<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/arch/x86, branch dev-4.10</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-4.10</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-4.10'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:30:57+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: fix user triggerable warning in kvm_apic_accept_events()</title>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:30:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Hildenbrand</name>
<email>david@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-23T10:46:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=74cbcb5afa75cab817b4c9fc42bdfadb15500e7b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:74cbcb5afa75cab817b4c9fc42bdfadb15500e7b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 28bf28887976d8881a3a59491896c718fade7355 upstream.

If we already entered/are about to enter SMM, don't allow switching to
INIT/SIPI_RECEIVED, otherwise the next call to kvm_apic_accept_events()
will report a warning.

Same applies if we are already in MP state INIT_RECEIVED and SMM is
requested to be turned on. Refuse to set the VCPU events in this case.

Fixes: cd7764fe9f73 ("KVM: x86: latch INITs while in system management mode")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86: Fix Broadwell-EP DRAM RAPL events</title>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:30:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vince Weaver</name>
<email>vincent.weaver@maine.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-02T18:08:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=f22d13c45f2d607b58a867a7e8c3d6fefd9385bd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f22d13c45f2d607b58a867a7e8c3d6fefd9385bd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 33b88e708e7dfa58dc896da2a98f5719d2eb315c upstream.

It appears as though the Broadwell-EP DRAM units share the special
units quirk with Haswell-EP/KNL.

Without this patch, you get really high results (a single DRAM using 20W
of power).

The powercap driver in drivers/powercap/intel_rapl.c already has this
change.

Signed-off-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kan Liang &lt;kan.liang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>um: Fix PTRACE_POKEUSER on x86_64</title>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:30:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Weinberger</name>
<email>richard@nod.at</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-31T22:41:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=29d07bb20ee5954d87e78e808fac9503652b3ec6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:29d07bb20ee5954d87e78e808fac9503652b3ec6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9abc74a22d85ab29cef9896a2582a530da7e79bf upstream.

This is broken since ever but sadly nobody noticed.
Recent versions of GDB set DR_CONTROL unconditionally and
UML dies due to a heap corruption. It turns out that
the PTRACE_POKEUSER was copy&amp;pasted from i386 and assumes
that addresses are 4 bytes long.

Fix that by using 8 as address size in the calculation.

Reported-by: jie cao &lt;cj3054@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, pmem: Fix cache flushing for iovec write &lt; 8 bytes</title>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:30:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-09T17:00:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=efbd8cc8f6f8ddb81079c0e416358d101f46f5e7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:efbd8cc8f6f8ddb81079c0e416358d101f46f5e7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8376efd31d3d7c44bd05be337adde023cc531fa1 upstream.

Commit 11e63f6d920d added cache flushing for unaligned writes from an
iovec, covering the first and last cache line of a &gt;= 8 byte write and
the first cache line of a &lt; 8 byte write.  But an unaligned write of
2-7 bytes can still cover two cache lines, so make sure we flush both
in that case.

Fixes: 11e63f6d920d ("x86, pmem: fix broken __copy_user_nocache ...")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/boot: Fix BSS corruption/overwrite bug in early x86 kernel startup</title>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:30:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashish Kalra</name>
<email>ashish@bluestacks.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-19T15:20:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=c4b0426385eaf6e205488a348acb32ab1ee162ec'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c4b0426385eaf6e205488a348acb32ab1ee162ec</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d594aa0277e541bb997aef0bc0a55172d8138340 upstream.

The minimum size for a new stack (512 bytes) setup for arch/x86/boot components
when the bootloader does not setup/provide a stack for the early boot components
is not "enough".

The setup code executing as part of early kernel startup code, uses the stack
beyond 512 bytes and accidentally overwrites and corrupts part of the BSS
section. This is exposed mostly in the early video setup code, where
it was corrupting BSS variables like force_x, force_y, which in-turn affected
kernel parameters such as screen_info (screen_info.orig_video_cols) and
later caused an exception/panic in console_init().

Most recent boot loaders setup the stack for early boot components, so this
stack overwriting into BSS section issue has not been exposed.

Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish@bluestacks.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170419152015.10011-1-ashishkalra@Ashishs-MacBook-Pro.local
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: adjust early dom0 p2m handling to xen hypervisor behavior</title>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:30:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-10T04:08:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=8fe6ee0b6e695b8e5de802c9d0a1360493653ee8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8fe6ee0b6e695b8e5de802c9d0a1360493653ee8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 69861e0a52f8733355ce246f0db15e1b240ad667 upstream.

When booted as pv-guest the p2m list presented by the Xen is already
mapped to virtual addresses. In dom0 case the hypervisor might make use
of 2M- or 1G-pages for this mapping. Unfortunately while being properly
aligned in virtual and machine address space, those pages might not be
aligned properly in guest physical address space.

So when trying to obtain the guest physical address of such a page
pud_pfn() and pmd_pfn() must be avoided as those will mask away guest
physical address bits not being zero in this special case.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: Revert commits da72ff5bfcb0 and 72a9b186292d</title>
<updated>2017-05-14T12:08:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Boris Ostrovsky</name>
<email>boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-24T19:04:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=4a66b610a8213a9e273914d6feaeda6b1e979c40'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4a66b610a8213a9e273914d6feaeda6b1e979c40</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 84d582d236dc1f9085e741affc72e9ba061a67c2 upstream.

Recent discussion (http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&amp;m=149192184523741)
established that commit 72a9b186292d ("xen: Remove event channel
notification through Xen PCI platform device") (and thus commit
da72ff5bfcb0 ("partially revert "xen: Remove event channel
notification through Xen PCI platform device"")) are unnecessary and,
in fact, prevent HVM guests from booting on Xen releases prior to 4.0

Therefore we revert both of those commits.

The summary of that discussion is below:

  Here is the brief summary of the current situation:

  Before the offending commit (72a9b186292):

  1) INTx does not work because of the reset_watches path.
  2) The reset_watches path is only taken if you have Xen &gt; 4.0
  3) The Linux Kernel by default will use vector inject if the hypervisor
     support. So even INTx does not work no body running the kernel with
     Xen &gt; 4.0 would notice. Unless he explicitly disabled this feature
     either in the kernel or in Xen (and this can only be disabled by
     modifying the code, not user-supported way to do it).

  After the offending commit (+ partial revert):

  1) INTx is no longer support for HVM (only for PV guests).
  2) Any HVM guest The kernel will not boot on Xen &lt; 4.0 which does
     not have vector injection support. Since the only other mode
     supported is INTx which.

  So based on this summary, I think before commit (72a9b186292) we were
  in much better position from a user point of view.

Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Cc: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Julien Grall &lt;julien.grall@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Ross Lagerwall &lt;ross.lagerwall@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Anthony Liguori &lt;aliguori@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed &lt;karahmed@amazon.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: nVMX: do not leak PML full vmexit to L1</title>
<updated>2017-05-14T12:08:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ladi Prosek</name>
<email>lprosek@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-31T08:19:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=69a09d73e8bd8434e34c5b83913937cc202d87a7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:69a09d73e8bd8434e34c5b83913937cc202d87a7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ab007cc94ff9d82f5a8db8363b3becbd946e58cf upstream.

The PML feature is not exposed to guests so we should not be forwarding
the vmexit either.

This commit fixes BSOD 0x20001 (HYPERVISOR_ERROR) when running Hyper-V
enabled Windows Server 2016 in L1 on hardware that supports PML.

Fixes: 843e4330573c ("KVM: VMX: Add PML support in VMX")
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek &lt;lprosek@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: nVMX: initialize PML fields in vmcs02</title>
<updated>2017-05-14T12:08:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ladi Prosek</name>
<email>lprosek@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-04T12:18:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=22e025bc1af900e4ac8b2bea9772cead23d402a1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:22e025bc1af900e4ac8b2bea9772cead23d402a1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1fb883bb827ee8efc1cc9ea0154f953f8a219d38 upstream.

L2 was running with uninitialized PML fields which led to incomplete
dirty bitmap logging. This manifested as all kinds of subtle erratic
behavior of the nested guest.

Fixes: 843e4330573c ("KVM: VMX: Add PML support in VMX")
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek &lt;lprosek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "KVM: nested VMX: disable perf cpuid reporting"</title>
<updated>2017-05-14T12:08:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jim Mattson</name>
<email>jmattson@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-21T00:34:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=4897ec5ece6c0ac1138a0546df7705865b44b1fa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4897ec5ece6c0ac1138a0546df7705865b44b1fa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0b4c208d443ba2af82b4c70f99ca8df31e9a0020 upstream.

This reverts commit bc6134942dbbf31c25e9bd7c876be5da81c9e1ce.

A CPUID instruction executed in VMX non-root mode always causes a
VM-exit, regardless of the leaf being queried.

Fixes: bc6134942dbb ("KVM: nested VMX: disable perf cpuid reporting")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
[The issue solved by bc6134942dbb has been resolved with ff651cb613b4
 ("KVM: nVMX: Add nested msr load/restore algorithm").]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
