<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/security/selinux, branch dev-5.4</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-5.4</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-5.4'/>
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<updated>2020-06-24T15:50:48+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix double free</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:50:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Rix</name>
<email>trix@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-10T21:57:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=ae3c09e346bdaf194e6cf5f2b74e29678937b038'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ae3c09e346bdaf194e6cf5f2b74e29678937b038</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 65de50969a77509452ae590e9449b70a22b923bb upstream.

Clang's static analysis tool reports these double free memory errors.

security/selinux/ss/services.c:2987:4: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
                        kfree(bnames[i]);
                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2990:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
        kfree(bvalues);
        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

So improve the security_get_bools error handling by freeing these variables
and setting their return pointers to NULL and the return len to 0

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix error return code in policydb_read()</title>
<updated>2020-06-22T07:31:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Yongjun</name>
<email>weiyongjun1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-29T07:30:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=b2083327ea3ca883735470a28680d9b24ec10dba'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b2083327ea3ca883735470a28680d9b24ec10dba</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4c09f8b6913a779ca0c70ea8058bf21537eebb3b ]

Fix to return negative error code -ENOMEM from the kvcalloc() error
handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

Fixes: acdf52d97f82 ("selinux: convert to kvmalloc")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;weiyongjun1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()</title>
<updated>2020-05-06T06:15:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-28T13:59:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=eeef0d9fd40df3c033dca68bca8249e5951660ac'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eeef0d9fd40df3c033dca68bca8249e5951660ac</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fb73974172ffaaf57a7c42f35424d9aece1a5af6 upstream.

Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink
messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to
SELinux access control.  Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected
the first message in the sk_buff.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update()</title>
<updated>2020-02-24T07:36:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jaihind Yadav</name>
<email>jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-17T11:55:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=111749fba968225d0cb51cce7727c18276ce6c6f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:111749fba968225d0cb51cce7727c18276ce6c6f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 030b995ad9ece9fa2d218af4429c1c78c2342096 ]

In AVC update we don't call avc_node_kill() when avc_xperms_populate()
fails, resulting in the avc-&gt;avc_cache.active_nodes counter having a
false value.  In last patch this changes was missed , so correcting it.

Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Jaihind Yadav &lt;jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Siddojigari &lt;rsiddoji@codeaurora.org&gt;
[PM: merge fuzz, minor description cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_insert()</title>
<updated>2020-02-24T07:36:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-10T01:39:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=0e44cd879ba1da559f0175f2f5a3670c58f10ff5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0e44cd879ba1da559f0175f2f5a3670c58f10ff5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d8db60cb23e49a92cf8cada3297395c7fa50fdf8 ]

Fix avc_insert() to call avc_node_kill() if we've already allocated
an AVC node and the code fails to insert the node in the cache.

Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Reported-by: rsiddoji@codeaurora.org
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fall back to ref-walk if audit is required</title>
<updated>2020-02-14T21:34:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-22T17:22:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=2d8fdc5744ff678e23d8869f57cedab4f5546f74'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2d8fdc5744ff678e23d8869f57cedab4f5546f74</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0188d5c025ca8fe756ba3193bd7d150139af5a88 upstream.

commit bda0be7ad994 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
passed down the rcu flag to the SELinux AVC, but failed to adjust the
test in slow_avc_audit() to also return -ECHILD on LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY.
Previously, we only returned -ECHILD if generating an audit record with
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE since this was only relevant from inode_permission.
Move the handling of MAY_NOT_BLOCK to avc_audit() and its inlined
equivalent in selinux_inode_permission() immediately after we determine
that audit is required, and always fall back to ref-walk in this case.

Fixes: bda0be7ad994 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
Reported-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall</title>
<updated>2020-02-14T21:34:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-17T20:24:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=875e01dd8a972115b58589e4715dec046eb51c0f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:875e01dd8a972115b58589e4715dec046eb51c0f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 98aa00345de54b8340dc2ddcd87f446d33387b5e upstream.

commit 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
introduced a new move_mount(2) system call and a corresponding new LSM
security_move_mount hook but did not implement this hook for any existing
LSM.  This creates a regression for SELinux with respect to consistent
checking of mounts; the existing selinux_mount hook checks mounton
permission to the mount point path.  Provide a SELinux hook
implementation for move_mount that applies this same check for
consistency.  In the future we may wish to add a new move_mount
filesystem permission and check as well, but this addresses
the immediate regression.

Fixes: 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: revert "stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link"</title>
<updated>2020-02-14T21:34:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-22T17:22:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=3b2e595dfe2bbbedee5cf2298739d9b6663e7d6d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3b2e595dfe2bbbedee5cf2298739d9b6663e7d6d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1a37079c236d55fb31ebbf4b59945dab8ec8764c upstream.

This reverts commit e46e01eebbbc ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK
to the AVC upon follow_link"). The correct fix is to instead fall
back to ref-walk if audit is required irrespective of the specific
audit data type.  This is done in the next commit.

Fixes: e46e01eebbbc ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link")
Reported-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux</title>
<updated>2019-10-08T17:51:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-08T17:51:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=2ef459167adb5d7cf76df403b4fcf79347056824'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2ef459167adb5d7cf76df403b4fcf79347056824</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull selinuxfix from Paul Moore:
 "One patch to ensure we don't copy bad memory up into userspace"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: fix context string corruption in convert_context()
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix context string corruption in convert_context()</title>
<updated>2019-10-03T18:13:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-03T13:59:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=2a5243937c700ffe6a28e6557a4562a9ab0a17a4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2a5243937c700ffe6a28e6557a4562a9ab0a17a4</id>
<content type='text'>
string_to_context_struct() may garble the context string, so we need to
copy back the contents again from the old context struct to avoid
storing the corrupted context.

Since string_to_context_struct() tokenizes (and therefore truncates) the
context string and we are later potentially copying it with kstrdup(),
this may eventually cause pieces of uninitialized kernel memory to be
disclosed to userspace (when copying to userspace based on the stored
length and not the null character).

How to reproduce on Fedora and similar:
    # dnf install -y memcached
    # systemctl start memcached
    # semodule -d memcached
    # load_policy
    # load_policy
    # systemctl stop memcached
    # ausearch -m AVC
    type=AVC msg=audit(1570090572.648:313): avc:  denied  { signal } for  pid=1 comm="systemd" scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=0 trawcon=73797374656D5F75007400000000000070BE6E847296FFFF726F6D000096FFFF76

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Milos Malik &lt;mmalik@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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