Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror) https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-5.2 2019-09-06T08:23:41+00:00 2019-09-06T08:23:41+00:00 Pu Wen puwen@hygon.cn 2019-08-31T02:19:58+00:00 urn:sha1:3698cd854f436b02ca2db6cf1a8d5a0221dcb03d commit 9cfa8e042f7cbb1994cc5923e46c78b36f6054f4 upstream. Commit 9392bd98bba760be96ee ("tools/power turbostat: Add support for AMD Fam 17h (Zen) RAPL") add a function get_tdp_amd(), the parameter is CPU family. But the rapl_probe_amd() function use wrong model parameter. Fix the wrong caller parameter of get_tdp_amd() to use family. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.1+ Signed-off-by: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn> Reviewed-by: Calvin Walton <calvin.walton@kepstin.ca> Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 2019-06-19T15:09:10+00:00 Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de 2019-06-04T08:10:59+00:00 urn:sha1:6c8f392ce8dac61bbb59f737dfc092752c480ece Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): license__ = gpl version 2 extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to add the SPDX identifier to this file. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081202.640009675@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 2019-06-05T15:37:06+00:00 Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de 2019-05-29T23:57:49+00:00 urn:sha1:a61127c2130236168321cc76c5a58e15c00ad154 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms and conditions of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation this program is distributed in the hope it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc 51 franklin st fifth floor boston ma 02110 1301 usa extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 111 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530000436.567572064@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 2019-05-30T18:29:53+00:00 Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de 2019-05-28T17:10:12+00:00 urn:sha1:59bd9ded4d7803d9f1f4d947064693513d18e724 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): released under gpl v2 extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 15 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190528171438.895196075@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 2019-05-14T14:57:29+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2019-05-14T14:57:29+00:00 urn:sha1:fa4bff165070dc40a3de35b78e4f8da8e8d85ec5 Pull x86 MDS mitigations from Thomas Gleixner: "Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU internal buffers. This new set of misfeatures has the following CVEs assigned: CVE-2018-12126 MSBDS Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling CVE-2018-12130 MFBDS Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling CVE-2018-12127 MLPDS Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling CVE-2019-11091 MDSUM Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory MDS attacks target microarchitectural buffers which speculatively forward data under certain conditions. Disclosure gadgets can expose this data via cache side channels. Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully. The mitigation is to flush the microarchitectural buffers on return to user space and before entering a VM. It's bolted on the VERW instruction and requires a microcode update. As some of the attacks exploit data structures shared between hyperthreads, full protection requires to disable hyperthreading. The kernel does not do that by default to avoid breaking unattended updates. The mitigation set comes with documentation for administrators and a deeper technical view" * 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits) x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers() x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY ... 2019-03-30T00:41:22+00:00 Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com 2019-03-30T00:41:22+00:00 urn:sha1:59cc8cd60c786ae54715daff851e9d7c2436bc8b Pull turbostat utility updates for 5.1 from Len Brown: "Misc fixes and updates." * 'turbostat' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/lenb/linux: tools/power turbostat: update version number tools/power turbostat: Warn on bad ACPI LPIT data tools/power turbostat: Add checks for failure of fgets() and fscanf() tools/power turbostat: Also read package power on AMD F17h (Zen) tools/power turbostat: Add support for AMD Fam 17h (Zen) RAPL tools/power turbostat: Do not display an error on systems without a cpufreq driver tools/power turbostat: Add Die column tools/power turbostat: Add Icelake support tools/power turbostat: Cleanup CNL-specific code tools/power turbostat: Cleanup CC3-skip code tools/power turbostat: Restore ability to execute in topology-order 2019-03-21T03:23:25+00:00 Len Brown len.brown@intel.com 2019-03-21T03:23:25+00:00 urn:sha1:0f71d089c912769251c992b8f7dcd508a472fe10 Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> 2019-03-21T03:11:44+00:00 Prarit Bhargava prarit@redhat.com 2018-09-25T12:59:26+00:00 urn:sha1:5ea7647b333f3580697edaaf2b17a2f6d29a82f1 On some systems /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpuidle/low_power_idle_cpu_residency_us or /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpuidle/low_power_idle_system_residency_us return a file error because of bad ACPI LPIT data from a misconfigured BIOS. turbostat interprets this failure as a fatal error and outputs turbostat: CPU LPI: No data available If the ACPI LPIT sysfs files return an error output a warning instead of a fatal error, disable the ACPI LPIT evaluation code, and continue. Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> 2019-03-21T03:02:27+00:00 Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk 2019-03-21T03:01:03+00:00 urn:sha1:8173c336989c1a12290cd023969df2775b2df34d Most calls to fgets() and fscanf() are followed by error checks. Add an exit-on-error in the remaining cases. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> 2019-03-21T02:55:45+00:00 Calvin Walton calvin.walton@kepstin.ca 2018-08-17T16:34:42+00:00 urn:sha1:3316f99a9f1b68c578c57e76792bd19da1c7d423 The package power can also be read from an MSR. It's not clear exactly what is included, and whether it's aggregated over all nodes or reported separately. It does look like this is reported separately per CCX (I get a single value on the Ryzen R7 1700), but it might be reported separately per- die (node?) on larger processors. If that's the case, it would have to be recorded per node and aggregated for the socket. Note that although Zen has these MSRs reporting power, it looks like the actual RAPL configuration (power limits, configured TDP) is done through PCI configuration space. I have not yet found any public documentation for this. Signed-off-by: Calvin Walton <calvin.walton@kepstin.ca> Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>