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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2010-08-18 20:35:08 +0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2010-08-18 20:35:08 +0400 |
| commit | 145c3ae46b37993b0debb0b3da6256daea4a6ec5 (patch) | |
| tree | 0dbff382ce36b23b3d2dbff87d3eaab73a07a2a4 /security | |
| parent | 81ca03a0e2ea0207b2df80e0edcf4c775c07a505 (diff) | |
| parent | 99b7db7b8ffd6bb755eb0a175596421a0b581cb2 (diff) | |
| download | linux-145c3ae46b37993b0debb0b3da6256daea4a6ec5.tar.xz | |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
fs: brlock vfsmount_lock
fs: scale files_lock
lglock: introduce special lglock and brlock spin locks
tty: fix fu_list abuse
fs: cleanup files_lock locking
fs: remove extra lookup in __lookup_hash
fs: fs_struct rwlock to spinlock
apparmor: use task path helpers
fs: dentry allocation consolidation
fs: fix do_lookup false negative
mbcache: Limit the maximum number of cache entries
hostfs ->follow_link() braino
hostfs: dumb (and usually harmless) tpyo - strncpy instead of strlcpy
remove SWRITE* I/O types
kill BH_Ordered flag
vfs: update ctime when changing the file's permission by setfacl
cramfs: only unlock new inodes
fix reiserfs_evict_inode end_writeback second call
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/path.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 |
2 files changed, 8 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c index 96bab9469d48..19358dc14605 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/path.c +++ b/security/apparmor/path.c @@ -62,19 +62,14 @@ static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen, int deleted, connected; int error = 0; - /* Get the root we want to resolve too */ + /* Get the root we want to resolve too, released below */ if (flags & PATH_CHROOT_REL) { /* resolve paths relative to chroot */ - read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); - root = current->fs->root; - /* released below */ - path_get(&root); - read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); + get_fs_root(current->fs, &root); } else { /* resolve paths relative to namespace */ root.mnt = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->root; root.dentry = root.mnt->mnt_root; - /* released below */ path_get(&root); } diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 42043f96e54f..4796ddd4e721 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2170,8 +2170,9 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, tty = get_current_tty(); if (tty) { - file_list_lock(); + spin_lock(&tty_files_lock); if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { + struct tty_file_private *file_priv; struct inode *inode; /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. @@ -2179,14 +2180,16 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, than using file_has_perm, as this particular open file may belong to another process and we are only interested in the inode-based check here. */ - file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list); + file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, + struct tty_file_private, list); + file = file_priv->file; inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) { drop_tty = 1; } } - file_list_unlock(); + spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock); tty_kref_put(tty); } /* Reset controlling tty. */ |