<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/drivers/char, branch v4.18.18</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=v4.18.18</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=v4.18.18'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2018-09-26T06:39:30+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>ipmi: Fix I2C client removal in the SSIF driver</title>
<updated>2018-09-26T06:39:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Corey Minyard</name>
<email>cminyard@mvista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-30T18:06:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=617afda7f5d9859d9e303dc0e94776f0410e041c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:617afda7f5d9859d9e303dc0e94776f0410e041c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0745dde62835be7e2afe62fcdb482fcad79cb743 upstream.

The SSIF driver was removing any client that came in through the
platform interface, but it should only remove clients that it
added.  On a failure in the probe function, this could result
in the following oops when the driver is removed and the
client gets unregistered twice:

 CPU: 107 PID: 30266 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 4.18.0+ #80
 Hardware name: Cavium Inc. Saber/Saber, BIOS Cavium reference firmware version 7.0 08/04/2018
 pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
 pc : kernfs_find_ns+0x28/0x120
 lr : kernfs_find_and_get_ns+0x40/0x60
 sp : ffff00002310fb50
 x29: ffff00002310fb50 x28: ffff800a8240f800
 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
 x25: 0000000056000000 x24: ffff000009073000
 x23: ffff000008998b38 x22: 0000000000000000
 x21: ffff800ed86de820 x20: 0000000000000000
 x19: ffff00000913a1d8 x18: 0000000000000000
 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 5300737265766972
 x13: 643d4d4554535953 x12: 0000000000000030
 x11: 0000000000000030 x10: 0101010101010101
 x9 : ffff800ea06cc3f9 x8 : 0000000000000000
 x7 : 0000000000000141 x6 : ffff000009073000
 x5 : ffff800adb706b00 x4 : 0000000000000000
 x3 : 00000000ffffffff x2 : 0000000000000000
 x1 : ffff000008998b38 x0 : ffff000008356760
 Process rmmod (pid: 30266, stack limit = 0x00000000e218418d)
 Call trace:
  kernfs_find_ns+0x28/0x120
  kernfs_find_and_get_ns+0x40/0x60
  sysfs_unmerge_group+0x2c/0x6c
  dpm_sysfs_remove+0x34/0x70
  device_del+0x58/0x30c
  device_unregister+0x30/0x7c
  i2c_unregister_device+0x84/0x90 [i2c_core]
  ssif_platform_remove+0x38/0x98 [ipmi_ssif]
  platform_drv_remove+0x2c/0x6c
  device_release_driver_internal+0x168/0x1f8
  driver_detach+0x50/0xbc
  bus_remove_driver+0x74/0xe8
  driver_unregister+0x34/0x5c
  platform_driver_unregister+0x20/0x2c
  cleanup_ipmi_ssif+0x50/0xd82c [ipmi_ssif]
  __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1b4/0x220
  el0_svc_handler+0x104/0x160
  el0_svc+0x8/0xc
 Code: aa1e03e0 aa0203f6 aa0103f7 d503201f (7940e280)
 ---[ end trace 09f0e34cce8e2d8c ]---
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
 SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
 Kernel Offset: disabled
 CPU features: 0x23800c38

So track the clients that the SSIF driver adds and only remove
those.

Reported-by: George Cherian &lt;george.cherian@cavium.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard &lt;cminyard@mvista.com&gt;
Tested-by: George Cherian &lt;george.cherian@cavium.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.14.x
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipmi: Move BT capabilities detection to the detect call</title>
<updated>2018-09-26T06:39:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Corey Minyard</name>
<email>cminyard@mvista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-23T20:22:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=31364b2e1fb1cabdc647d7c8ccc958674b39879a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:31364b2e1fb1cabdc647d7c8ccc958674b39879a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c86ba91be75702c013bbf7379542920b6920e98f upstream.

The capabilities detection was being done as part of the normal
state machine, but it was possible for it to be running while
the upper layers of the IPMI driver were initializing the
device, resulting in error and failure to initialize.

Move the capabilities detection to the the detect function,
so it's done before anything else runs on the device.  This also
simplifies the state machine and removes some code, as a bonus.

Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard &lt;cminyard@mvista.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrew Banman &lt;abanman@hpe.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrew Banman &lt;abanman@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipmi: Rework SMI registration failure</title>
<updated>2018-09-26T06:39:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Corey Minyard</name>
<email>cminyard@mvista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-22T17:08:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=288bd736c8a027040fc261c86a87b65e7bc3f6fa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:288bd736c8a027040fc261c86a87b65e7bc3f6fa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2512e40e48d21d8bac09f7e91d2c3ceb2d3b50b2 upstream.

There were certain situations where ipmi_register_smi() would
return a failure, but the interface would still be registered
and would need to be unregistered.  This is obviously a bad
design and resulted in an oops in certain failure cases.

If the interface is started up in ipmi_register_smi(), then
an error occurs, shut down the interface there so the
cleanup can be done properly.

Fix the various smi users, too.

Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard &lt;cminyard@mvista.com&gt;
Reported-by: Justin Ernst &lt;justin.ernst@hpe.com&gt;
Tested-by: Justin Ernst &lt;justin.ernst@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Banman &lt;abanman@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: Russ Anderson &lt;russ.anderson@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.18.x
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: switch to i2c_lock_bus(..., I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT)</title>
<updated>2018-09-19T20:41:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Rosin</name>
<email>peda@axentia.se</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-20T05:17:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=d44e0ddb577dcae51e11e725c19d17d65dad87e5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d44e0ddb577dcae51e11e725c19d17d65dad87e5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bb853aac2c478ce78116128263801189408ad2a8 ]

Locking the root adapter for __i2c_transfer will deadlock if the
device sits behind a mux-locked I2C mux. Switch to the finer-grained
i2c_lock_bus with the I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT flag. If the device does not
sit behind a mux-locked mux, the two locking variants are equivalent.

Signed-off-by: Peter Rosin &lt;peda@axentia.se&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alexander Steffen &lt;Alexander.Steffen@infineon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang &lt;wsa@the-dreams.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm_tis_spi: Pass the SPI IRQ down to the driver</title>
<updated>2018-09-19T20:41:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Walleij</name>
<email>linus.walleij@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-08T07:09:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=d229e7ecc0cb29996688f0fa98c5eb6128b81e3a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d229e7ecc0cb29996688f0fa98c5eb6128b81e3a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1a339b658d9dbe1471f67b78237cf8fa08bbbeb5 ]

An SPI TPM device managed directly on an embedded board using
the SPI bus and some GPIO or similar line as IRQ handler will
pass the IRQn from the TPM device associated with the SPI
device. This is already handled by the SPI core, so make sure
to pass this down to the core as well.

(The TPM core habit of using -1 to signal no IRQ is dubious
(as IRQ 0 is NO_IRQ) but I do not want to mess with that
semantic in this patch.)

Cc: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm: separate cmd_ready/go_idle from runtime_pm</title>
<updated>2018-09-05T07:29:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tomas Winkler</name>
<email>tomas.winkler@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-28T15:13:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=7624ac8705f5cc2d59259c1a7259170b89402685'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7624ac8705f5cc2d59259c1a7259170b89402685</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 627448e85c766587f6fdde1ea3886d6615081c77 upstream.

Fix tpm ptt initialization error:
tpm tpm0: A TPM error (378) occurred get tpm pcr allocation.

We cannot use go_idle cmd_ready commands via runtime_pm handles
as with the introduction of localities this is no longer an optional
feature, while runtime pm can be not enabled.
Though cmd_ready/go_idle provides a power saving, it's also a part of
TPM2 protocol and should be called explicitly.
This patch exposes cmd_read/go_idle via tpm class ops and removes
runtime pm support as it is not used by any driver.

When calling from nested context always use both flags:
TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED and TPM_TRANSMIT_RAW. Both are needed to resolve
tpm spaces and locality request recursive calls to tpm_transmit().
TPM_TRANSMIT_RAW should never be used standalone as it will fail
on double locking. While TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED standalone should be
called from non-recursive locked contexts.

New wrappers are added tpm_cmd_ready() and tpm_go_idle() to
streamline tpm_try_transmit code.

tpm_crb no longer needs own power saving functions and can drop using
tpm_pm_suspend/resume.

This patch cannot be really separated from the locality fix.
Fixes: 888d867df441 (tpm: cmd_ready command can be issued only after granting locality)

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 888d867df441 (tpm: cmd_ready command can be issued only after granting locality)
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler &lt;tomas.winkler@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm: Return the actual size when receiving an unsupported command</title>
<updated>2018-09-05T07:29:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ricardo Schwarzmeier</name>
<email>Ricardo.Schwarzmeier@infineon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-26T15:31:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=b64b3b46074e66c2cd0a620e26984a5f134cb64f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b64b3b46074e66c2cd0a620e26984a5f134cb64f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 36a11029b07ee30bdc4553274d0efea645ed9d91 upstream.

The userpace expects to read the number of bytes stated in the header.
Returning the size of the buffer instead would be unexpected.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 095531f891e6 ("tpm: return a TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response if command is not implemented")
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Schwarzmeier &lt;Ricardo.Schwarzmeier@infineon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random</title>
<updated>2018-07-29T02:40:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-29T02:40:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=a26fb01c2879ed7026e6cbd78bb701912d249eef'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a26fb01c2879ed7026e6cbd78bb701912d249eef</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull random fixes from Ted Ts'o:
 "In reaction to the fixes to address CVE-2018-1108, some Linux
  distributions that have certain systemd versions in some cases
  combined with patches to libcrypt for FIPS/FEDRAMP compliance, have
  led to boot-time stalls for some hardware.

  The reaction by some distros and Linux sysadmins has been to install
  packages that try to do complicated things with the CPU and hope that
  leads to randomness.

  To mitigate this, if RDRAND is available, mix it into entropy provided
  by userspace. It won't hurt, and it will probably help"

* tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
  random: mix rdrand with entropy sent in from userspace
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: fix vma_is_anonymous() false-positives</title>
<updated>2018-07-27T02:38:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-26T23:37:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=bfd40eaff5abb9f62c8ef94ca13ed0d94a560f10'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bfd40eaff5abb9f62c8ef94ca13ed0d94a560f10</id>
<content type='text'>
vma_is_anonymous() relies on -&gt;vm_ops being NULL to detect anonymous
VMA.  This is unreliable as -&gt;mmap may not set -&gt;vm_ops.

False-positive vma_is_anonymous() may lead to crashes:

	next ffff8801ce5e7040 prev ffff8801d20eca50 mm ffff88019c1e13c0
	prot 27 anon_vma ffff88019680cdd8 vm_ops 0000000000000000
	pgoff 0 file ffff8801b2ec2d00 private_data 0000000000000000
	flags: 0xff(read|write|exec|shared|mayread|maywrite|mayexec|mayshare)
	------------[ cut here ]------------
	kernel BUG at mm/memory.c:1422!
	invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
	CPU: 0 PID: 18486 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3+ #136
	Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google
	01/01/2011
	RIP: 0010:zap_pmd_range mm/memory.c:1421 [inline]
	RIP: 0010:zap_pud_range mm/memory.c:1466 [inline]
	RIP: 0010:zap_p4d_range mm/memory.c:1487 [inline]
	RIP: 0010:unmap_page_range+0x1c18/0x2220 mm/memory.c:1508
	Call Trace:
	 unmap_single_vma+0x1a0/0x310 mm/memory.c:1553
	 zap_page_range_single+0x3cc/0x580 mm/memory.c:1644
	 unmap_mapping_range_vma mm/memory.c:2792 [inline]
	 unmap_mapping_range_tree mm/memory.c:2813 [inline]
	 unmap_mapping_pages+0x3a7/0x5b0 mm/memory.c:2845
	 unmap_mapping_range+0x48/0x60 mm/memory.c:2880
	 truncate_pagecache+0x54/0x90 mm/truncate.c:800
	 truncate_setsize+0x70/0xb0 mm/truncate.c:826
	 simple_setattr+0xe9/0x110 fs/libfs.c:409
	 notify_change+0xf13/0x10f0 fs/attr.c:335
	 do_truncate+0x1ac/0x2b0 fs/open.c:63
	 do_sys_ftruncate+0x492/0x560 fs/open.c:205
	 __do_sys_ftruncate fs/open.c:215 [inline]
	 __se_sys_ftruncate fs/open.c:213 [inline]
	 __x64_sys_ftruncate+0x59/0x80 fs/open.c:213
	 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Reproducer:

	#include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
	#include &lt;stddef.h&gt;
	#include &lt;stdint.h&gt;
	#include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
	#include &lt;string.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/types.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/stat.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/ioctl.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/mman.h&gt;
	#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
	#include &lt;fcntl.h&gt;

	#define KCOV_INIT_TRACE			_IOR('c', 1, unsigned long)
	#define KCOV_ENABLE			_IO('c', 100)
	#define KCOV_DISABLE			_IO('c', 101)
	#define COVER_SIZE			(1024&lt;&lt;10)

	#define KCOV_TRACE_PC  0
	#define KCOV_TRACE_CMP 1

	int main(int argc, char **argv)
	{
		int fd;
		unsigned long *cover;

		system("mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug");
		fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", O_RDWR);
		ioctl(fd, KCOV_INIT_TRACE, COVER_SIZE);
		cover = mmap(NULL, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long),
				PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
		munmap(cover, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long));
		cover = mmap(NULL, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long),
				PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
		memset(cover, 0, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long));
		ftruncate(fd, 3UL &lt;&lt; 20);
		return 0;
	}

This can be fixed by assigning anonymous VMAs own vm_ops and not relying
on it being NULL.

If -&gt;mmap() failed to set -&gt;vm_ops, mmap_region() will set it to
dummy_vm_ops.  This way we will have non-NULL -&gt;vm_ops for all VMAs.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180724121139.62570-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+3f84280d52be9b7083cc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: mix rdrand with entropy sent in from userspace</title>
<updated>2018-07-18T01:32:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-15T03:55:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=81e69df38e2911b642ec121dec319fad2a4782f3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:81e69df38e2911b642ec121dec319fad2a4782f3</id>
<content type='text'>
Fedora has integrated the jitter entropy daemon to work around slow
boot problems, especially on VM's that don't support virtio-rng:

    https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1572944

It's understandable why they did this, but the Jitter entropy daemon
works fundamentally on the principle: "the CPU microarchitecture is
**so** complicated and we can't figure it out, so it *must* be
random".  Yes, it uses statistical tests to "prove" it is secure, but
AES_ENCRYPT(NSA_KEY, COUNTER++) will also pass statistical tests with
flying colors.

So if RDRAND is available, mix it into entropy submitted from
userspace.  It can't hurt, and if you believe the NSA has backdoored
RDRAND, then they probably have enough details about the Intel
microarchitecture that they can reverse engineer how the Jitter
entropy daemon affects the microarchitecture, and attack its output
stream.  And if RDRAND is in fact an honest DRNG, it will immeasurably
improve on what the Jitter entropy daemon might produce.

This also provides some protection against someone who is able to read
or set the entropy seed file.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
