<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/include/linux, branch dev-5.7</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-5.7</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-5.7'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-08-04T07:58:36+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'v5.7.12' into dev-5.7</title>
<updated>2020-08-04T07:58:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joel Stanley</name>
<email>joel@jms.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-04T07:58:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=9524588381df213554a10d3661a9200a4b7f6db2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9524588381df213554a10d3661a9200a4b7f6db2</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the 5.7.12 stable release

Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley &lt;joel@jms.id.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: allow at most one TLP probe per flight</title>
<updated>2020-07-31T16:47:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yuchung Cheng</name>
<email>ycheng@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-23T19:00:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=64ad87bfab4aab750b66c31c482488f825aeaff5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:64ad87bfab4aab750b66c31c482488f825aeaff5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 76be93fc0702322179bb0ea87295d820ee46ad14 ]

Previously TLP may send multiple probes of new data in one
flight. This happens when the sender is cwnd limited. After the
initial TLP containing new data is sent, the sender receives another
ACK that acks partial inflight.  It may re-arm another TLP timer
to send more, if no further ACK returns before the next TLP timeout
(PTO) expires. The sender may send in theory a large amount of TLP
until send queue is depleted. This only happens if the sender sees
such irregular uncommon ACK pattern. But it is generally undesirable
behavior during congestion especially.

The original TLP design restrict only one TLP probe per inflight as
published in "Reducing Web Latency: the Virtue of Gentle Aggression",
SIGCOMM 2013. This patch changes TLP to send at most one probe
per inflight.

Note that if the sender is app-limited, TLP retransmits old data
and did not have this issue.

Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm integrity: fix integrity recalculation that is improperly skipped</title>
<updated>2020-07-29T08:20:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mikulas Patocka</name>
<email>mpatocka@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-23T14:42:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=a3ec4725ddedf2ffacfee233c90ad0c34dfce27c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a3ec4725ddedf2ffacfee233c90ad0c34dfce27c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5df96f2b9f58a5d2dc1f30fe7de75e197f2c25f2 upstream.

Commit adc0daad366b62ca1bce3e2958a40b0b71a8b8b3 ("dm: report suspended
device during destroy") broke integrity recalculation.

The problem is dm_suspended() returns true not only during suspend,
but also during resume. So this race condition could occur:
1. dm_integrity_resume calls queue_work(ic-&gt;recalc_wq, &amp;ic-&gt;recalc_work)
2. integrity_recalc (&amp;ic-&gt;recalc_work) preempts the current thread
3. integrity_recalc calls if (unlikely(dm_suspended(ic-&gt;ti))) goto unlock_ret;
4. integrity_recalc exits and no recalculating is done.

To fix this race condition, add a function dm_post_suspending that is
only true during the postsuspend phase and use it instead of
dm_suspended().

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka redhat com&gt;
Fixes: adc0daad366b ("dm: report suspended device during destroy")
Cc: stable vger kernel org # v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io-mapping: indicate mapping failure</title>
<updated>2020-07-29T08:19:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael J. Ruhl</name>
<email>michael.j.ruhl@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-24T04:15:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=03902f9efb20bfb7b0c775467d59a9d938a8fc85'/>
<id>urn:sha1:03902f9efb20bfb7b0c775467d59a9d938a8fc85</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e0b3e0b1a04367fc15c07f44e78361545b55357c upstream.

The !ATOMIC_IOMAP version of io_maping_init_wc will always return
success, even when the ioremap fails.

Since the ATOMIC_IOMAP version returns NULL when the init fails, and
callers check for a NULL return on error this is unexpected.

During a device probe, where the ioremap failed, a crash can look like
this:

    BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000210000
     #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
     #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
     Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
     CPU: 0 PID: 177 Comm:
     RIP: 0010:fill_page_dma [i915]
       gen8_ppgtt_create [i915]
       i915_ppgtt_create [i915]
       intel_gt_init [i915]
       i915_gem_init [i915]
       i915_driver_probe [i915]
       pci_device_probe
       really_probe
       driver_probe_device

The remap failure occurred much earlier in the probe.  If it had been
propagated, the driver would have exited with an error.

Return NULL on ioremap failure.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: detect ioremap_wc() errors earlier]

Fixes: cafaf14a5d8f ("io-mapping: Always create a struct to hold metadata about the io-mapping")
Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl &lt;michael.j.ruhl@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel@ffwll.ch&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200721171936.81563-1-michael.j.ruhl@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs/xattr: mm/shmem: kernfs: release simple xattr entry in a right way</title>
<updated>2020-07-29T08:19:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chengguang Xu</name>
<email>cgxu519@mykernel.net</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-24T04:15:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=e1aa90dc86ac84137af53303fa6165e2f205b113'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e1aa90dc86ac84137af53303fa6165e2f205b113</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3bef735ad7b7d987069181e7b58588043cbd1509 upstream.

After commit fdc85222d58e ("kernfs: kvmalloc xattr value instead of
kmalloc"), simple xattr entry is allocated with kvmalloc() instead of
kmalloc(), so we should release it with kvfree() instead of kfree().

Fixes: fdc85222d58e ("kernfs: kvmalloc xattr value instead of kmalloc")
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu &lt;cgxu519@mykernel.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Daniel Xu &lt;dxu@dxuuu.xyz&gt;
Cc: Chris Down &lt;chris@chrisdown.name&gt;
Cc: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[5.7]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200704051608.15043-1-cgxu519@mykernel.net
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Input: add `SW_MACHINE_COVER`</title>
<updated>2020-07-29T08:19:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Merlijn Wajer</name>
<email>merlijn@wizzup.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-30T18:47:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=7a485f9a4eb1c19cdc4abd38adb674e410495577'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7a485f9a4eb1c19cdc4abd38adb674e410495577</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c463bb2a8f8d7d97aa414bf7714fc77e9d3b10df ]

This event code represents the state of a removable cover of a device.
Value 0 means that the cover is open or removed, value 1 means that the
cover is closed.

Reviewed-by: Sebastian Reichel &lt;sebastian.reichel@collabora.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren &lt;tony@atomide.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Merlijn Wajer &lt;merlijn@wizzup.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200612125402.18393-2-merlijn@wizzup.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi/efivars: Expose RT service availability via efivars abstraction</title>
<updated>2020-07-29T08:19:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ardb@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-08T10:01:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=552952e51fad35670459674bcb8a03bd96fe4646'/>
<id>urn:sha1:552952e51fad35670459674bcb8a03bd96fe4646</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f88814cc2578c121e6edef686365036db72af0ed ]

Commit

  bf67fad19e493b ("efi: Use more granular check for availability for variable services")

introduced a check into the efivarfs, efi-pstore and other drivers that
aborts loading of the module if not all three variable runtime services
(GetVariable, SetVariable and GetNextVariable) are supported. However, this
results in efivarfs being unavailable entirely if only SetVariable support
is missing, which is only needed if you want to make any modifications.
Also, efi-pstore and the sysfs EFI variable interface could be backed by
another implementation of the 'efivars' abstraction, in which case it is
completely irrelevant which services are supported by the EFI firmware.

So make the generic 'efivars' abstraction dependent on the availibility of
the GetVariable and GetNextVariable EFI runtime services, and add a helper
'efivar_supports_writes()' to find out whether the currently active efivars
abstraction supports writes (and wire it up to the availability of
SetVariable for the generic one).

Then, use the efivar_supports_writes() helper to decide whether to permit
efivarfs to be mounted read-write, and whether to enable efi-pstore or the
sysfs EFI variable interface altogether.

Fixes: bf67fad19e493b ("efi: Use more granular check for availability for variable services")
Reported-by: Heinrich Schuchardt &lt;xypron.glpk@gmx.de&gt;
Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas &lt;ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org&gt;
Tested-by: Ilias Apalodimas &lt;ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'v5.7.10' into dev-5.7</title>
<updated>2020-07-22T09:35:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joel Stanley</name>
<email>joel@jms.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-22T09:35:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=41e79eca6d10d4a1ed14360fe3ffd49df62b9375'/>
<id>urn:sha1:41e79eca6d10d4a1ed14360fe3ffd49df62b9375</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the 5.7.10 stable release

Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley &lt;joel@jms.id.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: sockmap: Require attach_bpf_fd when detaching a program</title>
<updated>2020-07-22T07:34:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lorenz Bauer</name>
<email>lmb@cloudflare.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-29T09:56:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=1b751c786612b948a47c0a8b78ca4021c3186ed8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1b751c786612b948a47c0a8b78ca4021c3186ed8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bb0de3131f4c60a9bf976681e0fe4d1e55c7a821 upstream.

The sockmap code currently ignores the value of attach_bpf_fd when
detaching a program. This is contrary to the usual behaviour of
checking that attach_bpf_fd represents the currently attached
program.

Ensure that attach_bpf_fd is indeed the currently attached
program. It turns out that all sockmap selftests already do this,
which indicates that this is unlikely to cause breakage.

Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer &lt;lmb@cloudflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200629095630.7933-5-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dmabuf: use spinlock to access dmabuf-&gt;name</title>
<updated>2020-07-22T07:34:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Charan Teja Kalla</name>
<email>charante@codeaurora.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-19T11:57:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=855bd4f219f0d078356971796fa7e39383eba609'/>
<id>urn:sha1:855bd4f219f0d078356971796fa7e39383eba609</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6348dd291e3653534a9e28e6917569bc9967b35b upstream.

There exists a sleep-while-atomic bug while accessing the dmabuf-&gt;name
under mutex in the dmabuffs_dname(). This is caused from the SELinux
permissions checks on a process where it tries to validate the inherited
files from fork() by traversing them through iterate_fd() (which
traverse files under spin_lock) and call
match_file(security/selinux/hooks.c) where the permission checks happen.
This audit information is logged using dump_common_audit_data() where it
calls d_path() to get the file path name. If the file check happen on
the dmabuf's fd, then it ends up in -&gt;dmabuffs_dname() and use mutex to
access dmabuf-&gt;name. The flow will be like below:
flush_unauthorized_files()
  iterate_fd()
    spin_lock() --&gt; Start of the atomic section.
      match_file()
        file_has_perm()
          avc_has_perm()
            avc_audit()
              slow_avc_audit()
	        common_lsm_audit()
		  dump_common_audit_data()
		    audit_log_d_path()
		      d_path()
                        dmabuffs_dname()
                          mutex_lock()--&gt; Sleep while atomic.

Call trace captured (on 4.19 kernels) is below:
___might_sleep+0x204/0x208
__might_sleep+0x50/0x88
__mutex_lock_common+0x5c/0x1068
__mutex_lock_common+0x5c/0x1068
mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x50
dmabuffs_dname+0xa0/0x170
d_path+0x84/0x290
audit_log_d_path+0x74/0x130
common_lsm_audit+0x334/0x6e8
slow_avc_audit+0xb8/0xf8
avc_has_perm+0x154/0x218
file_has_perm+0x70/0x180
match_file+0x60/0x78
iterate_fd+0x128/0x168
selinux_bprm_committing_creds+0x178/0x248
security_bprm_committing_creds+0x30/0x48
install_exec_creds+0x1c/0x68
load_elf_binary+0x3a4/0x14e0
search_binary_handler+0xb0/0x1e0

So, use spinlock to access dmabuf-&gt;name to avoid sleep-while-atomic.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; [5.3+]
Signed-off-by: Charan Teja Kalla &lt;charante@codeaurora.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael J. Ruhl &lt;michael.j.ruhl@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian König &lt;christian.koenig@amd.com&gt;
 [sumits: added comment to spinlock_t definition to avoid warning]
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/a83e7f0d-4e54-9848-4b58-e1acdbe06735@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
