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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-01-30 06:08:02 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-01-30 06:08:02 +0300
commit6304672b7f0a5c010002e63a075160856dc4f88d (patch)
tree3f2d7fbaa9fe998787fa474c63fb1e6aa98090ab /arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
parent942633523cde99c5bfa0329996dd839ca66a87aa (diff)
parent64e16720ea0879f8ab4547e3b9758936d483909b (diff)
downloadlinux-6304672b7f0a5c010002e63a075160856dc4f88d.tar.xz
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86/pti updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Another set of melted spectrum related changes: - Code simplifications and cleanups for RSB and retpolines. - Make the indirect calls in KVM speculation safe. - Whitelist CPUs which are known not to speculate from Meltdown and prepare for the new CPUID flag which tells the kernel that a CPU is not affected. - A less rigorous variant of the module retpoline check which merily warns when a non-retpoline protected module is loaded and reflects that fact in the sysfs file. - Prepare for Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier support. - Prepare for exposure of the Speculation Control MSRs to guests, so guest OSes which depend on those "features" can use them. Includes a blacklist of the broken microcodes. The actual exposure of the MSRs through KVM is still being worked on" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg x86/nospec: Fix header guards names x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c9
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index b514b2b2845a..290ecf711aec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
#include <linux/stringify.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include "x86.h"
#include "tss.h"
@@ -1021,8 +1022,8 @@ static __always_inline u8 test_cc(unsigned int condition, unsigned long flags)
void (*fop)(void) = (void *)em_setcc + 4 * (condition & 0xf);
flags = (flags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF;
- asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]"
- : "=a"(rc) : [fastop]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags));
+ asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC
+ : "=a"(rc) : [thunk_target]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags));
return rc;
}
@@ -5335,9 +5336,9 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*fop)(struct fastop *))
if (!(ctxt->d & ByteOp))
fop += __ffs(ctxt->dst.bytes) * FASTOP_SIZE;
- asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]; pushf; pop %[flags]\n"
+ asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC " ; pushf; pop %[flags]\n"
: "+a"(ctxt->dst.val), "+d"(ctxt->src.val), [flags]"+D"(flags),
- [fastop]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
+ [thunk_target]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
: "c"(ctxt->src2.val));
ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK) | (flags & EFLAGS_MASK);