diff options
| author | Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> | 2010-12-26 09:54:53 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2010-12-31 22:13:27 +0300 |
| commit | 9f260e0efa4766e56d0ac14f1aeea6ee5eb8fe83 (patch) | |
| tree | a30573e33db58c6b084e02a50fd6f2bfd1cb90d7 /net/can/bcm.c | |
| parent | 4a5fc4e179d79c79ad87bfc12a2d7e9b2371e40c (diff) | |
| download | linux-9f260e0efa4766e56d0ac14f1aeea6ee5eb8fe83.tar.xz | |
CAN: Use inode instead of kernel address for /proc file
Since the socket address is just being used as a unique identifier, its
inode number is an alternative that does not leak potentially sensitive
information.
CC-ing stable because MITRE has assigned CVE-2010-4565 to the issue.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/can/bcm.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/can/bcm.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 6faa8256e10c..9d5e8accfab1 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ struct bcm_sock { struct list_head tx_ops; unsigned long dropped_usr_msgs; struct proc_dir_entry *bcm_proc_read; - char procname [20]; /* pointer printed in ASCII with \0 */ + char procname [32]; /* inode number in decimal with \0 */ }; static inline struct bcm_sock *bcm_sk(const struct sock *sk) @@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ static int bcm_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len, if (proc_dir) { /* unique socket address as filename */ - sprintf(bo->procname, "%p", sock); + sprintf(bo->procname, "%lu", sock_i_ino(sk)); bo->bcm_proc_read = proc_create_data(bo->procname, 0644, proc_dir, &bcm_proc_fops, sk); |