BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/security/selinux, branch dev-4.3

mm: mark most vm_operations_struct const

2015-09-10T20:29:01+00:00

With two exceptions (drm/qxl and drm/radeon) all vm_operations_struct structs should be constant. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Minchan Kim Cc: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2015-09-08T19:41:25+00:00

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for module signing. See comments in 3f1e1bea. ** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which must be installed, e.g. the openssl-devel on Fedora ** - Smack - add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads - support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data - SELinux: - add ioctl whitelisting (see http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf) - fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change - Seccomp: - add ptrace options for suspend/resume" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits) PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore modsign: Handle signing key in source tree modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key Move certificate handling to its own directory sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7 PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652] X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer PKCS#7: Check content type and versions MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved ...

fs: create and use seq_show_option for escaping

2015-09-04T23:54:41+00:00

Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g. new lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files. This could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what else. This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or in other situations with delegated mount privileges. Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink). Imagine the use of "sudo" is something more sneaky: $ BASE="ovl" $ MNT="$BASE/mnt" $ LOW="$BASE/lower" $ UP="$BASE/upper" $ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000" $ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK" $ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt $ cat /proc/mounts none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0 $ fusermount -u /proc $ cat /proc/mounts cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option handlers to use them as needed. Some, like SELinux, need to be open coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees] [keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Acked-by: Jan Kara Acked-by: Paul Moore Cc: J. R. Okajima Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next

2015-08-15T03:29:57+00:00

selinux: Create a common helper to determine an inode label [ver #3]

2015-07-13T17:31:59+00:00

Create a common helper function to determine the label for a new inode. This is then used by: - may_create() - selinux_dentry_init_security() - selinux_inode_init_security() This will change the behaviour of the functions slightly, bringing them all into line. Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: David Howells Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

selinux: Augment BUG_ON assertion for secclass_map.

2015-07-13T17:31:59+00:00

Ensure that we catch any cases where tclass == 0. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

selinux: initialize sock security class to default value

2015-07-13T17:31:59+00:00

Initialize the security class of sock security structures to the generic socket class. This is similar to what is already done in inode_alloc_security for files. Generally the sclass field will later by set by socket_post_create or sk_clone or sock_graft, but for protocol implementations that fail to call any of these for newly accepted sockets, we want some sane default that will yield a legitimate avc denied message with non-garbage values for class and permission. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

selinux: reduce locking overhead in inode_free_security()

2015-07-13T17:31:59+00:00

The inode_free_security() function just took the superblock's isec_lock before checking and trying to remove the inode security struct from the linked list. In many cases, the list was empty and so the lock taking is wasteful as no useful work is done. On multi-socket systems with a large number of CPUs, there can also be a fair amount of spinlock contention on the isec_lock if many tasks are exiting at the same time. This patch changes the code to check the state of the list first before taking the lock and attempting to dequeue it. The list_del_init() can be called more than once on the same list with no harm as long as they are properly serialized. It should not be possible to have inode_free_security() called concurrently with list_add(). For better safety, however, we use list_empty_careful() here even though it is still not completely safe in case that happens. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

selinux: extended permissions for ioctls

2015-07-13T17:31:58+00:00

Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm : ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm : ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep Acked-by: Nick Kralevich Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into for-linus2

2015-07-10T23:13:45+00:00