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<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/fs/kernfs/dir.c, branch dev</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev</id>
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<updated>2015-07-03T22:20:57+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2015-07-03T22:20:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-03T22:20:57+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0cbee992696236227a7ea411e4b0fbf73b918b6a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized
  that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace
  permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide
  if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all.

  Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could
  be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of
  proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and
  sysfs.  Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced.

  There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement.  Only filesystems
  mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but
  the test for empty directories was insufficient.  So in my tree
  directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are
  created specially.  Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary
  directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and
  shows that the directory is empty.  Special creation of directories
  for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about
  it's purpose.  I asked container developers from the various container
  projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount
  points on proc and sysfs that are created specially.

  This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh
  mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of
  proc and sysfs.  I expected this to be the boring part of the work but
  unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of
  proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags
  on the previous mount of proc and sysfs.  So for now only the atime,
  read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep
  consistent are enforced.  Dealing with the noexec and nosuid
  attributes remains for another time.

  This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file
  descriptors from /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/* are displayed.  Recently readlink of
  /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been
  meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was
  converted) and is not now actively wrong.

  There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that
  I will mention briefly.

  It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount.
  At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can
  be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem.  With user
  namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created
  allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename
  to outside of the bind mount.  This is challenging to fix and doubly
  so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the
  performance part of pathname resolution.

  As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that
  developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable
  files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions
  in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as
  such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once
  they are recognized"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path
  mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories
  sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point
  sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points.
  kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.
  proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points
  sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.
  fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories.
  vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible
  mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime
  mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.</title>
<updated>2015-07-01T15:36:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-13T21:09:29+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ea015218f2f7ace2dad9cedd21ed95bdba2886d7</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a new function kernfs_create_empty_dir that can be used to create
directory that can not be modified.

Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when reporting a
permanently empty directory to the vfs.

Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: do not account ino_ida allocations to memcg</title>
<updated>2015-05-15T00:55:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vladimir Davydov</name>
<email>vdavydov@parallels.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-14T22:16:58+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:499611ed451508a42d1d7d1faff10177827755d5</id>
<content type='text'>
root-&gt;ino_ida is used for kernfs inode number allocations. Since IDA has
a layered structure, different IDs can reside on the same layer, which
is currently accounted to some memory cgroup. The problem is that each
kmem cache of a memory cgroup has its own directory on sysfs (under
/sys/fs/kernel/&lt;cache-name&gt;/cgroup). If the inode number of such a
directory or any file in it gets allocated from a layer accounted to the
cgroup which the cache is created for, the cgroup will get pinned for
good, because one has to free all kmem allocations accounted to a cgroup
in order to release it and destroy all its kmem caches. That said we
must not account layers of ino_ida to any memory cgroup.

Since per net init operations may create new sysfs entries directly
(e.g. lo device) or indirectly (nf_conntrack creates a new kmem cache
per each namespace, which, in turn, creates new sysfs entries), an easy
way to reproduce this issue is by creating network namespace(s) from
inside a kmem-active memory cgroup.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov@parallels.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Thelen &lt;gthelen@google.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[4.0.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations</title>
<updated>2015-04-15T19:06:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-17T22:25:59+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2b0143b5c986be1ce8408b3aadc4709e0a94429d</id>
<content type='text'>
that's the bulk of filesystem drivers dealing with inodes of their own

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: remove KERNFS_STATIC_NAME</title>
<updated>2015-02-14T05:21:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-13T22:36:31+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dfeb0750b630b72b5d4fb2461bc7179eceb54666</id>
<content type='text'>
When a new kernfs node is created, KERNFS_STATIC_NAME is used to avoid
making a separate copy of its name.  It's currently only used for sysfs
attributes whose filenames are required to stay accessible and unchanged.
There are rare exceptions where these names are allocated and formatted
dynamically but for the vast majority of cases they're consts in the
rodata section.

Now that kernfs is converted to use kstrdup_const() and kfree_const(),
there's little point in keeping KERNFS_STATIC_NAME around.  Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrzej Hajda &lt;a.hajda@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: convert node name allocation to kstrdup_const</title>
<updated>2015-02-14T05:21:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrzej Hajda</name>
<email>a.hajda@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-13T22:36:27+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:75287a677ba1beab7ca0db948468f44eb23a709f</id>
<content type='text'>
sysfs frequently performs duplication of strings located in read-only
memory section.  Replacing kstrdup by kstrdup_const allows to avoid such
operations.

Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda &lt;a.hajda@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Marek Szyprowski &lt;m.szyprowski@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Kyungmin Park &lt;kyungmin.park@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Turquette &lt;mturquette@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;greg@kroah.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: Fix kernfs_name_compare</title>
<updated>2015-01-09T23:51:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rasmus Villemoes</name>
<email>linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-05T22:41:33+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:72392ed0eb6fde96826cb9d66bd4f50a7ba61450</id>
<content type='text'>
Returning a difference from a comparison functions is usually wrong
(see acbbe6fbb240 "kcmp: fix standard comparison bug" for the long
story). Here there is the additional twist that if the void pointers
ns and kn-&gt;ns happen to differ by a multiple of 2^32,
kernfs_name_compare returns 0, falsely reporting a match to the
caller.

Technically 'hash - kn-&gt;hash' is ok since the hashes are restricted to
31 bits, but it's better to avoid that subtlety.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>switch d_materialise_unique() users to d_splice_alias()</title>
<updated>2014-11-19T18:01:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-13T02:24:21+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:41d28bca2da4bd75a8915c1ccf2cacf7f4a2e531</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Remove unnecessary calls of check_submounts_and_drop</title>
<updated>2014-10-09T06:38:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-13T17:34:30+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9b053f3207e8887fed88162a339fdd4001abcdb2</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that check_submounts_and_drop can not fail and is called from
d_invalidate there is no longer a need to call check_submounts_and_drom
from filesystem d_revalidate methods so remove it.

Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge 3.15-rc3 into staging-next</title>
<updated>2014-04-28T04:36:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-28T04:36:39+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d35cc56ddfc948d8df1aa6d41ac345fcec01854d</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
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