<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/arch/x86/include, branch dev-4.10</title>
<subtitle>Intel OpenBMC Linux kernel source tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-4.10</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/atom?h=dev-4.10'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:30:57+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86, pmem: Fix cache flushing for iovec write &lt; 8 bytes</title>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:30:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-09T17:00:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=efbd8cc8f6f8ddb81079c0e416358d101f46f5e7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:efbd8cc8f6f8ddb81079c0e416358d101f46f5e7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8376efd31d3d7c44bd05be337adde023cc531fa1 upstream.

Commit 11e63f6d920d added cache flushing for unaligned writes from an
iovec, covering the first and last cache line of a &gt;= 8 byte write and
the first cache line of a &lt; 8 byte write.  But an unaligned write of
2-7 bytes can still cover two cache lines, so make sure we flush both
in that case.

Fixes: 11e63f6d920d ("x86, pmem: fix broken __copy_user_nocache ...")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: Revert commits da72ff5bfcb0 and 72a9b186292d</title>
<updated>2017-05-14T12:08:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Boris Ostrovsky</name>
<email>boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-24T19:04:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=4a66b610a8213a9e273914d6feaeda6b1e979c40'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4a66b610a8213a9e273914d6feaeda6b1e979c40</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 84d582d236dc1f9085e741affc72e9ba061a67c2 upstream.

Recent discussion (http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&amp;m=149192184523741)
established that commit 72a9b186292d ("xen: Remove event channel
notification through Xen PCI platform device") (and thus commit
da72ff5bfcb0 ("partially revert "xen: Remove event channel
notification through Xen PCI platform device"")) are unnecessary and,
in fact, prevent HVM guests from booting on Xen releases prior to 4.0

Therefore we revert both of those commits.

The summary of that discussion is below:

  Here is the brief summary of the current situation:

  Before the offending commit (72a9b186292):

  1) INTx does not work because of the reset_watches path.
  2) The reset_watches path is only taken if you have Xen &gt; 4.0
  3) The Linux Kernel by default will use vector inject if the hypervisor
     support. So even INTx does not work no body running the kernel with
     Xen &gt; 4.0 would notice. Unless he explicitly disabled this feature
     either in the kernel or in Xen (and this can only be disabled by
     modifying the code, not user-supported way to do it).

  After the offending commit (+ partial revert):

  1) INTx is no longer support for HVM (only for PV guests).
  2) Any HVM guest The kernel will not boot on Xen &lt; 4.0 which does
     not have vector injection support. Since the only other mode
     supported is INTx which.

  So based on this summary, I think before commit (72a9b186292) we were
  in much better position from a user point of view.

Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Cc: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Julien Grall &lt;julien.grall@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Ross Lagerwall &lt;ross.lagerwall@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Anthony Liguori &lt;aliguori@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed &lt;karahmed@amazon.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/vdso: Plug race between mapping and ELF header setup</title>
<updated>2017-04-21T07:32:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-10T15:14:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=083d30d61a1aef4d28c7d6b273430de20e1c1efe'/>
<id>urn:sha1:083d30d61a1aef4d28c7d6b273430de20e1c1efe</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6fdc6dd90272ce7e75d744f71535cfbd8d77da81 upstream.

The vsyscall32 sysctl can racy against a concurrent fork when it switches
from disabled to enabled:

    arch_setup_additional_pages()
	if (vdso32_enabled)
           --&gt; No mapping
                                        sysctl.vsysscall32()
                                          --&gt; vdso32_enabled = true
    create_elf_tables()
      ARCH_DLINFO_IA32
        if (vdso32_enabled) {
           --&gt; Add VDSO entry with NULL pointer

Make ARCH_DLINFO_IA32 check whether the VDSO mapping has been set up for
the newly forked process or not.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170410151723.602367196@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, pmem: fix broken __copy_user_nocache cache-bypass assumptions</title>
<updated>2017-04-21T07:32:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Williams</name>
<email>dan.j.williams@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-06T16:04:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=b8cb11e01a7feb5a7136f4881324ebde1a57a2eb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b8cb11e01a7feb5a7136f4881324ebde1a57a2eb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 11e63f6d920d6f2dfd3cd421e939a4aec9a58dcd upstream.

Before we rework the "pmem api" to stop abusing __copy_user_nocache()
for memcpy_to_pmem() we need to fix cases where we may strand dirty data
in the cpu cache. The problem occurs when copy_from_iter_pmem() is used
for arbitrary data transfers from userspace. There is no guarantee that
these transfers, performed by dax_iomap_actor(), will have aligned
destinations or aligned transfer lengths. Backstop the usage
__copy_user_nocache() with explicit cache management in these unaligned
cases.

Yes, copy_from_iter_pmem() is now too big for an inline, but addressing
that is saved for a later patch that moves the entirety of the "pmem
api" into the pmem driver directly.

Fixes: 5de490daec8b ("pmem: add copy_from_iter_pmem() and clear_pmem()")
Cc: &lt;x86@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Jeff Moyer &lt;jmoyer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;mawilcox@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hpe.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: cleanup the page tracking SRCU instance</title>
<updated>2017-03-31T08:33:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-27T15:53:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=71a434f7c9b8dc2737926895f464c9b37dc72670'/>
<id>urn:sha1:71a434f7c9b8dc2737926895f464c9b37dc72670</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2beb6dad2e8f95d710159d5befb390e4f62ab5cf upstream.

SRCU uses a delayed work item.  Skip cleaning it up, and
the result is use-after-free in the work item callbacks.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 0eb05bf290cfe8610d9680b49abef37febd1c38a
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong &lt;xiaoguangrong.eric@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/tlb: Fix tlb flushing when lguest clears PGE</title>
<updated>2017-03-15T02:20:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-11T00:31:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=459bc5065631ab698917355ba6b2e3167547a801'/>
<id>urn:sha1:459bc5065631ab698917355ba6b2e3167547a801</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2c4ea6e28dbf15ab93632c5c189f3948366b8885 upstream.

Fengguang reported random corruptions from various locations on x86-32
after commits d2852a224050 ("arch: add ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY config") and
9d876e79df6a ("bpf: fix unlocking of jited image when module ronx not set")
that uses the former. While x86-32 doesn't have a JIT like x86_64, the
bpf_prog_lock_ro() and bpf_prog_unlock_ro() got enabled due to
ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY, whereas Fengguang's test kernel doesn't have module
support built in and therefore never had the DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX setting
enabled.

After investigating the crashes further, it turned out that using
set_memory_ro() and set_memory_rw() didn't have the desired effect, for
example, setting the pages as read-only on x86-32 would still let
probe_kernel_write() succeed without error. This behavior would manifest
itself in situations where the vmalloc'ed buffer was accessed prior to
set_memory_*() such as in case of bpf_prog_alloc(). In cases where it
wasn't, the page attribute changes seemed to have taken effect, leading to
the conclusion that a TLB invalidate didn't happen. Moreover, it turned out
that this issue reproduced with qemu in "-cpu kvm64" mode, but not for
"-cpu host". When the issue occurs, change_page_attr_set_clr() did trigger
a TLB flush as expected via __flush_tlb_all() through cpa_flush_range(),
though.

There are 3 variants for issuing a TLB flush: invpcid_flush_all() (depends
on CPU feature bits X86_FEATURE_INVPCID, X86_FEATURE_PGE), cr4 based flush
(depends on X86_FEATURE_PGE), and cr3 based flush.  For "-cpu host" case in
my setup, the flush used invpcid_flush_all() variant, whereas for "-cpu
kvm64", the flush was cr4 based. Switching the kvm64 case to cr3 manually
worked fine, and further investigating the cr4 one turned out that
X86_CR4_PGE bit was not set in cr4 register, meaning the
__native_flush_tlb_global_irq_disabled() wrote cr4 twice with the same
value instead of clearing X86_CR4_PGE in the first write to trigger the
flush.

It turned out that X86_CR4_PGE was cleared from cr4 during init from
lguest_arch_host_init() via adjust_pge(). The X86_FEATURE_PGE bit is also
cleared from there due to concerns of using PGE in guest kernel that can
lead to hard to trace bugs (see bff672e630a0 ("lguest: documentation V:
Host") in init()). The CPU feature bits are cleared in dynamic
boot_cpu_data, but they never propagated to __flush_tlb_all() as it uses
static_cpu_has() instead of boot_cpu_has() for testing which variant of TLB
flushing to use, meaning they still used the old setting of the host
kernel.

Clearing via setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PGE) so this would propagate
to static_cpu_has() checks is too late at this point as sections have been
patched already, so for now, it seems reasonable to switch back to
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE) as it was prior to commit c109bf95992b
("x86/cpufeature: Remove cpu_has_pge"). This lets the TLB flush trigger via
cr3 as originally intended, properly makes the new page attributes visible
and thus fixes the crashes seen by Fengguang.

Fixes: c109bf95992b ("x86/cpufeature: Remove cpu_has_pge")
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: bp@suse.de
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: lkp@01.org
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernrl.org/r/20170301125426.l4nf65rx4wahohyl@wfg-t540p.sh.intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/25c41ad9eca164be4db9ad84f768965b7eb19d9e.1489191673.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/pkeys: Check against max pkey to avoid overflows</title>
<updated>2017-03-12T05:44:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Hansen</name>
<email>dave.hansen@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-23T22:26:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=6039863d6c97814cd1e147021487fcc21a82762a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6039863d6c97814cd1e147021487fcc21a82762a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 58ab9a088ddac4efe823471275859d64f735577e upstream.

Kirill reported a warning from UBSAN about undefined behavior when using
protection keys.  He is running on hardware that actually has support for
it, which is not widely available.

The warning triggers because of very large shifts of integers when doing a
pkey_free() of a large, invalid value. This happens because we never check
that the pkey "fits" into the mm_pkey_allocation_map().

I do not believe there is any danger here of anything bad happening
other than some aliasing issues where somebody could do:

	pkey_free(35);

and the kernel would effectively execute:

	pkey_free(8);

While this might be confusing to an app that was doing something stupid, it
has to do something stupid and the effects are limited to the app shooting
itself in the foot.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: shuah@kernel.org
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170223222603.A022ED65@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/CPU/AMD: Bring back Compute Unit ID</title>
<updated>2017-02-05T11:18:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov</name>
<email>bp@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-05T10:50:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=79a8b9aa388b0620cc1d525d7c0f0d9a8a85e08e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:79a8b9aa388b0620cc1d525d7c0f0d9a8a85e08e</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit:

  a33d331761bc ("x86/CPU/AMD: Fix Bulldozer topology")

restored the initial approach we had with the Fam15h topology of
enumerating CU (Compute Unit) threads as cores. And this is still
correct - they're beefier than HT threads but still have some
shared functionality.

Our current approach has a problem with the Mad Max Steam game, for
example. Yves Dionne reported a certain "choppiness" while playing on
v4.9.5.

That problem stems most likely from the fact that the CU threads share
resources within one CU and when we schedule to a thread of a different
compute unit, this incurs latency due to migrating the working set to a
different CU through the caches.

When the thread siblings mask mirrors that aspect of the CUs and
threads, the scheduler pays attention to it and tries to schedule within
one CU first. Which takes care of the latency, of course.

Reported-by: Yves Dionne &lt;yves.dionne@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.9
Cc: Brice Goglin &lt;Brice.Goglin@inria.fr&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Yazen Ghannam &lt;yazen.ghannam@amd.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170205105022.8705-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/microcode: Do not access the initrd after it has been freed</title>
<updated>2017-01-30T08:32:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov</name>
<email>bp@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-25T20:00:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=24c2503255d35c269b67162c397a1a1c1e02f6ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:24c2503255d35c269b67162c397a1a1c1e02f6ce</id>
<content type='text'>
When we look for microcode blobs, we first try builtin and if that
doesn't succeed, we fallback to the initrd supplied to the kernel.

However, at some point doing boot, that initrd gets jettisoned and we
shouldn't access it anymore. But we do, as the below KASAN report shows.
That's because find_microcode_in_initrd() doesn't check whether the
initrd is still valid or not.

So do that.

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in find_cpio_data
  Read of size 1 by task swapper/1/0
  page:ffffea0000db9d40 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x1
  flags: 0x100000000000000()
  raw: 0100000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 00000000ffffffff
  raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
  CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G        W       4.10.0-rc5-debug-00075-g2dbde22 #3
  Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9360/0839Y6, BIOS 1.2.3 12/01/2016
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack
   ? _atomic_dec_and_lock
   ? __dump_page
   kasan_report_error
   ? pointer
   ? find_cpio_data
   __asan_report_load1_noabort
   ? find_cpio_data
   find_cpio_data
   ? vsprintf
   ? dump_stack
   ? get_ucode_user
   ? print_usage_bug
   find_microcode_in_initrd
   __load_ucode_intel
   ? collect_cpu_info_early
   ? debug_check_no_locks_freed
   load_ucode_intel_ap
   ? collect_cpu_info
   ? trace_hardirqs_on
   ? flat_send_IPI_mask_allbutself
   load_ucode_ap
   ? get_builtin_firmware
   ? flush_tlb_func
   ? do_raw_spin_trylock
   ? cpumask_weight
   cpu_init
   ? trace_hardirqs_off
   ? play_dead_common
   ? native_play_dead
   ? hlt_play_dead
   ? syscall_init
   ? arch_cpu_idle_dead
   ? do_idle
   start_secondary
   start_cpu
  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffff880036e74f00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
   ffff880036e74f80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
  &gt;ffff880036e75000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                     ^
   ffff880036e75080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
   ffff880036e75100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
  ==================================================================

Reported-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170126165833.evjemhbqzaepirxo@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/unwind: Include __schedule() in stack traces</title>
<updated>2017-01-12T08:28:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-09T18:00:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/BMC/Intel-BMC/linux.git/commit/?id=2c96b2fe9c57b4267c3f0a680d82d7cc52e1c447'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2c96b2fe9c57b4267c3f0a680d82d7cc52e1c447</id>
<content type='text'>
In the following commit:

  0100301bfdf5 ("sched/x86: Rewrite the switch_to() code")

... the layout of the 'inactive_task_frame' struct was designed to have
a frame pointer header embedded in it, so that the unwinder could use
the 'bp' and 'ret_addr' fields to report __schedule() on the stack (or
ret_from_fork() for newly forked tasks which haven't actually run yet).

Finish the job by changing get_frame_pointer() to return a pointer to
inactive_task_frame's 'bp' field rather than 'bp' itself.  This allows
the unwinder to start one frame higher on the stack, so that it properly
reports __schedule().

Reported-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@codemonkey.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/598e9f7505ed0aba86e8b9590aa528c6c7ae8dcd.1483978430.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
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