<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/net, branch dev-5.10.49-intel</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-5.10.49-intel</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-5.10.49-intel'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2021-07-14T17:00:53+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Fix NCSI driver issue caused by host shutdown due to overheated.</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T17:00:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuiying Wang</name>
<email>kuiying.wang@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-29T03:28:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=92869e07c7e564ec3eb6a581e1f1e449570b6837'/>
<id>urn:sha1:92869e07c7e564ec3eb6a581e1f1e449570b6837</id>
<content type='text'>
NCSI device cannot be recovered when host shutdown due to overheated.

Tested:
Heat host till shutdown due to overheated and then
run the ipmi command like power status

Signed-off-by: Kuiying Wang &lt;kuiying.wang@intel.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: handle various extensible elements correctly</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-18T10:41:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=fb71d81ccd69c3d607c44a8562f7abf606ae74e8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fb71d81ccd69c3d607c44a8562f7abf606ae74e8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 652e8363bbc7d149fa194a5cbf30b1001c0274b0 ]

Various elements are parsed with a requirement to have an
exact size, when really we should only check that they have
the minimum size that we need. Check only that and therefore
ignore any additional data that they might carry.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho &lt;luciano.coelho@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20210618133832.cd101f8040a4.Iadf0e9b37b100c6c6e79c7b298cc657c2be9151a@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: reset profile_periodicity/ema_ap</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-18T10:41:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=676a7cb1a96bfa8e8cb38a9fcdd69f3d91a0abda'/>
<id>urn:sha1:676a7cb1a96bfa8e8cb38a9fcdd69f3d91a0abda</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bbc6f03ff26e7b71d6135a7b78ce40e7dee3d86a ]

Apparently we never clear these values, so they'll remain set
since the setting of them is conditional. Clear the values in
the relevant other cases.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho &lt;luciano.coelho@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20210618133832.316e32d136a9.I2a12e51814258e1e1b526103894f4b9f19a91c8d@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/packet: annotate accesses to po-&gt;ifindex</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-16T13:42:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=196b22ef6cd1cdd87a85811d27ec8936fd71f346'/>
<id>urn:sha1:196b22ef6cd1cdd87a85811d27ec8936fd71f346</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e032f7c9c7cefffcfb79b9fc16c53011d2d9d11f ]

Like prior patch, we need to annotate lockless accesses to po-&gt;ifindex
For instance, packet_getname() is reading po-&gt;ifindex (twice) while
another thread is able to change po-&gt;ifindex.

KCSAN reported:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_getname

write to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25573 on cpu 1:
 packet_do_bind+0x420/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3191
 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25578 on cpu 0:
 packet_getname+0x5b/0x1a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3525
 __sys_getsockname+0x10e/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1887
 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1902 [inline]
 __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1899 [inline]
 __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1899
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x00000000 -&gt; 0x00000001

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 25578 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/packet: annotate accesses to po-&gt;bind</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-16T13:42:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=da8b3aeff4ad7f8f777dd4b4d1929150849c9f46'/>
<id>urn:sha1:da8b3aeff4ad7f8f777dd4b4d1929150849c9f46</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c7d2ef5dd4b03ed0ee1d13bc0c55f9cf62d49bd6 ]

tpacket_snd(), packet_snd(), packet_getname() and packet_seq_show()
can read po-&gt;num without holding a lock. This means other threads
can change po-&gt;num at the same time.

KCSAN complained about this known fact [1]
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to address the issue.

[1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_sendmsg

write to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24714 on cpu 0:
 packet_do_bind+0x3ab/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3181
 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24719 on cpu 1:
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2899 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x317/0x3570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3040
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x1ed/0x270 net/socket.c:2433
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2440 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2440
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000 -&gt; 0x1200

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 24719 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/packet: annotate data race in packet_sendmsg()</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-10T16:00:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=f57132a887ea4be3d7d813b5003d56716ba33448'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f57132a887ea4be3d7d813b5003d56716ba33448</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d1b5bee4c8be01585033be9b3a8878789285285f ]

There is a known race in packet_sendmsg(), addressed
in commit 32d3182cd2cd ("net/packet: fix race in tpacket_snd()")

Now we have data_race(), we can use it to avoid a future KCSAN warning,
as syzbot loves stressing af_packet sockets :)

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ping: Check return value of function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb'</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zheng Yongjun</name>
<email>zhengyongjun3@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-10T01:41:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=61b132f67c0d69ff367a8b52f42f0ececffc89e4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:61b132f67c0d69ff367a8b52f42f0ececffc89e4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9d44fa3e50cc91691896934d106c86e4027e61ca ]

Function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb' not always return success, which will
also return fail. If not check the wrong return value of it, lead to function
`ping_rcv` return success.

Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun &lt;zhengyongjun3@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet: annotate data race in inet_send_prepare() and inet_dgram_connect()</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-09T07:59:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=08c389de6d53ce6055573e4edd4e2010d1789f05'/>
<id>urn:sha1:08c389de6d53ce6055573e4edd4e2010d1789f05</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dcd01eeac14486b56a790f5cce9b823440ba5b34 ]

Both functions are known to be racy when reading inet_num
as we do not want to grab locks for the common case the socket
has been bound already. The race is resolved in inet_autobind()
by reading again inet_num under the socket lock.

syzbot reported:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet_send_prepare / udp_lib_get_port

write to 0xffff88812cba150e of 2 bytes by task 24135 on cpu 0:
 udp_lib_get_port+0x4b2/0xe20 net/ipv4/udp.c:308
 udp_v6_get_port+0x5e/0x70 net/ipv6/udp.c:89
 inet_autobind net/ipv4/af_inet.c:183 [inline]
 inet_send_prepare+0xd0/0x210 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:807
 inet6_sendmsg+0x29/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:639
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88812cba150e of 2 bytes by task 24132 on cpu 1:
 inet_send_prepare+0x21/0x210 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:806
 inet6_sendmsg+0x29/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:639
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000 -&gt; 0x9db4

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 24132 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: ethtool: clear heap allocations for ethtool function</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Austin Kim</name>
<email>austindh.kim@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-09T02:34:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=c2311fd6de7815187fc31fe79fe6c969bc8a0b4c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c2311fd6de7815187fc31fe79fe6c969bc8a0b4c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 80ec82e3d2c1fab42eeb730aaa7985494a963d3f ]

Several ethtool functions leave heap uncleared (potentially) by
drivers. This will leave the unused portion of heap unchanged and
might copy the full contents back to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Austin Kim &lt;austindh.kim@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: drop multicast fragments</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-09T14:13:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=c2813d1966ba45ec205e57e94c53cd07805be2e1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c2813d1966ba45ec205e57e94c53cd07805be2e1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a9799541ca34652d9996e45f80e8e03144c12949 ]

These are not permitted by the spec, just drop them.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210609161305.23def022b750.Ibd6dd3cdce573dae262fcdc47f8ac52b883a9c50@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
