<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c, branch v4.4</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2015-10-23T12:42:21+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>tcp/dccp: fix hashdance race for passive sessions</title>
<updated>2015-10-23T12:42:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-22T15:20:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=5e0724d027f0548511a2165a209572d48fe7a4c8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5e0724d027f0548511a2165a209572d48fe7a4c8</id>
<content type='text'>
Multiple cpus can process duplicates of incoming ACK messages
matching a SYN_RECV request socket. This is a rare event under
normal operations, but definitely can happen.

Only one must win the race, otherwise corruption would occur.

To fix this without adding new atomic ops, we use logic in
inet_ehash_nolisten() to detect the request was present in the same
ehash bucket where we try to insert the new child.

If request socket was not found, we have to undo the child creation.

This actually removes a spin_lock()/spin_unlock() pair in
reqsk_queue_unlink() for the fast path.

Fixes: e994b2f0fb92 ("tcp: do not lock listener to process SYN packets")
Fixes: 079096f103fa ("tcp/dccp: install syn_recv requests into ehash table")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix fastopen races vs lockless listener</title>
<updated>2015-10-05T09:45:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-05T04:08:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=7656d842de93fd2d2de7b403062cad757cadf1df'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7656d842de93fd2d2de7b403062cad757cadf1df</id>
<content type='text'>
There are multiple races that need fixes :

1) skb_get() + queue skb + kfree_skb() is racy

An accept() can be done on another cpu, data consumed immediately.
tcp_recvmsg() uses __kfree_skb() as it is assumed all skb found in
socket receive queue are private.

Then the kfree_skb() in tcp_rcv_state_process() uses an already freed skb

2) tcp_reqsk_record_syn() needs to be done before tcp_try_fastopen()
for the same reasons.

3) We want to send the SYNACK before queueing child into accept queue,
otherwise we might reintroduce the ooo issue fixed in
commit 7c85af881044 ("tcp: avoid reorders for TFO passive connections")

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener</title>
<updated>2015-10-03T11:32:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-02T18:43:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=ca6fb06518836ef9b65dc0aac02ff97704d52a05'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ca6fb06518836ef9b65dc0aac02ff97704d52a05</id>
<content type='text'>
If a listen backlog is very big (to avoid syncookies), then
the listener sk-&gt;sk_wmem_alloc is the main source of false
sharing, as we need to touch it twice per SYNACK re-transmit
and TX completion.

(One SYN packet takes listener lock once, but up to 6 SYNACK
are generated)

By attaching the skb to the request socket, we remove this
source of contention.

Tested:

 listen(fd, 10485760); // single listener (no SO_REUSEPORT)
 16 RX/TX queue NIC
 Sustain a SYNFLOOD attack of ~320,000 SYN per second,
 Sending ~1,400,000 SYNACK per second.
 Perf profiles now show listener spinlock being next bottleneck.

    20.29%  [kernel]  [k] queued_spin_lock_slowpath
    10.06%  [kernel]  [k] __inet_lookup_established
     5.12%  [kernel]  [k] reqsk_timer_handler
     3.22%  [kernel]  [k] get_next_timer_interrupt
     3.00%  [kernel]  [k] tcp_make_synack
     2.77%  [kernel]  [k] ipt_do_table
     2.70%  [kernel]  [k] run_timer_softirq
     2.50%  [kernel]  [k] ip_finish_output
     2.04%  [kernel]  [k] cascade

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: prepare fastopen code for upcoming listener changes</title>
<updated>2015-09-29T23:53:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-29T14:42:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=0536fcc039a8926ec12ec587f41a83f7acafeb82'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0536fcc039a8926ec12ec587f41a83f7acafeb82</id>
<content type='text'>
While auditing TCP stack for upcoming 'lockless' listener changes,
I found I had to change fastopen_init_queue() to properly init the object
before publishing it.

Otherwise an other cpu could try to lock the spinlock before it gets
properly initialized.

Instead of adding appropriate barriers, just remove dynamic memory
allocations :
- Structure is 28 bytes on 64bit arches. Using additional 8 bytes
  for holding a pointer seems overkill.
- Two listeners can share same cache line and performance would suffer.

If we really want to save few bytes, we would instead dynamically allocate
whole struct request_sock_queue in the future.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: avoid reorders for TFO passive connections</title>
<updated>2015-09-29T05:11:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-25T00:16:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=7c85af8810448d8ef59331be51e482413b5f503d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7c85af8810448d8ef59331be51e482413b5f503d</id>
<content type='text'>
We found that a TCP Fast Open passive connection was vulnerable
to reorders, as the exchange might look like

[1] C -&gt; S S &lt;FO ...&gt; &lt;request&gt;
[2] S -&gt; C S. ack request &lt;options&gt;
[3] S -&gt; C . &lt;answer&gt;

packets [2] and [3] can be generated at almost the same time.

If C receives the 3rd packet before the 2nd, it will drop it as
the socket is in SYN_SENT state and expects a SYNACK.

S will have to retransmit the answer.

Current OOO avoidance in linux is defeated because SYNACK
packets are attached to the LISTEN socket, while DATA packets
are attached to the children. They might be sent by different cpus,
and different TX queues might be selected.

It turns out that for TFO, we created a child, which is a
full blown socket in TCP_SYN_RECV state, and we simply can attach
the SYNACK packet to this socket.

This means that at the time tcp_sendmsg() pushes DATA packet,
skb-&gt;ooo_okay will be set iff the SYNACK packet had been sent
and TX completed.

This removes the reorder source at the host level.

We also removed the export of tcp_try_fastopen(), as it is no
longer called from IPv6.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Do not call tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher from interrupt context</title>
<updated>2015-06-23T09:38:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Paasch</name>
<email>cpaasch@apple.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-18T16:15:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=dfea2aa654243f70dc53b8648d0bbdeec55a7df1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dfea2aa654243f70dc53b8648d0bbdeec55a7df1</id>
<content type='text'>
tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher really cannot be called from interrupt
context. It allocates the tcp_fastopen_context with GFP_KERNEL and
calls crypto_alloc_cipher, which allocates all kind of stuff with
GFP_KERNEL.

Thus, we might sleep when the key-generation is triggered by an
incoming TFO cookie-request which would then happen in interrupt-
context, as shown by enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP:

[   36.001813] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:1266
[   36.003624] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1016, name: packetdrill
[   36.004859] CPU: 1 PID: 1016 Comm: packetdrill Not tainted 4.1.0-rc7 #14
[   36.006085] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
[   36.008250]  00000000000004f2 ffff88007f8838a8 ffffffff8171d53a ffff880075a084a8
[   36.009630]  ffff880075a08000 ffff88007f8838c8 ffffffff810967d3 ffff88007f883928
[   36.011076]  0000000000000000 ffff88007f8838f8 ffffffff81096892 ffff88007f89be00
[   36.012494] Call Trace:
[   36.012953]  &lt;IRQ&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff8171d53a&gt;] dump_stack+0x4f/0x6d
[   36.014085]  [&lt;ffffffff810967d3&gt;] ___might_sleep+0x103/0x170
[   36.015117]  [&lt;ffffffff81096892&gt;] __might_sleep+0x52/0x90
[   36.016117]  [&lt;ffffffff8118e887&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x47/0x190
[   36.017266]  [&lt;ffffffff81680d82&gt;] ? tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher+0x42/0x130
[   36.018485]  [&lt;ffffffff81680d82&gt;] tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher+0x42/0x130
[   36.019679]  [&lt;ffffffff81680f01&gt;] tcp_fastopen_init_key_once+0x61/0x70
[   36.020884]  [&lt;ffffffff81680f2c&gt;] __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen+0x1c/0x60
[   36.022058]  [&lt;ffffffff816814ff&gt;] tcp_try_fastopen+0x58f/0x730
[   36.023118]  [&lt;ffffffff81671788&gt;] tcp_conn_request+0x3e8/0x7b0
[   36.024185]  [&lt;ffffffff810e3872&gt;] ? __module_text_address+0x12/0x60
[   36.025327]  [&lt;ffffffff8167b2e1&gt;] tcp_v4_conn_request+0x51/0x60
[   36.026410]  [&lt;ffffffff816727e0&gt;] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x190/0xda0
[   36.027556]  [&lt;ffffffff81661f97&gt;] ? __inet_lookup_established+0x47/0x170
[   36.028784]  [&lt;ffffffff8167c2ad&gt;] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x16d/0x3d0
[   36.029832]  [&lt;ffffffff812e6806&gt;] ? security_sock_rcv_skb+0x16/0x20
[   36.030936]  [&lt;ffffffff8167cc8a&gt;] tcp_v4_rcv+0x77a/0x7b0
[   36.031875]  [&lt;ffffffff816af8c3&gt;] ? iptable_filter_hook+0x33/0x70
[   36.032953]  [&lt;ffffffff81657d22&gt;] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x92/0x1f0
[   36.034065]  [&lt;ffffffff81657f1a&gt;] ip_local_deliver+0x9a/0xb0
[   36.035069]  [&lt;ffffffff81657c90&gt;] ? ip_rcv+0x3d0/0x3d0
[   36.035963]  [&lt;ffffffff81657569&gt;] ip_rcv_finish+0x119/0x330
[   36.036950]  [&lt;ffffffff81657ba7&gt;] ip_rcv+0x2e7/0x3d0
[   36.037847]  [&lt;ffffffff81610652&gt;] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x552/0x930
[   36.038994]  [&lt;ffffffff81610a57&gt;] __netif_receive_skb+0x27/0x70
[   36.040033]  [&lt;ffffffff81610b72&gt;] process_backlog+0xd2/0x1f0
[   36.041025]  [&lt;ffffffff81611482&gt;] net_rx_action+0x122/0x310
[   36.042007]  [&lt;ffffffff81076743&gt;] __do_softirq+0x103/0x2f0
[   36.042978]  [&lt;ffffffff81723e3c&gt;] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30

This patch moves the call to tcp_fastopen_init_key_once to the places
where a listener socket creates its TFO-state, which always happens in
user-context (either from the setsockopt, or implicitly during the
listen()-call)

Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Fixes: 222e83d2e0ae ("tcp: switch tcp_fastopen key generation to net_get_random_once")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch &lt;cpaasch@apple.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix a potential deadlock in tcp_get_info()</title>
<updated>2015-05-22T17:46:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-22T04:51:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=d654976cbf852ee20612ee10dbe57cdacda9f452'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d654976cbf852ee20612ee10dbe57cdacda9f452</id>
<content type='text'>
Taking socket spinlock in tcp_get_info() can deadlock, as
inet_diag_dump_icsk() holds the &amp;hashinfo-&gt;ehash_locks[i],
while packet processing can use the reverse locking order.

We could avoid this locking for TCP_LISTEN states, but lockdep would
certainly get confused as all TCP sockets share same lockdep classes.

[  523.722504] ======================================================
[  523.728706] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
[  523.734990] 4.1.0-dbg-DEV #1676 Not tainted
[  523.739202] -------------------------------------------------------
[  523.745474] ss/18032 is trying to acquire lock:
[  523.750002]  (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [&lt;ffffffff81669d44&gt;] tcp_get_info+0x2c4/0x360
[  523.758129]
[  523.758129] but task is already holding lock:
[  523.763968]  (&amp;(&amp;hashinfo-&gt;ehash_locks[i])-&gt;rlock){+.-...}, at: [&lt;ffffffff816bcb75&gt;] inet_diag_dump_icsk+0x1d5/0x6c0
[  523.774661]
[  523.774661] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[  523.774661]
[  523.782850]
[  523.782850] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  523.790326]
-&gt; #1 (&amp;(&amp;hashinfo-&gt;ehash_locks[i])-&gt;rlock){+.-...}:
[  523.796599]        [&lt;ffffffff811126bb&gt;] lock_acquire+0xbb/0x270
[  523.802565]        [&lt;ffffffff816f5868&gt;] _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
[  523.808628]        [&lt;ffffffff81665af8&gt;] __inet_hash_nolisten+0x78/0x110
[  523.815273]        [&lt;ffffffff816819db&gt;] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x24b/0x350
[  523.822067]        [&lt;ffffffff81684d41&gt;] tcp_check_req+0x3c1/0x500
[  523.828199]        [&lt;ffffffff81682d09&gt;] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x239/0x3d0
[  523.834331]        [&lt;ffffffff816842fe&gt;] tcp_v4_rcv+0xa8e/0xc10
[  523.840202]        [&lt;ffffffff81658fa3&gt;] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x133/0x3e0
[  523.847214]        [&lt;ffffffff81659a9a&gt;] ip_local_deliver+0xaa/0xc0
[  523.853440]        [&lt;ffffffff816593b8&gt;] ip_rcv_finish+0x168/0x5c0
[  523.859624]        [&lt;ffffffff81659db7&gt;] ip_rcv+0x307/0x420

Lets use u64_sync infrastructure instead. As a bonus, 64bit
arches get optimized, as these are nop for them.

Fixes: 0df48c26d841 ("tcp: add tcpi_bytes_acked to tcp_info")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: add tcpi_bytes_received to tcp_info</title>
<updated>2015-04-29T21:10:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-28T22:28:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=bdd1f9edacb5f5835d1e6276571bbbe5b88ded48'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bdd1f9edacb5f5835d1e6276571bbbe5b88ded48</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch tracks total number of payload bytes received on a TCP socket.
This is the sum of all changes done to tp-&gt;rcv_nxt

RFC4898 named this : tcpEStatsAppHCThruOctetsReceived

This is a 64bit field, and can be fetched both from TCP_INFO
getsockopt() if one has a handle on a TCP socket, or from inet_diag
netlink facility (iproute2/ss patch will follow)

Note that tp-&gt;bytes_received was placed near tp-&gt;rcv_nxt for
best data locality and minimal performance impact.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Matt Mathis &lt;mattmathis@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Salo &lt;salo@google.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Rapier &lt;rapier@psc.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: RFC7413 option support for Fast Open server</title>
<updated>2015-04-07T22:36:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Lee</name>
<email>Longinus00@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-06T21:37:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=7f9b838b71eb78a27de27a12ca5de8542fac3115'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7f9b838b71eb78a27de27a12ca5de8542fac3115</id>
<content type='text'>
Fast Open has been using the experimental option with a magic number
(RFC6994) to request and grant Fast Open cookies. This patch enables
the server to support the official IANA option 34 in RFC7413 in
addition.

The change has passed all existing Fast Open tests with both
old and new options at Google.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Lee &lt;Longinus00@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: coding style: comparison for equality with NULL</title>
<updated>2015-04-03T16:11:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ian Morris</name>
<email>ipm@chirality.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-03T08:17:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=51456b2914a34d16b1255b7c55d5cbf6a681d306'/>
<id>urn:sha1:51456b2914a34d16b1255b7c55d5cbf6a681d306</id>
<content type='text'>
The ipv4 code uses a mixture of coding styles. In some instances check
for NULL pointer is done as x == NULL and sometimes as !x. !x is
preferred according to checkpatch and this patch makes the code
consistent by adopting the latter form.

No changes detected by objdiff.

Signed-off-by: Ian Morris &lt;ipm@chirality.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
