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<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/security/selinux, branch dev-4.10</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-4.10</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-4.10'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2017-02-08T08:09:53+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr</title>
<updated>2017-02-08T08:09:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-31T16:54:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=0c461cb727d146c9ef2d3e86214f498b78b7d125'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0c461cb727d146c9ef2d3e86214f498b78b7d125</id>
<content type='text'>
SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an
attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to
clear the attribute.  However, the test for clearing attributes has
always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further
lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit
bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a ("proc_pid_attr_write():
switch to memdup_user()").  Fix the off-by-one error.

Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not
support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and
newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute,
requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use
echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the
write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write
causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo
without -n to clear, as in the following example:
$ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 &gt; /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
$ echo "" &gt; /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate

Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise
the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell.

There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we
should just get rid of it.

UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process
with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a
result of this bug.  This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
[PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5: d6ea83ec6864e
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2016-12-22T18:03:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-22T18:03:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=67327145c4af673d9c4ef06537ca8c5818f97668'/>
<id>urn:sha1:67327145c4af673d9c4ef06537ca8c5818f97668</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull SElinux fix from James Morris:
 "From Paul:
   'A small SELinux patch to fix some clang/llvm compiler warnings and
    ensure the tools under scripts work well in the face of kernel
    changes'"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  selinux: use the kernel headers when building scripts/selinux
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: use the kernel headers when building scripts/selinux</title>
<updated>2016-12-21T15:39:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-21T15:39:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=bfc5e3a6af397dcf9c99a6c1872458e7867c4680'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bfc5e3a6af397dcf9c99a6c1872458e7867c4680</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 3322d0d64f4e ("selinux: keep SELinux in sync with new capability
definitions") added a check on the defined capabilities without
explicitly including the capability header file which caused problems
when building genheaders for users of clang/llvm.  Resolve this by
using the kernel headers when building genheaders, which is arguably
the right thing to do regardless, and explicitly including the
kernel's capability.h header file in classmap.h.  We also update the
mdp build, even though it wasn't causing an error we really should
be using the headers from the kernel we are building.

Reported-by: Nicolas Iooss &lt;nicolas.iooss@m4x.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2016-12-14T21:57:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-14T21:57:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=683b96f4d1d132fcefa4a0bd11916649800d7361'/>
<id>urn:sha1:683b96f4d1d132fcefa4a0bd11916649800d7361</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Generally pretty quiet for this release. Highlights:

  Yama:
   - allow ptrace access for original parent after re-parenting

  TPM:
   - add documentation
   - many bugfixes &amp; cleanups
   - define a generic open() method for ascii &amp; bios measurements

  Integrity:
   - Harden against malformed xattrs

  SELinux:
   - bugfixes &amp; cleanups

  Smack:
   - Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalid label
   - Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hook
   - parse mnt opts after privileges check (fixes unpriv DoS vuln)"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (56 commits)
  Yama: allow access for the current ptrace parent
  tpm: adjust return value of tpm_read_log
  tpm: vtpm_proxy: conditionally call tpm_chip_unregister
  tpm: Fix handling of missing event log
  tpm: Check the bios_dir entry for NULL before accessing it
  tpm: return -ENODEV if np is not set
  tpm: cleanup of printk error messages
  tpm: replace of_find_node_by_name() with dev of_node property
  tpm: redefine read_log() to handle ACPI/OF at runtime
  tpm: fix the missing .owner in tpm_bios_measurements_ops
  tpm: have event log use the tpm_chip
  tpm: drop tpm1_chip_register(/unregister)
  tpm: replace dynamically allocated bios_dir with a static array
  tpm: replace symbolic permission with octal for securityfs files
  char: tpm: fix kerneldoc tpm2_unseal_trusted name typo
  tpm_tis: Allow tpm_tis to be bound using DT
  tpm, tpm_vtpm_proxy: add kdoc comments for VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV
  tpm: Only call pm_runtime_get_sync if device has a parent
  tpm: define a generic open() method for ascii &amp; bios measurements
  Documentation: tpm: add the Physical TPM device tree binding documentation
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: Convert isec-&gt;lock into a spinlock</title>
<updated>2016-11-22T22:44:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andreas Gruenbacher</name>
<email>agruenba@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-15T10:06:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=9287aed2ad1ff1bde5eb190bcd6dccd5f1cf47d3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9287aed2ad1ff1bde5eb190bcd6dccd5f1cf47d3</id>
<content type='text'>
Convert isec-&gt;lock from a mutex into a spinlock.  Instead of holding
the lock while sleeping in inode_doinit_with_dentry, set
isec-&gt;initialized to LABEL_PENDING and release the lock.  Then, when
the sid has been determined, re-acquire the lock.  If isec-&gt;initialized
is still set to LABEL_PENDING, set isec-&gt;sid; otherwise, the sid has
been set by another task (LABEL_INITIALIZED) or invalidated
(LABEL_INVALID) in the meantime.

This fixes a deadlock on gfs2 where

 * one task is in inode_doinit_with_dentry -&gt; gfs2_getxattr, holds
   isec-&gt;lock, and tries to acquire the inode's glock, and

 * another task is in do_xmote -&gt; inode_go_inval -&gt;
   selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx, holds the inode's glock, and
   tries to acquire isec-&gt;lock.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruenba@redhat.com&gt;
[PM: minor tweaks to keep checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: keep SELinux in sync with new capability definitions</title>
<updated>2016-11-21T20:37:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-18T15:23:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=3322d0d64f4e942862a152f6f11137a1f5eac2e9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3322d0d64f4e942862a152f6f11137a1f5eac2e9</id>
<content type='text'>
When a new capability is defined, SELinux needs to be updated.
Trigger a build error if a new capability is defined without
corresponding update to security/selinux/include/classmap.h's
COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.  This is similar to BUILD_BUG_ON() guards
in the SELinux nlmsgtab code to ensure that SELinux tracks
new netlink message types as needed.

Note that there is already a similar build guard in
security/selinux/hooks.c to detect when more than 64
capabilities are defined, since that will require adding
a third capability class to SELinux.

A nicer way to do this would be to extend scripts/selinux/genheaders
or a similar tool to auto-generate the necessary definitions and code
for SELinux capability checking from include/uapi/linux/capability.h.
AppArmor does something similar in its Makefile, although it only
needs to generate a single table of names.  That is left as future
work.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
[PM: reformat the description to keep checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: normalize input to /sys/fs/selinux/enforce</title>
<updated>2016-11-20T22:13:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-18T14:30:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=ea49d10eee5a220b717dbf2ee429c9e3d59c978c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ea49d10eee5a220b717dbf2ee429c9e3d59c978c</id>
<content type='text'>
At present, one can write any signed integer value to
/sys/fs/selinux/enforce and it will be stored,
e.g. echo -1 &gt; /sys/fs/selinux/enforce or echo 2 &gt;
/sys/fs/selinux/enforce. This makes no real difference
to the kernel, since it only ever cares if it is zero or non-zero,
but some userspace code compares it with 1 to decide if SELinux
is enforcing, and this could confuse it. Only a process that is
already root and is allowed the setenforce permission in SELinux
policy can write to /sys/fs/selinux/enforce, so this is not considered
to be a security issue, but it should be fixed.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>posix-timers: Make them configurable</title>
<updated>2016-11-16T08:26:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolas Pitre</name>
<email>nicolas.pitre@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-11T05:10:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=baa73d9e478ff32d62f3f9422822b59dd9a95a21'/>
<id>urn:sha1:baa73d9e478ff32d62f3f9422822b59dd9a95a21</id>
<content type='text'>
Some embedded systems have no use for them.  This removes about
25KB from the kernel binary size when configured out.

Corresponding syscalls are routed to a stub logging the attempt to
use those syscalls which should be enough of a clue if they were
disabled without proper consideration. They are: timer_create,
timer_gettime: timer_getoverrun, timer_settime, timer_delete,
clock_adjtime, setitimer, getitimer, alarm.

The clock_settime, clock_gettime, clock_getres and clock_nanosleep
syscalls are replaced by simple wrappers compatible with CLOCK_REALTIME,
CLOCK_MONOTONIC and CLOCK_BOOTTIME only which should cover the vast
majority of use cases with very little code.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nico@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Richard Cochran &lt;richardcochran@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett &lt;josh@joshtriplett.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Bolle &lt;pebolle@tiscali.nl&gt;
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michal Marek &lt;mmarek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Edward Cree &lt;ecree@solarflare.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478841010-28605-7-git-send-email-nicolas.pitre@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: Clean up initialization of isec-&gt;sclass</title>
<updated>2016-11-14T20:53:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andreas Gruenbacher</name>
<email>agruenba@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-10T21:18:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=13457d073c29da92001f6ee809075eaa8757fb96'/>
<id>urn:sha1:13457d073c29da92001f6ee809075eaa8757fb96</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that isec-&gt;initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED implies that
isec-&gt;sclass is valid, skip such inodes immediately in
inode_doinit_with_dentry.

For the remaining inodes, initialize isec-&gt;sclass at the beginning of
inode_doinit_with_dentry to simplify the code.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruenba@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: Pass file mode to proc_pid_make_inode</title>
<updated>2016-11-14T20:39:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andreas Gruenbacher</name>
<email>agruenba@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-10T21:18:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=db978da8fa1d0819b210c137d31a339149b88875'/>
<id>urn:sha1:db978da8fa1d0819b210c137d31a339149b88875</id>
<content type='text'>
Pass the file mode of the proc inode to be created to
proc_pid_make_inode.  In proc_pid_make_inode, initialize inode-&gt;i_mode
before calling security_task_to_inode.  This allows selinux to set
isec-&gt;sclass right away without introducing "half-initialized" inode
security structs.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruenba@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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