BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier, branch dev-5.4

bpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged users

2020-05-02T06:48:46+00:00

commit 6e7e63cbb023976d828cdb22422606bf77baa8a9 upstream. When check_xadd() verifies an XADD operation on a pointer to a stack slot containing a spilled pointer, check_stack_read() verifies that the read, which is part of XADD, is valid. However, since the placeholder value -1 is passed as `value_regno`, check_stack_read() can only return a binary decision and can't return the type of the value that was read. The intent here is to verify whether the value read from the stack slot may be used as a SCALAR_VALUE; but since check_stack_read() doesn't check the type, and the type information is lost when check_stack_read() returns, this is not enforced, and a malicious user can abuse XADD to leak spilled kernel pointers. Fix it by letting check_stack_read() verify that the value is usable as a SCALAR_VALUE if no type information is passed to the caller. To be able to use __is_pointer_value() in check_stack_read(), move it up. Fix up the expected unprivileged error message for a BPF selftest that, until now, assumed that unprivileged users can use XADD on stack-spilled pointers. This also gives us a test for the behavior introduced in this patch for free. In theory, this could also be fixed by forbidding XADD on stack spills entirely, since XADD is a locked operation (for operations on memory with concurrency) and there can't be any concurrency on the BPF stack; but Alexei has said that he wants to keep XADD on stack slots working to avoid changes to the test suite [1]. The following BPF program demonstrates how to leak a BPF map pointer as an unprivileged user using this bug: // r7 = map_pointer BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_7, small_map), // r8 = launder(map_pointer) BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_7, -8), BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0), ((struct bpf_insn) { .code = BPF_STX | BPF_DW | BPF_XADD, .dst_reg = BPF_REG_FP, .src_reg = BPF_REG_1, .off = -8 }), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_FP, -8), // store r8 into map BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_ARG1, BPF_REG_7), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_ARG2, BPF_REG_FP), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_ARG2, -4), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_ARG2, 0, 0), BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_8, 0), BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN() [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200416211116.qxqcza5vo2ddnkdq@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com/ Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200417000007.10734-1-jannh@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf, test_verifier: switch bpf_get_stack's 0 s> r8 test

2020-04-23T08:36:46+00:00

[ no upstream commit ] Switch the comparison, so that is_branch_taken() will recognize that below branch is never taken: [...] 17: [...] R1_w=inv0 [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=-1,umin_value=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff)) [...] 17: (67) r8 <<= 32 18: [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=-4294967296,umin_value=9223372036854775808,umax_value=18446744069414584320,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0x7fffffff00000000)) [...] 18: (c7) r8 s>>= 32 19: [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=-1,umin_value=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff)) [...] 19: (6d) if r1 s> r8 goto pc+16 [...] R1_w=inv0 [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=-1,umin_value=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff)) [...] [...] Currently we check for is_branch_taken() only if either K is source, or source is a scalar value that is const. For upstream it would be good to extend this properly to check whether dst is const and src not. For the sake of the test_verifier, it is probably not needed here: # ./test_verifier 101 #101/p bpf_get_stack return R0 within range OK Summary: 1 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED I haven't seen this issue in test_progs* though, they are passing fine: # ./test_progs-no_alu32 -t get_stack Switching to flavor 'no_alu32' subdirectory... #20 get_stack_raw_tp:OK Summary: 1/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED # ./test_progs -t get_stack #20 get_stack_raw_tp:OK Summary: 1/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Test_verifier, bpf_get_stack return value add <0

2020-04-23T08:36:46+00:00

commit 9ac26e9973bac5716a2a542e32f380c84db2b88c upstream. With current ALU32 subreg handling and retval refine fix from last patches we see an expected failure in test_verifier. With verbose verifier state being printed at each step for clarity we have the following relavent lines [I omit register states that are not necessarily useful to see failure cause], #101/p bpf_get_stack return R0 within range FAIL Failed to load prog 'Success'! [..] 14: (85) call bpf_get_stack#67 R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=48,imm=0) R3_w=inv48 15: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 15: (b7) r1 = 0 16: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 16: (bf) r8 = r0 17: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 17: (67) r8 <<= 32 18: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=9223372032559808512, umax_value=18446744069414584320, var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff00000000), s32_min_value=0, s32_max_value=0, u32_max_value=0, var32_off=(0x0; 0x0)) 18: (c7) r8 s>>= 32 19 R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648, smax_value=2147483647, var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 19: (cd) if r1 s< r8 goto pc+16 R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648, smax_value=0, var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 20: R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1_w=inv0 R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648, smax_value=0, R9=inv48 20: (1f) r9 -= r8 21: (bf) r2 = r7 22: R2_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=48,imm=0) 22: (0f) r2 += r8 value -2147483648 makes map_value pointer be out of bounds After call bpf_get_stack() on line 14 and some moves we have at line 16 an r8 bound with max_value 48 but an unknown min value. This is to be expected bpf_get_stack call can only return a max of the input size but is free to return any negative error in the 32-bit register space. The C helper is returning an int so will use lower 32-bits. Lines 17 and 18 clear the top 32 bits with a left/right shift but use ARSH so we still have worst case min bound before line 19 of -2147483648. At this point the signed check 'r1 s< r8' meant to protect the addition on line 22 where dst reg is a map_value pointer may very well return true with a large negative number. Then the final line 22 will detect this as an invalid operation and fail the program. What we want to do is proceed only if r8 is positive non-error. So change 'r1 s< r8' to 'r1 s> r8' so that we jump if r8 is negative. Next we will throw an error because we access past the end of the map value. The map value size is 48 and sizeof(struct test_val) is 48 so we walk off the end of the map value on the second call to get bpf_get_stack(). Fix this by changing sizeof(struct test_val) to 24 by using 'sizeof(struct test_val) / 2'. After this everything passes as expected. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158560426019.10843.3285429543232025187.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next

2019-09-06T14:49:17+00:00

Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree. The main changes are: 1) Add the ability to use unaligned chunks in the AF_XDP umem. By relaxing where the chunks can be placed, it allows to use an arbitrary buffer size and place whenever there is a free address in the umem. Helps more seamless DPDK AF_XDP driver integration. Support for i40e, ixgbe and mlx5e, from Kevin and Maxim. 2) Addition of a wakeup flag for AF_XDP tx and fill rings so the application can wake up the kernel for rx/tx processing which avoids busy-spinning of the latter, useful when app and driver is located on the same core. Support for i40e, ixgbe and mlx5e, from Magnus and Maxim. 3) bpftool fixes for printf()-like functions so compiler can actually enforce checks, bpftool build system improvements for custom output directories, and addition of 'bpftool map freeze' command, from Quentin. 4) Support attaching/detaching XDP programs from 'bpftool net' command, from Daniel. 5) Automatic xskmap cleanup when AF_XDP socket is released, and several barrier/{read,write}_once fixes in AF_XDP code, from Björn. 6) Relicense of bpf_helpers.h/bpf_endian.h for future libbpf inclusion as well as libbpf versioning improvements, from Andrii. 7) Several new BPF kselftests for verifier precision tracking, from Alexei. 8) Several BPF kselftest fixes wrt endianess to run on s390x, from Ilya. 9) And more BPF kselftest improvements all over the place, from Stanislav. 10) Add simple BPF map op cache for nfp driver to batch dumps, from Jakub. 11) AF_XDP socket umem mapping improvements for 32bit archs, from Ivan. 12) Add BPF-to-BPF call and BTF line info support for s390x JIT, from Yauheni. 13) Small optimization in arm64 JIT to spare 1 insns for BPF_MOD, from Jerin. 14) Fix an error check in bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie() helper, from Petar. 15) Various minor fixes and cleanups, from Nathan, Masahiro, Masanari, Peter, Wei, Yue. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

selftests/bpf: precision tracking tests

2019-09-05T11:55:50+00:00

Add two tests to check that stack slot marking during backtracking doesn't trigger 'spi > allocated_stack' warning. One test is using BPF_ST insn. Another is using BPF_STX. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

selftests/bpf: add precision tracking test

2019-08-27T22:30:12+00:00

Copy-paste of existing test "calls: cross frame pruning - liveness propagation" but ran with different parentage chain heuristic which stresses different path in precision tracking logic. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Song Liu Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

selftests/bpf: verifier precise tests

2019-08-27T22:30:11+00:00

Use BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ flag to check that precision tracking works as expected by comparing every step it takes. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Song Liu Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

2019-08-19T18:54:03+00:00

Merge conflict of mlx5 resolved using instructions in merge commit 9566e650bf7fdf58384bb06df634f7531ca3a97e. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next

2019-08-13T23:24:57+00:00

Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree. There is a small merge conflict in libbpf (Cc Andrii so he's in the loop as well): for (i = 1; i <= btf__get_nr_types(btf); i++) { t = (struct btf_type *)btf__type_by_id(btf, i); if (!has_datasec && btf_is_var(t)) { /* replace VAR with INT */ t->info = BTF_INFO_ENC(BTF_KIND_INT, 0, 0); <<<<<<< HEAD /* * using size = 1 is the safest choice, 4 will be too * big and cause kernel BTF validation failure if * original variable took less than 4 bytes */ t->size = 1; *(int *)(t+1) = BTF_INT_ENC(0, 0, 8); } else if (!has_datasec && kind == BTF_KIND_DATASEC) { ======= t->size = sizeof(int); *(int *)(t + 1) = BTF_INT_ENC(0, 0, 32); } else if (!has_datasec && btf_is_datasec(t)) { >>>>>>> 72ef80b5ee131e96172f19e74b4f98fa3404efe8 /* replace DATASEC with STRUCT */ Conflict is between the two commits 1d4126c4e119 ("libbpf: sanitize VAR to conservative 1-byte INT") and b03bc6853c0e ("libbpf: convert libbpf code to use new btf helpers"), so we need to pick the sanitation fixup as well as use the new btf_is_datasec() helper and the whitespace cleanup. Looks like the following: [...] if (!has_datasec && btf_is_var(t)) { /* replace VAR with INT */ t->info = BTF_INFO_ENC(BTF_KIND_INT, 0, 0); /* * using size = 1 is the safest choice, 4 will be too * big and cause kernel BTF validation failure if * original variable took less than 4 bytes */ t->size = 1; *(int *)(t + 1) = BTF_INT_ENC(0, 0, 8); } else if (!has_datasec && btf_is_datasec(t)) { /* replace DATASEC with STRUCT */ [...] The main changes are: 1) Addition of core parts of compile once - run everywhere (co-re) effort, that is, relocation of fields offsets in libbpf as well as exposure of kernel's own BTF via sysfs and loading through libbpf, from Andrii. More info on co-re: http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-2 and http://vger.kernel.org/lpc-bpf2018.html#session-2 2) Enable passing input flags to the BPF flow dissector to customize parsing and allowing it to stop early similar to the C based one, from Stanislav. 3) Add a BPF helper function that allows generating SYN cookies from XDP and tc BPF, from Petar. 4) Add devmap hash-based map type for more flexibility in device lookup for redirects, from Toke. 5) Improvements to XDP forwarding sample code now utilizing recently enabled devmap lookups, from Jesper. 6) Add support for reporting the effective cgroup progs in bpftool, from Jakub and Takshak. 7) Fix reading kernel config from bpftool via /proc/config.gz, from Peter. 8) Fix AF_XDP umem pages mapping for 32 bit architectures, from Ivan. 9) Follow-up to add two more BPF loop tests for the selftest suite, from Alexei. 10) Add perf event output helper also for other skb-based program types, from Allan. 11) Fix a co-re related compilation error in selftests, from Yonghong. ==================== Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

selftests/bpf: tests for jmp to 1st insn

2019-08-01T20:14:29+00:00

Add 2 tests that check JIT code generation to jumps to 1st insn. 1st test is similar to syzbot reproducer. The backwards branch is never taken at runtime. 2nd test has branch to 1st insn that executes. The test is written as two bpf functions, since it's not possible to construct valid single bpf program that jumps to 1st insn. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Song Liu