BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/arch/x86/kernel, branch dev-5.1

Merge tag 'v5.1.16' into dev-5.1

2019-07-04T01:43:41+00:00

This is the 5.1.16 stable release Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley

x86/resctrl: Prevent possible overrun during bitmap operations

2019-07-03T11:13:39+00:00

commit 32f010deab575199df4ebe7b6aec20c17bb7eccd upstream. While the DOC at the beginning of lib/bitmap.c explicitly states that "The number of valid bits in a given bitmap does _not_ need to be an exact multiple of BITS_PER_LONG.", some of the bitmap operations do indeed access BITS_PER_LONG portions of the provided bitmap no matter the size of the provided bitmap. For example, if find_first_bit() is provided with an 8 bit bitmap the operation will access BITS_PER_LONG bits from the provided bitmap. While the operation ensures that these extra bits do not affect the result, the memory is still accessed. The capacity bitmasks (CBMs) are typically stored in u32 since they can never exceed 32 bits. A few instances exist where a bitmap_* operation is performed on a CBM by simply pointing the bitmap operation to the stored u32 value. The consequence of this pattern is that some bitmap_* operations will access out-of-bounds memory when interacting with the provided CBM. This same issue has previously been addressed with commit 49e00eee0061 ("x86/intel_rdt: Fix out-of-bounds memory access in CBM tests") but at that time not all instances of the issue were fixed. Fix this by using an unsigned long to store the capacity bitmask data that is passed to bitmap functions. Fixes: e651901187ab ("x86/intel_rdt: Introduce "bit_usage" to display cache allocations details") Fixes: f4e80d67a527 ("x86/intel_rdt: Resctrl files reflect pseudo-locked information") Fixes: 95f0b77efa57 ("x86/intel_rdt: Initialize new resource group with sane defaults") Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Fenghua Yu Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: stable Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tony Luck Cc: x86-ml Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/58c9b6081fd9bf599af0dfc01a6fdd335768efef.1560975645.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/microcode: Fix the microcode load on CPU hotplug for real

2019-07-03T11:13:39+00:00

commit 5423f5ce5ca410b3646f355279e4e937d452e622 upstream. A recent change moved the microcode loader hotplug callback into the early startup phase which is running with interrupts disabled. It missed that the callbacks invoke sysfs functions which might sleep causing nice 'might sleep' splats with proper debugging enabled. Split the callbacks and only load the microcode in the early startup phase and move the sysfs handling back into the later threaded and preemptible bringup phase where it was before. Fixes: 78f4e932f776 ("x86/microcode, cpuhotplug: Add a microcode loader CPU hotplug callback") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86-ml Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1906182228350.1766@nanos.tec.linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation: Allow guests to use SSBD even if host does not

2019-07-03T11:13:39+00:00

commit c1f7fec1eb6a2c86d01bc22afce772c743451d88 upstream. The bits set in x86_spec_ctrl_mask are used to calculate the guest's value of SPEC_CTRL that is written to the MSR before VMENTRY, and control which mitigations the guest can enable. In the case of SSBD, unless the host has enabled SSBD always on mode (by passing "spec_store_bypass_disable=on" in the kernel parameters), the SSBD bit is not set in the mask and the guest can not properly enable the SSBD always on mitigation mode. This has been confirmed by running the SSBD PoC on a guest using the SSBD always on mitigation mode (booted with kernel parameter "spec_store_bypass_disable=on"), and verifying that the guest is vulnerable unless the host is also using SSBD always on mode. In addition, the guest OS incorrectly reports the SSB vulnerability as mitigated. Always set the SSBD bit in x86_spec_ctrl_mask when the host CPU supports it, allowing the guest to use SSBD whether or not the host has chosen to enable the mitigation in any of its modes. Fixes: be6fcb5478e9 ("x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic") Signed-off-by: Alejandro Jimenez Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560187210-11054-1-git-send-email-alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152

2019-07-02T05:03:44+00:00

Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Allison Randal Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman (cherry picked from commit 2874c5fd284268364ece81a7bd936f3c8168e567) Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley

x86/resctrl: Don't stop walking closids when a locksetup group is found

2019-06-25T03:34:56+00:00

commit 87d3aa28f345bea77c396855fa5d5fec4c24461f upstream. When a new control group is created __init_one_rdt_domain() walks all the other closids to calculate the sets of used and unused bits. If it discovers a pseudo_locksetup group, it breaks out of the loop. This means any later closid doesn't get its used bits added to used_b. These bits will then get set in unused_b, and added to the new control group's configuration, even if they were marked as exclusive for a later closid. When encountering a pseudo_locksetup group, we should continue. This is because "a resource group enters 'pseudo-locked' mode after the schemata is written while the resource group is in 'pseudo-locksetup' mode." When we find a pseudo_locksetup group, its configuration is expected to be overwritten, we can skip it. Fixes: dfe9674b04ff6 ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable entering of pseudo-locksetup mode") Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Reinette Chatre Cc: Fenghua Yu Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: H Peter Avin Cc: Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190603172531.178830-1-james.morse@arm.com [Dropped comment due to lack of space] Signed-off-by: James Morse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/CPU/AMD: Don't force the CPB cap when running under a hypervisor

2019-06-22T06:09:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2ac44ab608705948564791ce1d15d43ba81a1e38 ] For F17h AMD CPUs, the CPB capability ('Core Performance Boost') is forcibly set, because some versions of that chip incorrectly report that they do not have it. However, a hypervisor may filter out the CPB capability, for good reasons. For example, KVM currently does not emulate setting the CPB bit in MSR_K7_HWCR, and unchecked MSR access errors will be thrown when trying to set it as a guest: unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010015 (tried to write 0x0000000001000011) at rIP: 0xffffffff890638f4 (native_write_msr+0x4/0x20) Call Trace: boost_set_msr+0x50/0x80 [acpi_cpufreq] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x86/0x560 sort_range+0x20/0x20 cpuhp_thread_fun+0xb0/0x110 smpboot_thread_fn+0xef/0x160 kthread+0x113/0x130 kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 To avoid this issue, don't forcibly set the CPB capability for a CPU when running under a hypervisor. Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden Acked-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com Fixes: 0237199186e7 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Set the CPB bit unconditionally on F17h") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522221745.GA15789@dev-dsk-fllinden-2c-c1893d73.us-west-2.amazon.com [ Minor edits to the changelog. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/resctrl: Prevent NULL pointer dereference when local MBM is disabled

2019-06-19T06:00:14+00:00

commit c7563e62a6d720aa3b068e26ddffab5f0df29263 upstream. Booting with kernel parameter "rdt=cmt,mbmtotal,memlocal,l3cat,mba" and executing "mount -t resctrl resctrl -o mba_MBps /sys/fs/resctrl" results in a NULL pointer dereference on systems which do not have local MBM support enabled.. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 722 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 5.2.0-0.rc3.git0.1.el7_UNSUPPORTED.x86_64 #2 Workqueue: events mbm_handle_overflow RIP: 0010:mbm_handle_overflow+0x150/0x2b0 Only enter the bandwith update loop if the system has local MBM enabled. Fixes: de73f38f7680 ("x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Feedback loop to dynamically update mem bandwidth") Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Fenghua Yu Cc: Reinette Chatre Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190610171544.13474-1-prarit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/microcode, cpuhotplug: Add a microcode loader CPU hotplug callback

2019-06-19T06:00:14+00:00

commit 78f4e932f7760d965fb1569025d1576ab77557c5 upstream. Adric Blake reported the following warning during suspend-resume: Enabling non-boot CPUs ... x86: Booting SMP configuration: smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x2 unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x10f (tried to write 0x0000000000000000) \ at rIP: 0xffffffff8d267924 (native_write_msr+0x4/0x20) Call Trace: intel_set_tfa intel_pmu_cpu_starting ? x86_pmu_dead_cpu x86_pmu_starting_cpu cpuhp_invoke_callback ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave notify_cpu_starting start_secondary secondary_startup_64 microcode: sig=0x806ea, pf=0x80, revision=0x96 microcode: updated to revision 0xb4, date = 2019-04-01 CPU1 is up The MSR in question is MSR_TFA_RTM_FORCE_ABORT and that MSR is emulated by microcode. The log above shows that the microcode loader callback happens after the PMU restoration, leading to the conjecture that because the microcode hasn't been updated yet, that MSR is not present yet, leading to the #GP. Add a microcode loader-specific hotplug vector which comes before the PERF vectors and thus executes earlier and makes sure the MSR is present. Fixes: 400816f60c54 ("perf/x86/intel: Implement support for TSX Force Abort") Reported-by: Adric Blake Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203637 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/kprobes: Set instruction page as executable

2019-06-09T07:16:18+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7298e24f904224fa79eb8fd7e0fbd78950ccf2db ] Set the page as executable after allocation. This patch is a preparatory patch for a following patch that makes module allocated pages non-executable. While at it, do some small cleanup of what appears to be unnecessary masking. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-11-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin