<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/include/linux, branch v4.18.6</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=v4.18.6</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=v4.18.6'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2018-09-05T07:29:54+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>scsi: sysfs: Introduce sysfs_{un,}break_active_protection()</title>
<updated>2018-09-05T07:29:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bart Van Assche</name>
<email>bart.vanassche@wdc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-02T17:51:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=807d1d299a04e9ad9a9dac55419c1137a105254b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:807d1d299a04e9ad9a9dac55419c1137a105254b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2afc9166f79b8f6da5f347f48515215ceee4ae37 upstream.

Introduce these two functions and export them such that the next patch
can add calls to these functions from the SCSI core.

Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche &lt;bart.vanassche@wdc.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm: separate cmd_ready/go_idle from runtime_pm</title>
<updated>2018-09-05T07:29:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tomas Winkler</name>
<email>tomas.winkler@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-28T15:13:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=7624ac8705f5cc2d59259c1a7259170b89402685'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7624ac8705f5cc2d59259c1a7259170b89402685</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 627448e85c766587f6fdde1ea3886d6615081c77 upstream.

Fix tpm ptt initialization error:
tpm tpm0: A TPM error (378) occurred get tpm pcr allocation.

We cannot use go_idle cmd_ready commands via runtime_pm handles
as with the introduction of localities this is no longer an optional
feature, while runtime pm can be not enabled.
Though cmd_ready/go_idle provides a power saving, it's also a part of
TPM2 protocol and should be called explicitly.
This patch exposes cmd_read/go_idle via tpm class ops and removes
runtime pm support as it is not used by any driver.

When calling from nested context always use both flags:
TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED and TPM_TRANSMIT_RAW. Both are needed to resolve
tpm spaces and locality request recursive calls to tpm_transmit().
TPM_TRANSMIT_RAW should never be used standalone as it will fail
on double locking. While TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED standalone should be
called from non-recursive locked contexts.

New wrappers are added tpm_cmd_ready() and tpm_go_idle() to
streamline tpm_try_transmit code.

tpm_crb no longer needs own power saving functions and can drop using
tpm_pm_suspend/resume.

This patch cannot be really separated from the locality fix.
Fixes: 888d867df441 (tpm: cmd_ready command can be issued only after granting locality)

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 888d867df441 (tpm: cmd_ready command can be issued only after granting locality)
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler &lt;tomas.winkler@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>printk/nmi: Prevent deadlock when accessing the main log buffer in NMI</title>
<updated>2018-09-05T07:29:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Mladek</name>
<email>pmladek@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-27T14:20:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=a4ed70a386c07d27e02dc5bcfebca12158389189'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a4ed70a386c07d27e02dc5bcfebca12158389189</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 03fc7f9c99c1e7ae2925d459e8487f1a6f199f79 upstream.

The commit 719f6a7040f1bdaf96 ("printk: Use the main logbuf in NMI
when logbuf_lock is available") brought back the possible deadlocks
in printk() and NMI.

The check of logbuf_lock is done only in printk_nmi_enter() to prevent
mixed output. But another CPU might take the lock later, enter NMI, and:

      + Both NMIs might be serialized by yet another lock, for example,
	the one in nmi_cpu_backtrace().

      + The other CPU might get stopped in NMI, see smp_send_stop()
	in panic().

The only safe solution is to use trylock when storing the message
into the main log-buffer. It might cause reordering when some lines
go to the main lock buffer directly and others are delayed via
the per-CPU buffer. It means that it is not useful in general.

This patch replaces the problematic NMI deferred context with NMI
direct context. It can be used to mark a code that might produce
many messages in NMI and the risk of losing them is more critical
than problems with eventual reordering.

The context is then used when dumping trace buffers on oops. It was
the primary motivation for the original fix. Also the reordering is
even smaller issue there because some traces have their own time stamps.

Finally, nmi_cpu_backtrace() need not longer be serialized because
it will always us the per-CPU buffers again.

Fixes: 719f6a7040f1bdaf96 ("printk: Use the main logbuf in NMI when logbuf_lock is available")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627142028.11259-1-pmladek@suse.com
To: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>scsi: libsas: dynamically allocate and free ata host</title>
<updated>2018-09-05T07:29:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Yan</name>
<email>yanaijie@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-10T03:05:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=84342771f595b576a2d64775c0fd88d3bb95138e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:84342771f595b576a2d64775c0fd88d3bb95138e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2fa4a32613c9182b00e46872755b0662374424a7 upstream.

Commit 2623c7a5f2 ("libata: add refcounting to ata_host") v4.17+ introduced
refcounting to ata_host and will increase or decrease the refcount when
adding or deleting transport ATA port.

Now the ata host for libsas is embedded in domain_device, and the -&gt;kref
member is not initialized. Afer we add ata transport class, ata_host_get()
will be called when adding transport ATA port and a warning will be
triggered as below:

refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 103 at
lib/refcount.c:153 refcount_inc+0x40/0x48 ......  Call trace:
 refcount_inc+0x40/0x48
 ata_host_get+0x10/0x18
 ata_tport_add+0x40/0x120
 ata_sas_tport_add+0xc/0x14
 sas_ata_init+0x7c/0xc8
 sas_discover_domain+0x380/0x53c
 process_one_work+0x12c/0x288
 worker_thread+0x58/0x3f0
 kthread+0xfc/0x128
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

And also when removing transport ATA port ata_host_put() will be called and
another similar warning will be triggered. If the refcount decreased to
zero, the ata host will be freed. But this ata host is only part of
domain_device, it cannot be freed directly.

So we have to change this embedded static ata host to a dynamically
allocated ata host and initialize the -&gt;kref member. To use ata_host_get()
and ata_host_put() in libsas, we need to move the declaration of these
functions to the public libata.h and export them.

Fixes: b6240a4df018 ("scsi: libsas: add transport class for ATA devices")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan &lt;yanaijie@huawei.com&gt;
CC: John Garry &lt;john.garry@huawei.com&gt;
CC: Taras Kondratiuk &lt;takondra@cisco.com&gt;
CC: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T15:37:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-07T06:19:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=4d3579f7f904cddf55264c427b746e1ac1a83d7c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4d3579f7f904cddf55264c427b746e1ac1a83d7c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bc2d8d262cba5736332cbc866acb11b1c5748aa9 upstream.

Josh reported that the late SMT evaluation in cpu_smt_state_init() sets
cpu_smt_control to CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED in case that 'nosmt' was supplied
on the kernel command line as it cannot differentiate between SMT disabled
by BIOS and SMT soft disable via 'nosmt'. That wreckages the state and
makes the sysfs interface unusable.

Rework this so that during bringup of the non boot CPUs the availability of
SMT is determined in cpu_smt_allowed(). If a newly booted CPU is not a
'primary' thread then set the local cpu_smt_available marker and evaluate
this explicitely right after the initial SMP bringup has finished.

SMT evaulation on x86 is a trainwreck as the firmware has all the
information _before_ booting the kernel, but there is no interface to query
it.

Fixes: 73d5e2b47264 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")
Reported-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/hotplug: Set CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED early</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T15:37:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-13T14:23:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=347ff08ab796dfca6bdb820ff8111e2f61852056'/>
<id>urn:sha1:347ff08ab796dfca6bdb820ff8111e2f61852056</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fee0aede6f4739c87179eca76136f83210953b86 upstream.

The CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED state is set (if the processor does not support
SMT) when the sysfs SMT control file is initialized.

That was fine so far as this was only required to make the output of the
control file correct and to prevent writes in that case.

With the upcoming l1tf command line parameter, this needs to be set up
before the L1TF mitigation selection and command line parsing happens.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.121795971@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/hotplug: Expose SMT control init function</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T15:37:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Kosina</name>
<email>jkosina@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-13T14:23:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=758b51878d9e6221e2ee04d00425cddbbb5efb6f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:758b51878d9e6221e2ee04d00425cddbbb5efb6f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8e1b706b6e819bed215c0db16345568864660393 upstream.

The L1TF mitigation will gain a commend line parameter which allows to set
a combination of hypervisor mitigation and SMT control.

Expose cpu_smt_disable() so the command line parser can tweak SMT settings.

[ tglx: Split out of larger patch and made it preserve an already existing
  	force off state ]

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.039715135@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T15:37:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-29T15:48:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=24d9fd272ec02eea118bf8cc36a0276087e4a23c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:24d9fd272ec02eea118bf8cc36a0276087e4a23c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 05736e4ac13c08a4a9b1ef2de26dd31a32cbee57 upstream.

Provide a command line and a sysfs knob to control SMT.

The command line options are:

 'nosmt':	Enumerate secondary threads, but do not online them

 'nosmt=force': Ignore secondary threads completely during enumeration
 		via MP table and ACPI/MADT.

The sysfs control file has the following states (read/write):

 'on':		 SMT is enabled. Secondary threads can be freely onlined
 'off':		 SMT is disabled. Secondary threads, even if enumerated
 		 cannot be onlined
 'forceoff':	 SMT is permanentely disabled. Writes to the control
 		 file are rejected.
 'notsupported': SMT is not supported by the CPU

The command line option 'nosmt' sets the sysfs control to 'off'. This
can be changed to 'on' to reenable SMT during runtime.

The command line option 'nosmt=force' sets the sysfs control to
'forceoff'. This cannot be changed during runtime.

When SMT is 'on' and the control file is changed to 'off' then all online
secondary threads are offlined and attempts to online a secondary thread
later on are rejected.

When SMT is 'off' and the control file is changed to 'on' then secondary
threads can be onlined again. The 'off' -&gt; 'on' transition does not
automatically online the secondary threads.

When the control file is set to 'forceoff', the behaviour is the same as
setting it to 'off', but the operation is irreversible and later writes to
the control file are rejected.

When the control status is 'notsupported' then writes to the control file
are rejected.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T15:37:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andi Kleen</name>
<email>ak@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-13T22:48:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=1655bd148c1b0ee24d1810b8a0121d3680d3065e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1655bd148c1b0ee24d1810b8a0121d3680d3065e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 377eeaa8e11fe815b1d07c81c4a0e2843a8c15eb upstream.

For the L1TF workaround its necessary to limit the swap file size to below
MAX_PA/2, so that the higher bits of the swap offset inverted never point
to valid memory.

Add a mechanism for the architecture to override the swap file size check
in swapfile.c and add a x86 specific max swapfile check function that
enforces that limit.

The check is only enabled if the CPU is vulnerable to L1TF.

In VMs with 42bit MAX_PA the typical limit is 2TB now, on a native system
with 46bit PA it is 32TB. The limit is only per individual swap file, so
it's always possible to exceed these limits with multiple swap files or
partitions.

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T15:37:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andi Kleen</name>
<email>ak@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-13T22:48:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=dcd1b1099b59cef17fdd5f90ee564e7b304619c2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dcd1b1099b59cef17fdd5f90ee564e7b304619c2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 17dbca119312b4e8173d4e25ff64262119fcef38 upstream.

L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and normally always enabled, However
they still should be reported in sysfs if the system is vulnerable or
mitigated. Add the necessary CPU feature/bug bits.

- Extend the existing checks for Meltdowns to determine if the system is
  vulnerable. All CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown are also not
  vulnerable to L1TF

- Check for 32bit non PAE and emit a warning as there is no practical way
  for mitigation due to the limited physical address bits

- If the system has more than MAX_PA/2 physical memory the invert page
  workarounds don't protect the system against the L1TF attack anymore,
  because an inverted physical address will also point to valid
  memory. Print a warning in this case and report that the system is
  vulnerable.

Add a function which returns the PFN limit for the L1TF mitigation, which
will be used in follow up patches for sanity and range checks.

[ tglx: Renamed the CPU feature bit to L1TF_PTEINV ]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
