<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/fs, branch dev-5.3</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-5.3</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-5.3'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2019-12-04T21:34:28+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>ext4: add more paranoia checking in ext4_expand_extra_isize handling</title>
<updated>2019-12-04T21:34:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-08T02:43:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=fb7bc3a2bb987865e149f6baa2a3d22dd18b201e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fb7bc3a2bb987865e149f6baa2a3d22dd18b201e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4ea99936a1630f51fc3a2d61a58ec4a1c4b7d55a upstream.

It's possible to specify a non-zero s_want_extra_isize via debugging
option, and this can cause bad things(tm) to happen when using a file
system with an inode size of 128 bytes.

Add better checking when the file system is mounted, as well as when
we are actually doing the trying to do the inode expansion.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191110121510.GH23325@mit.edu
Reported-by: syzbot+f8d6f8386ceacdbfff57@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+33d7ea72e47de3bdf4e1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+44b6763edfc17144296f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: return -EINVAL if given fsc mount option on kernel w/o support</title>
<updated>2019-12-04T21:33:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-07T14:39:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=54183e1bd28df076b9561d03633dc6b240be0c5c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:54183e1bd28df076b9561d03633dc6b240be0c5c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ff29fde84d1fc82f233c7da0daa3574a3942bec7 ]

If someone requests fscache on the mount, and the kernel doesn't
support it, it should fail the mount.

[ Drop ceph prefix -- it's provided by pr_err. ]

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: async workers should inherit the user creds</title>
<updated>2019-12-04T21:33:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-25T15:52:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=ad700a7eb17dc3fc1f96152b4291532e5ba5a7ad'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ad700a7eb17dc3fc1f96152b4291532e5ba5a7ad</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 181e448d8709e517c9c7b523fcd209f24eb38ca7 ]

If we don't inherit the original task creds, then we can confuse users
like fuse that pass creds in the request header. See link below on
identical aio issue.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/26f0d78e-99ca-2f1b-78b9-433088053a61@scylladb.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "fs: ocfs2: fix possible null-pointer dereferences in ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry()"</title>
<updated>2019-11-29T09:07:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joseph Qi</name>
<email>joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-22T01:53:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=d6221301ee6084c79d5716139a7ef1b09ce343ff'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d6221301ee6084c79d5716139a7ef1b09ce343ff</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 94b07b6f9e2e996afff7395de6b35f34f4cb10bf upstream.

This reverts commit 56e94ea132bb5c2c1d0b60a6aeb34dcb7d71a53d.

Commit 56e94ea132bb ("fs: ocfs2: fix possible null-pointer dereferences
in ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry()") introduces a regression that fail to
create directory with mount option user_xattr and acl.  Actually the
reported NULL pointer dereference case can be correctly handled by
loc-&gt;xl_ops-&gt;xlo_add_entry(), so revert it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1573624916-83825-1-git-send-email-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 56e94ea132bb ("fs: ocfs2: fix possible null-pointer dereferences in ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry()")
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Reported-by: Thomas Voegtle &lt;tv@lio96.de&gt;
Acked-by: Changwei Ge &lt;gechangwei@live.cn&gt;
Cc: Jia-Ju Bai &lt;baijiaju1990@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Gang He &lt;ghe@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Jun Piao &lt;piaojun@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: ensure registered buffer import returns the IO length</title>
<updated>2019-11-20T15:49:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-13T23:12:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=d9ed38e57483d63f40bb183582bf0dfad59f6211'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d9ed38e57483d63f40bb183582bf0dfad59f6211</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5e559561a8d7e6d4adfce6aa8fbf3daa3dec1577 upstream.

A test case was reported where two linked reads with registered buffers
failed the second link always. This is because we set the expected value
of a request in req-&gt;result, and if we don't get this result, then we
fail the dependent links. For some reason the registered buffer import
returned -ERROR/0, while the normal import returns -ERROR/length. This
broke linked commands with registered buffers.

Fix this by making io_import_fixed() correctly return the mapped length.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3
Reported-by: 李通洲 &lt;carter.li@eoitek.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry-&gt;d_parent is not stable either</title>
<updated>2019-11-20T15:49:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-03T18:55:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=d77bdcae8846c67630f6633c9b110137edb65e60'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d77bdcae8846c67630f6633c9b110137edb65e60</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 762c69685ff7ad5ad7fee0656671e20a0c9c864d upstream.

We need to get the underlying dentry of parent; sure, absent the races
it is the parent of underlying dentry, but there's nothing to prevent
losing a timeslice to preemtion in the middle of evaluation of
lower_dentry-&gt;d_parent-&gt;d_inode, having another process move lower_dentry
around and have its (ex)parent not pinned anymore and freed on memory
pressure.  Then we regain CPU and try to fetch -&gt;d_inode from memory
that is freed by that point.

dentry-&gt;d_parent *is* stable here - it's an argument of -&gt;lookup() and
we are guaranteed that it won't be moved anywhere until we feed it
to d_add/d_splice_alias.  So we safely go that way to get to its
underlying dentry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # since 2009 or so
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry-&gt;d_inode is not stable</title>
<updated>2019-11-20T15:49:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-03T18:45:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=8fecee4bb9445828c0e13e2adec4cc800e061def'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8fecee4bb9445828c0e13e2adec4cc800e061def</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e72b9dd6a5f17d0fb51f16f8685f3004361e83d0 upstream.

lower_dentry can't go from positive to negative (we have it pinned),
but it *can* go from negative to positive.  So fetching -&gt;d_inode
into a local variable, doing a blocking allocation, checking that
now -&gt;d_inode is non-NULL and feeding the value we'd fetched
earlier to a function that won't accept NULL is not a good idea.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Btrfs: fix log context list corruption after rename exchange operation</title>
<updated>2019-11-20T15:49:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
<email>fdmanana@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-08T16:11:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=3fdb261cdeff93dc9e36d10708996895d36f97d7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3fdb261cdeff93dc9e36d10708996895d36f97d7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e6c617102c7e4ac1398cb0b98ff1f0727755b520 upstream.

During rename exchange we might have successfully log the new name in the
source root's log tree, in which case we leave our log context (allocated
on stack) in the root's list of log contextes. However we might fail to
log the new name in the destination root, in which case we fallback to
a transaction commit later and never sync the log of the source root,
which causes the source root log context to remain in the list of log
contextes. This later causes invalid memory accesses because the context
was allocated on stack and after rename exchange finishes the stack gets
reused and overwritten for other purposes.

The kernel's linked list corruption detector (CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y) can
detect this and report something like the following:

  [  691.489929] ------------[ cut here ]------------
  [  691.489947] list_add corruption. prev-&gt;next should be next (ffff88819c944530), but was ffff8881c23f7be4. (prev=ffff8881c23f7a38).
  [  691.489967] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 28933 at lib/list_debug.c:28 __list_add_valid+0x95/0xe0
  (...)
  [  691.489998] CPU: 2 PID: 28933 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-62 #1
  [  691.490001] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  [  691.490003] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x95/0xe0
  (...)
  [  691.490007] RSP: 0018:ffff8881f0b3faf8 EFLAGS: 00010282
  [  691.490010] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88819c944530 RCX: 0000000000000000
  [  691.490011] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffa2c497e0
  [  691.490013] RBP: ffff8881f0b3fe68 R08: ffffed103eaa4115 R09: ffffed103eaa4114
  [  691.490015] R10: ffff88819c944000 R11: ffffed103eaa4115 R12: 7fffffffffffffff
  [  691.490016] R13: ffff8881b4035610 R14: ffff8881e7b84728 R15: 1ffff1103e167f7b
  [  691.490019] FS:  00007f4b25ea2e80(0000) GS:ffff8881f5500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [  691.490021] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [  691.490022] CR2: 00007fffbb2d4eec CR3: 00000001f2a4a004 CR4: 00000000003606e0
  [  691.490025] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [  691.490027] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  [  691.490029] Call Trace:
  [  691.490058]  btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x667/0x2730 [btrfs]
  [  691.490083]  ? join_transaction+0x24a/0xce0 [btrfs]
  [  691.490107]  ? btrfs_end_log_trans+0x80/0x80 [btrfs]
  [  691.490111]  ? dget_parent+0xb8/0x460
  [  691.490116]  ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
  [  691.490121]  ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
  [  691.490127]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x142/0x220
  [  691.490151]  btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x65/0x90 [btrfs]
  [  691.490172]  btrfs_sync_file+0x9f1/0xc00 [btrfs]
  [  691.490195]  ? btrfs_file_write_iter+0x1800/0x1800 [btrfs]
  [  691.490198]  ? rcu_read_lock_any_held.part.11+0x20/0x20
  [  691.490204]  ? __do_sys_newstat+0x88/0xd0
  [  691.490207]  ? cp_new_stat+0x5d0/0x5d0
  [  691.490218]  ? do_fsync+0x38/0x60
  [  691.490220]  do_fsync+0x38/0x60
  [  691.490224]  __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x32/0x40
  [  691.490228]  do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x540
  [  691.490233]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
  [  691.490235] RIP: 0033:0x7f4b253ad5f0
  (...)
  [  691.490239] RSP: 002b:00007fffbb2d6078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
  [  691.490242] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f4b253ad5f0
  [  691.490244] RDX: 00007fffbb2d5fe0 RSI: 00007fffbb2d5fe0 RDI: 0000000000000003
  [  691.490245] RBP: 000000000000000d R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007fffbb2d608c
  [  691.490247] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000001f4
  [  691.490248] R13: 0000000051eb851f R14: 00007fffbb2d6120 R15: 00005635a498bda0

This started happening recently when running some test cases from fstests
like btrfs/004 for example, because support for rename exchange was added
last week to fsstress from fstests.

So fix this by deleting the log context for the source root from the list
if we have logged the new name in the source root.

Reported-by: Su Yue &lt;Damenly_Su@gmx.com&gt;
Fixes: d4682ba03ef618 ("Btrfs: sync log after logging new name")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Tested-by: Su Yue &lt;Damenly_Su@gmx.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cgroup,writeback: don't switch wbs immediately on dead wbs if the memcg is dead</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:28:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-08T20:18:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=4e967af04ec0e2894b91d8e3e0bddd2f17937005'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4e967af04ec0e2894b91d8e3e0bddd2f17937005</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 65de03e251382306a4575b1779c57c87889eee49 upstream.

cgroup writeback tries to refresh the associated wb immediately if the
current wb is dead.  This is to avoid keeping issuing IOs on the stale
wb after memcg - blkcg association has changed (ie. when blkcg got
disabled / enabled higher up in the hierarchy).

Unfortunately, the logic gets triggered spuriously on inodes which are
associated with dead cgroups.  When the logic is triggered on dead
cgroups, the attempt fails only after doing quite a bit of work
allocating and initializing a new wb.

While c3aab9a0bd91 ("mm/filemap.c: don't initiate writeback if mapping
has no dirty pages") alleviated the issue significantly as it now only
triggers when the inode has dirty pages.  However, the condition can
still be triggered before the inode is switched to a different cgroup
and the logic simply doesn't make sense.

Skip the immediate switching if the associated memcg is dying.

This is a simplified version of the following two patches:

 * https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190513183053.GA73423@dennisz-mbp/
 * http://lkml.kernel.org/r/156355839560.2063.5265687291430814589.stgit@buzz

Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Fixes: e8a7abf5a5bd ("writeback: disassociate inodes from dying bdi_writebacks")
Acked-by: Dennis Zhou &lt;dennis@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: protect extent tree in ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write()</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:28:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shuning Zhang</name>
<email>sunny.s.zhang@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-06T05:16:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=8e02baf62a63109d2cc6bac5333e56a74572350d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8e02baf62a63109d2cc6bac5333e56a74572350d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e74540b285569d2b1e14fe7aee92297078f235ce ]

When the extent tree is modified, it should be protected by inode
cluster lock and ip_alloc_sem.

The extent tree is accessed and modified in the
ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write, but isn't protected by ip_alloc_sem.

The following is a case.  The function ocfs2_fiemap is accessing the
extent tree, which is modified at the same time.

  kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/extent_map.c:475!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  Modules linked in: tun ocfs2 ocfs2_nodemanager configfs ocfs2_stackglue [...]
  CPU: 16 PID: 14047 Comm: o2info Not tainted 4.1.12-124.23.1.el6uek.x86_64 #2
  Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X7-2L/ASM, MB MECH, X7-2L, BIOS 42040600 10/19/2018
  task: ffff88019487e200 ti: ffff88003daa4000 task.ti: ffff88003daa4000
  RIP: ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache.isra.11+0x390/0x550 [ocfs2]
  Call Trace:
    ocfs2_fiemap+0x1e3/0x430 [ocfs2]
    do_vfs_ioctl+0x155/0x510
    SyS_ioctl+0x81/0xa0
    system_call_fastpath+0x18/0xd8
  Code: 18 48 c7 c6 60 7f 65 a0 31 c0 bb e2 ff ff ff 48 8b 4a 40 48 8b 7a 28 48 c7 c2 78 2d 66 a0 e8 38 4f 05 00 e9 28 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 bb 86 ff ff ff e9 13 fe ff ff 66 0f 1f
  RIP  ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache.isra.11+0x390/0x550 [ocfs2]
  ---[ end trace c8aa0c8180e869dc ]---
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
  Kernel Offset: disabled

This issue can be reproduced every week in a production environment.

This issue is related to the usage mode.  If others use ocfs2 in this
mode, the kernel will panic frequently.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
[Fix new warning due to unused function by removing said function - Linus ]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1568772175-2906-2-git-send-email-sunny.s.zhang@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Shuning Zhang &lt;sunny.s.zhang@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Gang He &lt;ghe@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Joseph Qi &lt;jiangqi903@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Changwei Ge &lt;gechangwei@live.cn&gt;
Cc: Jun Piao &lt;piaojun@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
