 @@ interruptions from clocksource watchdog are not acceptable). + tsx= [X86] Control Transactional Synchronization + Extensions (TSX) feature in Intel processors that + support TSX control. + + This parameter controls the TSX feature. The options are: + + on - Enable TSX on the system. Although there are + mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities, + TSX has been known to be an accelerator for + several previous speculation-related CVEs, and + so there may be unknown security risks associated + with leaving it enabled. + + off - Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this + option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are + not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have + MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get + the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode + update. This new MSR allows for the reliable + deactivation of the TSX functionality.) + + auto - Disable TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present, + otherwise enable TSX on the system. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off. + + See Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst + for more details. + + tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the TSX Async + Abort (TAA) vulnerability. + + Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS) + certain CPUs that support Transactional + Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an + exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward + information to a disclosure gadget under certain + conditions. + + In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded + data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to + access data to which the attacker does not have direct + access. + + This parameter controls the TAA mitigation. The + options are: + + full - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs + if TSX is enabled. + + full,nosmt - Enable TAA mitigation and disable SMT on + vulnerable CPUs. If TSX is disabled, SMT + is not disabled because CPU is not + vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks. + off - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation + + On MDS-affected machines, tsx_async_abort=off can be + prevented by an active MDS mitigation as both vulnerabilities + are mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable + this mitigation, you need to specify mds=off too. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + tsx_async_abort=full. On CPUs which are MDS affected + and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not + required and doesn't provide any additional + mitigation. + + For details see: + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst + turbografx.map[2|3]= [HW,JOY] TurboGraFX parallel port interface Format: |