diff options
author | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2008-10-13 02:35:14 +0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2008-10-13 02:35:14 +0400 |
commit | 93db628658197aa46bd7f83d429908b6f187ec9c (patch) | |
tree | b09496f42570a5864212eb8cfde4ba2ea9fa7a40 /security | |
parent | f1b2a5ace996de339292d4035f9f5b294aecd11e (diff) | |
parent | 0da939b0058742ad2d8580b7db6b966d0fc72252 (diff) | |
download | linux-93db628658197aa46bd7f83d429908b6f187ec9c.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'next' into for-linus
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 229 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 44 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/netlabel.c | 280 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/services.c | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smackfs.c | 4 |
7 files changed, 472 insertions, 112 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 4a7374c12d9c..c679ba653e1d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security; sk->sk_security = NULL; + selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec); kfree(ssec); } @@ -3801,6 +3802,7 @@ out: static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct inode_security_struct *isec; int err; @@ -3814,7 +3816,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { - struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct avc_audit_data ad; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; @@ -3848,6 +3849,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, goto out; } + err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address); + out: return err; } @@ -4077,20 +4080,28 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk, } static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct avc_audit_data *ad, - u16 family, char *addrp) + u16 family) { int err; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u32 peer_sid; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; + struct avc_audit_data ad; + char *addrp; + + AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif; + ad.u.net.family = family; + err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); + if (err) + return err; if (selinux_compat_net) - err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad, + err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family, addrp); else err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, - PACKET__RECV, ad); + PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) return err; @@ -4099,12 +4110,14 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, if (err) return err; err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, - SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad); + SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad); + if (err) + selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); } else { - err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad); + err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad); if (err) return err; - err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad); + err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); } return err; @@ -4118,6 +4131,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct avc_audit_data ad; char *addrp; + u8 secmark_active; + u8 peerlbl_active; if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) return 0; @@ -4126,6 +4141,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; + /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing + * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the + * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function + * as fast and as clean as possible. */ + if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer) + return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); + + secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); + peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); + if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) + return 0; + AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif; ad.u.net.family = family; @@ -4133,15 +4160,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (err) return err; - /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing - * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the - * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function - * as fast and as clean as possible. */ - if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer) - return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, - family, addrp); - - if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) { + if (peerlbl_active) { u32 peer_sid; err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); @@ -4149,13 +4168,17 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return err; err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); - if (err) + if (err) { + selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); return err; + } err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad); + if (err) + selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); } - if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) { + if (secmark_active) { err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) @@ -4214,10 +4237,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff * u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; u16 family; - if (sock) + if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + family = PF_INET; + else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) + family = PF_INET6; + else if (sock) family = sock->sk->sk_family; - else if (skb && skb->sk) - family = skb->sk->sk_family; else goto out; @@ -4275,8 +4300,6 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) isec->sid = sksec->sid; sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; - - selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent); } static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, @@ -4284,10 +4307,15 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; + u16 family = sk->sk_family; u32 newsid; u32 peersid; - err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid); + /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ + if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + family = PF_INET; + + err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); if (err) return err; if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { @@ -4322,12 +4350,18 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family); } -static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, - struct sk_buff *skb) +static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { + u16 family = sk->sk_family; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid); + /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ + if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + family = PF_INET; + + selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid); + + selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family); } static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, @@ -4377,39 +4411,54 @@ out: static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, u16 family) { + int err; char *addrp; u32 peer_sid; struct avc_audit_data ad; u8 secmark_active; + u8 netlbl_active; u8 peerlbl_active; if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) return NF_ACCEPT; secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); - peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); + netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled(); + peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return NF_ACCEPT; + if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) + return NF_DROP; + AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; ad.u.net.family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) return NF_DROP; - if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) - return NF_DROP; - - if (peerlbl_active) - if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family, - peer_sid, &ad) != 0) + if (peerlbl_active) { + err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family, + peer_sid, &ad); + if (err) { + selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1); return NF_DROP; + } + } if (secmark_active) if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad)) return NF_DROP; + if (netlbl_active) + /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING + * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary + * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH + * protection */ + if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0) + return NF_DROP; + return NF_ACCEPT; } @@ -4433,6 +4482,37 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum, } #endif /* IPV6 */ +static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 family) +{ + u32 sid; + + if (!netlbl_enabled()) + return NF_ACCEPT; + + /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path + * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling + * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ + if (skb->sk) { + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security; + sid = sksec->sid; + } else + sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; + if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0) + return NF_DROP; + + return NF_ACCEPT; +} + +static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum, + struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct net_device *in, + const struct net_device *out, + int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) +{ + return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET); +} + static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk, int ifindex, struct avc_audit_data *ad, @@ -4500,30 +4580,36 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk, static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, - struct avc_audit_data *ad, - u16 family, - char *addrp, - u8 proto) + u16 family) { struct sock *sk = skb->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; + struct avc_audit_data ad; + char *addrp; + u8 proto; if (sk == NULL) return NF_ACCEPT; sksec = sk->sk_security; + AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; + ad.u.net.family = family; + if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) + return NF_DROP; + if (selinux_compat_net) { if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex, - ad, family, addrp)) + &ad, family, addrp)) return NF_DROP; } else { if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, - SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad)) + SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad)) return NF_DROP; } if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) - if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto)) + if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) return NF_DROP; return NF_ACCEPT; @@ -4537,23 +4623,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, struct sock *sk; struct avc_audit_data ad; char *addrp; - u8 proto; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; - AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; - ad.u.net.family = family; - if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) - return NF_DROP; - /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function * as fast and as clean as possible. */ if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer) - return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad, - family, addrp, proto); + return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks @@ -4569,21 +4647,45 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return NF_ACCEPT; - /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the - * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being - * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label - * directly from the packet */ + /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the + * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local + * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label + * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */ sk = skb->sk; - if (sk) { + if (sk == NULL) { + switch (family) { + case PF_INET: + if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED) + secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; + else + secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; + break; + case PF_INET6: + if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED) + secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; + else + secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; + break; + default: + return NF_DROP; + } + if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) { + if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) + return NF_DROP; + } else + peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; + } else { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; peer_sid = sksec->sid; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; - } else { - if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) - return NF_DROP; - secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; } + AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; + ad.u.net.family = family; + if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) + return NF_DROP; + if (secmark_active) if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad)) @@ -5657,6 +5759,13 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = { .pf = PF_INET, .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, + }, + { + .hook = selinux_ipv4_output, + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .pf = PF_INET, + .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, + .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, } }; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h index 487a7d81fe20..b913c8d06038 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h @@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void); +void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway); + +void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *ssec); void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec, int family); @@ -46,8 +49,11 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *type, u32 *sid); +int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 family, + u32 sid); -void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock); +void selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, u16 family); int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock); int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask); int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, @@ -57,12 +63,27 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname); +int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr); + #else static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void) { return; } +static inline void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, + int error, + int gateway) +{ + return; +} + +static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free( + struct sk_security_struct *ssec) +{ + return; +} + static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset( struct sk_security_struct *ssec, int family) @@ -79,9 +100,21 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, *sid = SECSID_NULL; return 0; } +static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 family, + u32 sid) +{ + return 0; +} -static inline void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, - struct socket *sock) +static inline int selinux_netlbl_conn_setsid(struct sock *sk, + struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, + u16 family) { return; } @@ -107,6 +140,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, { return 0; } +static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, + struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ #endif diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 91070ab874ce..f8be8d7fa26d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -109,16 +109,19 @@ struct netport_security_struct { }; struct sk_security_struct { - u32 sid; /* SID of this object */ - u32 peer_sid; /* SID of peer */ - u16 sclass; /* sock security class */ #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL enum { /* NetLabel state */ NLBL_UNSET = 0, NLBL_REQUIRE, NLBL_LABELED, + NLBL_REQSKB, + NLBL_CONNLABELED, } nlbl_state; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlbl_secattr; /* NetLabel sec attributes */ #endif + u32 sid; /* SID of this object */ + u32 peer_sid; /* SID of peer */ + u16 sclass; /* sock security class */ }; struct key_security_struct { diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c index 89b418392f11..f58701a7b728 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ */ /* - * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007 + * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007, 2008 * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by @@ -29,8 +29,12 @@ #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/ip.h> +#include <linux/ipv6.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> +#include <net/ip.h> +#include <net/ipv6.h> #include "objsec.h" #include "security.h" @@ -64,32 +68,69 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb, } /** + * selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr - Generate the NetLabel socket secattr + * @sk: the socket + * + * Description: + * Generate the NetLabel security attributes for a socket, making full use of + * the socket's attribute cache. Returns a pointer to the security attributes + * on success, NULL on failure. + * + */ +static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk) +{ + int rc; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr; + + if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL) + return sksec->nlbl_secattr; + + secattr = netlbl_secattr_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC); + if (secattr == NULL) + return NULL; + rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sksec->sid, secattr); + if (rc != 0) { + netlbl_secattr_free(secattr); + return NULL; + } + sksec->nlbl_secattr = secattr; + + return secattr; +} + +/** * selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid - Label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism * @sk: the socket to label - * @sid: the SID to use * * Description: - * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given - * SID. Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure. + * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism. Returns zero values + * on success, negative values on failure. * */ -static int selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(struct sock *sk, u32 sid) +static int selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(struct sock *sk) { int rc; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr; - netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); + if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) + return 0; - rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sid, &secattr); - if (rc != 0) - goto sock_setsid_return; - rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr); - if (rc == 0) + secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk); + if (secattr == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, secattr); + switch (rc) { + case 0: sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED; + break; + case -EDESTADDRREQ: + sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB; + rc = 0; + break; + } -sock_setsid_return: - netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); return rc; } @@ -106,6 +147,38 @@ void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void) } /** + * selinux_netlbl_err - Handle a NetLabel packet error + * @skb: the packet + * @error: the error code + * @gateway: true if host is acting as a gateway, false otherwise + * + * Description: + * When a packet is dropped due to a call to avc_has_perm() pass the error + * code to the NetLabel subsystem so any protocol specific processing can be + * done. This is safe to call even if you are unsure if NetLabel labeling is + * present on the packet, NetLabel is smart enough to only act when it should. + * + */ +void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway) +{ + netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, error, gateway); +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free - Free the NetLabel fields + * @sssec: the sk_security_struct + * + * Description: + * Free all of the memory in the NetLabel fields of a sk_security_struct. + * + */ +void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *ssec) +{ + if (ssec->nlbl_secattr != NULL) + netlbl_secattr_free(ssec->nlbl_secattr); +} + +/** * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields * @ssec: the sk_security_struct * @family: the socket family @@ -163,35 +236,118 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, } /** - * selinux_netlbl_sock_graft - Netlabel the new socket + * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid - Set the NetLabel on a packet given a sid + * @skb: the packet + * @family: protocol family + * @sid: the SID + * + * Description + * Call the NetLabel mechanism to set the label of a packet using @sid. + * Returns zero on auccess, negative values on failure. + * + */ +int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 family, + u32 sid) +{ + int rc; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr_storage; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = NULL; + struct sock *sk; + + /* if this is a locally generated packet check to see if it is already + * being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */ + sk = skb->sk; + if (sk != NULL) { + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB) + return 0; + secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr; + } + if (secattr == NULL) { + secattr = &secattr_storage; + netlbl_secattr_init(secattr); + rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sid, secattr); + if (rc != 0) + goto skbuff_setsid_return; + } + + rc = netlbl_skbuff_setattr(skb, family, secattr); + +skbuff_setsid_return: + if (secattr == &secattr_storage) + netlbl_secattr_destroy(secattr); + return rc; +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established - Netlabel the newly accepted connection * @sk: the new connection - * @sock: the new socket * * Description: - * The connection represented by @sk is being grafted onto @sock so set the - * socket's NetLabel to match the SID of @sk. + * A new connection has been established on @sk so make sure it is labeled + * correctly with the NetLabel susbsystem. * */ -void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock) +void selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, u16 family) { + int rc; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; - u32 nlbl_peer_sid; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr; + struct inet_sock *sk_inet = inet_sk(sk); + struct sockaddr_in addr; if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) return; - netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); - if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 && - secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE && - security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0) - sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid; - netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); + secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk); + if (secattr == NULL) + return; - /* Try to set the NetLabel on the socket to save time later, if we fail - * here we will pick up the pieces in later calls to - * selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(). */ - selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid); + rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, secattr); + switch (rc) { + case 0: + sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED; + break; + case -EDESTADDRREQ: + /* no PF_INET6 support yet because we don't support any IPv6 + * labeling protocols */ + if (family != PF_INET) { + sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET; + return; + } + + addr.sin_family = family; + addr.sin_addr.s_addr = sk_inet->daddr; + if (netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, + secattr) != 0) { + /* we failed to label the connected socket (could be + * for a variety of reasons, the actual "why" isn't + * important here) so we have to go to our backup plan, + * labeling the packets individually in the netfilter + * local output hook. this is okay but we need to + * adjust the MSS of the connection to take into + * account any labeling overhead, since we don't know + * the exact overhead at this point we'll use the worst + * case value which is 40 bytes for IPv4 */ + struct inet_connection_sock *sk_conn = inet_csk(sk); + sk_conn->icsk_ext_hdr_len += 40 - + (sk_inet->opt ? sk_inet->opt->optlen : 0); + sk_conn->icsk_sync_mss(sk, sk_conn->icsk_pmtu_cookie); + + sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB; + } else + sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED; + break; + default: + /* note that we are failing to label the socket which could be + * a bad thing since it means traffic could leave the system + * without the desired labeling, however, all is not lost as + * we have a check in selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() to + * pick up the pieces that we might drop here because we can't + * return an error code */ + break; + } } /** @@ -205,13 +361,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock) */ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock) { - struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - - if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) - return 0; - - return selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid); + return selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sock->sk); } /** @@ -246,7 +396,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) local_bh_disable(); bh_lock_sock_nested(sk); if (likely(sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE)) - rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid); + rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk); else rc = 0; bh_unlock_sock(sk); @@ -307,7 +457,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, return 0; if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED) - netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc); + netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0); return rc; } @@ -334,7 +484,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; if (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS && - sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED) { + (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED || + sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_CONNLABELED)) { netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); lock_sock(sk); rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr); @@ -346,3 +497,50 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, return rc; } + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect + * @sk: the socket to label + * @addr: the destination address + * + * Description: + * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address. + * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + int rc; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr; + + if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB && + sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED) + return 0; + + local_bh_disable(); + bh_lock_sock_nested(sk); + + /* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family + * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset + * the socket */ + if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) { + netlbl_sock_delattr(sk); + sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB; + rc = 0; + goto socket_connect_return; + } + secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk); + if (secattr == NULL) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto socket_connect_return; + } + rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr); + if (rc == 0) + sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED; + +socket_connect_return: + bh_unlock_sock(sk); + local_bh_enable(); + return rc; +} diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index ab0cc0c7b944..343c8ab14af0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2955,7 +2955,7 @@ netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup: */ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { - int rc = -ENOENT; + int rc; struct context *ctx; if (!ss_initialized) @@ -2963,11 +2963,18 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) read_lock(&policy_rwlock); ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); - if (ctx == NULL) + if (ctx == NULL) { + rc = -ENOENT; goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure; + } secattr->domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1], GFP_ATOMIC); - secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY; + if (secattr->domain == NULL) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure; + } + secattr->attr.secid = sid; + secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID; mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr); rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr); if (rc != 0) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 87d75417ea93..6e2dc0bab70d 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2179,7 +2179,10 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) * This is the simplist possible security model * for networking. */ - return smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE); + rc = smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE); + if (rc != 0) + netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0); + return rc; } /** diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index e7c642458ec9..c21d8c8bf0c7 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -354,9 +354,11 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void) doip->tags[rc] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID; rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map(doip, NULL, &audit_info); - if (rc != 0) + if (rc != 0) { printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n", __func__, __LINE__, rc); + kfree(doip); + } } /** |