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<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/fs/f2fs, branch dev-4.4</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-4.4</id>
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<updated>2016-10-31T10:13:58+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions</title>
<updated>2016-10-31T10:13:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-19T15:39:09+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:57c9cfdb61ea270936fab76da99a742c6ef0b86f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef upstream.

When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok().  Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2).  Fix that.

References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruenba@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypto: add authorization check for setting encryption policy</title>
<updated>2016-09-24T08:07:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-08T17:57:08+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8d693a2e67b5793ee58d106fded28902b7fd0f72</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 163ae1c6ad6299b19e22b4a35d5ab24a89791a98 upstream.

On an ext4 or f2fs filesystem with file encryption supported, a user
could set an encryption policy on any empty directory(*) to which they
had readonly access.  This is obviously problematic, since such a
directory might be owned by another user and the new encryption policy
would prevent that other user from creating files in their own directory
(for example).

Fix this by requiring inode_owner_or_capable() permission to set an
encryption policy.  This means that either the caller must own the file,
or the caller must have the capability CAP_FOWNER.

(*) Or also on any regular file, for f2fs v4.6 and later and ext4
    v4.8-rc1 and later; a separate bug fix is coming for that.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2015-11-14T02:02:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-14T02:02:30+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5d2eb548b309be34ecf3b91f0b7300a2b9d09b8c</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs xattr cleanups from Al Viro.

* 'for-linus-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  f2fs: xattr simplifications
  squashfs: xattr simplifications
  9p: xattr simplifications
  xattr handlers: Pass handler to operations instead of flags
  jffs2: Add missing capability check for listing trusted xattrs
  hfsplus: Remove unused xattr handler list operations
  ubifs: Remove unused security xattr handler
  vfs: Fix the posix_acl_xattr_list return value
  vfs: Check attribute names in posix acl xattr handers
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: xattr simplifications</title>
<updated>2015-11-14T01:34:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andreas Gruenbacher</name>
<email>agruenba@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-04T17:18:54+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:29608d208b3619b3b508a6871622db789611d8a3</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that the xattr handler is passed to the xattr handler operations, we
have access to the attribute name prefix, so simplify
f2fs_xattr_generic_list.

Also, f2fs_xattr_advise_list is only ever called for
f2fs_xattr_advise_handler; there is no need to double check for that.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruenba@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Changman Lee &lt;cm224.lee@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Chao Yu &lt;chao2.yu@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xattr handlers: Pass handler to operations instead of flags</title>
<updated>2015-11-14T01:34:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andreas Gruenbacher</name>
<email>agruenba@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-04T17:18:51+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d9a82a04033f87bbd06efb29f78c0170a38154a8</id>
<content type='text'>
The xattr_handler operations are currently all passed a file system
specific flags value which the operations can use to disambiguate between
different handlers; some file systems use that to distinguish the xattr
namespace, for example.  In some oprations, it would be useful to also have
access to the handler prefix.  To allow that, pass a pointer to the handler
to operations instead of the flags value alone.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruenba@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/f2fs/namei.c: remove unnecessary new_valid_dev() check</title>
<updated>2015-11-09T23:11:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yaowei Bai</name>
<email>bywxiaobai@163.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-09T22:58:42+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a8415e4b130e0cd919c7c6584bdf27660f3ff295</id>
<content type='text'>
new_valid_dev() always returns 1, so the !new_valid_dev() check is not
needed.  Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Yaowei Bai &lt;bywxiaobai@163.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Changman Lee &lt;cm224.lee@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Chao Yu &lt;chao2.yu@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2015-11-05T23:32:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-05T23:32:38+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1873499e13648a2dd01a394ed3217c9290921b3d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
 "This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a
  notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a
  maintainer of that"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits)
  apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency
  selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct
  selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static
  selinux: use sprintf return value
  selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools()
  selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core()
  selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity()
  selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid
  selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call
  selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default
  KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
  KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature
  KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file
  keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used
  certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list
  KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key
  Smack: limited capability for changing process label
  TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion
  vTPM: support little endian guests
  char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: fix to skip shrinking extent nodes</title>
<updated>2015-10-22T16:39:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>chao2.yu@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-22T10:24:12+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:beaa57dd986d4f398728c060692fc2452895cfd8</id>
<content type='text'>
In f2fs_shrink_extent_tree we should stop shrink flow if we have already
shrunk enough nodes in extent cache.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao2.yu@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: fix error path of -&gt;symlink</title>
<updated>2015-10-22T16:39:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>chao2.yu@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-22T10:23:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=a6be014e1d28339ba7c745fc4ac1efdbf6e2c1a2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a6be014e1d28339ba7c745fc4ac1efdbf6e2c1a2</id>
<content type='text'>
Now, in -&gt;symlink of f2fs, we kept the fixed invoking order between
f2fs_add_link and page_symlink since we should init node info firstly
in f2fs_add_link, then such node info can be used in page_symlink.

But we didn't fix to release meta info which was done before page_symlink
in our error path, so this will leave us corrupt symlink entry in its
parent's dentry page. Fix this issue by adding f2fs_unlink in the error
path for removing such linking.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao2.yu@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: fix to clear GCed flag for atomic written page</title>
<updated>2015-10-22T16:37:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>chao2.yu@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-22T10:18:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=7fee740697e0d9a57d618b6fec79e4c4e09fd606'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7fee740697e0d9a57d618b6fec79e4c4e09fd606</id>
<content type='text'>
Atomic write page can be GCed, after committing this kind of page, we should
clear the GCed flag for it.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao2.yu@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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