<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/security, branch dev-5.4</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-5.4</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-5.4'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-07-22T09:42:46+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'v5.4.53' into dev-5.4</title>
<updated>2020-07-22T09:42:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joel Stanley</name>
<email>joel@jms.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-22T09:42:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=8a9b346382056b52cd7ff141ae9f15a0fcfeb13d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8a9b346382056b52cd7ff141ae9f15a0fcfeb13d</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the 5.4.53 stable release

Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley &lt;joel@jms.id.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: ensure that dfa state tables have entries</title>
<updated>2020-07-22T07:33:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-31T06:37:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=d79e57db45444a4ea9b334fde3fc581fa4846058'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d79e57db45444a4ea9b334fde3fc581fa4846058</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c27c6bd2c4d6b6bb779f9b722d5607993e1d5e5c upstream.

Currently it is possible to specify a state machine table with 0 length,
this is not valid as optional tables are specified by not defining
the table as present. Further this allows by-passing the base tables
range check against the next/check tables.

Fixes: d901d6a298dc ("apparmor: dfa split verification of table headers")
Reported-by: Mike Salvatore &lt;mike.salvatore@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix double free</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:50:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Rix</name>
<email>trix@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-10T21:57:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=ae3c09e346bdaf194e6cf5f2b74e29678937b038'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ae3c09e346bdaf194e6cf5f2b74e29678937b038</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 65de50969a77509452ae590e9449b70a22b923bb upstream.

Clang's static analysis tool reports these double free memory errors.

security/selinux/ss/services.c:2987:4: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
                        kfree(bnames[i]);
                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2990:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
        kfree(bvalues);
        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

So improve the security_get_bools error handling by freeing these variables
and setting their return pointers to NULL and the return len to 0

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix nnp subset test for unconfined</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:50:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-25T15:02:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=a78c65cb4b67bd77f8aa455fe63ab72ea73eba3b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a78c65cb4b67bd77f8aa455fe63ab72ea73eba3b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3ed4aaa94fc07db3cd0c91be95e3e1b9782a2710 ]

The subset test is not taking into account the unconfined exception
which will cause profile transitions in the stacked confinement
case to fail when no_new_privs is applied.

This fixes a regression introduced in the fix for
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1839037

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1844186
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: check/put label on apparmor_sk_clone_security()</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:50:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mauricio Faria de Oliveira</name>
<email>mfo@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-02T21:15:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=039a79ef0b1eb81ab060f29e14d3f9df0e6bc447'/>
<id>urn:sha1:039a79ef0b1eb81ab060f29e14d3f9df0e6bc447</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3b646abc5bc6c0df649daea4c2c976bd4d47e4c8 ]

Currently apparmor_sk_clone_security() does not check for existing
label/peer in the 'new' struct sock; it just overwrites it, if any
(with another reference to the label of the source sock.)

    static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
                                           struct sock *newsk)
    {
            struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
            struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);

            new-&gt;label = aa_get_label(ctx-&gt;label);
            new-&gt;peer = aa_get_label(ctx-&gt;peer);
    }

This might leak label references, which might overflow under load.
Thus, check for and put labels, to prevent such errors.

Note this is similarly done on:

    static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, ...)
    ...
            if (sock-&gt;sk) {
                    struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock-&gt;sk);

                    aa_put_label(ctx-&gt;label);
                    ctx-&gt;label = aa_get_label(label);
            }
    ...

Context:
-------

The label reference count leak is observed if apparmor_sock_graft()
is called previously: this sets the 'ctx-&gt;label' field by getting
a reference to the current label (later overwritten, without put.)

    static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, ...)
    {
            struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);

            if (!ctx-&gt;label)
                    ctx-&gt;label = aa_get_current_label();
    }

And that is the case on crypto/af_alg.c:af_alg_accept():

    int af_alg_accept(struct sock *sk, struct socket *newsock, ...)
    ...
            struct sock *sk2;
            ...
            sk2 = sk_alloc(...);
            ...
            security_sock_graft(sk2, newsock);
            security_sk_clone(sk, sk2);
    ...

Apparently both calls are done on their own right, especially for
other LSMs, being introduced in 2010/2014, before apparmor socket
mediation in 2017 (see commits [1,2,3,4]).

So, it looks OK there! Let's fix the reference leak in apparmor.

Test-case:
---------

Exercise that code path enough to overflow label reference count.

    $ cat aa-refcnt-af_alg.c
    #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
    #include &lt;string.h&gt;
    #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/socket.h&gt;
    #include &lt;linux/if_alg.h&gt;

    int main() {
            int sockfd;
            struct sockaddr_alg sa;

            /* Setup the crypto API socket */
            sockfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
            if (sockfd &lt; 0) {
                    perror("socket");
                    return 1;
            }

            memset(&amp;sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
            sa.salg_family = AF_ALG;
            strcpy((char *) sa.salg_type, "rng");
            strcpy((char *) sa.salg_name, "stdrng");

            if (bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *) &amp;sa, sizeof(sa)) &lt; 0) {
                    perror("bind");
                    return 1;
            }

            /* Accept a "connection" and close it; repeat. */
            while (!close(accept(sockfd, NULL, 0)));

            return 0;
    }

    $ gcc -o aa-refcnt-af_alg aa-refcnt-af_alg.c

    $ ./aa-refcnt-af_alg
    &lt;a few hours later&gt;

    [ 9928.475953] refcount_t overflow at apparmor_sk_clone_security+0x37/0x70 in aa-refcnt-af_alg[1322], uid/euid: 1000/1000
    ...
    [ 9928.507443] RIP: 0010:apparmor_sk_clone_security+0x37/0x70
    ...
    [ 9928.514286]  security_sk_clone+0x33/0x50
    [ 9928.514807]  af_alg_accept+0x81/0x1c0 [af_alg]
    [ 9928.516091]  alg_accept+0x15/0x20 [af_alg]
    [ 9928.516682]  SYSC_accept4+0xff/0x210
    [ 9928.519609]  SyS_accept+0x10/0x20
    [ 9928.520190]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130
    [ 9928.520808]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2

Note that other messages may be seen, not just overflow, depending on
the value being incremented by kref_get(); on another run:

    [ 7273.182666] refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.
    ...
    [ 7273.185789] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.

Kprobes:
-------

Using kprobe events to monitor sk -&gt; sk_security -&gt; label -&gt; count (kref):

Original v5.7 (one reference leak every iteration)

 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd2
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd4
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd3
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd5
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd4
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd6

Patched v5.7 (zero reference leak per iteration)

 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x593
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x594
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x593
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x594
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x593
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x594

Commits:
-------

[1] commit 507cad355fc9 ("crypto: af_alg - Make sure sk_security is initialized on accept()ed sockets")
[2] commit 4c63f83c2c2e ("crypto: af_alg - properly label AF_ALG socket")
[3] commit 2acce6aa9f65 ("Networking") a.k.a ("crypto: af_alg - Avoid sock_graft call warning)
[4] commit 56974a6fcfef ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation")

Fixes: 56974a6fcfef ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation")
Reported-by: Brian Moyles &lt;bmoyles@netflix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira &lt;mfo@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix introspection of of task mode for unconfined tasks</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:50:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-06T01:12:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=88bc3e06039035fcd63a0d52ed8625e8682b107a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:88bc3e06039035fcd63a0d52ed8625e8682b107a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dd2569fbb053719f7df7ef8fdbb45cf47156a701 ]

Fix two issues with introspecting the task mode.

1. If a task is attached to a unconfined profile that is not the
   ns-&gt;unconfined profile then. Mode the mode is always reported
   as -

      $ ps -Z
      LABEL                               PID TTY          TIME CMD
      unconfined                         1287 pts/0    00:00:01 bash
      test (-)                           1892 pts/0    00:00:00 ps

   instead of the correct value of (unconfined) as shown below

      $ ps -Z
      LABEL                               PID TTY          TIME CMD
      unconfined                         2483 pts/0    00:00:01 bash
      test (unconfined)                  3591 pts/0    00:00:00 ps

2. if a task is confined by a stack of profiles that are unconfined
   the output of label mode is again the incorrect value of (-) like
   above, instead of (unconfined). This is because the visibile
   profile count increment is skipped by the special casing of
   unconfined.

Fixes: f1bd904175e8 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'v5.4.48' into dev-5.4</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T07:38:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joel Stanley</name>
<email>joel@jms.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-24T07:37:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=f77eed1af7f260c2444fd5d4e1ebb0d8c4aa366f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f77eed1af7f260c2444fd5d4e1ebb0d8c4aa366f</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the 5.4.48 stable release

Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley &lt;joel@jms.id.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Set again build_ima_appraise variable</title>
<updated>2020-06-22T07:31:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Krzysztof Struczynski</name>
<email>krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-27T10:28:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=e131e70e2144b36ad0dd0d6b2f2c3ff866ce5604'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e131e70e2144b36ad0dd0d6b2f2c3ff866ce5604</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b59fda449cf07f2db3be3a67142e6c000f5e8d79 ]

After adding the new add_rule() function in commit c52657d93b05
("ima: refactor ima_init_policy()"), all appraisal flags are added to the
temp_ima_appraise variable. Revert to the previous behavior instead of
removing build_ima_appraise, to benefit from the protection offered by
__ro_after_init.

The mentioned commit introduced a bug, as it makes all the flags
modifiable, while build_ima_appraise flags can be protected with
__ro_after_init.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x
Fixes: c52657d93b05 ("ima: refactor ima_init_policy()")
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski &lt;krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Remove redundant policy rule set in add_rules()</title>
<updated>2020-06-22T07:31:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Krzysztof Struczynski</name>
<email>krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-27T10:28:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=2600136eaee989e8a3c8dfcee2581ae238f98964'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2600136eaee989e8a3c8dfcee2581ae238f98964</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6ee28442a465ab4c4be45e3b15015af24b1ba906 ]

Function ima_appraise_flag() returns the flag to be set in
temp_ima_appraise depending on the hook identifier passed as an argument.
It is not necessary to set the flag again for the POLICY_CHECK hook.

Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski &lt;krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Fix possible memory leak in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()</title>
<updated>2020-06-22T07:31:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-14T08:01:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=6de50456fe176caef211dc7a32ff16548c622665'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6de50456fe176caef211dc7a32ff16548c622665</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0c4395fb2aa77341269ea619c5419ea48171883f upstream.

Don't immediately return if the signature is portable and security.ima is
not present. Just set error so that memory allocated is freed before
returning from evm_calc_hmac_or_hash().

Fixes: 50b977481fce9 ("EVM: Add support for portable signature format")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
