BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/include/uapi, branch dev-5.1

Merge tag 'v5.1.16' into dev-5.1

2019-07-04T01:43:41+00:00

This is the 5.1.16 stable release Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley

bpf: fix unconnected udp hooks

2019-07-03T11:13:43+00:00

commit 983695fa676568fc0fe5ddd995c7267aabc24632 upstream. Intention of cgroup bind/connect/sendmsg BPF hooks is to act transparently to applications as also stated in original motivation in 7828f20e3779 ("Merge branch 'bpf-cgroup-bind-connect'"). When recently integrating the latter two hooks into Cilium to enable host based load-balancing with Kubernetes, I ran into the issue that pods couldn't start up as DNS got broken. Kubernetes typically sets up DNS as a service and is thus subject to load-balancing. Upon further debugging, it turns out that the cgroupv2 sendmsg BPF hooks API is currently insufficient and thus not usable as-is for standard applications shipped with most distros. To break down the issue we ran into with a simple example: # cat /etc/resolv.conf nameserver 147.75.207.207 nameserver 147.75.207.208 For the purpose of a simple test, we set up above IPs as service IPs and transparently redirect traffic to a different DNS backend server for that node: # cilium service list ID Frontend Backend 1 147.75.207.207:53 1 => 8.8.8.8:53 2 147.75.207.208:53 1 => 8.8.8.8:53 The attached BPF program is basically selecting one of the backends if the service IP/port matches on the cgroup hook. DNS breaks here, because the hooks are not transparent enough to applications which have built-in msg_name address checks: # nslookup 1.1.1.1 ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53 ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.208#53 ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53 [...] ;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached # dig 1.1.1.1 ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53 ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.208#53 ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53 [...] ; <<>> DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.7-Ubuntu <<>> 1.1.1.1 ;; global options: +cmd ;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached For comparison, if none of the service IPs is used, and we tell nslookup to use 8.8.8.8 directly it works just fine, of course: # nslookup 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8 1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa name = one.one.one.one. In order to fix this and thus act more transparent to the application, this needs reverse translation on recvmsg() side. A minimal fix for this API is to add similar recvmsg() hooks behind the BPF cgroups static key such that the program can track state and replace the current sockaddr_in{,6} with the original service IP. From BPF side, this basically tracks the service tuple plus socket cookie in an LRU map where the reverse NAT can then be retrieved via map value as one example. Side-note: the BPF cgroups static key should be converted to a per-hook static key in future. Same example after this fix: # cilium service list ID Frontend Backend 1 147.75.207.207:53 1 => 8.8.8.8:53 2 147.75.207.208:53 1 => 8.8.8.8:53 Lookups work fine now: # nslookup 1.1.1.1 1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa name = one.one.one.one. Authoritative answers can be found from: # dig 1.1.1.1 ; <<>> DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.7-Ubuntu <<>> 1.1.1.1 ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 51550 ;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1 ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 512 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;1.1.1.1. IN A ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: . 23426 IN SOA a.root-servers.net. nstld.verisign-grs.com. 2019052001 1800 900 604800 86400 ;; Query time: 17 msec ;; SERVER: 147.75.207.207#53(147.75.207.207) ;; WHEN: Tue May 21 12:59:38 UTC 2019 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 111 And from an actual packet level it shows that we're using the back end server when talking via 147.75.207.20{7,8} front end: # tcpdump -i any udp [...] 12:59:52.698732 IP foo.42011 > google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain: 18803+ PTR? 1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa. (38) 12:59:52.698735 IP foo.42011 > google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain: 18803+ PTR? 1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa. (38) 12:59:52.701208 IP google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain > foo.42011: 18803 1/0/0 PTR one.one.one.one. (67) 12:59:52.701208 IP google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain > foo.42011: 18803 1/0/0 PTR one.one.one.one. (67) [...] In order to be flexible and to have same semantics as in sendmsg BPF programs, we only allow return codes in [1,1] range. In the sendmsg case the program is called if msg->msg_name is present which can be the case in both, connected and unconnected UDP. The former only relies on the sockaddr_in{,6} passed via connect(2) if passed msg->msg_name was NULL. Therefore, on recvmsg side, we act in similar way to call into the BPF program whenever a non-NULL msg->msg_name was passed independent of sk->sk_state being TCP_ESTABLISHED or not. Note that for TCP case, the msg->msg_name is ignored in the regular recvmsg path and therefore not relevant. For the case of ip{,v6}_recv_error() paths, picked up via MSG_ERRQUEUE, the hook is not called. This is intentional as it aligns with the same semantics as in case of TCP cgroup BPF hooks right now. This might be better addressed in future through a different bpf_attach_type such that this case can be distinguished from the regular recvmsg paths, for example. Fixes: 1cedee13d25a ("bpf: Hooks for sys_sendmsg") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau Acked-by: Martynas Pumputis Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: simplify definition of BPF_FIB_LOOKUP related flags

2019-07-03T11:13:42+00:00

commit b1d6c15b9d824a58c5415673f374fac19e8eccdf upstream. Previously, the BPF_FIB_LOOKUP_{DIRECT,OUTPUT} flags in the BPF UAPI were defined with the help of BIT macro. This had the following issues: - In order to use any of the flags, a user was required to depend on . - No other flag in bpf.h uses the macro, so it seems that an unwritten convention is to use (1 << (nr)) to define BPF-related flags. Fixes: 87f5fc7e48dd ("bpf: Provide helper to do forwarding lookups in kernel FIB table") Signed-off-by: Martynas Pumputis Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge tag 'v5.1.11' into dev-5.1

2019-06-18T05:20:44+00:00

This is the 5.1.11 stable release Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley

tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits

2019-06-17T17:50:36+00:00

commit f070ef2ac66716357066b683fb0baf55f8191a2e upstream. Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory usage and/or overflow 32bit counters. TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes, so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting of retransmit queue. A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded. Note that this counter might increase in the case applications use SO_SNDBUF socket option to lower sk_sndbuf. CVE-2019-11478 : tcp_fragment, prevent fragmenting a packet when the socket is already using more than half the allowed space Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Jonathan Looney Acked-by: Neal Cardwell Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks Cc: Bruce Curtis Cc: Jonathan Lemon Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge tag 'v5.1.9' into dev-5.1

2019-06-12T10:40:01+00:00

This is the 5.1.9 stable release Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley

drm/i915: Fix I915_EXEC_RING_MASK

2019-06-11T10:19:21+00:00

commit d90c06d57027203f73021bb7ddb30b800d65c636 upstream. This was supposed to be a mask of all known rings, but it is being used by execbuffer to filter out invalid rings, and so is instead mapping high unused values onto valid rings. Instead of a mask of all known rings, we need it to be the mask of all possible rings. Fixes: 549f7365820a ("drm/i915: Enable SandyBridge blitter ring") Fixes: de1add360522 ("drm/i915: Decouple execbuf uAPI from internal implementation") Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin Cc: # v4.6+ Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190301140404.26690-21-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge tag 'v5.1.7' into dev-5.1

2019-06-05T04:12:29+00:00

This is the 5.1.7 stable release Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley

tipc: Avoid copying bytes beyond the supplied data

2019-06-04T05:59:43+00:00

TLV_SET is called with a data pointer and a len parameter that tells us how many bytes are pointed to by data. When invoking memcpy() we need to careful to only copy len bytes. Previously we would copy TLV_LENGTH(len) bytes which would copy an extra 4 bytes past the end of the data pointer which newer GCC versions complain about. In file included from test.c:17: In function 'TLV_SET', inlined from 'test' at test.c:186:5: /usr/include/linux/tipc_config.h:317:3: warning: 'memcpy' forming offset [33, 36] is out of the bounds [0, 32] of object 'bearer_name' with type 'char[32]' [-Warray-bounds] memcpy(TLV_DATA(tlv_ptr), data, tlv_len); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ test.c: In function 'test': test.c::161:10: note: 'bearer_name' declared here char bearer_name[TIPC_MAX_BEARER_NAME]; ^~~~~~~~~~~ We still want to ensure any padding bytes at the end are initialised, do this with a explicit memset() rather than copy bytes past the end of data. Apply the same logic to TCM_SET. Signed-off-by: Chris Packham Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge tag 'v5.1.5' into dev-5.1

2019-05-27T04:07:53+00:00

This is the 5.1.5 stable release Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley