BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/net, branch v4.10.13

mac80211: fix MU-MIMO follow-MAC mode

2017-04-27T07:12:58+00:00

commit 9e478066eae41211c92a8f63cc69aafc391bd6ab upstream. There are two bugs in the follow-MAC code: * it treats the radiotap header as the 802.11 header (therefore it can't possibly work) * it doesn't verify that the skb data it accesses is actually present in the header, which is mitigated by the first point Fix this by moving all of this out into a separate function. This function copies the data it needs using skb_copy_bits() to make sure it can be accessed if it's paged, and offsets that by the possibly present vendor radiotap header. This also makes all those conditions more readable. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: reject ToDS broadcast data frames

2017-04-27T07:12:58+00:00

commit 3018e947d7fd536d57e2b550c33e456d921fff8c upstream. AP/AP_VLAN modes don't accept any real 802.11 multicast data frames, but since they do need to accept broadcast management frames the same is currently permitted for data frames. This opens a security problem because such frames would be decrypted with the GTK, and could even contain unicast L3 frames. Since the spec says that ToDS frames must always have the BSSID as the RA (addr1), reject any other data frames. The problem was originally reported in "Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys" at usenix https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/vanhoef and brought to my attention by Jouni. Reported-by: Jouni Malinen Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --

make skb_copy_datagram_msg() et.al. preserve ->msg_iter on error

2017-04-21T07:32:40+00:00

commit 3278682123811dd8ef07de5eb701fc4548fcebf2 upstream. Fixes the mess observed in e.g. rsync over a noisy link we'd been seeing since last Summer. What happens is that we copy part of a datagram before noticing a checksum mismatch. Datagram will be resent, all right, but we want the next try go into the same place, not after it... All this family of primitives (copy/checksum and copy a datagram into destination) is "all or nothing" sort of interface - either we get 0 (meaning that copy had been successful) or we get an error (and no way to tell how much had been copied before we ran into whatever error it had been). Make all of them leave iterator unadvanced in case of errors - all callers must be able to cope with that (an error might've been caught before the iterator had been advanced), it costs very little to arrange, it's safer for callers and actually fixes at least one bug in said callers. Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/packet: fix overflow in check for priv area size

2017-04-18T04:59:35+00:00

commit 2b6867c2ce76c596676bec7d2d525af525fdc6e2 upstream. Subtracting tp_sizeof_priv from tp_block_size and casting to int to check whether one is less then the other doesn't always work (both of them are unsigned ints). Compare them as is instead. Also cast tp_sizeof_priv to u64 before using BLK_PLUS_PRIV, as it can overflow inside BLK_PLUS_PRIV otherwise. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Acked-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: unconditionally start new netdev queues with iTXQ support

2017-04-12T10:42:06+00:00

commit 7d65f82954dadbbe7b6e1aec7e07ad17bc6d958b upstream. When internal mac80211 TXQs aren't supported, netdev queues must always started out started even when driver queues are stopped while the interface is added. This is necessary because with the internal TXQ support netdev queues are never stopped and packet scheduling/dropping is done in mac80211. Fixes: 80a83cfc434b1 ("mac80211: skip netdev queue control with software queuing") Reported-and-tested-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cfg80211: check rdev resume callback only for registered wiphy

2017-04-12T10:42:05+00:00

commit b3ef5520c1eabb56064474043c7c55a1a65b8708 upstream. We got the following use-after-free KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in wiphy_resume+0x591/0x5a0 [cfg80211] at addr ffff8803fc244090 Read of size 8 by task kworker/u16:24/2587 CPU: 6 PID: 2587 Comm: kworker/u16:24 Tainted: G B 4.9.13-debug+ Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 15 9550/0N7TVV, BIOS 1.2.19 12/22/2016 Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn ffff880425d4f9d8 ffffffffaeedb541 ffff88042b80ef00 ffff8803fc244088 ffff880425d4fa00 ffffffffae84d7a1 ffff880425d4fa98 ffff8803fc244080 ffff88042b80ef00 ffff880425d4fa88 ffffffffae84da3a ffffffffc141f7d9 Call Trace: [] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4 [] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70 [] kasan_report_error+0x1fa/0x500 [] ? cfg80211_bss_age+0x39/0xc0 [cfg80211] [] ? cfg80211_bss_age+0x9a/0xc0 [cfg80211] [] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [] ? wiphy_suspend+0xc70/0xc70 [cfg80211] [] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x61/0x70 [] ? wiphy_suspend+0xbb0/0xc70 [cfg80211] [] ? wiphy_resume+0x591/0x5a0 [cfg80211] [] wiphy_resume+0x591/0x5a0 [cfg80211] [] ? wiphy_suspend+0xc70/0xc70 [cfg80211] [] dpm_run_callback+0x6e/0x4f0 [] device_resume+0x1c2/0x670 [] async_resume+0x1d/0x50 [] async_run_entry_fn+0xfe/0x610 [] process_one_work+0x716/0x1a50 [] ? process_one_work+0x679/0x1a50 [] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x3d/0x60 [] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x2b0/0x2b0 [] worker_thread+0xe0/0x1460 [] ? process_one_work+0x1a50/0x1a50 [] kthread+0x222/0x2e0 [] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [] ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 Object at ffff8803fc244088, in cache kmalloc-1024 size: 1024 Allocated: PID = 71 save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 save_stack+0x46/0xd0 kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 __kmalloc_track_caller+0x134/0x360 kmemdup+0x20/0x50 brcmf_cfg80211_attach+0x10b/0x3a90 [brcmfmac] brcmf_bus_start+0x19a/0x9a0 [brcmfmac] brcmf_pcie_setup+0x1f1a/0x3680 [brcmfmac] brcmf_fw_request_nvram_done+0x44c/0x11b0 [brcmfmac] request_firmware_work_func+0x135/0x280 process_one_work+0x716/0x1a50 worker_thread+0xe0/0x1460 kthread+0x222/0x2e0 ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 Freed: PID = 2568 save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 save_stack+0x46/0xd0 kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0 kfree+0xe8/0x2e0 brcmf_cfg80211_detach+0x62/0xf0 [brcmfmac] brcmf_detach+0x14a/0x2b0 [brcmfmac] brcmf_pcie_remove+0x140/0x5d0 [brcmfmac] brcmf_pcie_pm_leave_D3+0x198/0x2e0 [brcmfmac] pci_pm_resume+0x186/0x220 dpm_run_callback+0x6e/0x4f0 device_resume+0x1c2/0x670 async_resume+0x1d/0x50 async_run_entry_fn+0xfe/0x610 process_one_work+0x716/0x1a50 worker_thread+0xe0/0x1460 kthread+0x222/0x2e0 ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8803fc243f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8803fc244000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff8803fc244080: fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8803fc244100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8803fc244180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb What is happening is that brcmf_pcie_resume() detects a device that is no longer responsive and it decides to unbind resulting in a wiphy_unregister() and wiphy_free() call. Now the wiphy instance remains allocated, because PM needs to call wiphy_resume() for it. However, brcmfmac already does a kfree() for the struct cfg80211_registered_device::ops field. Change the checks in wiphy_resume() to only access the struct cfg80211_registered_device::ops if the wiphy instance is still registered at this time. Reported-by: Daniel J Blueman Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts Reviewed-by: Franky Lin Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: force GFP_NOIO for socket allocations

2017-04-08T07:35:03+00:00

commit 633ee407b9d15a75ac9740ba9d3338815e1fcb95 upstream. sock_alloc_inode() allocates socket+inode and socket_wq with GFP_KERNEL, which is not allowed on the writeback path: Workqueue: ceph-msgr con_work [libceph] ffff8810871cb018 0000000000000046 0000000000000000 ffff881085d40000 0000000000012b00 ffff881025cad428 ffff8810871cbfd8 0000000000012b00 ffff880102fc1000 ffff881085d40000 ffff8810871cb038 ffff8810871cb148 Call Trace: [] schedule+0x29/0x70 [] schedule_timeout+0x1bd/0x200 [] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x2c/0x120 [] ? ttwu_do_activate.constprop.135+0x66/0x70 [] wait_for_completion+0xbf/0x180 [] ? try_to_wake_up+0x390/0x390 [] flush_work+0x165/0x250 [] ? worker_detach_from_pool+0xd0/0xd0 [] xlog_cil_force_lsn+0x81/0x200 [xfs] [] ? __slab_free+0xee/0x234 [] _xfs_log_force_lsn+0x4d/0x2c0 [xfs] [] ? lookup_page_cgroup_used+0xe/0x30 [] ? xfs_reclaim_inode+0xa3/0x330 [xfs] [] xfs_log_force_lsn+0x3f/0xf0 [xfs] [] ? xfs_reclaim_inode+0xa3/0x330 [xfs] [] xfs_iunpin_wait+0xc6/0x1a0 [xfs] [] ? wake_atomic_t_function+0x40/0x40 [] xfs_reclaim_inode+0xa3/0x330 [xfs] [] xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag+0x257/0x3d0 [xfs] [] xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr+0x33/0x40 [xfs] [] xfs_fs_free_cached_objects+0x15/0x20 [xfs] [] super_cache_scan+0x178/0x180 [] shrink_slab_node+0x14e/0x340 [] ? mem_cgroup_iter+0x16b/0x450 [] shrink_slab+0x100/0x140 [] do_try_to_free_pages+0x335/0x490 [] try_to_free_pages+0xb9/0x1f0 [] ? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0x69/0x1be [] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x69a/0xb40 [] alloc_pages_current+0x9e/0x110 [] new_slab+0x2c5/0x390 [] __slab_alloc+0x33b/0x459 [] ? sock_alloc_inode+0x2d/0xd0 [] ? inet_sendmsg+0x71/0xc0 [] ? sock_alloc_inode+0x2d/0xd0 [] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1a2/0x1b0 [] sock_alloc_inode+0x2d/0xd0 [] alloc_inode+0x26/0xa0 [] new_inode_pseudo+0x1a/0x70 [] sock_alloc+0x1e/0x80 [] __sock_create+0x95/0x220 [] sock_create_kern+0x24/0x30 [] con_work+0xef9/0x2050 [libceph] [] ? rbd_img_request_submit+0x4c/0x60 [rbd] [] process_one_work+0x159/0x4f0 [] worker_thread+0x11b/0x530 [] ? create_worker+0x1d0/0x1d0 [] kthread+0xc9/0xe0 [] ? flush_kthread_worker+0x90/0x90 [] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90 [] ? flush_kthread_worker+0x90/0x90 Use memalloc_noio_{save,restore}() to temporarily force GFP_NOIO here. Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/19309 Reported-by: Sergey Jerusalimov Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder

2017-03-31T08:33:41+00:00

commit f843ee6dd019bcece3e74e76ad9df0155655d0df upstream. Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft Acked-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL replay_window

2017-03-31T08:33:41+00:00

commit 677e806da4d916052585301785d847c3b3e6186a upstream. When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for priviledge escalation. We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained replay_window. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft Acked-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfrm: policy: init locks early

2017-03-31T08:33:41+00:00

commit c282222a45cb9503cbfbebfdb60491f06ae84b49 upstream. Dmitry reports following splat: INFO: trying to register non-static key. the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation. turning off the locking correctness validator. CPU: 0 PID: 13059 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170207 #1 [..] spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:304 [inline] xfrm_policy_flush+0x32/0x470 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:963 xfrm_policy_fini+0xbf/0x560 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3041 xfrm_net_init+0x79f/0x9e0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3091 ops_init+0x10a/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:115 setup_net+0x2ed/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:291 copy_net_ns+0x26c/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:396 create_new_namespaces+0x409/0x860 kernel/nsproxy.c:106 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x1e0 kernel/nsproxy.c:205 SYSC_unshare kernel/fork.c:2281 [inline] Problem is that when we get error during xfrm_net_init we will call xfrm_policy_fini which will acquire xfrm_policy_lock before it was initialized. Just move it around so locks get set up first. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov Fixes: 283bc9f35bbbcb0e9 ("xfrm: Namespacify xfrm state/policy locks") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman