BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/crypto, branch dev-5.15-intel

crypto: xts - Add softdep on ecb

2022-04-08T12:23:55+00:00

[ Upstream commit dfe085d8dcd0bb1fe20cc2327e81c8064cead441 ] The xts module needs ecb to be present as it's meant to work on top of ecb. This patch adds a softdep so ecb can be included automatically into the initramfs. Reported-by: rftc Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: authenc - Fix sleep in atomic context in decrypt_tail

2022-04-08T12:23:05+00:00

[ Upstream commit 66eae850333d639fc278d6f915c6fc01499ea893 ] The function crypto_authenc_decrypt_tail discards its flags argument and always relies on the flags from the original request when starting its sub-request. This is clearly wrong as it may cause the SLEEPABLE flag to be set when it shouldn't. Fixes: 92d95ba91772 ("crypto: authenc - Convert to new AEAD interface") Reported-by: Corentin Labbe Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Tested-by: Corentin Labbe Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in pkcs1pad_verify_complete()

2022-04-08T12:23:01+00:00

commit a24611ea356c7f3f0ec926da11b9482ac1f414fd upstream. Before checking whether the expected digest_info is present, we need to check that there are enough bytes remaining. Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check

2022-04-08T12:23:01+00:00

commit d3481accd974541e6a5d6a1fb588924a3519c36e upstream. RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are required to be the same length as the RSA key size. RFC8017 specifically requires the verifier to check this (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.2). Commit a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") changed the kernel to allow longer signatures, but didn't explain this part of the change; it seems to be unrelated to the rest of the commit. Revert this change, since it doesn't appear to be correct. We can be pretty sure that no one is relying on overly-long signatures (which would have to be front-padded with zeroes) being supported, given that they would have been broken since commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms"). Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk Suggested-by: Vitaly Chikunov Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - correctly get hash from source scatterlist

2022-04-08T12:23:01+00:00

commit e316f7179be22912281ce6331d96d7c121fb2b17 upstream. Commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms") changed akcipher_alg::verify to take in both the signature and the actual hash and do the signature verification, rather than just return the hash expected by the signature as was the case before. To do this, it implemented a hack where the signature and hash are concatenated with each other in one scatterlist. Obviously, for this to work correctly, akcipher_alg::verify needs to correctly extract the two items from the scatterlist it is given. Unfortunately, it doesn't correctly extract the hash in the case where the signature is longer than the RSA key size, as it assumes that the signature's length is equal to the RSA key size. This causes a prefix of the hash, or even the entire hash, to be taken from the *signature*. (Note, the case of a signature longer than the RSA key size should not be allowed in the first place; a separate patch will fix that.) It is unclear whether the resulting scheme has any useful security properties. Fix this by correctly extracting the hash from the scatterlist. Fixes: c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms") Cc: # v5.2+ Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa

2022-04-08T12:23:01+00:00

commit 9b30430ea356f237945e52f8a3a42158877bd5a9 upstream. The pkcs1pad template can be instantiated with an arbitrary akcipher algorithm, which doesn't make sense; it is specifically an RSA padding scheme. Make it check that the underlying algorithm really is RSA. Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm") Cc: # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: asymmetric: properly validate hash_algo and encoding

2022-04-08T12:22:51+00:00

commit 590bfb57b2328951d5833979e7ca1d5fde2e609a upstream. It is insecure to allow arbitrary hash algorithms and signature encodings to be used with arbitrary signature algorithms. Notably, ECDSA, ECRDSA, and SM2 all sign/verify raw hash values and don't disambiguate between different hash algorithms like RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding does. Therefore, they need to be restricted to certain sets of hash algorithms (ideally just one, but in practice small sets are used). Additionally, the encoding is an integral part of modern signature algorithms, and is not supposed to vary. Therefore, tighten the checks of hash_algo and encoding done by software_key_determine_akcipher(). Also rearrange the parameters to software_key_determine_akcipher() to put the public_key first, as this is the most important parameter and it often determines everything else. Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys") Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification") Fixes: 0d7a78643f69 ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Stefan Berger Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: asymmetric: enforce that sig algo matches key algo

2022-04-08T12:22:51+00:00

commit 2abc9c246e0548e52985b10440c9ea3e9f65f793 upstream. Most callers of public_key_verify_signature(), including most indirect callers via verify_signature() as well as pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(), don't check that public_key_signature::pkey_algo matches public_key::pkey_algo. These should always match. However, a malicious signature could intentionally declare an unintended algorithm. It is essential that such signatures be rejected outright, or that the algorithm of the *key* be used -- not the algorithm of the signature as that would allow attackers to choose the algorithm used. Currently, public_key_verify_signature() correctly uses the key's algorithm when deciding which akcipher to allocate. That's good. However, it uses the signature's algorithm when deciding whether to do the first step of SM2, which is incorrect. Also, v4.19 and older kernels used the signature's algorithm for the entire process. Prevent such errors by making public_key_verify_signature() enforce that the signature's algorithm (if given) matches the key's algorithm. Also remove two checks of this done by callers, which are now redundant. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Stefan Berger Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: api - Move cryptomgr soft dependency into algapi

2022-02-11T08:10:26+00:00

commit c6ce9c5831cae515d375a01b97ae1778689acf19 upstream. The soft dependency on cryptomgr is only needed in algapi because if algapi isn't present then no algorithms can be loaded. This also fixes the case where api is built-in but algapi is built as a module as the soft dependency would otherwise get lost. Fixes: 8ab23d547f65 ("crypto: api - Add softdep on cryptomgr") Reported-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Tested-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: jitter - consider 32 LSB for APT

2022-01-27T10:04:31+00:00

[ Upstream commit 552d03a223eda3df84526ab2c1f4d82e15eaee7a ] The APT compares the current time stamp with a pre-set value. The current code only considered the 4 LSB only. Yet, after reviews by mathematicians of the user space Jitter RNG version >= 3.1.0, it was concluded that the APT can be calculated on the 32 LSB of the time delta. Thi change is applied to the kernel. This fixes a bug where an AMD EPYC fails this test as its RDTSC value contains zeros in the LSB. The most appropriate fix would have been to apply a GCD calculation and divide the time stamp by the GCD. Yet, this is a significant code change that will be considered for a future update. Note, tests showed that constantly the GCD always was 32 on these systems, i.e. the 5 LSB were always zero (thus failing the APT since it only considered the 4 LSB for its calculation). Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin