<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/fs, branch v4.18.18</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=v4.18.18</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=v4.18.18'/>
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<updated>2018-11-10T15:49:45+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>fscache: Fix out of bound read in long cookie keys</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:49:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Sandeen</name>
<email>sandeen@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-17T14:23:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=fc7f79df0f2a5cc781e7e8617b7448e51157311a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fc7f79df0f2a5cc781e7e8617b7448e51157311a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fa520c47eaa15b9baa8ad66ac18da4a31679693b upstream.

fscache_set_key() can incur an out-of-bounds read, reported by KASAN:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fscache_alloc_cookie+0x5b3/0x680 [fscache]
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88084ff056d4 by task mount.nfs/32615

and also reported by syzbot at https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/8/236

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fscache_set_key fs/fscache/cookie.c:120 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fscache_alloc_cookie+0x7a9/0x880 fs/fscache/cookie.c:171
  Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801d3cc8bb4 by task syz-executor907/4466

This happens for any index_key_len which is not divisible by 4 and is
larger than the size of the inline key, because the code allocates exactly
index_key_len for the key buffer, but the hashing loop is stepping through
it 4 bytes (u32) at a time in the buf[] array.

Fix this by calculating how many u32 buffers we'll need by using
DIV_ROUND_UP, and then using kcalloc() to allocate a precleared allocation
buffer to hold the index_key, then using that same count as the hashing
index limit.

Fixes: ec0328e46d6e ("fscache: Maintain a catalogue of allocated cookies")
Reported-by: syzbot+a95b989b2dde8e806af8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cachefiles: fix the race between cachefiles_bury_object() and rmdir(2)</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:49:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-17T14:23:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=4bdc50b060ca6eebd0addaa640915e9f008b2539'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4bdc50b060ca6eebd0addaa640915e9f008b2539</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 169b803397499be85bdd1e3d07d6f5e3d4bd669e upstream.

the victim might've been rmdir'ed just before the lock_rename();
unlike the normal callers, we do not look the source up after the
parents are locked - we know it beforehand and just recheck that it's
still the child of what used to be its parent.  Unfortunately,
the check is too weak - we don't spot a dead directory since its
-&gt;d_parent is unchanged, dentry is positive, etc.  So we sail all
the way to -&gt;rename(), with hosting filesystems _not_ expecting
to be asked renaming an rmdir'ed subdirectory.

The fix is easy, fortunately - the lock on parent is sufficient for
making IS_DEADDIR() on child safe.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9ae326a69004 (CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscache: Fix incomplete initialisation of inline key space</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:49:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-17T14:23:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=9ccc817d3fb0466300528e9152b00e5a1d187e8c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9ccc817d3fb0466300528e9152b00e5a1d187e8c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1ff22883b0b2f7a73eb2609ffe879c9fd96f6328 upstream.

The inline key in struct rxrpc_cookie is insufficiently initialized,
zeroing only 3 of the 4 slots, therefore an index_key_len between 13 and 15
bytes will end up hashing uninitialized memory because the memcpy only
partially fills the last buf[] element.

Fix this by clearing fscache_cookie objects on allocation rather than using
the slab constructor to initialise them.  We're going to pretty much fill
in the entire struct anyway, so bringing it into our dcache writably
shouldn't incur much overhead.

This removes the need to do clearance in fscache_set_key() (where we aren't
doing it correctly anyway).

Also, we don't need to set cookie-&gt;key_len in fscache_set_key() as we
already did it in the only caller, so remove that.

Fixes: ec0328e46d6e ("fscache: Maintain a catalogue of allocated cookies")
Reported-by: syzbot+a95b989b2dde8e806af8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: swap names of {do,vfs}_clone_file_range()</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:49:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
<email>amir73il@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-22T17:56:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=1d15a9f087040c3ec6ba4671a2771eb47f6cbdc7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1d15a9f087040c3ec6ba4671a2771eb47f6cbdc7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a725356b6659469d182d662f22d770d83d3bc7b5 upstream.

Commit 031a072a0b8a ("vfs: call vfs_clone_file_range() under freeze
protection") created a wrapper do_clone_file_range() around
vfs_clone_file_range() moving the freeze protection to former, so
overlayfs could call the latter.

The more common vfs practice is to call do_xxx helpers from vfs_xxx
helpers, where freeze protecction is taken in the vfs_xxx helper, so
this anomality could be a source of confusion.

It seems that commit 8ede205541ff ("ovl: add reflink/copyfile/dedup
support") may have fallen a victim to this confusion -
ovl_clone_file_range() calls the vfs_clone_file_range() helper in the
hope of getting freeze protection on upper fs, but in fact results in
overlayfs allowing to bypass upper fs freeze protection.

Swap the names of the two helpers to conform to common vfs practice
and call the correct helpers from overlayfs and nfsd.

Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 031a072a0b8a ("vfs: call vfs_clone_file_range() under freeze...")
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/fat/fatent.c: add cond_resched() to fat_count_free_clusters()</title>
<updated>2018-11-04T13:51:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Khazhismel Kumykov</name>
<email>khazhy@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-13T04:34:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=4afb03f48e7ec5aca272aec3a1b191b3e0a062db'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4afb03f48e7ec5aca272aec3a1b191b3e0a062db</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ac081c3be3fae6d0cc3e1862507fca3862d30b67 ]

On non-preempt kernels this loop can take a long time (more than 50 ticks)
processing through entries.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181010172623.57033-1-khazhy@google.com
Signed-off-by: Khazhismel Kumykov &lt;khazhy@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi &lt;hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>afs: Fix cell proc list</title>
<updated>2018-11-04T13:51:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-11T21:45:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=9721f5af4d23754cbf1557736a7eff16e21e8ff0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9721f5af4d23754cbf1557736a7eff16e21e8ff0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6b3944e42e2e554aa5a4be681ecd70dccd459114 ]

Access to the list of cells by /proc/net/afs/cells has a couple of
problems:

 (1) It should be checking against SEQ_START_TOKEN for the keying the
     header line.

 (2) It's only holding the RCU read lock, so it can't just walk over the
     list without following the proper RCU methods.

Fix these by using an hlist instead of an ordinary list and using the
appropriate accessor functions to follow it with RCU.

Since the code that adds a cell to the list must also necessarily change,
sort the list on insertion whilst we're at it.

Fixes: 989782dcdc91 ("afs: Overhaul cell database management")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: fix crash in ocfs2_duplicate_clusters_by_page()</title>
<updated>2018-11-04T13:51:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Larry Chen</name>
<email>lchen@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-05T22:51:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=203711a8820bf6f0e6d3e9c61fbd900730b6f0e5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:203711a8820bf6f0e6d3e9c61fbd900730b6f0e5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 69eb7765b9c6902444c89c54e7043242faf981e5 ]

ocfs2_duplicate_clusters_by_page() may crash if one of the extent's pages
is dirty.  When a page has not been written back, it is still in dirty
state.  If ocfs2_duplicate_clusters_by_page() is called against the dirty
page, the crash happens.

To fix this bug, we can just unlock the page and wait until the page until
its not dirty.

The following is the backtrace:

kernel BUG at /root/code/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:2961!
[exception RIP: ocfs2_duplicate_clusters_by_page+822]
__ocfs2_move_extent+0x80/0x450 [ocfs2]
? __ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x130/0x250 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_defrag_extent+0x5b8/0x5e0 [ocfs2]
__ocfs2_move_extents_range+0x2a4/0x470 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_move_extents+0x180/0x3b0 [ocfs2]
? ocfs2_wait_for_recovery+0x13/0x70 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents+0x133/0x2d0 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_ioctl+0x253/0x640 [ocfs2]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x90/0x5f0
SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x74/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2

Once we find the page is dirty, we do not wait until it's clean, rather we
use write_one_page() to write it back

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180829074740.9438-1-lchen@suse.com
[lchen@suse.com: update comments]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180830075041.14879-1-lchen@suse.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Larry Chen &lt;lchen@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Changwei Ge &lt;ge.changwei@h3c.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Joseph Qi &lt;jiangqi903@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "vfs: fix freeze protection in mnt_want_write_file() for overlayfs"</title>
<updated>2018-10-20T07:47:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-18T12:22:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=94d2da5ba1dd55c246757e58b7e74bbe45a5cc0a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:94d2da5ba1dd55c246757e58b7e74bbe45a5cc0a</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 5e1002ab5c9bde81a0c1eed12f243987e98f7bd0 which was
commit a6795a585929d94ca3e931bc8518f8deb8bbe627 upstream.

Turns out this causes problems and was to fix a patch only in the 4.19
and newer tree.

Reported-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>filesystem-dax: Fix dax_layout_busy_page() livelock</title>
<updated>2018-10-18T07:18:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Williams</name>
<email>dan.j.williams@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-06T17:56:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=7230bb7c98c10e8b7d44f2615003cad2af7d4b53'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7230bb7c98c10e8b7d44f2615003cad2af7d4b53</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d7782145e1ad537df4ce74e58c50f1f732a1462d upstream.

In the presence of multi-order entries the typical
pagevec_lookup_entries() pattern may loop forever:

	while (index &lt; end &amp;&amp; pagevec_lookup_entries(&amp;pvec, mapping, index,
				min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE),
				indices)) {
		...
		for (i = 0; i &lt; pagevec_count(&amp;pvec); i++) {
			index = indices[i];
			...
		}
		index++; /* BUG */
	}

The loop updates 'index' for each index found and then increments to the
next possible page to continue the lookup. However, if the last entry in
the pagevec is multi-order then the next possible page index is more
than 1 page away. Fix this locally for the filesystem-dax case by
checking for dax-multi-order entries. Going forward new users of
multi-order entries need to be similarly careful, or we need a generic
way to report the page increment in the radix iterator.

Fixes: 5fac7408d828 ("mm, fs, dax: handle layout changes to pinned dax...")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>afs: Fix clearance of reply</title>
<updated>2018-10-18T07:18:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-15T11:43:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=84a3974781536af940b1aaa36cef22bfa20c4266'/>
<id>urn:sha1:84a3974781536af940b1aaa36cef22bfa20c4266</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f0a7d1883d9f78ae7bf15fc258bf9a2b20f35b76 upstream.

The recent patch to fix the afs_server struct leak didn't actually fix the
bug, but rather fixed some of the symptoms.  The problem is that an
asynchronous call that holds a resource pointed to by call-&gt;reply[0] will
find the pointer cleared in the call destructor, thereby preventing the
resource from being cleaned up.

In the case of the server record leak, the afs_fs_get_capabilities()
function in devel code sets up a call with reply[0] pointing at the server
record that should be altered when the result is obtained, but this was
being cleared before the destructor was called, so the put in the
destructor does nothing and the record is leaked.

Commit f014ffb025c1 removed the additional ref obtained by
afs_install_server(), but the removal of this ref is actually used by the
garbage collector to mark a server record as being defunct after the record
has expired through lack of use.

The offending clearance of call-&gt;reply[0] upon completion in
afs_process_async_call() has been there from the origin of the code, but
none of the asynchronous calls actually use that pointer currently, so it
should be safe to remove (note that synchronous calls don't involve this
function).

Fix this by the following means:

 (1) Revert commit f014ffb025c1.

 (2) Remove the clearance of reply[0] from afs_process_async_call().

Without this, afs_manage_servers() will suffer an assertion failure if it
sees a server record that didn't get used because the usage count is not 1.

Fixes: f014ffb025c1 ("afs: Fix afs_server struct leak")
Fixes: 08e0e7c82eea ("[AF_RXRPC]: Make the in-kernel AFS filesystem use AF_RXRPC.")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
