bpf: Allow rewriting to ports under ip_unprivileged_port_start

At the moment, BPF_CGROUP_INET{4,6}_BIND hooks can rewrite user_port
to the privileged ones (< ip_unprivileged_port_start), but it will
be rejected later on in the __inet_bind or __inet6_bind.

Let's add another return value to indicate that CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
check should be ignored. Use the same idea as we currently use
in cgroup/egress where bit #1 indicates CN. Instead, for
cgroup/bind{4,6}, bit #1 indicates that CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE should
be bypassed.

v5:
- rename flags to be less confusing (Andrey Ignatov)
- rework BPF_PROG_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS_RUN_ARRAY to work on flags
  and accept BPF_RET_SET_CN (no behavioral changes)

v4:
- Add missing IPv6 support (Martin KaFai Lau)

v3:
- Update description (Martin KaFai Lau)
- Fix capability restore in selftest (Martin KaFai Lau)

v2:
- Switch to explicit return code (Martin KaFai Lau)

Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210127193140.3170382-1-sdf@google.com

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/net/inet_common.h b/include/net/inet_common.h
index cb2818862919..cad2a611efde 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_common.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_common.h
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len);
 #define BIND_WITH_LOCK			(1 << 1)
 /* Called from BPF program. */
 #define BIND_FROM_BPF			(1 << 2)
+/* Skip CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE check. */
+#define BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE	(1 << 3)
 int __inet_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len,
 		u32 flags);
 int inet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,