<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/sound/core, branch dev-4.17</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-4.17</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-4.17'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2018-08-22T05:44:54+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: seq: Fix poll() error return</title>
<updated>2018-08-22T05:44:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-25T14:34:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=99747622f957caff1e6064390728fa3e1c324984'/>
<id>urn:sha1:99747622f957caff1e6064390728fa3e1c324984</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a49a71f6e25da2acc637fcd31e73debd96ca18f8 upstream.

The sanity checks in ALSA sequencer and OSS sequencer emulation codes
return falsely -ENXIO from poll callback.  They should be EPOLLERR
instead.

This was caught thanks to the recent change to the return value.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: memalloc: Don't exceed over the requested size</title>
<updated>2018-08-22T05:44:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-19T09:01:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=349a3ed9b484f8a4e21aaedd5b7c74543732680d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:349a3ed9b484f8a4e21aaedd5b7c74543732680d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dfef01e150824b0e6da750cacda8958188d29aea upstream.

snd_dma_alloc_pages_fallback() tries to allocate pages again when the
allocation fails with reduced size.  But the first try actually
*increases* the size to power-of-two, which may give back a larger
chunk than the requested size.  This confuses the callers, e.g. sgbuf
assumes that the size is equal or less, and it may result in a bad
loop due to the underflow and eventually lead to Oops.

The code of this function seems incorrectly assuming the usage of
get_order().  We need to decrease at first, then align to
power-of-two.

Reported-and-tested-by: he, bo &lt;bo.he@intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: zhang jun &lt;jun.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: virmidi: Fix too long output trigger loop</title>
<updated>2018-08-22T05:44:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-26T12:27:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=15e20467394002bb58e29233eaecabb1730f09d6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:15e20467394002bb58e29233eaecabb1730f09d6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 50e9ffb1996a5d11ff5040a266585bad4ceeca0a upstream.

The virmidi output trigger tries to parse the all available bytes and
process sequencer events as much as possible.  In a normal situation,
this is supposed to be relatively short, but a program may give a huge
buffer and it'll take a long time in a single spin lock, which may
eventually lead to a soft lockup.

This patch simply adds a workaround, a cond_resched() call in the loop
if applicable.  A better solution would be to move the event processor
into a work, but let's put a duct-tape quickly at first.

Reported-and-tested-by: Dae R. Jeong &lt;threeearcat@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+619d9f40141d826b097e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: rawmidi: Change resized buffers atomically</title>
<updated>2018-07-25T09:26:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-17T15:26:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=f5f3789f192981a482856a69bd2ef38088f0e635'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f5f3789f192981a482856a69bd2ef38088f0e635</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 39675f7a7c7e7702f7d5341f1e0d01db746543a0 upstream.

The SNDRV_RAWMIDI_IOCTL_PARAMS ioctl may resize the buffers and the
current code is racy.  For example, the sequencer client may write to
buffer while it being resized.

As a simple workaround, let's switch to the resized buffer inside the
stream runtime lock.

Reported-by: syzbot+52f83f0ea8df16932f7f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: timer: Fix UBSAN warning at SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_NEXT_DEVICE ioctl</title>
<updated>2018-07-03T09:27:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-25T09:09:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=b859775275b139167abf462890918ee2fd9559be'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b859775275b139167abf462890918ee2fd9559be</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b41f794f284966fd6ec634111e3b40d241389f96 upstream.

The kernel may spew a WARNING about UBSAN undefined behavior at
handling ALSA timer ioctl SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_NEXT_DEVICE:

UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in sound/core/timer.c:1524:19
signed integer overflow:
2147483647 + 1 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x122/0x1c8 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 ubsan_epilogue+0x12/0x86 lib/ubsan.c:159
 handle_overflow+0x1c2/0x21f lib/ubsan.c:190
 __ubsan_handle_add_overflow+0x2a/0x31 lib/ubsan.c:198
 snd_timer_user_next_device sound/core/timer.c:1524 [inline]
 __snd_timer_user_ioctl+0x204d/0x2520 sound/core/timer.c:1939
 snd_timer_user_ioctl+0x67/0x95 sound/core/timer.c:1994
 ....

It happens only when a value with INT_MAX is passed, as we're
incrementing it unconditionally.  So the fix is trivial, check the
value with INT_MAX.  Although the bug itself is fairly harmless, it's
better to fix it so that fuzzers won't hit this again later.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200213
Reported-and-tested-by: Team OWL337 &lt;icytxw@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: timer: Fix pause event notification</title>
<updated>2018-05-18T06:43:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-17T21:34:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=3ae180972564846e6d794e3615e1ab0a1e6c4ef9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3ae180972564846e6d794e3615e1ab0a1e6c4ef9</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit f65e0d299807 ("ALSA: timer: Call notifier in the same spinlock")
combined the start/continue and stop/pause functions, and in doing so
changed the event code for the pause case to SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_CONTINUE.
Change it back to SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_PAUSE.

Fixes: f65e0d299807 ("ALSA: timer: Call notifier in the same spinlock")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: control: fix a redundant-copy issue</title>
<updated>2018-05-13T07:27:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wenwen Wang</name>
<email>wang6495@umn.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-05T18:38:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=3f12888dfae2a48741c4caa9214885b3aaf350f9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3f12888dfae2a48741c4caa9214885b3aaf350f9</id>
<content type='text'>
In snd_ctl_elem_add_compat(), the fields of the struct 'data' need to be
copied from the corresponding fields of the struct 'data32' in userspace.
This is achieved by invoking copy_from_user() and get_user() functions. The
problem here is that the 'type' field is copied twice. One is by
copy_from_user() and one is by get_user(). Given that the 'type' field is
not used between the two copies, the second copy is *completely* redundant
and should be removed for better performance and cleanup. Also, these two
copies can cause inconsistent data: as the struct 'data32' resides in
userspace and a malicious userspace process can race to change the 'type'
field between the two copies to cause inconsistent data. Depending on how
the data is used in the future, such an inconsistency may cause potential
security risks.

For above reasons, we should take out the second copy.

Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang &lt;wang6495@umn.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: pcm: Check PCM state at xfern compat ioctl</title>
<updated>2018-05-02T06:54:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-02T06:48:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=f13876e2c33a657a71bcbb10f767c0951b165020'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f13876e2c33a657a71bcbb10f767c0951b165020</id>
<content type='text'>
Since snd_pcm_ioctl_xfern_compat() has no PCM state check, it may go
further and hit the sanity check pcm_sanity_check() when the ioctl is
called right after open.  It may eventually spew a kernel warning, as
triggered by syzbot, depending on kconfig.

The lack of PCM state check there was just an oversight.  Although
it's no real crash, the spurious kernel warning is annoying, so let's
add the proper check.

Reported-by: syzbot+1dac3a4f6bc9c1c675d4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: seq: Fix races at MIDI encoding in snd_virmidi_output_trigger()</title>
<updated>2018-04-27T15:50:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-26T07:17:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=8f22e52528cc372b218b5f100457469615c733ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8f22e52528cc372b218b5f100457469615c733ce</id>
<content type='text'>
The sequencer virmidi code has an open race at its output trigger
callback: namely, virmidi keeps only one event packet for processing
while it doesn't protect for concurrent output trigger calls.

snd_virmidi_output_trigger() tries to process the previously
unfinished event before starting encoding the given MIDI stream, but
this is done without any lock.  Meanwhile, if another rawmidi stream
starts the output trigger, this proceeds further, and overwrites the
event package that is being processed in another thread.  This
eventually corrupts and may lead to the invalid memory access if the
event type is like SYSEX.

The fix is just to move the spinlock to cover both the pending event
and the new stream.

The bug was spotted by a new fuzzer, RaceFuzzer.

BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426045223.GA15307@dragonet.kaist.ac.kr
Reported-by: DaeRyong Jeong &lt;threeearcat@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: seq: oss: Hardening for potential Spectre v1</title>
<updated>2018-04-25T08:37:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-24T05:31:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=8d218dd8116695ecda7164f97631c069938aa22e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8d218dd8116695ecda7164f97631c069938aa22e</id>
<content type='text'>
As Smatch recently suggested, a few places in OSS sequencer codes may
expand the array directly from the user-space value with speculation,
namely there are a significant amount of references to either
info-&gt;ch[] or dp-&gt;synths[] array:

  sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c:315 note_on_event() warn: potential spectre issue 'info-&gt;ch' (local cap)
  sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c:362 note_off_event() warn: potential spectre issue 'info-&gt;ch' (local cap)
  sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:470 snd_seq_oss_synth_load_patch() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp-&gt;synths' (local cap)
  sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c:293 note_on_event() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp-&gt;synths'
  sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c:353 note_off_event() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp-&gt;synths'
  sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:506 snd_seq_oss_synth_sysex() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp-&gt;synths'
  sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:580 snd_seq_oss_synth_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp-&gt;synths'

Although all these seem doing only the first load without further
reference, we may want to stay in a safer side, so hardening with
array_index_nospec() would still make sense.

We may put array_index_nospec() at each place, but here we take a
different approach:

- For dp-&gt;synths[], change the helpers to retrieve seq_oss_synthinfo
  pointer directly instead of the array expansion at each place

- For info-&gt;ch[], harden in a normal way, as there are only a couple
  of places

As a result, the existing helper, snd_seq_oss_synth_is_valid() is
replaced with snd_seq_oss_synth_info().  Also, we cover MIDI device
where a similar array expansion is done, too, although it wasn't
reported by Smatch.

BugLink: https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152411496503418&amp;w=2
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
