BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c, branch dev-5.2

treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for missed files

2019-05-21T08:50:45+00:00

Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which: - Have no license information of any form - Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the initial scan/conversion to ignore the file These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge branch 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2019-05-14T14:57:29+00:00

Pull x86 MDS mitigations from Thomas Gleixner: "Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU internal buffers. This new set of misfeatures has the following CVEs assigned: CVE-2018-12126 MSBDS Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling CVE-2018-12130 MFBDS Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling CVE-2018-12127 MLPDS Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling CVE-2019-11091 MDSUM Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory MDS attacks target microarchitectural buffers which speculatively forward data under certain conditions. Disclosure gadgets can expose this data via cache side channels. Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully. The mitigation is to flush the microarchitectural buffers on return to user space and before entering a VM. It's bolted on the VERW instruction and requires a microcode update. As some of the attacks exploit data structures shared between hyperthreads, full protection requires to disable hyperthreading. The kernel does not do that by default to avoid breaking unattended updates. The mitigation set comes with documentation for administrators and a deeper technical view" * 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits) x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers() x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY ...

x86/exceptions: Split debug IST stack

2019-04-17T13:14:28+00:00

The debug IST stack is actually two separate debug stacks to handle #DB recursion. This is required because the CPU starts always at top of stack on exception entry, which means on #DB recursion the second #DB would overwrite the stack of the first. The low level entry code therefore adjusts the top of stack on entry so a secondary #DB starts from a different stack page. But the stack pages are adjacent without a guard page between them. Split the debug stack into 3 stacks which are separated by guard pages. The 3rd stack is never mapped into the cpu_entry_area and is only there to catch triple #DB nesting: --- top of DB_stack <- Initial stack --- end of DB_stack guard page --- top of DB1_stack <- Top of stack after entering first #DB --- end of DB1_stack guard page --- top of DB2_stack <- Top of stack after entering second #DB --- end of DB2_stack guard page If DB2 would not act as the final guard hole, a second #DB would point the top of #DB stack to the stack below #DB1 which would be valid and not catch the not so desired triple nesting. The backing store does not allocate any memory for DB2 and its guard page as it is not going to be mapped into the cpu_entry_area. - Adjust the low level entry code so it adjusts top of #DB with the offset between the stacks instead of exception stack size. - Make the dumpstack code aware of the new stacks. - Adjust the in_debug_stack() implementation and move it into the NMI code where it belongs. As this is NMI hotpath code, it just checks the full area between top of DB_stack and bottom of DB1_stack without checking for the guard page. That's correct because the NMI cannot hit a stackpointer pointing to the guard page between DB and DB1 stack. Even if it would, then the NMI operation still is unaffected, but the resume of the debug exception on the topmost DB stack will crash by touching the guard page. [ bp: Make exception_stack_names static const char * const ] Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Baoquan He Cc: "Chang S. Bae" Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Dominik Brodowski Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Joerg Roedel Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Juergen Gross Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masahiro Yamada Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Qian Cai Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: x86-ml Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.439944544@linutronix.de

x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user

2019-03-06T20:52:13+00:00

Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear mechanism on exit to user space and add the call into prepare_exit_to_usermode() and do_nmi() right before actually returning. Add documentation which kernel to user space transition this covers and explain why some corner cases are not mitigated. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker Reviewed-by: Jon Masters Tested-by: Jon Masters

locking/atomics: COCCINELLE/treewide: Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() patterns to READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()

2017-10-25T09:01:08+00:00

Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the coccinelle script shown below and apply its output. For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in churn. However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following coccinelle script: ---- // Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and // WRITE_ONCE() // $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch virtual patch @ depends on patch @ expression E1, E2; @@ - ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2 + WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2) @ depends on patch @ expression E; @@ - ACCESS_ONCE(E) + READ_ONCE(E) ---- Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: shuah@kernel.org Cc: snitzer@redhat.com Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com Cc: tj@kernel.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/nmi: Use raw lock

2017-08-16T18:40:09+00:00

register_nmi_handler() can be called from PREEMPT_RT atomic context (e.g. wakeup_cpu_via_init_nmi() or native_stop_other_cpus()), and thus ordinary spinlocks cannot be used. Signed-off-by: Scott Wood Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Don Zickus Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170724213242.27598-1-swood@redhat.com

Merge tag 'edac_for_4.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bp/bp

2017-05-01T18:36:00+00:00

Pull EDAC updates from Borislav Petkov: - an EDAC driver for Cavium ThunderX RAS IP (Sergey Temerkhanov) - removal of DRAM error reporting through PCI SERR NMI (Borislav Petkov) - misc small fixes (Jan Glauber, Thor Thayer) * tag 'edac_for_4.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bp/bp: EDAC, ghes: Do not enable it by default EDAC: Rename report status accessors EDAC: Delete edac_stub.c EDAC: Update Kconfig help text EDAC: Remove EDAC_MM_EDAC EDAC: Issue tracepoint only when it is defined ACPI/extlog: Add EDAC dependency EDAC: Move edac_op_state to edac_mc.c EDAC: Remove edac_err_assert EDAC: Get rid of edac_handlers x86/nmi, EDAC: Get rid of DRAM error reporting thru PCI SERR NMI EDAC, highbank: Align Makefile directives EDAC, thunderx: Remove unused code EDAC, thunderx: Change LMC index calculation EDAC, altera: Fix peripheral warnings for Cyclone5 EDAC, thunderx: Fix L2C MCI interrupt disable EDAC, thunderx: Add Cavium ThunderX EDAC driver

x86/nmi, EDAC: Get rid of DRAM error reporting thru PCI SERR NMI

2017-04-10T15:13:48+00:00

Apparently, some machines used to report DRAM errors through a PCI SERR NMI. This is why we have a call into EDAC in the NMI handler. See c0d121720220 ("drivers/edac: add new nmi rescan"). From looking at the patch above, that's two drivers: e752x_edac.c and e7xxx_edac.c. Now, I wanna say those are old machines which are probably decommissioned already. Tony says that "[t]the newest CPU supported by either of those drivers is the Xeon E7520 (a.k.a. "Nehalem") released in Q1'2010. Possibly some folks are still using these ... but people that hold onto h/w for 7 years generally cling to old s/w too ... so I'd guess it unlikely that we will get complaints for breaking these in upstream." So even if there is a small number still in use, we did load EDAC with edac_op_state == EDAC_OPSTATE_POLL by default (we still do, in fact) which means a default EDAC setup without any parameters supplied on the command line or otherwise would never even log the error in the NMI handler because we're polling by default: inline int edac_handler_set(void) { if (edac_op_state == EDAC_OPSTATE_POLL) return 0; return atomic_read(&edac_handlers); } So, long story short, I'd like to get rid of that nastiness called edac_stub.c and confine all the EDAC drivers solely to drivers/edac/. If we ever have to do stuff like that again, it should be notifiers we're using and not some insanity like this one. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tony Luck

x86/platform: Remove warning message for duplicate NMI handlers

2017-03-13T19:45:18+00:00

Remove the WARNING message associated with multiple NMI handlers as there are at least two that are legitimate. These are the KGDB and the UV handlers and both want to be called if the NMI has not been claimed by any other NMI handler. Use of the UNKNOWN NMI call chain dramatically lowers the NMI call rate when high frequency NMI tools are in use, notably the perf tools. It is required on systems that cannot sustain a high NMI call rate without adversely affecting the system operation. Signed-off-by: Mike Travis Reviewed-by: Dimitri Sivanich Cc: Don Zickus Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Russ Anderson Cc: Frank Ramsay Cc: Tony Ernst Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170307210841.730959611@asylum.americas.sgi.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner

sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to

2017-03-02T07:42:34+00:00

We are going to split out of , which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder file that just maps to to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds Cc: Mike Galbraith Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar